



Schizoanalysis as a  
Multidisciplinary  
Practice and Theory

LD

50  
Years  
Anti-  
Oedipus

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## ***Introduction – La Schizoanalyse et nous***

par GABRIEL MART & DIMITRI BOCHKOV [ИННОКЕНТИЙ МАРТЫНОВ & ДМИТРИЙ БОЧКОВ]

50 ans de *l'Anti-Œdipe*. Légitiment, cette année a été marquée par une multitude d'événements thématiques, mais aussi évidente que soit la première affirmation, il était encore nécessaire d'en marquer l'impressionnante géographie: il est rare que le sujet permette une telle transgression de la tendance à la domination anglo-américaine dans l'espace académique. Nous – pédagogues, psychanalystes, sociologues, philosophes, critiques et activistes, plus ou moins orientés vers les idées du projet de pensée dont Guattari a présenté la première version (charmante par son caractère contradictoire) avec Deleuze en 1972 – savons bien que les institutions, elles aussi, "parlent", établissant les relations de transfert tout en créant les défenses psychiques, etc. Il semble que notre série de rencontres au cours de l'année anniversaire ait pu nous rappeler ce que nous oublions souvent derrière la molarité du quotidien de notre travail: l'institution apparaît elle-même comme un sujet dans son inconscient. En observant nos collègues (et bien sûr nous-mêmes), nous avons vu que lorsque nous parlons des abstractions sociales et métaphysiques complexes de *L'Anti-Œdipe* depuis la tribune institutionnelle, nous parlons en fait de choses très personnelles: des réfractions locales de la schizoanalyse où le ciblage transforme le discours en parole.

La schizoanalyse et nous. Chaque année, chercheurs et critiques arrivent à inventer de nouveaux truismes sur la pertinence globale de *L'Anti-Œdipe* de l'année N. Sans oser nous inscrire dans cette glorieuse tradition, nous nous limiterons à un constat local qui nous est proche: deux processus différemment orientés, mais complémentaires se déroulent parallèlement en Russie. D'une part, un mouvement spécifique vers la singularité: la Russie tente actuellement de passer de la névrose collective à la névrose individuelle; il semble que ce processus risque d'être inversé par la guerre en Ukraine qui nous ramène à la névrose collective. D'autre part, un mouvement général en Occident vers la réappropriation de l'agentivité, à travers, surtout, l'agencement collectif (on se souvient du triomphe de Reddit sur les grands *traders* de Wall Street et de l'augmentation du cours de la bourse de GameStop). Guattari lui-même se serait sûrement réjoui d'une telle incohérence, mais la pertinence suffit-elle à rendre possible l'importation de la schizoanalyse en Russie ? Dans quel contexte la pensée guattarienne s'inscrit-elle ? Nous avons essayé de spéculer sur les facteurs cliniques, institutionnels et sociaux de la schizoanalyse en Russie. L'inspiration pour cette courte présentation est venue d'un article de Ian Parker (2021) sur Guattari dans la revue *Free Associations*.

Un certain nombre d'ouvrages majeurs de Deleuze et Guattari, notamment

*Capitalisme et schizophrénie* et *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie ?* ont été traduits en russe depuis très longtemps. De même, trois traductions de textes de Guattari, bien que modestes, sont à mentionner ces dernières années: l'essai *Les trois écologies* et l'article « Machine et structure » sont parus en 2019 et notre traduction conjointe de l'article « Un changement de paradigme » a été publiée en 2021 (Guattari 2019a; 2019b; 2021). Mais malgré sa popularité assez large parmi les philosophes, les idées cliniques de Guattari restent presque inconnues dans le milieu russophone. Le générique « schizoanalyse » est rare, de plus en plus remplacé par « de Deleuze ». Tout le monde croit savoir ce qu'est la schizoanalyse, mais ne veut pas la comprendre: lire Deleuze et Guattari est beaucoup plus inconfortable que lire simplement Deleuze. On a tendance d'oublier que Guattari est resté clinicien jusqu'à sa mort, psychanalyste si l'on veut, et qu'il a travaillé non seulement comme psychothérapeute à La Borde, mais qu'il effectuait aussi des séances analytiques privées dans son cabinet rue Saint-Sauveur.

