On Generic Schizoanalysis: Reading Anti-Oedipus *Alongside Laruelle's Non-Standard Philosophy*

by CHANTELLE GRAY

Abstract

This paper brings together Laruelle's project on non-standard philosophy with Deleuze and Guatttari's project on schizoanalysis. Laruelle critiques 'standard philosophy' for failing to concede that the Real precedes it and is foreclosed to thought, such that philosophy has no traction on it, meaning philosophy is *not sufficient* for thinking the Real. Non-philosophy is a response to this position and ultimately aims at a 'defetishization' of thought. Departing from this position, I hold that Deleuze and Guattari *perform* non-philosophy in *Anti-Oedipus* through their use of the unconscious and productive forces *as raw materials*, though they do so mainly at the level of subjectivity. For schizoanalysis to become generic it would, however, also have to lose its 'face' because faciality is precisely the Philosophical Decision whereby ordinary, lived reality becomes overcoded. Like the Christ face, the Philosophical Decision functions as a distillation of faciality so that the Human-in-Human, as much as Philosophy, are in need of redemption *from* rather than *by* Christ. Positing a structural parallel between faciality and Laruelle's general theory of victims, I conclude that the generic schizoanalysis of the Victim-in-person as an *ordinary messiah* is a direct response to messianic facialization or the criminal violence of philosophy. My argument, then, is that with a non-philosophical probe-head freed, psychoanalysis can be transformed from a technology of the unconscious into a schizo-dualysis of the Human-in-person – a science founded on the immanent being of the human where any 'loss' is treated as nothing more or less than just that: a generic part of radical lived experience rather than a redoubled object for Freudian or philosophical analysis.

A Philosophy of Obstructions, An Obstructive Philosophy

A bit of perseverance is required. A bit of patience. No doubt, this is a paper about *Anti-Oedipus*, but it requires an introduction to François Laruelle, which is not a straightforward task by any means because non-philosophy is not about exposition, commentary, analysis, critique or interpretation (etc., etc.). At any rate, the introduction is not to the non-philosopher himself: "Laruelle does not exist. There is a 'Laruelle' base [support] for non-philosophy. There is a subject-agent, a contributor, a manufacturer, but that's all" (Laruelle 2012a: 244). And yet, non-philosophy has to be introduced. One of Laruelle's most prominent interlocutors (if that is indeed the right word for a non-

philosophical 'dialogist'), Rocco Gangle, calls this the 'pedagogical' problem of non-philosophy, while Taylor Adkins, a respected translator of Laruelle's work, has conceded that any apposite primer to non-philosophy "is an illusion" (Ó Maoilearca 2017: 21). The problem is how to introduce non-philosophy without transforming it into what Laruelle calls 'standard philosophy'. And yet, non-philosophy has to be introduced. John Ó Maoilearca follows the premise of Lars von Trier's experimental film, *The Five Obstructions* (2003), for this task. In the film, von Trier works with another filmmaker, Jørgen Leth, whom he tasks with remaking his 1968 film, *The Perfect Human* (*Det perfekte menneske*) five times, each according to a restraint prescribed by von Trier. In *All Thoughts Are Equal*, Ó Maoilearca follows a similar procedure by 'forcing' non-philosophy via five pathways to 'perform' some of the axioms of non-philosophy. These circumventions are, however, not aimed at providing an explanation of Laruelle's project but rather at suggesting "that anything viewed with sufficient care (the act, practice, or performance of a vision-in-One) can be thoughtful, can correspond to another part of the One, when each is seen as equally Real", such that a real democratization of thought is achieved (Ó Maoilearca 2015: 42). While this is a rather brilliant method, it takes a book-long project to achieve. The problem thus remains: how to introduce non-philosophy? Perhaps the best one can do is try again, fail again, fail better.

Laruelle's project on non-philosophy or, as he calls it in his later works, non-standard philosophy, is a provocative and theoretically rich enterprise that takes umbrage with what he refers to as the 'double transcendence' (or hallucination) of standard philosophy and its practice of the Philosophical Decision (first transcendence), which is itself grounded in the Principle of Sufficiency (second transcendence). That is, standard philosophy – whether in terms of negation or affirmation – remains conditioned by an *invariant structure* according to which philosophy lays claim to the Real by representing it, even when it professes not to do so. Laruelle notoriously takes aim at 'philosophies of difference', including Deleuze's, to argue the latter point. The crux, for Laruelle, is that the Philosophical Decision constitutes a transcendent maneuver because it either naively believes that it is capable of deciding on the Real, or because it claims to think outside of the Real, all the time reducing the Real to the limits of philosophical thought. As Laruelle says, to philosophize – whether that be as philosophy *qua* philosophy, or as philosophy *qua* anthropology, politics, psychoanalysis, etc. – "is to decide on the Real *and* on thought, which ensues from it" (2013a: 117, emphasis added). This Decision not only refuses the immanent 'imprint' or 'cut' of the Real, but also cuts (*decaedere*) the human "off from the Real" by way of representation (Mullarkey; Smith 2013: 7). In short, the Philosophical Decision returns *all* philosophy into an idealist position because philosophy advances itself to the site of auto-givenness, thus assuming its own sufficiency according to which anything becomes *philosophizable* (see Laruelle 2013b [1989]: 22 and Laruelle 2015a [2000]: 8)*.* Precisely at this juncture philosophy has already, in advance, overdetermined whatever it aims to give an account of. This is also why Laruelle argues for a structural

parallel between philosophy and photography, both of which lay claim to standard philosophical tropes such as "truth, light, reason, illumination, and the Real" (Fardy 2018: 3) that are used to *frame* the Real by *imposing* a certain totalizing view on it even though the totality of the Real *always transcends and escapes* the limits of philosophy and photography. Standard photography, like standard philosophy, is thus reflective (self-reflective), aiming always to render comprehensible what is ultimately the obscurity (non-comprehensibleness) of the Real (see Laruelle 2011: 58).

