

Undoing the Present, Crystallising the Future: Psychedelic Schizoanalysis

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Abstract

In this article, I examine the use of psychedelics as a way of fulfilling the tasks of schizoanalysis. Specifically, I will argue that we can view psychedelics as counteractualising agents of ontogenesis and fabulation, observing that, even beyond the long-standing countercultural and therapeutic discourses supporting this view, there is now growing evidence from contemporary neuroscience that they can function as powerful deterritorialising tools right down to the neurobiological level. My interest in discussing psychedelics use in the context of Deleuze and Guattari is neither simply to observe interesting parallels nor to perpetuate the popular misunderstanding of the schizoanalytic project as the liberation of some kind of inchoate universal energy; instead, I would like to propose that psychedelics could aid us – individually and collectively (although, as we will be reminded below, these are already the same thing) – in dismantling the fascisms that surround us and the fascisms that inhabit us by allowing us to create new machinic arrangements of desire or, in Simondon's terms, to facilitate novel transductive couplings that allow for new individuations. Before turning to drugs, bodies and the myriad becomings that inhabit them and which they augur, I reiterate the core principles, theses and tasks of schizoanalysis.

Introduction: the delirious

The question of subjectivity is now returning as a leitmotiv. It is not a natural given any more than air or water. How do we produce it, capture it, enrich it, and permanently reinvent it in a way that renders it compatible with Universes of mutant value? How do we work for its liberation, that is, for its resingularisation?

Félix Guattari (1995: 135)

What is terrifying is our lack of collective imagination in a world that has reached such a boiling point, our myopia before all the 'molecular revolutions' which keep pulling the

rug out from under us, at an accelerated pace.

Félix Guattari (2009: 307)

Half a century after its original publication, thumbing through *Anti-Oedipus* produces an unusual tension: on the one hand, it reads like a romantic paean to the post-68 moment; on the other, the task it sets for us – the schizoanalytic task of locating and eradicating both the molar and the molecular forms of fascism – is perhaps even more apposite now than it was in the heady days of 1972. If, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, “every delirium is first of all the investment of a field that is social, economic, political, cultural, racial and racist, pedagogical, and religious” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 274), then it is surely the case that we live in a particularly delirious moment. With the growing popularity of far-right sentiment around the globe, reflected in the emergence of populist leaders, reactionary movements and the normalisation of the most noxious forms of online discourse, all of it unfolding within the context of spiralling digital complexity, ecological collapse, inter-imperial rivalry and a seemingly omnipresent global economic crisis, we can clearly see the ways in which “everything turns fascist or envelops itself in fascism, the way in which it falls back into archaisms” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 277), and how the “[s]ocial modes of organization that prevail today on earth are not holding up, literally and figuratively” (Guattari 2009: 307). As Guattari observes, at the current juncture, “[h]istory is gripped by crazy parameters: demography, energy, the technological-scientific explosion, pollution, the arms race [...] The earth is deterritorializing itself at top speed” (ibid.). In response to this, a renewed critical focus on social formations and the complex relations between the individual and collective subjectivation processes that emerge from and sustain them is a necessary pretext for any meaningful project of resistance and refiguration or, put otherwise, of “individual and collective reappropriation of the production of subjectivity” (Guattari 1995: 133). Crucially, this project cannot take the form of a mere escape but needs to cause more escapes as it unfolds (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 315) – it needs to make what it is escaping escape through the careful machining of new, experimental arrangements of collective desire. In undertaking this task, Guattari encourages us to distinguish between subjugated groups and subject groups. He observes in this regard how a “subject group endeavours to control its own behaviour” and is thus able to “produce its own tools of elucidation” or collective arrangements¹ of enunciation to become “open to a world beyond its own immediate interests”, whereas subjugated groups tend to express themselves in hierarchical structures and cultivate reactive relations to otherness. To the extent, however, that desire *is* liberated in subject groups

¹ While the usual English translation of Deleuze and Guattari’s often-used term ‘agencement’ is ‘assemblage’, I have opted for the lesser-used translation ‘arrangement’. Neither properly connote the enactive sense of ‘agency-ing’, but ‘assemblage’ carries with it the weight of serious misreadings within new materialist and object-oriented frameworks (see Buchanan 2021 for a corrective to these). Regardless, the active, participatory sense of the original French term should be recalled throughout.

and the participants can form a heterogeneous – and heterogenetic – collection of singularities with transversal relations, the group can become highly adaptive and creative, locating and eradicating internal micro-fascisms and putting in place a potentially revolutionary processual creativity.

What, however, beyond the proliferation of intuitively appealing neologisms and turns of phrase that mark out a particular Deleuzoguattarian identity, does it mean to ‘liberate our desire in subject groups in order to create a processual heterogenesis against micro-fascism’? If we don’t want the language of ‘desiring-machines’, ‘Bodies without Organs’ and ‘deterritorialisation’ to become just so many *margarine words*², perhaps we need to consider what an actual schizoanalytic practice – one we could enact in the real world against real forms of fascism – would look like. While the idea of schizoanalysis has been fruitfully applied in fields like cultural studies, are there any contemporary *practices* that we could regard as ‘schizoanalytic’? This may seem counterintuitive given that Deleuze and Guattari are explicit about the fact that “[n]o political program will be elaborated within the framework of schizoanalysis” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 380) and that the schiz is “prepared by a subterranean labor of causes, aims, and interests working together” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 378). We are thus unlikely to locate a political practice that calls itself schizoanalytic and, as Ian Buchanan has observed, whatever semblance of a program we could locate in Deleuze and Guattari’s oeuvres is fragmentary and tentative (Buchanan 2020: 5-6). There is not – nor could there ever be – a manual of schizoanalysis. Nor are the architects of desire interested in proposing any kind of utopianism; as Guattari observes, “[u]topia, today, is to believe that current societies will be able to continue along on their merry little way without major upheavals...The true Utopians are conservatives of all shapes and sizes who would like for this ‘to hold up all the same,’ to return to yesterday and the day before yesterday” (Guattari 2009: 307). That said, if we consider what *Anti-Oedipus* describes as the negative and positive tasks of the schizoanalytic project, we can recognise the immanent process-goal of the machining of desire as an anti-fascist practice in several surprising places. In this article, I turn towards one of the more surprising of these places in order to examine the use of psychedelics as a form of schizoanalysis aimed at combatting micro-fascism. Specifically, I will argue that we can view psychedelics as counteractualising agents of ontogenesis and fabulation, observing that, even beyond the long-standing countercultural and therapeutic discourses supporting this view, there is now growing evidence from contemporary neuroscience that they can function as

