Cinema, biopolitics and “cinematic operative model”

by Carlos Natalio

Abstract

Firstly, this article will try to grasp certain dimensions of the biopolitical in cinema. For this we will re-visit some ideas that connect cinema with the ability to “affect” thinking and/or the body. Secondly, what is at stake is to prove that the mutations in the concept of a new modus operandi in bio-technical and market-driven biopolitics not only mirror the undergoing changes in cinema, but will also be decisively affected by it. The task of an “audiovisualcy” as an extension of literacy, in the context of a “mandatory” digital hermeneutics, requires grasping the importance of cinematic procedures. What we aim to show is that cinema gave us a cinematic operative model for producing meaning that, due to its proximity with mechanisms of memory and perception, is vital to the way we will tackle the digital architectural world. It may be the case that after the (long proclaimed) ”death of cinema”, cinema has just begun at a much more complex and wider level.

In 2014, a group of academics, critics, curators and other practitioners all over the world in the area of cinema and the moving image arts created CAMIRA ¹ – Cinema and Moving Image Research Assembly. This community, embodying the potential space of a “collective intelligence” (Lévy 1994) “inhabiting” the digital world, has asked two foundational and interrelated questions in its statutes. The first one is the famous Bazinian interrogation, «What is cinema?» (Bazin 2011), here elevated to a perpetual ontological individuating principle. The second, which complements the former, is Lenin’s question to Chernyshevsky: «What is to be done?» (Camira 2014). This interplay between action and the search for intermittent phases of relative stable identity has been a constant in the short life of moving images. Similarly, when we consider today the task of rethinking biopolitics after Foucault’s heritage and Agamben’s extension, we are always confronted with a collective action.

Accordingly, this article will establish the intersections between cinema and the concept of biopolitics, with the hope that highlighting this proximity will enable a reassessment of the role of cinema (and cinematic procedure) not just in the analysis of the symptoms of a loss of “savoir vivre” (Stiegler 2004: 60) in the contemporary world, but also in the collective work of inventing new forms of living.

Cinema is usually approached to serve as a reflecting surface that allow us to look at, in a fictional or documental manner, the historical manifestations of modern biopolitics,

¹ To have more information about CAMIRA visit the website: http://camira.org/.
that is, for example, the exposition of “bare life” through the images of Holocaust extermination camps. Zooming out from this relation, what is at stake here is to understand how cinema as an «art of moving image destruction» (Usai 2001: 6-7), with an “impermanent structure”, which is the condition of its own existence, is able to have a biopolitical dimension that can link changes in cinema to changes in biopolitics itself.

It was only with L’Image Temps (1985), when Gilles Deleuze opened up the question of time with respect to modern cinema, that we became capable of realising two very important things. Firstly, that it was the moment when cinema started to itself pose the question of time that it was able to “invent” immobility and place itself on the side of life and movement, corresponding to a semi-godlike “frankensteinian” attempt to give life to inanimate matter. This placing took shape in respect to photography, the mournful mechanism that was able to freeze and kill both time and the moment (Barthes 1980). Secondly, the correct sequence of questions, as would be traced by Deleuze: the cited Bazinian question of 1976 would lead to 1991’s question, «what is philosophy?». But in the meantime the link was “pre-theorized” this way:

(...) there is always an hour, noon – midnight, in which it is no longer necessary to ask «what is cinema?». Cinema itself is the new practice of images and signs, of which philosophy must build a theory as a conceptual practice. (Deleuze 2006: 357)

However, it was much earlier that several “primitive” auteurs from film theory fascinated by the technological and optical rhetoric of the film camera, explored the capacity of cinema to produce thought: the “optical unconscious” (Benjamin 2006: 234), the vertovian “ciné-eye” (Hicks 2007), Alexandre Astruc’s “camera-stylo” (2009), and Jean Epstein’s idea of an “automatic subjectivity” (Epstein 1975: 63), are but a few examples.