Non-philosophy – which is then also what non-photography, non-Marxism, a generic psychoanalysis, etc. would do – axiomatically rejects any framing of the Real, holding that the Real is foreclosed to thought, and thus to philosophy. The reason that non-philosophy proceeds via axioms instead of postulates is that it is *performative* rather than *positional*. Axioms thus methodologically *perform* or *ventriloquize* non-philosophy's own *insufficiency* to determine or lay claim to the Real. Otherwise stated, no thought, and no philosophy, is sufficient to grasp the Real, whether in terms of totality, transcendentals, transcendence or immanence. In contrast to standard philosophy, non-philosophy proceeds from a principle of 'in-sufficient Real', meaning it subordinates itself to its immanent cause, the One-in-One or vision-in-One, because it understands the Real to be *in-One*, which is to say given-without-givenness, rather than *in-Being*, or any other similar point of departure such as *in-Difference.* So, the Real is indifferent to thought just as philosophy is insufficient in its relation to (or thought of) the Real, such that the Real does not require a Philosophical Decision (a decision of thought) for the expression or determination of its essence. "Precisely because it is *radical* (and not *absolute*)", writes Laruelle, "the Real's sufficiency, that of its immanence without desire or need for thought, implies an insufficiency that is just as 'radical' as far as the thought which could be developed according to it" (Laruelle 2013a: 106; emphasis added). Non-philosophy therefore aims to think *from* the (radical immanence of the) Real rather than *for* the Real. As such, there is a non-commutativity of Being and the Real or the One. In this sense, non-philosophy, rather than being a philosophical *position*, is a *posture* towards the Real that does not claim to know or determine it (see Laruelle 2016 [1992]: 12 and Smith 2016a: 86). This posture, and its criticality towards standard philosophy, no doubt makes it seem as though non-philosophy is anti-philosophy, but Laruelle himself states that non-philosophy is neither the end of philosophy, nor a negation thereof, but rather a supplement to it, in the same way that non-Euclidean geometry extends its Euclidean counterpart (Laruelle 2011: vii). We could say that there is an operational parallel between non-Euclidean geometry and non-philosophy because just as non-Euclidean geometry does away with the fifth postulate of parallelism in Euclidean geometry, so non-philosophy does away with parallelisms in standard philosophy, whether that be Spinoza's mind-body parallelism or the *noesis-noema* parallelism in phenomenology. Terence Blake (n.d.) has suggested that the 'non' in non-philosophy also alludes to Bachelard's *La philosophie du non* (1940) which philosophically traces the linguistic

operator 'non-' in mathematics and the sciences. But while this may be the case, at least to some extent, I suspect that Laruelle (and perhaps his interlocutors – though I would be careful to speak for them) would view Bachelard's philosophy as still being a *philosophy of science*, rather than an instance of philosophy using *the materials of science*, as non-standard philosophy aims to do. Put another way, the argument would be that even though the so-called 'philosophies of the concept' – such as those by Cavaillès, Bachelard, Canguilhem, Gueroult, Serres, Foucault and, arguably, Simondon and Deleuze – went far in the direction of what Laruelle calls a *science of philosophy*, and even expressed it to some extent, they ultimately remained *philosophies of science*. Yet it seems to me that Blake could be correct to some degree in arguing that Laruelle forms part of this lineage, even if in a 'non' manner. Unfortunately, Blake makes the claim without following through on the argument, though the overlaps can easily be observed in passages from *The Philosophy of No* (*La philosophie du non*) such as the following:

> Generalization by negation must include what it denies. Indeed the whole impetus of scientific thought for a century now stems from dialectical generalizations of this sort, which embrace what has been denied. Thus non-Euclidean geometry embraces Euclidean geometry; non-Newtonian mechanics embraces Newtonian mechanics; wave mechanics embraces relativist mechanics. In the domain of physics, Planck's constant h seems like a very small discrepancy amid the rules of common-sense science. But, as has often been observed, the removal of h from the formulae of wave mechanics is all that is required to restore the formulae of classical mechanics. (Bachelard 1968 [1940]: 117)

This passage (and others besides) certainly gives the impression that there are some links between Bachelard's philosophy of the no and Laruelle's non-philosophy, at least in the sense that Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry correspond, though readers should not be fooled into thinking that Laruelle's project is the same as Bachelard's, or that it is a 'cheap' imitation thereof. Lineage or not, Laruelle's project of non-philosophy stands apart from any standard philosophical project. This tension between a science of philosophy and a philosophy of science does, however, raise an interesting question for me in terms of *Anti-Oedipus* (1983 [1972]) and the 'scientific' use of *the materials* of psychoanalysis and Marxism.