Cependant, il ne s'agit pas d'un problème spécifiquement russe. Dans le monde anglo-américain, la « clinique » est prise en otage avec succès par le Capitalisme Mondial Intégré. La vision de la clinique de santé mentale, imposée par les agents d'assurance, est aujourd'hui déjà légitimement reproduite sans leur participation, par les gens eux-mêmes, qui ont vu la source des identifications chères dans les pratiques de répression mentale: le triumvirat scientifique de la pharmacologie, du neurofascisme et du comportementalisme cognitif (une réorganisation de l'Ego-Psychology américaine qui a perverti la psychanalyse). Avec la victoire de la pharmacologie sur « l'antipsychiatrie », il semble qu'il n'y ait plus de place pour une autre « clinique ».

Est-ce le cas en Russie ? À certains égards, le contexte historique de la Russie recoupe celui de l'Amérique latine: le développement de la médecine et de la santé mentale en Russie, comme en Amérique latine, s'est fait en dehors de l'orbite du monde anglo-américain pendant une période considérable. Un autre point de convergence est l'importante inégalité sociale en termes d'accès aux soins psychothérapeutiques; au Brésil, en Uruguay ou en Argentine, le système public est plus propice à la diffusion et à l'établissement de pratiques psychanalytiques qu'en Russie, même si la « qualité » de ces psychanalyses est remise en question (Tupinamba 2021). Pour comprendre la particularité du contexte russe dans la clinique, un certain nombre de facteurs doivent être pris en compte. En Occident, la pratique de la santé mentale a émergé du milieu hospitalier. Par exemple, en Angleterre, l'hôpital psychiatrique était autrefois un « asile de fous », une prison, et en France, un refuge politique local. Cela a, dans une large mesure, façonné les perceptions de la pratique psy. Si Parker dérive le destin de la schizoanalyse en Occident de l'unité d'hospitalisation, en Russie il devrait être dérivé de l'unité ambulatoire. Depuis les années 1920, la Russie a développé un réseau de dispensaires psychoneurologiques publics – des structures ambulatoires et semi-hospitalières rattachées aux hôpitaux psychiatriques. Le dispensaire psychoneurologique était considéré comme un établissement de soins primaires, au

même titre qu'une polyclinique thérapeutique générale ou une clinique gynécologique. En outre, des cabinets psychothérapeutiques ont été ouverts dans le cadre des polycliniques pour adultes (toutefois, au lieu d'un psychologue praticien, c'est un psychiatre qui y est installé), et des cabinets psychoneurologiques ont été ouverts dans le cadre des polycliniques pédiatriques. Ce système devait permettre d'offrir des soins psychiatriques révolutionnaires aux masses sans les retirer de la société. L'établissement hospitalier, quant à lui, devient le lieu où sont gardés les patients les plus graves, soit en crise, soit en pleine décompensation mentale. Ce système « psy » ambulatoire est l'œuvre de Nikolai Semashko, proche des idées de l'hygiène sociale, qui a introduit la nosologie psychiatrique s'ancrant dans les conditions sociales de l'individu. Les psychiatres russes ont été l'un des premiers groupes professionnels à soutenir le coup d'État bolchevik qui promettait des changements sociaux et politiques grandioses (Lavretsky 1998). Les bolcheviks ont tenu leur promesse, mais pas de la manière dont les pys l'ont perçue – la fin des années 1930 a vu une unification grandiose et révolutionnaire des perspectives théoriques, y compris dans le domaine des soins psychologiques. L'hygiène sociale a également été victime de cette unification.