One of the pioneer auteurs of film studies, the German psychologist Hugo Münsterberg, in his The Photoplay: A Psychological Study (1916), tried to prove the artistic seriousness of this “new” art of moving images, making an analogy between the work of cinema and the human mind – namely between its compositional mechanisms like the flashback, the close up, and so on, and acts of consciousness such as attention, memory or imagination. As Friedrich Kittler explains, Münsterberg was the author of the first «competent theory of film» and vital to the theory of media in the way he «assigns every single camera technique to an unconscious, psychical mechanism» (Kittler 1997: 100). In so doing, we might add, he also gave a precious contribution to the understanding of cinema as a technical simulation of the unconscious, showing spectators their own processes of visual perception. In the 1920s, Béla Balázs highlighted the way cinema, producing images that are taken from the real, would show us how reality would appear to us in mental images. In its «physical redemption of reality», Siegfried Kracauer defended the experience of cinema as competing with philosophy in its specificity of articulation of sensation, perception and thought.

If we started by referring Deleuze’s position, it was because his “post-humanist”
philosophy was responsible for bringing together these earlier approaches centred on
the brain (which had been, in the meantime, a bit forgotten by structuralist, linguistic
and psychoanalyst discourses). For Deleuze, cinema has the capacity to produce
autonomous and automatic moving images, which travel the molecular circuits of our
brain (Deleuze 2000: 366) activating our “spiritual automaton” (Deleuze 2006:202). This
could be done in two different ways, producing two different types of “nooshock”: in
classical cinema, the brain produces an idea out of the causal nexus of the images, an Eis-
ensteinian “intellectual shock” based on the powers of rational and logical thought
(Deleuze 2006: 204-212); in modern cinema, there is a work outside the idea, the
“whole”, a purely “neuro-physiological vibration”, an infinite and indistinct circuit
between image and the brain that will consider indistinctness, ambiguity, and the object
in its pure optical and sonorous logic, confronting us with a gap in our thinking, the “im-
power” of our thought (Deleuze 2006: 212-224), producing then a new “image of
thought”.

This centrality of the relationship between the functioning of the brain and cinema
medium seems to create the possibility of finding a biopolitical dimension within the
seventh art. Michel Foucault’s approach to biopolitics (with the first mention at the end
of History of Sexuality, Vol.1 – The Will to Knowledge, in the chapter «Right of Death and
Power of Life», and its later development in Society Must Be Defended – Lectures at the
Collège de France 1975/1976) and the centrality of a “new technology of power” that
transcends discipline and manages the physical existence of the population and its bod-
ies, will know with cinema and its identification processes a specific concretisation. Fur-
thermore, Deleuze’s two circuits within the brain – broadly, the causal nexus of ideas and
the pure optical and sonorous logic – should allow us to glimpse that, once established,
the biopolitical dimension of cinema, its architecture, should be taken into account from
a “pharmacological perspective”, a vital concept for Bernard Stiegler’s philosophy. This
means we must not exclude either the manipulating or the liberating effect of cinema
that many people highlighted over the past century.

Cinema's efficacy over the body was theorized in many ways. For example, phenomen-
ologist Vivian Sobchack thesis was that cinema could provoke in the human “carnal
thoughts”. This would happen due to the fact that the spectator is captured “without
thinking” by cinema because the world presented is turned to itself, placing the viewer
in an anonymous, unprotected place. We are, she believes, «really, “touched” and
“moved” by the movies» (Sobchack 2004: 59) because cinema makes sense not to our
bodies but because of them. In this manner, the identification processes are less connec-
ted with narrative expectations and more with a common sense of pre-personal materi-
ality of what is there on the screen. The stimulus that a representation of the word gives
us, the desire to do and touch, is reverted to the only body able to be touched – our own.