² “The way activists talk at their meetings is primarily in margarine-words. These may be slogans, phrases whose function is to circulate, not to mean; or they may be certain oily words that slip from mouth to ear, person to machine, situation to scene. One way to recognize margarine-words is repetition: they are used a lot, functioning as code words or passwords, their appropriateness assumed, never shown. Ultimately, this is because their circulation is also the usually unquestioned circulation of moral beliefs; but in any given iteration, the repetition may be well-nigh meaningless, just a little index, gentle reminder of the shared morals rather than harsh mnemotechnic. It is never really clear which is primary, which gives form to which: the morality at work, or the compulsion to repeat in its collusion with the most gregarious drives” (Acosta 2014: 138).

powerful deterritorialising tools right down to the neurobiological level. My interest in discussing psychedelics use in the context of Deleuze and Guattari is neither simply to observe interesting parallels nor to perpetuate the stereotypical popular misunderstanding of the schizoanalytic project as the liberation of some kind of inchoate universal energy³; instead, in line with the practical injunction mentioned above, I would like to propose that they could aid us – individually and collectively (although, as we will be reminded below, these are already the same thing) – in dismantling the fascisms that surround us and the fascisms that inhabit us by allowing us to create new machinic arrangements of desire or, in Simondon's terms, to facilitate novel transductive couplings that allow for new individuations (Simondon 2020: 13-16; 175-180). Before turning to drugs, bodies and the myriad becomings that inhabit them and which they augur, however, it is worth reminding ourselves of the core principles, theses and tasks of schizoanalysis.

Prolegomena to any future schizoanalysis

Desire is an exile, desire is a desert that traverses the body without organs and makes us pass from one of its faces to the other. Never an individual exile, never a personal desert, but a collective exile and a collective desert.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1977: 377)

In this brief diagrammatic reminder of schizoanalysis, I will rely primarily on *Anti-Oedipus*, but I will also gesture towards Guattari's later solo writings as they reflect a sustained development and continual transformation of the fluid conceptual architecture of the ideas most commonly associated with the first volume of the *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* project. In that book, Deleuze and Guattari scatter various 'theses' and 'tasks' of schizoanalysis across the last chapter. Drawing these together will provide a provisional framework through which to encounter psychedelics. Foucault of course attempted something like this in the famous introduction to *Anti-Oedipus*, but his polemical take is, when presented in isolation (and no doubt despite his intentions), prone to the above-mentioned popular misreading of the 'liberation of desire', so let us instead turn to the body of the text itself. Deleuze and Guattari begin the final chapter by

³ "I will take the liberty of questioning all references to undifferentiation, all references to spontaneist mythologies: every time we succeed in assembling devices of expression that escape from the despotism of the dominant system of significances, and that escape from the articulation of all the dominant syntaxizations, we are actually dealing with highly elaborate machinisms" (Guattari and Rolnik 2007: 353).

presenting the negative task – although we should bear in mind that “[t]he negative or destructive task of schizoanalysis is in no way separable from its positive tasks – all these tasks are necessarily undertaken at the same time” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 322) – which is “ultimately that of discovering for every case the nature of the libidinal investments of the social field, their possible internal conflicts, their relationships with the preconscious investments of the same field. their possible conflicts with these-in short, the entire interplay of the desiring-machines and the repression of desire” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 381-2). In other words, schizoanalysis involves a careful analysis of how unconscious desire is machined in each instance as well as how this relates to the preconscious interests that don’t necessarily align with unconscious desire. This machining – because remember, “desire is a machine, a synthesis of machines, a machinic arrangement – desiring-machines” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 296) – is in fact what we could describe, in quasi-Marxist language, as part of the ‘infrastructure’: “[t]he most general principle of schizoanalysis is that desire is always constitutive of a social field” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 348). Desire invests production as social production and desire itself is likewise a form of desiring-production – there is a kind of reciprocal presupposition between desire and production that forms the core of the analytic component of schizoanalysis. When examining a particular social field, “schizoanalysis only asks what place it reserves for desiring-production; what generative role desire enjoys therein; in what forms the conciliation between the regime of desiring-production and the regime of social production is brought about, since in any case it is the same production” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 380). While “all production is at once desiring-production and social production” (296), it is analysed in two distinct yet overlapping ways: first as it affects the preconscious “molar aggregates of social production” and second as it is expressed in the unconscious “molecular multiplicities of desiring production” (380), both of which are collective, machinic regimes that differ merely in their degrees of stratification or, as Deleuze and Guattari put it in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the kinds of lines they form (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 208-31). In the interweaving, resonance and divergence of these lines – the molar lines of identitarian axioms, class belongings and all the manifest content of the social order, as well as the molecular lines limning the hidden content of libidinal investments that belong to a different, often contrary distribution of multiplicities – schizoanalysis then seeks to locate points of rupture – lines of flight and leakage as well as tendencies towards fascisms on all scales. This is distilled in the four theses outlined in the final chapter of *Anti-Oedipus*. The first of these is, as we have already made clear, that “every investment is social, and in any case bears upon a sociohistorical field” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 342). The second is that when examining how desire is machined within a particular social arrangement, we need to “distinguish the unconscious libidinal investment of group or desire, and the preconscious investment of class or interest” (343). As Deleuze and Guattari observe, preconscious investment reflects “large social goals, and concerns the organism and the collective organs, including the arranged vacuoles of lack”

(344), i.e., what we could otherwise refer to as the molar and the manifest. Notably, and similarly to the distinction Deleuze makes in *Difference and Repetition* between the actual and the intensive, it is here, among the fully-established terms and properties – or classes – that comprise the concrete, structured social reality that we can locate lack and exclusive disjunction, things that are missing when we turn to the pure positivity of the subterranean partial⁴ flows. It is by examining the *selection* of these flows, Deleuze and Guattari tell us, that we can understand preconscious interests. The third thesis of schizoanalysis reiterates the critique of psychoanalysis that takes place throughout the book by underscoring “the primacy of the libidinal investments of the social field over the familial investment” (356); simply put, it is the former that is expressed in the latter. The fourth and perhaps most important thesis distinguishes “between two poles of social libidinal investment: the paranoiac, reactionary, and fascisizing pole, and the schizoid revolutionary pole” (366). These two poles of *unconscious* desire can be defined by two different relationships to power and molarity. In the case of the molar, desire is invested in the ‘large aggregates’ or dominant social formations (think parties, militant groups, religions, ideologies) that “crush singularities, select them, and regularize those that they retain in codes or axiomatics” (ibid.) or, in other words, territorialise and integrate the flows of desire, recuperating them into the ongoing functioning of current arrangements of power. This mode of investment produces and maintains ‘subjugated groups’, themselves a microcosm of the aggregates they align with. The schizoid revolutionary pole, on the other hand, invests desire in a manner that subordinates dominant power relations and results in a resingularisation – a deterritorialisation and dis-integration that produces lines of escape or overflow that dominant social formations are not able to contain, as well as subject groups with a positive relation to transversal becomings. Of course, as Deleuze and Guattari love to remind us, things are never quite as simple as these binaries – any actual analysis of the investments in a social field will uncover a complex arrangement of flows, some of them preconscious and some unconscious, some of them paranoiac and some of them schizoid. It is always a question of the functioning of this arrangement – this *agency-ing* – and of each of the gradients of distribution that fuel or disrupt it.