To be clear, science, according to Laruelle, is, like non-philosophy, a posture towards knowledge, but it is neither an epistemology, nor a philosophy of science (Schmid 2013: 122). This posture, moreover, presents to philosophy *a way out of* philosophizing because science does not lay claim to knowledge of the Real and does not therefore submit the Real to the principle of Sufficiency. Knowledge is thus *gnostic* for Laruelle, where gnosticism "denotes the 'equality in principle' of all knowledges" (Ó Maoilearca 2015: 97–98). But how, if at all, can philosophy become gnostic? And is it possible to transform philosophy from a thought of sufficiency into a 'rigorous science' or practice of thought

that refuses the auto-reproduction and meta-justification of the epistemic violence of standard philosophy? Laruelle turns here to Gödel's incompleteness theorem which states that any formal axiomatic mathematical system has some propositions (or truth statements) that cannot be proved or disproved within that system, just as the consistency (or all axioms) of the system itself cannot be proved. Recall that Gödel was responding to projects of his milieu, such as Whitehead and Russell's *Principia Mathematica*, a three-volume work aimed at doing exactly the opposite of what Gödel proved, namely, to provide a formalized mathematical system comprising a set of complete and consistent axioms from which all mathematical truth claims could be derived. The latter position should sound familiar: it is nothing less than the quest for the double transcendence of standard philosophy. Laruelle generalizes Gödel's model to a non-Gödelian one, which amounts to a non-philosophical one, thus responding to standard philosophy in the same way that Gödel does to Whitehead and Russell: by pointing out the finitude of philosophical systems, just as Gödel proved the finitude of mathematical systems. According to Laruelle, this permits a recognition that epistemology *philosophically* organizes and delineates the concepts it uses to describe science, or any other 'regional' knowledge, so reducing all knowledge(s) to the recursive self-analysis and meta-rationalization of standard philosophy. Laruelle's point is that Gödel's condemnation of metascience is in fact a non-philosophical denunciation of "the classical relation of the authority of philosophy over science and its positivist and scientistic inversions", including philosophies-*of-science*, philosophies-*in-science* and epistemology, the latter of which functions to reduce the generality of science to particular philosophical positions (Laruelle 2013c [1996]:68). Non-philosophy, in contrast, refuses to place knowledge "over science under this antithetical form" (Schmid 2013: 125), thus refusing philosophical transcendence and the 'epistemo-logical distance' it creates. This epistemo-logical detachment is precisely the formal attribute of objectification ('meta') that reduces knowledge to philosophical reflection and interpretation (Laruelle 2013c: 65). Readers will have noticed the way in which non-philosophy hyphenates words, for example vision-in-One, given-without-givenness or, in the previous sentence, epistemo-logical. These hyphens either specify an elimination of philosophical (epistemological) distance at "the level of the grapheme" (Smith 2016: 53), as in the first two examples or, alternatively, indicate the implicit assumptions of standard philosophical concepts, such as with epistemology, which conjugates *episteme* (knowledge) and *logos* (reason), thereby taking for granted a *reasoned* and *reasonable* auto-justification of philosophical *knowledge.* This is one of the main ways in which non-standard philosophy differs from standard philosophy: it refuses to think itself sufficient to grasp the Real-One. Yet even though absolute knowledge of the Real is impossible, we can, and do, according to Laruelle, have 'regional' (partial or local) knowledge of the Real via science (Fardy 2018: 2), precisely because science relies on a 'generic' practice of thought. That is to say, science has a *generic* commitment to curiosity, experimentation

and the discovery of new knowledge. If philosophy can, like science, make its primary aim to experimentally approach philosophy as raw materials, it could be transformed into a *science of* philosophy insofar as it refuses to decide on a given object – especially the Real – prior to experimentation.

This has a number of consequences. First, instead of positing any sufficiency or knowledge of the Real, a science of philosophy becomes a radical experimentation in generic, ordinary lived experience. Second, instead of philosophy being decisive for the Real, the Real becomes decisive for thought, but only 'in-the-last-instance'. The concept of determination-in-the-last-instance is, of course, from the work of Althusser or, more accurately, is 'cloned' from Althusser's work via Engels, specifically Engels's remark that "he and Marx only ever held that the economy was decisive for historical and political change in the last instance" (Fardy 2021: 3). Althusser "extends the critique of 'economism' inaugurated by Engels and Marx, but adds the caveat that even the 'last instance' of the economy 'never comes'" (Fardy 2021: 4). Laruelle, for his part, further radicalizes the cloned concept of determination-in-the-last-instance (DLI) by claiming that, alongside One-in-One (the Real), DLI is central to non-philosophy because it is the Real that acts as the determinant, or an immanent causality, but only ever in the last instance – an instance that 'never comes' because it never enacts a Philosophical Decision. It thus also refuses a convertibility between different Philosophical Decisions, for example the primacy of Being at times, or Thought (etc.) at other times (see Laruelle 2016: 19). To perform this methodologically, non-philosophy does not create concepts as is done in standard philosophy, for example by Deleuze and Guattari in *What is Philosophy?* (1994 [1991]), because for Laruelle this amounts to little more than an effect of the Philosophical Decision. Non-standard philosophy instead 'clones' the raw materials of standard philosophy, thereby neutralizing its propensity to decide on the Real. As Paul Anthony Smith explains, rather than being a copy, image or representation, the clone "carries the same genetic structure as the material it is cloned from" – the 'genetic material' here being the Real – but preserves its own identity (2016b: 83). So, (scientific) knowledge proceeds *from* (or is cloned *from*) the (genetic material of the) Real – it is unidirectional. An acceptance of this leads to the third consequence, namely a non-philosophical 'defetishization' of thought which not only places philosophy in a humbler position in its relation to the Real, but also performs a profound act of non-epistemic violence. This, then, is where I return to Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*, and particularly their use of the raw materials of Marxism and psychoanalysis. What I am arguing is that they *perform* non-philosophy in their use of the unconscious and productive forces *as raw materials*. Laruelle claims, in his *Introduction to Non-Marxism*, that it is "impossible, even in Freud and in Marx, and even more so in philosophy, to find the radical concepts of the Real and the uni-versal – only those of the unconscious and productive forces, of desire and work. But after this discovery", he goes on to write, "psychoanalysis and Marxism take on more than a new meaning – a transformation of their theories into simple materials" (Laruelle

2015a: 68). All this to say, instead of *philosophizing* psychoanalysis or Marxism, thereby deciding on the Real-One, I will argue that Deleuze and Guattari use their concepts *scientifically*, or as raw materials in an experiment.