By contrast, Stanley Cavell (A World Viewed) would state that «Film is a moving image
of skepticism» (1979: 188) in which it is necessary to distance oneself from the world in
order to look at it from an isolated point of view. This sort of architecture of looking at the world may remind us of Bentham’s famous panoptic surveillance building. However, taking into account cinema’s effectiveness in capturing the spectator’s body and flux of consciousness, we can say that Cavell’s position is upturned. If we gather in movie theatres to anonymously accede and “control” the thought of the screen and the world represented in it, the opposite also takes place. The spectator does not only voyeuristically control without being seen but he is also being controlled without knowing it.

The analytical elements in cinema, the shooting, the editing, the postproduction, are generally controlled by the director/producer seeking to turn the discontinuous into a continuous flow, achieving a synthesis that may be absorbed homogenously by the spectator. This “disguise” is working the apparent liberating dimension in the spectators’ heads. Indeed, we could describe cinema with the same sentence with which Michel Foucault ended the first volume of The History of Sexuality: «The irony of this deployment: having us believe that our “liberation” is in the balance» (Foucault 1994: 171). Like the prisoner of Plato’s cave who believes he lives in a free world, the spectators have a hard time acknowledging this capture, this biopolitical effect subsumed under identities and bodies. The French writer George Duhamel put it in a caricatured way in 1930: «the images in motion occupied the place of my thoughts» (Duhamel apud Benjamin 2006: 236) and as a result he could no longer think what he wanted.

In a way, media theory already acknowledges a biopolitical control of media over the body. McLuhan’s theories seem to move between the idea that “media is the message” with its cultural programming influence and, on another note, an anthropocentric dimension. The expression, «our human senses, of which all media are extensions» (McLuhan 1994: 21), points towards a notion of a “technological simulation of conscience”, that inaugurates the post-medial condition of ubiquity and the converging of digital encoding.

With cinema, the “non indifferent nature” (to use Eisenstein’s expression) of its medium and its political and ideological dimension were only explored further in the 70’s, with the work of Jean-Louis Baudry, Christian Metz and Thierry Kuntzel and the concept of “dispositif”. Then, the presentation of the “ideological machine” of Hollywood was, in a certain sense, a materialist complement of concept of “culture industries” crafted by Adorno and Horkheimer.

When, in La Technique et le Temps, tome 3: Le Temps du cinéma et la Question du mal-être, the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler (2001) conjoined the centrality of technics and the phenomenological dimension of “conscience as montage”, placing it within a positive and pharmacological approach to the cultural deciphering of Kant’s transcendental schematism in Adorno’s theory, he was indeed giving us theoretical ground to explain two different dimensions. The first is to phenomenologically justify cinema’s expansion, both as concept and effect, into everyday lives and dreams, as already detected in Jean Baudrillard’s theories. The second is to place cinema within the core of a human, tech-
technical and social interplay, that is, the locus of biopolitics per se.

What we will do now is draw a parallel between Stigler’s re-working of the potential of the cinematic and Giorgio Agamben’s critique and expansion of Foucault’s notion of biopolitics. When in 1994, in *La technique et le temps 1: La faute d’Épiméthée*, Stiegler called attention to the symbology of Epimetheus and the “default” to explain an ontological originary lack of the human, one could not avoid thinking of the ontological vacuum or originary impurity upon which cinema’s ontological status was conceived. Exemplifying this notion we have Christian Metz famous “*signifiant imaginaire*” or Bellour’s notion of “texte untrouvable”. In both concepts there seems to always already be something that perpetually lacks and escapes. In Metz, the spectator is always chasing a double absence, an hallucinatory projection of a referent that is absent in space and that is escaping in time. Similarly, with Bellour, the spreading of film in space like a picture, or its serialization in time like music, makes film particularly unquotable, since written text cannot restore what the projector produced.