With the four theses in mind, how can we better elaborate the positive task of schizoanalysis? If the negative task is the diagramming of the flows of interest and desire, the positive task is that of liberating the primary productive forces of desire so that they can be arranged differently, something that “goes by way of destruction – a whole scouring of the unconscious, a complete curettage” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 311). This curettage is the construction of the Body without Organs “that haunts all forms of socius” (281) and

⁴ As the English translators of *Anti-Oedipus* make clear in a note, Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘partial’, when referring to the flows of desire, in the sense of ‘partial to’, i.e., preferential towards, as opposed to, for instance, Klein’s notion of part(ial) objects as incomplete components of a lost unity. This should be borne in mind when we turn to dynamic systems theory and attractor topologies later.

aims to produce a ‘degree zero’ of intensity or a ‘smoothing’ of space through a counteractualisation that can allow for new individuations, “thereby causing the desiring-machines to start up again” (339). If the way desire is currently machined is through the lack-ist⁵ faciality machines of psychoanalysis, capitalism, the State and so forth, then this entails that we “[d]estroy Oedipus, the illusion of the ego, the puppet of the superego, guilt, the law, castration”, and this is by no means “a matter of pious destructions, such as those performed by psychoanalysis under the benevolent neutral eye of the analyst” because these are “Hegel-style destructions, ways of conserving” (311); as is well known, Deleuze and Guattari are profoundly critical of these ‘ways of conserving’. In this regard, as Guattari succinctly argues in *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, “the field of schizoanalysis far exceeds that which psychoanalysts consider their own, that is: 1) an individual oral performance, generally centred on a certain familialist habitus of subjectivity, in the context of developed industrial societies; 2) affective manifestations circumscribed in the etiolated space of the cure” (Guattari 2013: 51). Indeed, there is no representation or interpretation here – the unconscious is nonfigurative and nonsymbolic. Instead, “[t]he schizoanalyst is a mechanic, and schizoanalysis is solely functional” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 322). Like any mechanic or ‘micromechanic’ (339), the schizoanalyst must proceed with great care and patience in following the machinic indices of the populations and groups, the vibrations, flows, schizzes and knots that operate below the level of unified identity, in order to bring about the production of a viable Body without Organs – to botch it, as we know, could be fatal (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 161). Perhaps, however, the schizoanalyst is less a mechanic than a practitioner of *kintsugi*, because “everyone is a little group (*un groupuscule*) and must live as such – or rather, like the Zen tea box broken in a hundred places, whose every crack is repaired with cement made of gold” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 362). Taking apart our egos and presuppositions in order to liberate the prepersonal singularities contained within us and then putting ourselves back together – “assembling the desiring-machines that countersect everyone and group everyone with others” (ibid.) – tentative lines of identity marked by golden threads that glimmer with pre-individual charge. What flows through your veins? What are your desiring-machines?⁶ How do they work? How could they work? *You work by breaking down.*

Psychedelic ontogenesis

⁵ Lack, from Freud to Lacan, is, for Deleuze and Guattari, “[a]n idea originating in bad conscience, and not in the unconscious” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 295).

⁶ “[T]he real question of schizoanalysis: What drives your own desiring-machines? What is their functioning? What are the syntheses into which they enter and operate? What use do you make of them, in all the transitions that extend from the molecular to the molar and inversely, and that constitute the cycle whereby the unconscious, remaining a subject, produces and reproduces itself?” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 291)

I have crossed a threshold of consistency. Before the hold of this block of sensation, this nucleus of partial subjectivation, everything was dull, beyond it, I am no longer as I was before, I am swept away by a becoming other, carried beyond my familiar existential Territories.

Félix Guattari (1995: 93)

Such a voyage does not necessarily imply great movements in extension; it becomes immobile, in a room and on a body without organs-an intensive voyage that undoes all the lands for the benefit of the one it is creating.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1977: 319)

In the previous section I recapitulated the core features of the schizoanalytic project in such a way as to lay the groundwork for the discussion we now turn to: psychedelics. Given the foregoing, there is – especially for those who have some experience with the effects of psychedelic compounds – perhaps already a larval sense of how a ‘curettage of the unconscious’ and a ‘liberation of pre-individual singularities’, a micromechanics of subjectivation, are useful ways to conceive of how psychedelics affect us and the transformative possibilities opened up by their judicious use (see Miller 2017; Pollan 2018; Scott; Carhart-Harris 2019 and Read 2021 for some representative overviews). Indeed, while neither Deleuze nor Guattari ever explicitly connect the schizoanalytic project to the ingestion of psychedelics beyond a handful of allusions to Castaneda (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 161-2) and LSD (Deleuze 1990: 56)⁷, their project provides a remarkably insightful framework (or ‘metamodel’) with which to engage the topic, especially when we consider how central ideas like ego-dissolution, enhanced aesthetic experience and an awareness of conditioned ways of experiencing self and world, along with the possibilities for profound moments of catharsis and transformation, are within the psychedelic literature. Early accounts of the ingestion of LSD, mescaline, psilocybin and other so-called ‘classic psychedelics’ are rich with descriptions of how those under

⁷ Interestingly, when drugs are mentioned, it’s often Deleuze who seems more enthusiastic than Guattari. Alluding to the discussion of delirium in *Anti-Oedipus*, for instance, Deleuze, in his ‘Letter to a harsh critic’, has the following to say: [d]rugs can produce delire, so why can't I get into a delire about drugs? Why does your particular version of ‘reality’ have to come into it? You're a pretty unimaginative realist” (Deleuze 1995: 12). Guattari, on the other hand, seems far more cautious: “It’s true that LSD—or drugs in general—can develop perceptual processes, enriching semiotic processes, when they are assembled with a personality such as Henri Michaux. Unfortunately, the Henri Michaux assemblages are not very common, and we can easily find phenomena of implosion, neutralization, impotentialization, or quite simply phenomena of black holes” (Guattari and Rolnik: 405).