Notes on Non-Marxism and Non-Standard Psychoanalysis

In his introduction to *Anti-Oedipus*, Mark Seem, one of the text's translators, argues that even though Deleuze and Guattari refer to both Marx and Freud in the text, "it would be an error to view *Anti-Oedipus* as yet another attempt at a Freud/Marx synthesis" (quoted in Deleuze; Guattari 1983: xviii). This is the first important non-philosophical index because non-standard philosophy requires an "identity *without-synthesis*, a transcendental identity of a 'unilateral duality'" (Laruelle 2013c: 301). Because the Real is foreclosed to thought, and thus to philosophy, yet determinant in-the-last-instance, there is a 'non-relation' between the Real and philosophy, which Laruelle calls 'unilateral duality'. Non-philosophy proceeds *axiomatically* from this position, which is to say it posits "the One as the radically immanent Real", but this One assumes a dualistic non-relation that refuses a synthesis or unity, such as Spinoza's monism might (Laruelle 2012b [2004]: 29). Laruelle calls this style 'uni-laterality', as opposed to the triadic system of philosophy which requires a synthesis that is either immanent to or transcendent of the dyad, such that it both posits and conditions "the theoretico-technical ternary" (Laruelle 2012b: 116). This triple model is sometimes referred to as a 3/2 or 2/3 transcendental invariant matrix, which basically means that philosophy divides the Real (or ordinary reality, as opposed to philosophical reality) into at least two coordinates, usually Thought and Being, and then synthesizes both under the aegis of one of the terms, providing itself simultaneously with "an interiority and an exteriority, an immanence and a transcendence", ultimately giving way to a circular causality – and this, for Laruelle, is even the case of 1/2, as with Difference (Laruelle 2013c: 4). Non-philosophy, on the other hand, is always "2-in-1 in-the-last-instance or 1-(of)-2" (Laruelle 2013c: 4). It may immediately strike the reader that there seems to be a tension here because Deleuze and Guattari *collide[1]* libido and economy in their concept of *desiring-production*, so could it be said that even though they collide these concepts they don't conjoin or collapse them in a synthesis? The answer may seem apparent at first: obviously *desiring-production* is a

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[1] "The collider", writes Laruelle, "is the quasi-transcendental apparatus, indivisibly scientific and philosophical, that accumulates the two properties within a superposed state" (2017: 171). The concept of superposition is from quantum theory and refers to a particle being in two states at the same time ('Schrödinger's cat' is often cited as the thought experiment). For Laruelle, superposition can be used to indicate relations between, for example, science and non-philosophy, or philosophy and mathematics, though it also marks a practice for getting out of the usual binds placed on objects by theoretical or formal determinations by acting as a catalyst for more "creative underdetermination or potentialization both in and across a variety of domains" (Gangle; Greve 2017: 10). To 'collide' concepts is thus to keep them in a superposed state, rather than collapsing them into a single philosophical concept.

synthesis – Deleuze and Guattari even talk about syntheses in the book, for example the connective synthesis of production, the disjunctive synthesis of recording, and the conjunctive synthesis of consumption-consummation. At a closer look, however, what they are doing is *describing* (not prescribing, and not philosophizing) how psychoanalysis and capitalism – and especially the marriage between them – come to decide on the Real, thus forcing a synthesis. In terms of connective synthesis, they write:

> What is more, castration and oedipalization beget a basic illusion that makes us believe that real desiring-production is answerable to higher formations that integrate it, subject it to transcendent laws, and make it serve a higher social and cultural production; there then appears a kind of "unsticking" of the social field with regard to the production of desire, in whose name all resignations are justified in advance. (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 74)

Notice their description of what Oedipalization – as a representation of the totality of the Real – enacts: not only a Decision of Sufficiency (Oedipus as the Real), but also a determination of the human as always-already Oedipalized. That is, Oedipalization cuts thought off from the Real through its initial decision about how to frame thought and what/how it reflects (on), and then redistributes this cut-off structure philosophically *as if* it has traction on the Real. This is what Laruelle calls *humanist* rather than *human* thought where, instead of the *Human-in-person*, we have a *human-as-subject* – like Heidegger's *Dasein* – attributed to the fullest extent, but in a way that is separate (or cut off) from ordinary, generic life. Laruelle's generic orientation or posture is aimed precisely at undercutting standard philosophical delineations such as '*Dasein*', 'rational man' or 'Oedipal person' and is, therefore, a kind of *reduction* of the grand and the abstract to ordinary, phenomenal and immanent experience (Laruelle 2015b [2012]: xiv). For Laruelle, the kind of Oedipal violence described by Deleuze and Guattari would not only be psychological, but also epistemological, especially when enacted by intellectuals as part of a "new politico-quotidian doxa" which overrepresents its "victim" (i.e., the Oedipal human), thereby acting in the service of Philosophy-with-a-capital-P rather than in the service of life (2015b: 1). Deleuze and Guattari elaborate this problem in their own register, this time in terms of disjunctive synthesis, writing:

> Oedipus is like the labyrinth, you only get out by re-entering it – or by making someone else enter it. Oedipus as either problem or solution is the two ends of a ligature that cuts off all desiring-production. The screws are tightened, nothing relating to production can make its way through any longer, except for a far-distant murmur. The unconscious has been crushed, triangulated, and confronted with a choice that is not its own. (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 79)