If this was already a similarity that could somehow predict a complicity between cinema and technics, in 2001 Stiegler went on to explain the double coincidence between the human and the singularity of cinema’s medium: on the one hand «la coïncidence photophonographique entre passé et réalité» induces in the spectator an effect of the real, a belief that is ingrained in the human by the technique itself; on the other hand, there is a «coincidence entre flux du film et flux da la conscience du spectateur de ce film» (Stiegler 2001: 34). This gives rise, in the movement of the film’s photograms connected by the phonographic flux, to the adoption of the time of the film by the time of the spectator’s conscience. This consciousness, itself a flux (that also works through inserts and montage, i.e., in a cinematic way) is also captured by the flux of the images. This way, cinema is a temporal object in which the consciousness of the spectator enters during perception, and it is while it’s there that it can be solicited and affected. Or, in other words: “outer cinema” (material mechanism) and “inner cinema” (human mechanism) get each other’s attention. Finally, the phenomenological argument taken from the reworking of Husserl’s retentions, especially the fact that the “tertiary retentions” constituted by technical objects can always affect perception and memory, closes the discussion: cinema is placed within the human and it operationalizes a vital key played outside a rigidified, industrialised vision of the medium of film.

If Stiegler will extend his notion of cinema so that he can expand his efficacy both internally (by conceiving an “arche-cinema of consciousness”) and externally (by exploring the political consequences of a standardized “American way of life”, as a continuation of the immanent power of cinema in everyday life), Giorgio Agamben will also operate a similar expansion over Foucault’s concept of biopolitics. Agamben will also start from within and then expand his argument. Agamben will work from within the concept of “homo sacer” and “state of exception”, in order to operate an expansion of biopolitics outside Foucault’s system of knowledge-power linked with the biomedical domain. For
the Italian, “homo sacer” is the paradigmatic and historical figure of a man that due to his crimes is banned from society and can be killed by anybody (Agamben 2007: 90). In it the judicial order revokes all his citizen life (bios, or qualified life) and reduces him to bare life (zoe) in a double operation of inclusion/exclusion (Agamben 2007: 98).

From this historical example, Agamben will expand (as Stiegler does in his own argument), drawing from Aristotle, that the power of law to separate citizens from their bodies is something that has constituted sovereignty from the beginning. This structure of excepption, of inclusion and exclusion of bare life, has always constituted states of exception (Agamben 2007: 15). However, it is the generalized institution of the states of exception as the rule, eliminating every space between life and politics that makes it harder for humanity to act against the State. Therefore what is at stake is not so much a biopower within the configurations of power but a generalized institution of the exception as the norm by these same powers.

Regarding Agamben’s expansion one could think of another parallel with respect to the biopolitical dimension of cinema: the importance of separation. Cinema also used to constitute itself around this notion of separation between the real world and the segregated spaces (movie theatres), where one would turn up its head, in a ceremonious way, and look at the screen. Cinema used to put its spectators in a dark room, isolated, excluded, watching the world of others. This mechanism seems to point to a locus of exception in regard to the political, allowing spectators to be ex-cluded from the world (both the one happening outside and the one reenacted on the screen). If we take on the intellectual exercise of perceiving this separation of the spectator as something similar to the separation of the “homo sacer” that Agamben pointed out, and that movie theatres might be this “camp” where ex-ception takes place, we can understand two things:

- The first is that this way of affecting the spectator as if everything was directed not for him but for a proper and independent world where everything is possible, might conceive the biopolitical actuation of cinema more effectively. With this exception regarding the body of the spectator, cinema gains an inclusive dimension of the politization of zoe.
- The second is the overcoming of movie theatres as places for the separation to take place (where the “suspension of rights” is substituted by fiction’s “suspension of disbelief” here attributed to everyday life). As it happened with Agamben’s argument, this “camp” was also expanded and extracted from specific places and turned into a norm: cinema is no longer the place of cinema. We are always in it, even if we are not physically there.

If the movie theater was at first a place of separation, constituting a “state of exception” from the world, now the camp has “opened”. The new rule is then cinema taken as the “free” invader of the public contemporary imaginary, and here images lose their ca-
capacity of symbolization of the real. In this process, the cinematographization of everyday life - where screens lose their screen-effect and the one who looks at loses the quality of spectator in an absorbing indeterminacy - is a more accomplished project of the biopolitical in cinema. This process can annul the alterity that the distance towards the other in the screen presupposed, but can also destroy the symbolic in the screen, creating a zone of indistinction between the body of the citizen and the body of the spectator. In this thin line between the real and the symbolic, cinema erased the traces of its perception, putting its invisible presence at a higher level and perfecting into greater efficacy its biopolitical dimension.