La situation ne s'est pas améliorée après la guerre et après la mort de Staline. Alors que les hôpitaux psychiatriques occidentaux ont ouvert leurs portes dans les années 60 et 70, c'est exactement le contraire qui est arrivé en Russie où à l'inverse la marginalisation de l'hôpital psychiatrique a été lancée. Le système ambulatoire a commencé à s'ossifier au fur et à mesure: le médecin généraliste, nécessairement présent dans toutes les polycliniques, s'est transformé en distributeur de patients à d'autres médecins (Sheiman 2013). L'hôpital psychiatrique était perçu comme une sorte de prison particulière. Tout problème psychiatrique même peu grave était perçu comme une maladie dangereuse. C'est une sorte de métonymie qui s'est produite: toute personne recherchant des soins psychiatriques ambulatoires est désormais perçue comme potentiellement dangereuse et exposée à l'expulsion sociale et à l'isolement dans une prison spéciale. Jusqu'à aujourd'hui, les institutions psychiatriques sont désignées de manière dépréciative, mais prudente, par le terme « *durka* » (consonant avec le terme russe « *durak* », fou). Les mots "schizo", "schizophrène", "autiste" sont encore des jurons très communs dans le langage quotidien. L'utilisation des services psychiatriques par les autorités soviétiques à des fins politiques (suppression des opposants) a contribué à l'attitude méfiante des Russes à l'égard de toute forme de psychopratique. Une métaphore clinique essentielle à la schizoanalyse, la schizophrénie, la *dementia praecox*, contenait des connotations politiques explicites dans le contexte soviétique, associées aux pratiques et aux abus répressifs de l'État. La « schizophrénie à évolution lente », désignée par Snezhnevsky comme une « variété non psychotique » (le phénomène que les analystes appelleraient aujourd'hui psychose ordinaire ou blanche), est devenue la marque de fabrique de la psychiatrie punitive, utilisée par l'État soviétique à partir des années 1960 pour lutter contre les dissidents. Il faut également mentionner un autre

aspect du contexte russe. Alors que dans certaines parties du monde les psychologues ont pu devenir une alternative plus « amicale » au psychiatre, pour les Russes, tout praticien psy – psychiatre, psychologue, psychothérapeute, psychanalyste – est perçu comme un médecin et, par conséquent, comme un élément d'une machine psychiatrique effrayante. À l'hôpital, les patients me demandent (G.M.) périodiquement de regarder leur estomac ou se plaignent d'une toux. Le fait qu'avant l'effondrement de l'Union soviétique, la psychothérapie était majoritairement perçue comme une thérapie par la suggestion ou l'hypnose crée également des attentes spécifiques chez les gens. Dans un tel environnement, la population en général est plus susceptible de se tourner vers des coachs de vie, l'ésotérisme ou une bouteille de vodka que vers un système de santé mentale.

Au-delà des aspects de la clinique russe, il faut également aborder le thème social. La Russie n'a pas échappé à l'idéologie néolibérale de la réussite à outrance, du bonheur imposé de manière répressive, ainsi que de la culpabilité et du désespoir face à l'impossibilité de l'atteindre. En plus de la particularité de la clinique russe, les gens ne se sentent pas seulement cassés, mais croient qu'ils peuvent être réparés comme un automate. Ce qu'ils attendent d'un praticien de psy, c'est qu'il les fera guérir: une position de passivité où une manipulation médicale ou magique sera effectuée sur le sujet. C'est simple et facile ! Réparé, à nouveau fonctionnel. Cela explique la prolifération des psychotechniques de toutes sortes où le sujet est parlé par l'Autre lacanien dans le sens psychotique le plus malin: la recherche de scénario de vie dans les vies antérieures, traumatismes de la naissance, astrologie, hypnose, codage et autres « magies urbaines », bien monétisées par le capitalisme tardif. Il est difficile de dire s'il y a derrière tout cela un besoin d'expérimentation créative, libératrice et ontologique. On peut également y voir un fondement pragmatique. La psychopratique de qualité reste, semble-t-il, assez inaccessible. Le recours à un spécialiste très qualifié (ce qui, en Russie, implique souvent la formation obtenue à l'étranger) reste une prérogative réservée à la classe moyenne supérieure, mais le marché surchauffé des services psy est truffé de praticiens aux qualifications douteuses, enclins au dumping. L'absence totale de diplôme ou d'autres barrières minimales à l'entrée dans le métier n'améliore pas la situation.