With a choice that is not its own or, as Laruelle says in his essay on generalized analysis (or non-analysis), as a "functional requisition of transcendent entities: Consciousness, the Unconscious, Self, Other, etc. without ever asking how such entities are received and lived" by the human as an ordinary, immanent subject of the science of the Human-in-person (2013d [1989]). Although psychoanalysis may appear, at least sometimes, to treat the human in the latter way, Laruelle argues that when it does so, it is in an already-transcendent form so that the human is treated as *a technology of the unconscious* (its 'standing-reserve') according to the sufficiency of psychoanalysis, rather than the unconscious being treated as a science of the Human-in-person. This is, of course, nothing other than the invariant structure of the Philosophical Decision which subordinates any possibility of analysis to philosophizing. If psychoanalysis is to become 'scientific' or 'generic', it would have to submit itself to the generic human (or what Laruelle understands by the 'victim', as will become clearer), thereby integrating analysis into a more *material* and *human* (rather than *materialist* and *humanist*) science that "would henceforth represent a particular case or a given" and renounce the inaccurate generalizations of philosophy in favour of "a scientific type of generalization", which it would have to learn to distinguish (Laruelle 2013d). Laruelle calls this *non-psychoanalysis*: a "scientific pragmatics of analysis thus generalized within the limits of a really human science" that refuses to conflate the human 'object' with philosophical sufficiency, such that it is markedly different from Freudian or any other related analysis (Laruelle 2013d). This, as I will argue later in the paper, is precisely what a generic schizoanalysis would do.

Contextually, as Foucault writes in the introduction to *Anti-Oedipus*, it helps to understand that critical theory in Europe, from about 1945 to 1965, relied on a "certain style of political discourse, a certain ethics of the intellectual", which required that one "be on familiar terms with Marx", while not allowing "one's dreams stray too far from Freud", or neglecting to "treat sign-systems – the signifier – with the greatest respect" (Foucault in Deleuze; Guattari 1983: xi). Deleuze and Guattari want, naturally, to disrupt this holy trinity, as much as they want to trouble the Oedipalized triad of daddy-mommy-me. But they also recognize the strange 'status' of Oedipus: "At times", they write, "we say that Oedipus is nothing, almost nothing (within the order of desiring-production, even in the child); at other times we say that it is everywhere (in the enterprise of domesticating the unconscious, of representing desire and the unconscious). To be sure, we have never dreamed of saying that psychoanalysis invented Oedipus" (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 121). To say that Oedipus is nothing is a recognition that it *only presents itself* as the Real, as sufficient to the Real, when in reality it is little more than a specific (philosophical) framing of reality, in the same way that "philosophy is already the photography of the World" (Laruelle 2011: 9). Alongside Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari see capitalism as enacting a similar photography of the World – hence their recourse to both Freud and Marx. Jonathan Fardy (2021), Alexander Galloway (2012), Katerina Kolozova (2012) and

Laruelle (2015a) himself have all argued extensively, albeit with individual nuances, that capitalism functions by *axiomatically* assuming that everything, including the Real, is reducible to an exchange value. Deleuze and Guattari, likewise, argue for this position in *Anti-Oedipus*, explaining also *how* capitalism comes to take this axiomatic position. "By substituting money for the very notion of a code", they write, "it has created an axiomatic of abstract quantities that keeps moving further and further in the direction of the deterritorialization of the socius" (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 33). Far from being an aberration, the propensity capitalism has for absolute deterritorialization is, for Deleuze and Guattari, a condition of its functioning. This is a rather straightforward Marxist position. For it to become a non-Marxist one would require not only a critique of capital, but also of the "imbrication of philosophy and capital" (Fardy 2021: 6), implying that capitalism is not merely an economic violence, but an epistemological one as well, just as we saw with psychoanalysis. For Laruelle, decoupling Marx from Philosophy is a double task: it entails not only the classic question of "how to break with Hegel?", but also, more generally, how to disentangle form Philosophy-with-a-capital-P, or Philosophy as Sufficiency rather than philosophy "as a particular doctrine" (Laruelle 2015a: 38). It is no secret that Hegel's project represents the philosophy of synthesis *par excellence*, so for Marxism to break with Hegel, and therefore Philosophy, is to treat the One as a dualistic non-relation that refuses a synthesized unity. For Laruelle, "Marx's reticence toward Hegel" is an "indication of a non-philosophical instinct *already implicit* in Marx", even if he did not name it as such (Galloway 2012: 204). Similarly, I would argue that there is a non-philosophical impulse at work in Deleuze and Guattari's theorization of psychoanalysis and capitalism, the latter especially via their exposition of *contingency.* Whereas Marx argues for a typological and evolutionary three-stage theory that moves from savagery to barbarism to civilization, principally influenced by Lewis Henry Morgan's book, *Ancient Society; Or: Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization* (1877), Deleuze and Guattari argue that capitalism, like the formation of Statist societies, was always contested and *contingent.* Instead of relying on a historical materialism that develops as distinct stages, each of which progresses in terms of a thesis, antithesis and synthesis, with communism representing the ultimate (metaphysical, and therefore philosophical) synthesis, Deleuze and Guattari argue against the "dreary, colorless dialectic of evolution, aimed at forming a harmonious whole out of heterogeneous bits by rounding off their rough edges" (1983: 116). In a passage that could be a non-philosophical critique of the co-imbrication of capitalism and philosophy, they write: "As a general rule, the problem of the relationships between parts and the whole continues to be rather awkwardly formulated by classic mechanism and vitalism, so long as the whole is considered as a totality derived from the parts, or as an original totality from which the parts emanate, or as a dialectical totalization" (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 44). In a non-philosophical register of cloning, this could read as: Generally, the problem of the relation between philosophy (or capitalism, or capitalist-philosophy, or philo-