their influence were able to see the world anew (Huxley 1963) or gain potentially therapeutically beneficial insight into deep-seated harmful patterns of thought and behaviour (e.g., Lilly 1973; Grof 2008). While such early accounts usually either deferred speculation into how exactly psychedelics achieved these profound effects or proffered explanations that frequently lapsed into the worst metaphysical and pseudo-scientific excesses⁸, including a penchant for crudely caricaturing various forms of Eastern mysticism and indigenous practices, the new, more scientifically rigorous wave of interest in these compounds that has unfolded over the past two decades has employed cutting-edge neuroscientific and psychotherapeutic technologies to develop a set of causal explanations that have the potential to explain not just the neurobiological basis of the psychedelic experience but many of its most salient emergent subjective features too. On the one hand “neuroimaging studies of the psychedelic state are providing tantalising clues about the biological bases of consciousness and self-awareness” (Letheby 2021: 2)⁹, while on the other, data from these studies is fuelling the development of new theoretical paradigms that reiterate many of the intuitive earlier findings while grounding them in a broadly naturalistic worldview. The core principle, however, is that psychedelics function as a kind of ‘unbinding’ (125) or ‘unselfing’ that provisionally dissolves the grip of a hegemonic ‘self-model’ in order to revise it. As Juuso Kähönen explains, “[t]he egocentric perspective can easily become quite constraining, our autobiographical narratives can become impenetrable fences between the world and us, and our existential perspective can become stuck in the mode of egocentric evaluations... [thus] the ability to be able to visit other kinds of perspectives is both existentially and morally important” (Kähönen 2020). Or, as Chris Letheby summarises in the groundbreaking *Philosophy of Psychedelics*¹⁰, “psychedelic therapy involves the temporary disintegration, and subsequent beneficial revision, of predictive models of the self” (Letheby 2021: 111). It thus “has a two-factor structure: it involves (a) the induction of neural and psychological plasticity at multiple levels, and (b) the discovery and consolidation of new forms of self-modelling” (6). Importantly, and contrary to a dominant assumption within the first wave of psychedelics research, our current understanding is that these “existentially significant changes to self-awareness do not depend on changes to metaphysical beliefs about the

⁸ It should be noted, however, that the lack of rigorous scientific understanding of the effects of psychedelics did not impede the myriad promising psychotherapeutic findings that were made in the ‘first wave’ of psychedelic research from the 1950s and 1960s that was cut short by the backlash against the 60s counterculture (see Lee; Shlain 1994 for a definitive account).

⁹ See, for instance, dos Santos et. al. 2020 for a comprehensive survey of the field.

¹⁰ For its many merits, this book, which represents the current gold standard in the field, still relies on a broadly functionalist/computationalist paradigm which, as we will see below, has been challenged in recent years by those working in 4E cognition, particularly the enactivist school associated with Varela, Thompson, di Paolo and others. For their part, some of the more promising contributions in Hauskeller and Sjöstedt-Hughes’s recent edited collection *Philosophy and Psychedelics* (2023) gesture past functionalism/computationalism in the direction of process philosophical, phenomenological and enactivist positions, but there does not yet seem to be any rigorous, sustained work on psychedelics within post-functionalist cognitive science.

ultimate nature of reality” (122). Said otherwise, the transformative capacities of psychedelic compounds seem to rely more upon an immanent self-unfolding than on any appeal to transcendence. With our recently acquired ability to be able to model real time psychedelic-induced changes in connectivity dynamics¹¹ across brain areas – including the hypothesised ‘Default Mode Network’ (DMN) (Davey; Harrison 2018) and ‘Salience Network’ (SN) that are roughly responsible for ‘normal’ conscious self-representation and attentional focus respectively – using fMRI, PET and/or EEG technologies (Carhart-Harris; Friston 2010), coupled with direct reports from subjects who have ingested a psychedelic (e.g., Carhart-Harris et. al. 2012), we have come close to the neurophenomenological ideal proposed by Francisco Varela in his research on the neural substrates of consciousness (Varela 1996) – a non-reductive approach to understanding the links between brain activity and subjective experience. Many of the most popular models that have been developed along these lines base themselves on what is known as the Bayesian brain hypothesis, which is, simply put, the idea that the brain is a prediction engine that iteratively builds and tests models or hypotheses of itself and its environment in order to maintain itself qua embodied system in the face of dissipative tendencies via the minimisation of a quantity known as ‘mismatch’, ‘surprisal’ or ‘free energy’ that represents the divergence between states systems expect to find themselves in and those they in fact find themselves in. The predictive processing framework popularised by Anil Seth (2014) is such a model¹², as is Karl Friston’s increasingly hegemonic active inference / free energy principle approach, which seeks to unify action and perception as two reciprocal parts of ongoing processes of self-optimisation through belief updating and belief testing via interaction with the world (Friston 2010; 2016; Parr, Pezzulo; Friston 2022)¹³. One of the tools most used in the presentation of these frameworks, and one that should be familiar to those who have benefitted from Manuel deLanda’s singular exposition of Deleuzian philosophy (DeLanda 2002), is dynamic systems theory (DST). DST models systems by extracting each of their salient degrees of freedom (broadly, properties that can change) and presenting these as dimensions of a phase space representing the space of possibility for that system. A simplified atmospheric system, for instance, could be modelled as a three-dimensional space where atmospheric pressure, humidity and temperature each form one of the dimensions. Any particular state of such a system can be represented as a

¹¹ Connectivity is discussed in several ways in contemporary neuroscience, often in the context of temporal connectivity, e.g., oscillatory coupling and phase synchronization (Kometer et al. 2015; Atasoy et al. 2017; Grimm et al. 2018; Bedford et al. 2023). This should be borne in mind throughout the below discussion.

¹² As Letheby usefully summarises, predictive processing models depict “the brain as an inference engine that builds hierarchical models of the world in order to predict its future inputs. Any discrepancy between predicted and actual input generates an error signal that must be cancelled, either by updating the model or by acting in the world to alter the source of the discrepant input. The overarching imperative of the brain, on this view, is to minimise error signals by optimising its predictions of sensory inputs” (Letheby 2021: 114).