Implicitly addressing the already mentioned “American way of life”, Jean Baudrillard stated in an interview in 1984, called “Is an Image Not Fundamentally Immoral?”:

Cinema is the mode of expression one finds in the street, everywhere; life itself is cinematographic and, what’s more, that is what makes it possible to bear it; This dimension is part and parcel of collective survival. (Baudrillard 1993: 71)

If, from an ideological point of view, this “world-turned-cinema” state of things belongs to a continuation of a process of synchronization of consciousnesses, the industrialization of memory and what Stiegler calls “le mal être” of contemporary society, at later stages of his theory, Baudrillard also sees in this a dimension of “survival”. It was clear for him that cinema, as part of the “society of spectacle”, was “biopolitically responsible” for the erasure of the real as model. Cinema helped to build the “hyperreal”, inverting the mimetic relationship between image and the real and becoming the model by which we would measure reality (Baudrillard 1988: 55-6). While broadly there is a pessimism around the interpretation of Baudrillard’s theories – where technical perfection and the end of history show the end of viable alternatives – hope does not seem impossible. In an article entitled with the name of the French theorist, Catherine Constable defends Baudrillard on the grounds that he sees this “cinematographization of everyday life” as a «productive interplay between the image and the real» (Constable 2009: 220). The shift in perspective on the world operated by the filmic image and its powers to transform our perception might allow us to place post-modernism not as a doomed ending where speeding fragmentation is taking more and more a pure machine-like rhythm incompatible with anamnesis, but as looking for a task of imminent renewal.

From our perspective, in order to think this renewal one must not place too much hope on salvific perspectives on cinema such as Kracauer’s cinema’s redemptive qualities of reality, or Agamben’s idea that cinema has the capacity to help us recover from the «disaster of the gesture» (Agamben 1993: 136). In the first, the German theorist believed that cinema’s capacity to penetrate in the physical reality could help us recover from the «disaster of the gesture» (Agamben 1993: 136). In the first, the German theorist believed that cinema’s capacity to penetrate in the physical reality could help us recover from the «disaster of the gesture» (Agamben 1993: 136). In the first, the German theorist believed that cinema’s capacity to penetrate in the physical reality could help us recover from the «disaster of the gesture» (Agamben 1993: 136). In the first, the German theorist believed that cinema’s capacity to penetrate in the physical reality could help us recover from the «disaster of the gesture» (Agamben 1993: 136). In the first, the German theorist believed that cinema’s capacity to penetrate in the physical reality could help us recover from the «disaster of the gesture» (Agamben 1993: 136). In the first, the German theorist believed that cinema’s capacity to penetrate in the physical reality could help us recover from the «disaster of the gesture» (Agamben 1993: 136). In the first, the German theorist believed that cinema’s capacity to penetrate in the physical reality could help us recover from the «disaster of the gesture» (Agamben 1993: 136).
has of retrieving the lost gestures of humanity, by dismembering things in a philosophic-
al unfolding of reality. This way, cinema has an ethical mission: to recuperate human ges-
tures and aggregate them to the contemporary imaginary in its capacity of self-signifi-
cance. Cinema is perverting the traditional productive function, instead producing noth-
ing but itself, being a “means without end”. Both these theories still consider cinema as
something that may be detached from everyday life, from zoe. One must look instead for
what is at stake at the mutation of the concept of biopolitics in itself. This happens not
only because we live in a time in which a shift is taking place from the literary to the di-
gital audiovisual paradigm, but also because the mechanisms of living, especially in what
concerns perception and memory, are inherently cinematographic. Therefore, a change
in biopolitical effects will transductively mean changes in cinema’s operative perform-
ances.