capitalism) and the Real continues to be rather awkwardly formulated by standard philosophy, so long as the Real is considered as a totality derived from philosophical interpretation, or as a dialectical totalization that forms a cogent cosmology of meaning, thereby denying the ordinary, generic individual who, like the Real, is irreducible to the framings, concepts and alienations of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and capital. Instead, the Real is "the 'Lived' of the 'Human-in-Human'", prior to its representative abstractions (Kolozova 2012: 216). Like non-psychoanalysis, non-Marxism is an attempt to describe this ordinary Lived *from* the Real, not *as* the Real, thus acknowledging the non-commutativity of Thought and the Real as a pure dyad that cannot be synthesized. The question now is: Does Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis live up to this or, if not quite, are there enough raw materials in schizoanalysis for it to become a generic practice?

A Generic Schizoanalysis, A Generic Pragmatics

I want to start this section by addressing a critique Laruelle raises against Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* in his article "La concept d'analyse generalisée ou de 'non-analyse'", translated by Taylor Adkins as "The Concept of Generalized Analysis or of 'Non-Analysis'" (2013d). Having taken some time to explain what non-analysis is, which Laruelle also describes as a 'pragmatics of the unconscious' (readers of Deleuze and Guattari will surely recognise 'pragmatics' as another term for 'schizoanalysis'), he writes – and I quote at length:

> What's the point in de-Oedipalizing desire if only to machine it, to fold it to the ultimate restrictive code of desiring machines or to the last fold of "difference"? This combat within philosophy has nothing to do with the scientific safeguarding of analysis and of its real object. If the Unconscious knows neither contradiction nor logic, it will no longer know philosophy, which is an internalizing construction on logic and is inseparable from the latter. Neither formal logic nor combinatory logic, neither logos nor onto-logic, the Unconscious is "hopelessly" empty. It is not a question of again filling it with these substitutes of the imaginary or of the socio-structural. Rather than the last wound, the wound in the last instance or the real wound. And this is not what the Unconscious inflicts upon the Conscious, but what science does to this Unconscious still too full of metaphysical substitutes and transcendent objects; it wounds the residual narcissism of psychoanalysis. (Laruelle 2013d)

Apart from his lengthy meditation on the philosophies of difference of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Deleuze and Derrida in *Philosophies of Difference* (2010b [1986]), Laruelle often makes pithier indictments against Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari, many remaining unexplained, thereby implicitly assuming agreement from the reader – as in

the quote above. (In fairness, many philosophers, including Deleuze and Guattari, do this.) To be clear, for Laruelle Deleuze's theorizations of *Difference* and the *virtual*, as well as Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of the *Body without Organs* (BwO) and the *plane of immanence*, are all examples of philosophical models that start by rejecting dualisms, such as immanence vs transcendence, and then opt for one – immanence in the case of Deleuze and Guattari – but a one that unifies rather than remaining in-One or immanent (to) itself. Laruelle's argument is that even though Deleuze and Guattari claim to *proceed from immanence*, they are actually still laying claim to the Real. According to Laruelle, then, Deleuze and Guattari reduce the Real by making it equivalent to Difference = the virtual = the BwO = the plane of immanence. In *All Thoughts Are Equal*, Ó Maoilearca comes to Deleuze and Guattari's defense, arguing that a concept like the 'plane of immanence' could be read as a "term for the equality of all before Being, the univocity of the Real (where being is said in the same way of every different thing)" (2015: 71). This is a fair reading, though Ó Maoilearca ultimately concedes that Deleuze's invocation of a One-All in a Spinozist vein leaves Deleuze "too much the philosopher for Laruelle's taste" (Ó Maoilearca 2015: 71–72). According to Laruelle, Deleuze and Guattari's concepts succumb, in the end, to a Philosopical Decision, though I would argue that while they do not explicitly argue that the Real (or immanence) is foreclosed to thought – and this is where Laruelle's project is decisive – they do in fact address Sufficiency. This has already been shown in terms of their theorization of psychoanalysis and capitalism, but it could be said of Difference too, at least in the way it is used by Deleuze (rather than, say, Derrida, whose work I am not addressing here). Much has been said about Deleuze's Difference, and I will certainly not recount it all here. Rather, I want to suggest that Difference, rather than being a 'plane' or 'fold' (as Laruelle understands these concepts), is simply *a way of stating the problem of immanence.* Recall that Deleuze says on more than one occasion that problems always get the solutions they deserve because the 'solution' is nothing other than the "conditions under which it is determined as a problem" (1991: 16). When Deleuze talks about 'problems' and 'solutions' he is addressing the relationship between thought and images in thought, which speaks not only to representation – such as representations *of* immanence, or the Real – but also to the image of thought that Philosophy gives to itself, i.e., Sufficiency. Before thought takes place, it therefore "already has an image of what it means to think" (Bénit 2021: 52) – and what it means to think the Real. Having a *new* image of thought would thus be to think *from*, rather than *to*, Difference, which is to say immanence. When Deleuze critiques philosophical thought, especially in the final three of the eight postulates on the dogmatic image of thought, I don't think it is too outrageous to claim that Deleuze himself was already pointing out the false purchase of the Philosophical Decision on the Real. Readers of Deleuze will recall that he elaborates this with reference to non-Euclidean geometry, especially the work of the mathematician, Bernhard Riemann, who further developed Carl Friedrich Gauss's notion of surfaces as spaces in themselves by addressing "a much more general problem:

that of *n*-dimensional surfaces or spaces" (DeLanda 2002: 4). Without invoking the container space of a Euclidean object, such as a cube, which would be expressed in terms of the Euclidean values x, y and z (length, width and height), Riemann showed that only the instantaneous rate of change – the infinitesimal or the velocity at *this* instant – needs to be calculated, which he expressed as *dy/dx*. The rate of change of x with respect to y is thus done without recourse to a global embedding or *transcendent* space. This is why Deleuze (and Guattari) sometimes speak of *n*-1: to indicate that there is no need for a transcendent unity (see Deleuze 1994: 182). To restate this in non-philosophical language, the *n*-1 renders possible a cloning of the One that does not result in or rely on a synthesis but remains immanent (to) itself, or in-One. Deleuze's insistence on univocity is therefore not quite the same as a Spinozist one. Difference differentiating itself is a movement *from* immanence rather than *to* it. Laruelle's argument, in short, that Difference still frames the Real because it functions as a meta-physical principle (see Laruelle 2010b: 27–28). Difference, accordingly, *stands in for* the Real. It could certainly be read this way, and part of the problem for Laruelle is the choice of word here but choosing a word like 'Real' does not come without its own semantic encumbrance, laden with Lacanian overtones as it is. Laruelle does, however, make a substantial effort to sidestep this problem methodologically, but what I hope my discussion shows, albeit in brief, is that this is actually a complex argument, especially given Deleuze's own critique of Philosophy's dogmatic image of thought (i.e., its sufficiency).[2]

I am not trying to diminish Laruelle's project by arguing this point; his non-standard philosophical endeavour is unique, and even though I would argue that he, in some sense, takes Deleuze's project on immanence to its natural conclusion, there are many differences between them. One of the greatest contributions from Laruelle is, as I have already intimated, his methodology for non-philosophically enacting immanence, i.e., his non-epistemology. My point is that while Laruelle argues that Deleuze and Guattari submit desire to philosophical sufficiency, it seems to me that there is a strong case to be made that Difference is a way of posing the problem of immanence, such that the human-in-subject can be given new coordinates which, if not non-philosophical *as such*, does have a larval non-philosophical drive. This is true of *Difference and Repetition* as much as it is for *Anti-Oedipus.* For example, Deleuze and Guattari write: "In like fashion we are compelled to say that *psychoanalysis has its metaphysics* – its name is Oedipus. And that a revolution – this time material*ist* – can proceed only by way of a critique of Oedipus, by denouncing the illegitimate use of the syntheses of the unconscious as found in Oedipal psychoanalysis, so as to rediscover a *transcendental unconscious defined by the immanence of its criteria*, and a corresponding practice that we shall call schizoanalysis" (Deleuze;

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[2] I take some time elaborating this point as much (though not all) of the secondary literature on Laruelle tends to follow his critique of Deleuze (and Guattari) rather than engaging with this tension more substantially. At the same time, I admit that I am not doing Laruelle's very detailed arguments justice here due to space constraints – and they absolutely do deserve to be engaged with rigorously. My hope is that readers will follow this trail of crumbs.

Guattari 1983: 75, emphasis added). Clearly, granting that Oedipus functions as a metaphysics laying claim to the One is a 'real kernel' – a recognition that generically lived reality exceeds philosophical abstraction, which leads to the discovery of what could read either as 'the One-in-One defined by the immanence of its criteria' (which is how I read it here) or as 'a plane of immanence defined by the immanence of its criteria' (which is how I suspect Laruelle would read it). Laruelle would also argue for a material rather than material*ist* 'revolution' – and here I would take his point (not as philosophical interpretation, but as axiomatic). Elsewhere they write: "It is not the purpose of schizoanalysis to resolve Oedipus, it does not intend to resolve it better than Oedipal psychoanalysis does. Its aim is to de-oedipalize the unconscious in order *to reach the real problems*" (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 81, emphasis added). Here schizoanalysis is presented as a generic practice which, like Laruelle's non-psychoanalysis, reduces the transcendent foundation of Freudian analysis to something quite ordinary: a "simple *dimension* of human phenomena" (Laruelle 2013d) – to *a* life, which "is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing" which "is itself a life" (Deleuze 2005:11), though whereas Deleuze describes *a* life as *absolute*, it is *radical* for Laruelle. There are many more examples such as these, but rather than arguing about whether Deleuze and Guattari are, on the whole, non-philosophical – which is not the larger point I am trying to make here in any case – there is enough to at least assume a non-philosophical instinct and, as such, I want to think about what a generic schizoanalysis might look like.

Towards the end of *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari outline a negative task of schizoanalysis – "defamiliarizing, de-oedipalizing, decastrating; undoing theater, dream, and fantasy; decoding, deterritorializing" (1983: 381) – as well as two positive tasks, the first being to discover how desiring-machines work, *detached from any foregone interpretations* (1983: 322), and the second being "to reach the investments of unconscious desire of the social field" (1983: 350). These tasks seem to me to be summed up in the second iteration of their project, namely *A Thousand Plateaus*, as: "if human beings have a destiny, it is rather to escape the face, to dismantle the face and facializations, to become imperceptible, to become clandestine" (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 171). This could be phrased differently as: it is the destiny of psychoanalysis to lose its 'face', just as it is the destiny of capitalism to lose its 'face', because faciality is precisely the Philosophical Decision whereby ordinary, lived reality becomes overcoded. This overcoding effectuates an incorporeal transformation that submits all subjectivation processes to the hierarchical functions of biunivocalization and binarization *in advance*, where the former functions to create mutually opposed groupings (x or y; man or woman; white or black) and the latter to set a normative standard between these, so ensuring measurement (x is better – read more normative and less deviant – than Y) (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 177). The destructive aim of schizoanalysis is thus to undo the mask of faciality in order to allow subjectivation, or individuation, to take place without the predetermined ascription processes and trajectory conditions of faciality. At this point,