¹³ For a discussion of active inference from a broadly Deleuzoguattarian and Simondonian perspective, see Eloff (2022).

vector within its phase space, i.e., a particular point that has a directionality attached to it connoting the current tendencies of that system. Over time, complex patterns of behaviour are expressed by mapping actual systems as trajectories within phase space, which in turn increasingly define the composition of the space itself as a distribution of likelihoods of outcome for the system, i.e., those areas of the phase space that are more or less tended towards in the behaviour of the system (allowing us, for instance, to predict certain weather conditions based on the patterned interplay of the aforementioned dimensions of an atmospheric system). Technically, this distribution is described as the phase space's attractor and repeller layout, terms whose meaning should be intuitively clear¹⁴. When modelling systems like the brain using DST, then, we produce phase diagrams that map abstract features of our cognitive architecture viewed as a dynamic system (i.e., as an ever-changing set of linked processes) iteratively exploring and mapping out an attractor space that can in turn be understood as describing brain behaviour or, more ambitiously, the link between neurobiological dynamics and the vicissitudes of conscious experience. Something like this approach has been recently employed by Robin Carhart-Harris, Friston and their fellow researchers to develop an active inference based, partially DST-modelled account known as the *RElaxed Beliefs Under pSychedelics* (REBUS) model of psychedelic experience and its corollary, the *anarchic brain hypothesis* (Carhart-Harris 2018; Carhart-Harris; Friston 2019; see also Eloff 2022 for a Deleuzian account of this framework). Building on work that views psychedelics as agents of neuroplasticity (e.g., Almeida et al. 2019; borne out in Bedford et al. 2023), Carhart-Harris and co. propose that many of the positive effects attributed to psychedelics can be accounted for by the REBUS model by arguing that experiences like ego dissolution and insights into negative patterns of behaviour in fact result from a reduction in the activity of top-down regulatory brain systems like the DMN and SN and the simultaneous increase in bottom-up (or 'anarchic') brain activity. Cast in the language of DST, this behaviour is a temporary flattening of the energy landscape or attractor topology, a perturbation in the usual tendencies of a system that lessens¹⁵ the pull and push of usually dominant attractors and repellers and allows for potentially novel traversals of the space of possibility described by the phase space:

What seems to persist for at least some time after the experience is a flattening of the 'prior landscape': various hypotheses about what kind of person 'I' am are put on a more level playing field, as the relative probabilities assigned to some are decreased,

¹⁴ For the purposes of this article, I am simplifying matters somewhat; as DeLanda and others have made clear, systems tend asymptotically towards attractors and often exhibit complex or chaotic patterns of behaviour in their proximity, with attractors commonly described with terms like 'steady state', 'cyclical' and 'strange' depending on their specific dynamics. Notably, Guattari mentions attractors, phase spaces and so forth in quite a similar manner to how I am presenting them here in books like *Chaosmosis* (e.g., 95; 116).

¹⁵ Without ever entirely smoothing space, because the BwO is headed towards asymptotically and because "chaos is not pure indifferenciation; it possesses a specific ontological texture. It is inhabited by virtual entities and modalities of alterity which have nothing universal about them" (Guattari 1995: 81).

and to others increased. This flattening of the prior landscape plausibly underlies the feelings of openness, spaciousness, and freedom—the sense of being unburdened—that characterises the short-to-medium-term afterglow (Carhart-Harris; Friston 2019).

While the links we can draw between the neurobiological systems being modelled here and actual subjective experience are provisional, there is nothing inherent to the framework that prevents us from speculating that when viewed as an indirect model of conscious experience, these phase space topologies can be described as a distribution of long-term behavioural dynamics, i.e., what we figuratively describe as the habits, patterns of behaviour and so forth, good or bad, that we accrue over the courses of our lives¹⁶. The trajectory we're following in the current discussion should be becoming clear; if, as Letheby summarises, the research to date points to the idea that “modulation of the Default Mode and Salience networks seems to be an especially consistent correlate of (i) insightfulness experiences, (ii) ego dissolution, and (iii) lasting psychological benefits” (Letheby 2021: 93), and if contemporary psychedelic science is correct that by perturbing these networks, “psychedelics in effect ‘shake the snow globe’, allowing the system to be subsequently reset into a healthier configuration” (96), then there seems to be a remarkable degree of overlap between the consumption of psychedelics and the practice of schizoanalysis. Here is how Guattari describes schizoanalysis in *Chaosmosis*, for instance:

The Unconscious is intimately connected with the concept: it too is an incorporeal construction which takes possession of subjectivity at the point of its emergence. But it is a concept which at every moment risks becoming clogged up, and which must be constantly cleared of the cultural scoria which threatens to reterritorialise it. It requires reactivating, machinic recharging, due to the virulence of events which set subjectivity into action. (Guattari 1995: 64)

Guattari even appears to come close to something like predictive processing when he asks:

What processes unfold in a consciousness affected by the shock of the unexpected?

¹⁶ Indeed, this is a central component of the REBUS framework, which Letheby glosses as follows: “psychedelics alter consciousness by perturbing neural processes that encode the precision (or ‘confidence’) that the brain assigns to its own high-level beliefs. Since these high-level beliefs play a central role in the cognitive economy, one flow-on effect is to induce an unconstrained mode of cognition, sending the system on a whirlwind tour (or ‘trip’) through an expanded state space. When phenomenal feelings of uncertainty or puzzlement occur, they result from specific representational activity: from the brain representing its own beliefs as highly imprecise or uncertain” (Letheby 2021: 107). These high-level beliefs are also described as ‘hyperpriors’ and likened “to Kantian categories, to Wittgensteinian ‘hinge’ or ‘framework’ propositions, to the constituents of a Kuhnian paradigm, or to the central nodes of a Quinean web of belief” (Letheby 2021: 119).

How can a mode of thought, a capacity to apprehend, be modified when the surrounding world itself is in the throes of change? How are the representations of an exterior world changed when it is itself in the process of changing? (Guattari 1995: 11-2)

Cultural scoria as attractors and repellers – territories or anti-territories – and machinic recharging as a shaking of the snow globe¹⁷. The virulence of events that set subjectivity into action as life as it unfolds, diagramming “fields of the possible, tensions in value, relations of heterogeneity, of alterity, of becoming other” (Guattari 1995: 27), oftentimes remarkably unaware that this is happening. To learn “what a subject’s desiring-machines are, how they work, with what syntheses, what bursts of energy in the machine, what constituent misfires, with what flows, what chains, and what becomings in each case” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 339), just hook them up to an fMRI and then give them a psychedelic to set in motion “the destruction of the molar aggregates, the structures and representations that prevent the machine from functioning” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 339), because “schizoanalysis would come to nothing if it did not add to its positive tasks the constant destructive task of disintegrating the normal ego” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 362). *What are your attractors – what machinings of desire do the collective assemblages of enunciation and power formations of the social field express within your psyche? How can these be redistributed? What new ones can we experiment with?* It’s almost too easy: the DMN as the territorialised subject, psychedelics as agents of deterritorialisation. *How do you create yourself a Body without Organs?* “[F]or each case and each situation... construct a map of the unconscious—with its strata, its lines of deterritorialization, its black holes—open to perspectives of experimentation” (Guattari 2011: 170). Then, proceed by weakening “the constraining influence of those priors on the process of probabilistic inference... expanding the space of phenomenologically possible worlds” (Letheby 2021: 121).