The first of these changes was produced at the end of modern cinema. As the capital-
ist system increased its mechanisms of smoother logic of control and circulation of com-
modities, cinema language entered “the age of access” and started a game of manipula-
tion of quotations, sound and meta-signifiers. With this mechanism being taken for real-
ity, it was not easy to see an outside from which to look at, and the very antecedents of a
TINA (there is no alternative) landscape were being forged.

This was accompanied by the fragmentation of the medium of cinema (this conceived
in terms of a main “narrative, representative, industrial” model: one screen, one project-
or, one movie theatre) and the explosion of the ideological closures that we still, at cost,
call films. Cinema ran across different “dispositifs” and contexts and once more the
Bazinian question «what is cinema?» proved to be not an interrogation that had one per-
fect and closed answer but an ontologically foundational and ever present principle. The
shift from «mise-en-scène to dispositif», to use an expression of Adrian Martin (2012), or
Bellour’s «la querelle des dispositifs» (2012), both entail, as happened later with the full
digital architecture of the present world, a liberating promise. One can say that the
movement of images of traditional cinema was too rigid and needed to be put in a larger
scale of circulation. One can also say that the portability of digital cinema” and the new
“expanded cinema” (considered even further than the concept crafted in the seventies by
Gene Youngblood), in the splendour of a democratizing access to means of production
liberates art from its old gatekeeper’s tight control. This liberation comes as a continu-
ous process of fragmentation that started with the segmentation that characterised the
passage from of aural cultures into discrete elements of writing. Afterwards, it suffered
another increment of fragmentation with the modernist shocks of factory “assembly
lines” then turned into “editing timelines” in cinema. Cinema after “industrial cinema” is,
in this sense, an increase in its fragmentation and “shocking” potential.

The capture, however, of these artistic fragmentations by a bio-economy logic of bi-
opolitical control that renders calculable the potential of psychopower and, with it, the
dimensions of human libidinal and cognitive capacities, disguises these fractures and
democratic elements as a simulacrum of heterogeneity. We can use an analogy here. Just as classical cinema is built upon a formula to disguise its technics and render the whole homogenous, biopolitical control attempts the inverse: to disguise a 24/7 governmental and homogeneous flux of massified stimulations into an appearance of shocks, which by their multiplying effect, give us the illusion of the production of difference.

It is precisely here that cinema comes to terms with its potential in terms of rethinking ways of living that challenge the new state of bio-technical politics. Cinema should be taken here as a specific operative model that is now inserted into reality both as a material and an immaterial technic, resonating its logic in a context of perceptual, productive ecology and invention of being.

The decadence of industrial, hegemonic “traditional cinema”, the “cinema-form” as André Parente (2007: 4) calls it, with its “aesthetics of transparence”, the coming of the digital, and the move from “the dispositif of cinema to the cinema of dispositif” (Parente 2007) only served to re-present the question of immateriality and highlight a characteristic of cinema that was present since the beginning: its “impure nature”. This shows how cinema lives off constant individuation with other technical “dispositifs”. Since the beginning, its openness and its heterogeneity of elements has been a foundational characteristic. The movie screen would function as a mirror for the gathering of other arts (literature, painting, theatre, photography) that would undergo some sort of transposition and distorted reflection. The first experimentations pré-Lumière, the experimental cinema, the “expanded cinema”, Bellour’s “entre-images” to explore the coming of video, the interactive digital cinema, all have in common that they show cinema’s openness and its vitality outside “cinema-form” and point out each new crystallization under a different formation or episteme.