however, schizoanalysis remains at the level of the signifier and subjectivity. Deleuze and Guattari themselves say this: "Dismantling the face is the same as breaking through the wall of the signifier and getting out of the black hole of subjectivity" (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 188). They then go on, in the next line, to describe this explicitly as the 'programme' and 'slogan' of schizoanalysis. For it to become non-philosophical, or a *generic* schizoanalysis, it cannot however remain at the level of subjectivity or individuation as that 'redeems' the human-in-subject at only one level, while failing to transform the human-in-subject to the Human-in-Human by delivering it from the sufficiency of the Philosophical Decision. That is, a generic schizoanalysis would also have to be about philosophy losing its face or, positively stated, about philosophy becoming a probe-head rather than being a faciality machine.

Here, a generic schizoanalysis would benefit from Laruelle's *General Theory of Victims* in which he argues that philosophy is itself the criminal that creates victims by enclosing the Human-in-Human within a Philosophical Decision. That is to say, the Philosophical Decision is itself an enactment of faciality. This being said, Laruelle holds that it is the victim who, paradoxically, can 'save' intellectuals by helping them become *generic*. In his words: "there is a single vectorial equation or a vector state for the victim and the intellectual. The intellectual passes through the two states; in general, he [*sic*] helps the victim acquire the power to manifest, judge, and thus 'save' the criminal. But he contributes to saving himself (judging himself, condemning himself, etc.) by superposing himself on the victim and abandoning his spontaneously or 'unconsciously' criminal side" (Laruelle 2015b: 154). Stated plainly, philosophy, and philosophers, and thus also schizoanalysis, becomes generic by *reducing* the double hallucination of standard philosophy (or standard psychoanalysis) to a phenomenal immanence that, instead of being subject to a principle of logical or philosophical identity, is subjected to a quantum indivisibility that nevertheless remains a non-commutativity of the Real and the Human-in-Human or Victim-in-person (2-in-1 in-the-last-instance or 1-(of)-2). For Laruelle, this is the "underdetermining condition of justice" (2015b: xxi) which requires that philosophy's Sufficiency be replaced by a Principle of Compassion – not pity, not vengeance and not heroism, as he goes on to explain. Compassion is not reducible to any form of Christian, material*ist* or human*ist* sympathy, just as it is not a principle "except in-the-last-instance", which would render it generic: "universal-without-reason" and "necessary-without-sufficiency" (Laruelle 2015b: 47). This requires thinking humanity as non-facialized – "as indivisible by cultures, communities, and races, while at the same time as not being a transcendent unity like essence or nature" (Laruelle 2015b: 7). Laruelle proposes that this be done not at the level of subjectivity, but at the level of non-epistemology: by rendering the human the 'object' of an axiom that is stripped of all philosophical attributes. Yet this axiom would have to simultaneously allow the human to be a 'subject' or, more precisely, "the lived or neutralized materiality, what we call an 'oraxiom'" – the generic or non-philosophical portmanteau that superposes "the oracle

and the axiom, or the axiom-subject" (Laruelle 2015b: 7). Laruelle's scientific endeavour becomes clear here: rather than collapsing the Victim-in-person into the synthesized object-subject of Philosophy, the cloning of victims becomes the under-determining last instance of intellectuals. Call to mind that Deleuze and Guattari argue that faciality functions according to resonance and redundancy, because in the same way that news headlines tell us what to believe, remember, expect, etc., so too does the ultimate normative face, namely the Christ face. The Christ face thus functions as a distillation of faciality and is redundant precisely because it has been repeated or resonated so many times that the referent is not actually Christ's face, but a copy (of a copy) thereof. It would seem, then, that the Human-in-Human, as much as Philosophy, are in need of redemption *from* rather than *by* Christ. Laruelle argues that it is the victim who "carries with it resurrection, or rather the prior-to-the-first insurrection, against the dialectic of being and nothingness, which has no real or lived sense" (2015b: 44), because the victim forces a gnostic or generic passivity towards the Real. Instead of *analysis*, a generic schizoanalysis would proceed by way of *dualysis* – a method whereby the strong force of the Philosophical Decision is weakened because it refuses a synthesis or unity of the dyad. To 'arise' is to dualyse rather than analyse or synthesize – to bring generic lived experience *back to life* by affirming "the primacy of the glorious body over the duplicity of the world" (Laruelle 2015b: 112). The generic (in)(re)surrection, or non-schizoanalysis, of the Victim-in-person as an *ordinary messiah* is therefore a direct response to messianic facialization or the criminal violence of philosophy. Could it be the line that frees a non-philosophical probe-head?

Deleuze and Guattari remain quite vague on what a probe-head is, but they do give us some indication of what it does: "dismantle the strata in their wake, break through the walls of signifiance, pour out of the holes of subjectivity, fell trees in favor of veritable rhizomes, and steer the flows down lines of positive deterritorializaton or creative flight" (1987: 190). It could thus be viewed as a non-philosophical *tool* for un-building the structures of standard psychoanalysis. As a non-schizoanalytic tool it would also transform psychoanalysis from a technology of the unconscious into a schizo-dualysis of the Human-in-person – a science founded on the immanent being of the human, where any 'loss' is treated as nothing more or less than just that: a generic immanent part of radical lived experience rather than a redoubled object for Freudian analysis that "can only go to the point of a half-loss, just as it [only] comes to the point of a half-rediscovery" (Laruelle 2013d).

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