The thousand faces of the schizoanalytic psychedelic subject

We always make love with worlds.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1977: 294)

¹⁷ Interestingly, Guattari explicitly refers to attractors when discussing the idea of the refrain: “the refrain is not based on elements of form, material or ordinary signification, but on the detachment of an existential ‘motif’ (or leitmotiv) which installs itself like an ‘attractor’ within a sensible and significational chaos. The different components conserve their heterogeneity, but are nevertheless captured by a refrain which couples them to the existential Territory of my self. In the case of neurotic identity, sometimes the refrain develops into a ‘hardened’ representation, for example, an obsessive ritual. If for any reason this machine of subjectivation is threatened, the whole personality may implode; this occurs in psychosis where the partial components move off on delirious, hallucinatory lines” (Guattari 1995: 17).

Perhaps it is all a little too easy though, in the sense that schizoanalysis in fact proposes a far more profound view of subjectivity – or rather processes of subjectivation – than can be found in contemporary mainstream psychedelic research. For one, Deleuze and Guattari express deep antipathy towards representational views of the unconscious, contrasting a machinic, non-representational machinery of desire to a ‘theatre of the unconscious’ that goes by way of signification and is amenable to recuperation by psychoanalytic discourse. For them we are not, in other words, “in the presence of a passively representative image, but of a vector of subjectivation” (Guattari 1995: 25). Similarly, they argue against the idea that there are ‘beliefs’ in the unconscious to be uncovered and interpreted. As they aver, there is “no mystery, no hidden universe... nothing to discover in the unconscious” (Guattari 1996: 52). Instead, “[t]he unconscious needs to be created” (ibid.), a view that situates them far from any functionalist-representationalist view of the mind. Here, as John Protevi has demonstrated (Protevi 2013: 155-78), Deleuze and Guattari are far closer to the 4E school of cognition, specifically the enactivist framework originally proposed by Francisco Varela and developed by Evan Thompson (2007), Ezequiel di Paolo (di Paolo, Buhrmann; Barandiaran 2017) and others. On the enactivist view, cognition is a form of sense-making that involves an inter- and intra-systemic tension between processes of self-distinction and processes of self-production¹⁸. Cognition as sense-making is something systems – human beings for instance – *do*, something that unfolds in relation with environments in ways that render systems and environments differentially entangled via various forms of openness and closure representing processes of self-production and self-distinction respectively (114-6)¹⁹. Cognition is thus not the abstract reflective symbolic juggling of a circumscribed rational agent, but instead the processual imbrication of systems – themselves complexly nested in recursive networks of reciprocal adaptation – and environments that are similarly complex. Enactivism, as di Paolo and co. have noted (di Paolo, Cuffari; de Jaegher 2018), is thus similar to Simondon’s notion of individuation (2020) which was in turn a substantial influence on Deleuze (1994). The parallels here are especially evident in Varela’s influential view of cognition as involving what he called a ‘meshwork of selfless selves’ (Varela 1991), an assemblage of proto-subjective becomings or larval subjects (Deleuze 1994: 78-9). As Guattari puts it, “[a] thousand machinic propositions constantly work upon each individual, under and over their

¹⁸ Di Paolo et al. cast this tension in explicitly dialectical terms; it is unclear that this is necessary, however, if we take a Simondonian transductive view wherein disparation, i.e., differences between incommensurable orders, can drive ongoing processes of individuation in a manner Simondon convincingly argues is non-dialectical (2020: 85-6; 111).

¹⁹ Guattari is remarkably close to 4E views of cognition as sense-making when he offers a provisional definition of subjectivity, broadly described, as “[t]he ensemble of conditions which render possible the emergence of individual and/or collective instances as self-referential existential Territories, adjacent, or in a delimiting relation, to an alterity that is itself subjective” (Guattari 1995: 8-9).

speaking heads” (2011: 156) and in this sense, “[s]ubjectivity is in fact plural and polyphonic... [and] recognises no dominant or determinant instance guiding all other forms according to a univocal causality” (Guattari 1995: 1). Similarly, enactivism recognises the reciprocal nature of becomings, or what Simondon would call transductions (2020: 13-6), in its view that systems and environments individuate at the same time as part of the same processes of cognition as sense-making²⁰. Guattari seems close to this view when discussing infant development and noting “the inherently trans-subjective character of an infant's early experiences, which do not dissociate the feeling of self from the feeling of the other”; this “nascent subjectivity, which we will continually find in dreams, délire, creative exaltation, or the feeling of love” (Guattari 1995: 6), but which is to some extent present in all experience, is thus for Guattari, as for Simondon, *collective* in the sense that it is “a multiplicity that deploys itself as much beyond the individual, on the side of the socius, as before the person, on the side of preverbal intensities, indicating a logic of affects rather than a logic of delimited sets” (9). Adopting this kind of transversal approach, where cognition is the ongoing enacting of a world-become-subject-become-world, where subjects are a meshwork of larval selves (or where, as Guattari says, “a sense of being-in-itself is established before any discursive scheme, uniquely positioned across an intensive continuum whose distinctive traits are not perceptible by an apparatus of representation but by a... pre-egoic, pre-identificatory agglomeration” (79)) and where “[s]ubjectivity is manufactured just as energy, electricity, and aluminium are” (Guattari and Rolnik 2007: 47), has serious implications for how we think about psychedelics. Instead of viewing them as ‘mind-revealing’ agents in the representationalist sense of the term, they are, in a sense that is true to the etymology of the term *psyche-delic*, *mind-manifesting*, i.e., literally setting in motion a particular viscosity of desire by freeing up the flows from some of the more congealed aspects of habituated practices of sense-making. To be sure, an entire theatre of the unconscious is often expressed in the unfolding of a psychedelic experience – people regularly hallucinates archetypes, transcendent forms and all the names of History as a kind of transformative mythic drama (see, for instance, the discussion of ‘basic perinatal matrices’ in Grof 2008) – but this is just the flotsam of the attractors torn loose from their moorings²¹ and drifting past us as we pick up speed

²⁰ In *Chaosmosis*, Guattari describes something particularly close to sense-making when he talks about “worlding a complexion of sense” and observes that this “always involves taking hold of a massive and immediate ensemble of contextual diversity, a fusion in an undifferentiated, or rather de-differentiated, whole” (Guattari 1995: 80). On his view, embodiment functions as a “a nucleus of chaosmosis” via which sense-making can unfold as a rapid oscillation between a “state of chaotic ‘grasping’ and the deployment of complexions anchored within worldly coordinates... Formations of sense and States of things are thus chaotised in the very movement of the bringing into existence of their complexity. At the source of a world’s constitution there is always a certain modality of chaotic discomfort in its organicity, functionality and relations of alterity” (Guattari 1995: 80-1).