While cinema is shattered into multiple forms, the discourse that abandons media specificity by relying on the inexistence of a “persistent identity” for that art replaces the old discourse about the death of cinema. That’s the case with Francesco Casetti, for example, in his 2012 article entitled «The Relocation of Cinema». In it he defends the idea that cinema as a medium is no longer tied to a specific dispositif, but rather to a memory of an experience and a cultural idea that he describes as follows:

A relationship with images in movement, mechanically reproduced and projected onto a screen; a sensory intensity, tied most closely with the visual; a constriction of distance with the world; the opening up of a fantastical universe which is just as concrete as the real one; and finally, the sense of collective participation. These are the characteristics that allow other situations to appear or to be understood as cinematographic. However, these traits do not come to light only in theory – we extract them from our habits. (Casetti 2012)

In a manner that differs from this “experience criteria”, D. N. Rodowick engages with Stanley Cavell’s argument that the media of cinema may be immanent to the creative act,
and the work not defined \textit{a priori} by its materiality (2007: 45). Today, while it is clear that cinema is not attached to a certain form or materiality, we still acknowledge the immaterial survival of a “cinematic ghost” in digital media. This presence of the cinematic in the post-cinematic is fuzzy. Cinema has lost its material, economic and cultural importance but remains an «ubiquitous omnipresence», a «specific form of affective address, temporal structure and narrative organisation [that] has become the implicit norm of moving image culture» (Hagener 2014). D. N. Rodowick is more cautious when he acknowledges that this survival draws upon a cinematic metaphor, but it remains unclear in what way this relationship takes place, or what, specifically, survives. Is it a matter of a certain “cinema effect” (Cubbit 2004) that remains present? Or might it be that a certain post-cinematic “affect” (Shaviro 2010) enables us to encounter it?

The effects or affects are certainly modelled by a new media environment that is instrumental to a new biopolitical landscape in which financialization, globalization, micro-surveillance and post-fordist production help to regulate the \textit{zoe} and dissolve conscious moral existence. This context is either the heir of a «cinematic mode of production» that brought “revolution to the eye” (Beller 2006) and is bringing forward the immaterial and specular dimension of capital in the domain of an ever increasing efficient attention economy; or it is simply a context that accommodates changes as animated by the teleological and idealist Bazinian principle of the “myth of total cinema” (Bazin 2011: 19) and essential realism.

Whether the cinematic procedure is a pre-stage of total cinema or simply a model of immaterial capitalist circulation, its ghostly presence in the post-cinematic digital world has allowed us to identify the problem. And this is not connected to narrative or the material conditions of production/projection of moving images. It is instead related to a certain operation that we learnt to master. Cinema was a technical achievement by which we learnt how to produce meaning by juxtaposing, in a temporal flux, images and sounds. Therefore I tend to consider cinema’s “ghost” in the post-cinematic world as the presence of a specific procedure. This takes the form of a cinematic operative model of composition that works through transductive operations of the manipulation and creation of meanings via the iterative and progressive juxtaposition of images and sounds in a continuous temporal flux.

That said, then, the invention of film might be no more than, in Gilbert Simondon’s terms, a stage of “technical concretization” of a general theory for the articulation of sound and image, a \textit{modus operandi} that was (and still is) especially relevant within a world of fluidity and ever changing conceptual frontiers. Its ever changing materiality, in its successive moments of development, doesn’t let the metaphysical persistence of cinema go away. In other words, the technical concretization of cinema doesn’t abolish the operative procedure that forms the title of this article.

From our point of view it is only by considering the cinematic operative model that we can grasp the similarities between phenomenological arguments (that lead us to an
interior and immaterial dimension of “spiritual”, perceptive inner cinema) and this material historical form that is now more than 100 years old. We can say that this model, which works fundamentally through states of aggregation and editing, was the specific mechanism that materialised humankind’s perceptive mechanism and that was concretised in rudimentary form by film. The decadence of its traditional dispositif, together with technical, historical and economic factors, meant that the cinematic operative model was claiming to work in a more expanded way than the one provided by the “rigid” initial “dispositif”. This was seen as a rigidified model that needed to be “opened” onto a larger operation of transduction between other forms, materials and rhythms.