D'autre part, les institutions publiques ne garantissent pas non plus de qualifications spécialisées et il peut être difficile de s'y rendre autrement qu'en « ambulance ». En outre, les gens ne sont pas prêts à contribuer à long terme dans leur bien-être mental. Ils seraient plus disposés à payer dix ou cent fois cette somme à un guide ésotérique ou à un hypnotiseur s'il promet de les « réparer » en une seule séance. Les modalités psychothérapeutiques communes, qui ont été simplement importées après l'effondrement de l'Union soviétique dans les années 1990, entrent en conflit avec le contexte social particulier. Ainsi, en raison du taux élevé de divorce et de mortalité masculine, la famille nucléaire était en crise depuis près de 20 ans. D'où vient une anecdote russe courante: « La moitié du pays a été élevée par une famille homosexuelle

composée d'une mère et d'une grand-mère ». Bien que la famille nucléaire soit en train d'être réinventée en Russie, la psychanalyse anglo-américaine basée sur ce phénomène est mal accueillie et ses adeptes ressemblent soit à un culte du cargo, soit à une loge maçonnique. La psychanalyse freudienne, plus ouverte et plus souple, est mieux accueillie dans certains milieux, bien qu'elle ne représente pas un phénomène social remarquable. Les systèmes familiaux sont confrontés à des difficultés similaires. Le comportementalisme cognitif, quant à lui, ne fait que pervertir davantage l'état déjà précaire de la psyché russe. Dans une telle situation, les pratiques « humanistes » de « caresses » sociales se sont considérablement répandues: Gestalt, Rogerianisme, psychologie positive et leurs variantes locales.

Ainsi, l'importation directe de la schizoanalyse en Russie est impossible, tout comme l'importation directe de n'importe quelle autre école analytique. La schizoanalyse se distingue favorablement des autres écoles en ce que le caractère de la schizoanalyse contredit l'idée d'une importation simple. La schizoanalyse est une doctrine incomplète et contradictoire, pas une orthodoxie profonde laissée par le maître à ses élèves. Néanmoins, elle n'est pas tant un assemblage analytique qu'un métamodèle qui peut se déployer dans des domaines variés. Guattari lui-même, au début de ses *Cartographies schizoanalytiques*, ne présente pas la schizoanalyse comme une nouvelle marque plus fidèle de la psychanalyse ni comme une nouvelle discipline alternative à celle-ci. Au contraire, une telle dialectique des contradictions pour la schizoanalyse est un autre réductionnisme malvenu. Guattari écrit qu'il cherche à libérer tous les éléments de valeur qui ont été découverts par la psychanalyse de ses couches réductionnistes. Si, dans un certain contexte national, il était important que les schizoanalystes se distancient de la psychanalyse, ce n'est pas le cas en Russie. De même que pour le Russe, tout le monde dans la clinique est médecin, tout analyste – guattarien, winnicottien, lacanien – sera toujours le même psychanalyste. En même temps, dans le contexte créé par la trajectoire du développement de la clinique russe, il semble plus pertinent de se distancier non pas de la psychanalyse, mais de la psychothérapie: cette dénomination forme certaines attentes chez le patient russe. Il s'attend à être soigné, que quelque chose lui soit fait, il accepte déjà la passivité avant qu'elle ne se déroule. L'utilisation de la racine « schiz » comme un juron courant soulève également le problème du « *branding* ». La schizoanalyse est vraiment difficile à présenter. La schizoanalyse est en fait constituée de trois projets: un programme de la philosophie et de la théorie sociale développé par Guattari avec Gilles Deleuze (psychiatrie matérialiste et ontologie glossématique); un métamodèle; et une pratique clinique. S'il n'est pas possible de présenter la schizoanalyse comme quelque chose d'unifié, nous suggérons d'avancer pas à pas, en commençant par la clinique – le domaine de pratique le plus clair – précédée par des recherches théoriques présentées lors des événements thématiques orientés vers l'académie.

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## ***Introduction – Schizoanalysis and Us***

by GABRIEL MART & DIMITRI BOCHKOV [ИННОКЕНТИЙ МАРТЫНОВ & ДМИТРИЙ БОЧКОВ]

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50 years of *Anti-Œdipus*. Legitimately, this year has been marked by a multitude of thematic events, but as obvious as the first statement is, it was still necessary to mark its impressive geography: it's rare that the subject allows such a transgression of the Anglo American tendency to dominate academic space. We – pedagogues, psychoanalysts, sociologists, philosophers, critics and activists, more or less oriented towards the ideas of the project of thought of which Guattari presented the first version (charming in its contradictory nature) with Deleuze in 1972 – are well aware that institutions, too, "speak", establishing transference relations while creating psychic defenses and so on. It seems that our series of meetings over the course of the anniversary year has reminded us of what we often forget behind the molarity of our day-to-day work: the institution itself appears as a subject in its unconscious. Observing our colleagues (and, of course, ourselves), we've seen that when we talk about the complex social and metaphysical abstractions of *L'Anti-Œdipus* from the institutional podium, we're actually talking about very personal things: local refractions of schizoanalysis where targeting transforms discourse into speech.