²¹ In this regard, “[a] little additional effort is enough to overturn everything, and to lead us finally toward other far-off places. The schizoanalytic flick of the finger, which restarts the movement, links up again with the tendency, and pushes the simulacra to a point where they cease being artificial images to become indices of the new world. That is what the completion of the process is: not a promised and a

on our “immobile voyage in intensities on the body without organs” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 292) in order to cross “the barriers of non-sense which prohibit access to a-signifying nuclei of subjectivation, the only way to shift petrified systems of modelisation” (Guattari 1995: 68)²²:

O, the narrator does not homestead in the familial and neurotic lands of Oedipus, there where the global and personal connections are established; he does not remain there, he crosses these lands... until he reaches the unknown country, his own, the unknown land, which alone is created by his own work in progress (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 318).

This entails “brutally intervening each time the subject strikes up the song of myth or intones tragic lines, carrying him back to the factory” of the machinic unconscious in while desire is arranged and rearranged (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 314).

Another fundamental difference between psychedelic therapy and schizoanalysis is that the former tends to operate, despite ostensibly frequent ‘all is one’ mystical experiences that transcend subject/object dualism, within a reasonably straightforward individualist framework of the kind encountered in traditional therapeutic contexts. Here, subjects are viewed as relatively autonomous rational agents whose subjectivity can be exhaustively reduced to personological aspects like familial history and self-actualisation, something we know is anathema to Deleuze and Guattari. As the latter observes, “[t]he individual who we see before us is often nothing but the ‘terminal’ of a whole group of social assemblages... if we don’t get to the core of those assemblages, we embark upon fictitious attitudes” (Guattari and Rolnik 2007: 371). In other words, as mentioned earlier, there is a direct reciprocal presupposition between subjectivation – the machining of desire – and the social field. We are, each of us, “situated at the intersection of numerous vectors of partial subjectivation... connected to a range of expressive and practical

pre-existing land, but a world created in the process of its tendency, its coming undone, its deterritorialization. The movement of the theater of cruelty; for it is the only theater of production, there where the flows cross the threshold of de territorialization and produce the new land not at all a hope, but a simple “finding,” a “finished design,” where the person who escapes causes other escapes, and marks out the land while deterritorializing himself. An active point of escape where the revolutionary machine, the artistic machine, the scientific machine, and the (schizo) analytic machine become parts and pieces of one another” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 321-2).

²² The dynamic tension between quasi-narrative experiences of mythic import and the a-signifying preindividual milieu that lies further towards the degree zero of the Body without Organs is alluded to by Guattari in a particularly lucid section of *Schizoanalytic Cartographies* when he observes a “distinction between level I of the Unconscious (where the sites of intensive entities will acquire a weight of intrinsic reference, a systemic or structural ‘truth’) and level II (where these same sites become ontologically precarious and are charged with risks and new potentialities for crystallization)” (Guattari 2013: 58). Similarly, in *Anti-Oedipus* we are told that myth and tragedy are to be “denounced as conscious beliefs or illusions, nothing more than ideas” and that we should pit “the functioning of the desiring-machines against tragedy, against ‘the fatal drama of the personality,’ against ‘the inevitable confusion between mask and actor’” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 299).

registers in direct contact with social life and the outside world” (Guattari 1995: 98-9). As the old saying goes, we cannot separate the ‘personal’ from the ‘political’, and this in a much more profound and material sense than is often supposed. The social and collective nature of subjectivation has especially important implications for how we think about psychedelics when considering the role of what is commonly termed ‘set and setting’. These terms, a mainstay of the psychedelic literature, refer to the ‘mindset’ of someone ingesting a psychedelic (set), which can include everything from their beliefs and aspirations to their anxieties and the amount of stress they’re currently experiencing in their lives, and to the broader context (setting) in which the psychedelic will be experienced, which typically means the physical space, replete with lighting, music, other individuals and so forth. If, however, we are in fact the ‘terminal of a whole group of social assemblages’ and if, on the enactive view, we are complexly entangled with our environment in ongoing processes of sense-making, then instead of thinking of set and setting as two distinct salient aspects that need to be considered vis-à-vis the psychedelic experience, it is perhaps more useful to think about the entire context – from innermost fears to outermost properties of the space we find ourselves in – as a messy assemblage (or agencement, *agency-ing*) of flows and processes that includes everything from the molar aggregates of sex, race and class to the molecular investments of desire and neurochemistry, “the existence of libidinal stratifications, repetitive structures literally mimicking the homeostasis of systems of physical fluctuations at equilibrium (neurotic negotiations between narcissism and object investments, failure syndromes, repetition compulsion)” (Guattari 2013: 53-4), and which is comprised of various tendencies towards deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. The negative task of schizoanalysis is thus also, in part, the limning of the psychedelic assemblage – a careful if necessarily incomplete and tentative delineation of the machining of desire and the collective arrangements of enunciation at play. If we acknowledge that the psychedelic experience can unleash, “[d]esiring machines which break with the great interpersonal and social organic equilibria, which invert orders, play the role of the other as against a politics of auto-centering on the self”, then it is crucial that we undertake this part of the negative task given that the psychedelic set and setting assemblage and in fact “all machinic assemblages harbour — even if in an embryonic state — enunciative zones which are so many desiring proto-machines” (Guattari 1995: 52). As Tarkovsky makes clear in the film *Stalker*, we should always take the trip with someone who is able to understand the zone, a place where the normal laws of physics do not apply, and nothing is as it seems (Tarkovsky 1979). If the preparation is just right, and the deterritorialising dose is high enough, then the death will be a propitious one, setting in motion “a Universe of processual emergence as much as of abolition” (Guattari 1995: 66).

An ending, a beginning

The only acceptable finality of human activity is the production of a subjectivity that is auto-enriching its relation to the world in a continuous fashion.