This operation can also permit us to see, due to its “openness” and “impurity”, the fragmentation of cinema into multiple windows, digital forms of manipulation and archive, as a new stage of meta-stability, a new phase of cinematic individuation, which is progressively aggregating all forms and possibilities. We are already in Shaviro’s “post-cinematic sensibility” but with an important legacy given to us by film: the cinematic operative model.

The cinematic operative model allows us to operate processes of signification within a “plastic fabric” that supports and aggregates everything, in a dynamism produced by circulation. In the moment that we channel our energy towards the light, the spectacle (that we manipulate, in an infinite network, elements of history and elements of the archive), this model taken as a “materialization” of how “transductive form” evolves, helps to deal with this moment of hyper individuation of the culture of images. It is in this operation of reunion of iterative meanings that a certain cinematic form (in the sense that a form is a temporary stop) still survives. In a way, we can state that the open and transductive form of cinema, whose modus operandi was this model, had been searching since the beginning for new matter for which to make a body with. In other words, the accomplishment of cinematic movement claimed the “corporeal” death of its traditional medium. This death meant two things: the first is that cinematic individuation was entering into a new phase of development; the second is that the cinematic operative model that survived this material obsolescence is a theoretical reference for studying the passage of successive stages [phases] in individuating processes, and for this reason should be articulated with digitalization within the same framework of thinking.

The reason we wanted to trace this model is because, within a framework of biopolitical mutation, which calls for new efforts of digital hermeneutics and new collective actions of resistance and invention, cinematic procedures lie at the heart of these concerns.

Part of these new hermeneutical processes is consubstantiated by the move from literacy to «audiovisualcy» and with it a change in the capacity of everyone to master cinematic processes. Catherine Grant coined the term «audiovisualcy» in 2011 to name a project about the creation of a Vimeo forum for video essays about films and moving image texts, film and moving image studies, and film theory. Although with specific contextual meaning, the term may apply for this media shift we are portraying here. Softening
Bellour's anguished idea about not finding the text of cinema and fulfilling Godard’s dream of having films available for quotation as one does already with books, today’s intensification of cinematic uses provides an increment of critical gestures towards the moving image culture.

This expansion of the cinematic is very clear in the domain of audiovisual essays. For the first time in history people are starting to produce critical discourses (whether about other films or any other subjects) using images and sounds. The growing of areas of knowledge, such as the case of “videographic film studies”, attests to this reality. In these objects, the progressive erasure of cinematic images’ auras (and with it a growing proximity between these images and their users) corresponds to an enlargement of the capacity of people to produce critical gestures utilizing audiovisual “fabric”.

When Jean Luc Godard advanced this process by keeping history plural in his account of the century of cinema – *Histoires du Cinema* instead of “Histoire du Cinema”– he was highlighting that the producers and consumers of the cinematic were no longer on opposite sides. Hence, a new history with multiple individuals would come to oppose a dominant narrative in which clear biopolitical controlling instances at play.

These critical gestures, being the psychic, collective and technical interdependence always at play, have an interior dimension. Using the cinematic for critical purposes as a material operation is also using this same cinematic as an immaterial, noetic operation. The transition from critical gesture to critical thought is operated via the cinematic. Therefore, the cinematic operative model highlights the necessity of internalizing these processes as models for producing knowledge not as fixed essence, but as relation, flux and transduction. The nature of this cinematic operative model, that has the task of composing the heterogeneous, was historically and economically closed in the ideological models of film editing, but now operates according to another logic. Within a late postmodern unresolved matter of circulation, the model articulates images and sounds in a network’s architecture and, with technical interplay, enters into a context of “anthropo (mise en) scène” vital for the definition of individuation processes in the human. That is to say, private and collective processes of *mise-en-scène*.

Cinematic procedures lie for this reason at the core of a new “illuminist” task of a healthy editing of the noetic, in identifying meaningful processes in the ecological tasks of selection and articulation of perception, memory and activity in everyday life. What lies ahead is the use of these procedures to produce difference, quality and aesthetic value in the domain of mathematical, repetitive and quantitative processes of “invisible” biopolitical homogenization.
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