Félix Guattari (1995: 21)

Death, surprisingly – the death in life that transforms life, a little bit of pure immanence – is something that schizoanalysis and accounts of psychedelic experience are often in agreement on. In fact, for Deleuze and Guattari “[t]he experience of death is the most common of occurrences in the unconscious, precisely because it occurs in life and for life, in every passage or becoming, in every intensity as passage or becoming” (1977: 330). This is death as a new individuation – a flattening of the energy landscape so that the anarchic brain can redistribute the attractor layout and travel along new vectors, “catalysing existential operators capable of acquiring consistence and persistence” (Guattari 1995: 19). As psychedelic neuroscience would have it, “if the DMN and SN perform their integrative functions by modelling the existence of a simple, indivisible entity, sharply bounded and distinct from the external world, then this would explain why disruption to these systems should lead to the feeling that the individual is disintegrating, dying, or merging with the cosmos” (Letheby 2021: 136). Everything is said in a few fine lines from *Anti-Oedipus*: the little death, the loss of ego, the absence of representation and interpretation, the re-machining of desire:

From one aspect to the other, there is not at all a personal deepening, but something quite different: there is a return from the experience of death to the model of death, in the cycle of the desiring-machines. The cycle is closed. For a new departure, since this I is another? The experience of death must have given us exactly enough broadened experience, in order to live and know that the desiring machines do not die. And that the subject as an adjacent part is always a ‘one’ who conducts the experience, not an I who receives the model. For the model itself is not the I either, but the body without organs. And I does not rejoin the model without the model starting out again in the direction of another experience (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 331).

As experienced psychedelic practitioners are wont to remind us, we can botch this death in at least two ways, transforming a potential breakthrough into a breakdown (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 362); on the one hand, we can fight against it, arresting the process and entering the bad trip or, on the other hand, we can come to regard the death itself as the goal, continuing in the void – the line of abolition – as opposed to releasing what Guattari calls coefficients of processual creativity in order to be able to undertake the positive task of fabulating a people to come and a new Earth. As Deleuze and Guattari

say of psychoanalysis become schizoanalysis, the use of psychedelics “ought to be a song of life, or else be worth nothing at all. It ought, practically, to teach us to sing life” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 339). This is a song we make up as we go along, because “[b]eneath the diversity of beings, no univocal ontological plinth is given” (Guattari 1995: 58). Fabulating, singing our immanent song, it is also easy to get lost in the process itself, to exercise the Body without Organs past the point of exhaustion until it lies limp on the plane of consistency, a rhabdomyolysis of desire. In this regard, what psychedelic therapy describes as integration is crucial (Aixalá 2022); instead of endlessly repeating the negative task of schizoanalysis, curation of the unconscious until there is nothing left but scar tissue, we should turn to the positive task of arranging desire otherwise. As Letheby reminds us, “for truly durable change to occur, the induction of plasticity alone does not suffice. New, healthier forms of self-modelling must be discovered during the acute experience, and consolidated during the subsequent period of integration” (2021: 151). Recognising the immediately social nature of desire, the complex imbrication of selves and world, these new forms of modelling and integration, these new Earths, should themselves be social. Seen in this light, several things become immediately apparent. First, any intervention into the arrangements of desire, even at the most personal or molecular levels, is an intervention into molar articulations of the socius. This is not necessarily a bad thing – if political economy is libidinal economy then schizoanalysis is already a form of politics, both at the level of analysis (“the force and the obstinacy of a deterritorialization can only be evaluated through the types of reterritorialization that represent it” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 316)) and in its positive transformative aspect, even when this may not be obvious (“[t]o those who say that escaping is not courageous, we answer: what is not escape and social investment at the same time?” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 316)). Second, this does not, to reiterate an earlier point, mean that the schizoanalytic method entails a program. While the ostensible lack of a single model for revolutionary praxis has become something of a blunt cudgel wielded by those who denigrate the schizoanalytic project as a kind of jejune liberatory naivete (the spectre of an inchoate anarcho-desiring that eschews structure, organization and so forth, and which is, tellingly, strikingly at odds with *Anti-Oedipus's* constant endorsement of practices of careful *machining* and *arrangement*), any such program would be, as we have seen, profoundly oxymoronic and against the necessarily open-ended nature of schizoanalysis as a practice of counteractualisation and individuation that is, as Guattari underscores, based upon “the definitive non-finality of all systems” (2006: 196), this being its ethical guarantee²³. Third, while “collective existential mutation will have the last word... large

²³ “Schizoanalysis does not thus choose one modelisation to the exclusion of another. Within the diverse cartographies in action in a given situation, it tries to make nuclei of virtual autopoiesis discernible, in order to actualise them, by transversalising them, in conferring on them an operative diagrammatism (for example, by a change in the material of Expression), in making them themselves operative within modified assemblages, more open, more processual, more deterritorialised. Schizoanalysis, rather than moving in the direction of reductionist modelisations which simplify the complex, will work towards its

movements of subjectivation don't necessarily develop in the direction of emancipation" (Guattari 1995: 2). As any historian of the 1960s counterculture will remind us, we can trace a short path from the psychedelic love-in of Woodstock to the violence of Altamont, dogmatic LSD cults, hard drugs and, a short while later, Silicon Valley neoliberalism and hippie Trump supporters. That said, we should simultaneously acknowledge the profound nature of the individuations that took place in the 1960s – from Haight-Ashbury to the Panthers to May 68 – which began with “nothing but scattered machinic indexes, first being a quick, powerless deterritorialization, then becoming an abstract machine capable of catalyzing new semiotic assemblages of desire in the social field” (Guattari 2011: 161), and we should remember that these events are all bound up in a single incorporeal Event (Deleuze 1990: 148-53). Fourth, to invoke perhaps the most unlikely sentence in *Anti-Oedipus*, we should admit that “[w]e are all little dogs, we need circuits, and we need to be taken for walks” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 315). We should remind ourselves, in other words, that whatever the romantic attachments we have to the liberatory task of unleashing our desire along lines of psychedelic flight, creating a nomadic war machine to traverse smooth space and redistribute our attractors, “a schizoanalytic intervention is not necessarily ‘extremist’... in a sense, it will frequently require much more prudence than psychoanalysis with its trenchant interpretations and its often unmasterable transferences” (Guattari 2011: 185-6). A careful arranging and rearranging of desire as a simultaneously political and existential-libidinal, molar and molecular, practice of metamodellisation; the machining of meshworks of selfless selves or collective assemblages of enunciation as the individuation of the possibilities of life in such a way as to increase its pre-individual charge and amplify processual creativity; in the end, this resingularisation of radically mutant forms of subjectivity and the world, undertaken “not only for self, but for the whole alterity of the cosmos and for the infinity of times” (Guattari 1995: 53), is the task of schizoanalysis; if we apply ourselves to this task then “different ways of seeing and of making the world, different ways of being and of bringing to light modalities of being will open up, be irrigated and enrich one another” (Guattari 1995: 120). And, for those of us who wish to open up and irrigate psychedelically, it is perhaps especially salient to cultivate “[a] subjectivity of the outside and of wide-open spaces which far from being fearful of finitude — the trials of life, suffering, desire and death — embraces them like a spice essential to the cuisine of life” (Guattari 1995: 89-90)

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