Schizoanalysis and us. Every year, researchers and critics come up with new truisms about the global relevance of *L'Anti-Œdipus* of year n. Without daring to join in this glorious tradition, we'll confine ourselves to a local observation that's close to home: two differently oriented but complementary processes are running in parallel in Russia. On the one hand, a specific movement towards singularity: Russia is currently trying to move from collective neurosis to individual neurosis; it seems that this process risks being reversed by the war in Ukraine, which brings us back to collective neurosis. On the other hand, a general movement in the West towards the reappropriation of agency, through, above all, collective arrangement (we remember Reddit's triumph over the big Wall Street traders and GameStop's stock price rise). Guattari himself would surely have welcomed such incoherence, but is relevance enough to make it possible to import schizoanalysis into Russia? What is the context of Guattari's thinking? We have tried to speculate on the clinical, institutional and social factors of schizoanalysis in Russia. The inspiration for this short presentation came from an article by Ian Parker (2021) on Guattari in the journal *Free Associations*.

A number of major works by Deleuze and Guattari, including *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* and *What is Philosophy?* have been translated into Russian for a very long time. Similarly, three translations of Guattari's texts, albeit modest, are worth mentioning in recent years: the essay *Les trois écologies* and the article "Machine et structure" appeared in 2019, and our joint translation of the article "Un changement de paradigme" was published in 2021 (Guattari 2019a; 2019b; 2021). But despite his fairly widespread popularity among philosophers, Guattari's clinical ideas remain almost unknown in Russian-speaking circles. The generic "schizoanalysis" is rare and increasingly replaced by "Deleuze's". Everyone thinks they know what schizoanalysis is, but doesn't want to understand it: reading Deleuze and Guattari is much more uncomfortable than simply reading Deleuze. We tend to forget that Guattari remained a clinician until his death, a psychoanalyst if you like, and that he not only worked as a psychotherapist at La Borde, but also conducted private analytical sessions in his office on rue Saint-Sauveur.

However, this is not a specifically Russian problem. In the Anglo-American world, the "clinic" is being successfully hijacked by Integrated World Capitalism. The vision of the mental health clinic, imposed by insurance agents, is today already being legitimately reproduced without their participation, by the people themselves, who have seen the source of cherished identification in the practices of mental repression: the scientific triumvirate of pharmacology, neurofascism and cognitive behaviorism (a reorganization of American Ego-Psychology that perverted psychoanalysis). With the victory of pharmacology over "anti-psychiatry", there seems to be no room left for another "clinic".

Is this the case in Russia? In some respects, Russia's historical context overlaps with that of Latin America: the development of medicine and mental health in Russia, as in Latin America, took place outside the orbit of the Anglo-American world for a considerable period. Another point of convergence is the significant social inequality in terms of access to psychotherapeutic care; in Brazil, Uruguay or Argentina, the public system is more conducive to the spread and establishment of psychoanalytic practices than in Russia, even if the "quality" of these psychoanalyses is called into question (Tupinamba 2021). To understand the particularity of the Russian clinical context, a number of factors need to be taken into account. In the West, mental health practice emerged from the hospital environment. For example, in England, the psychiatric hospital was once an "insane asylum", a prison, and in France, a local political refuge. This has, to a large extent, shaped perceptions of psy practice. If Parker derives the fate of schizoanalysis in the West from the inpatient unit, in Russia it should be derived from the outpatient unit. Since the 1920s, Russia has developed a network of public psychoneurological dispensaries – outpatient and semi-outpatient structures attached to psychiatric hospitals. The psychoneurological dispensary was considered a primary care facility, on a par with a general therapeutic polyclinic or gynecological clinic. In addition, psychotherapeutic practices were opened in adult polyclinics (albeit with a psychiatrist instead of a practicing psychologist), and psychoneurological practices were opened in pediatric polyclinics. This system was

intended to bring revolutionary psychiatric care to the masses without removing them from society. Hospitals, on the other hand, became the place where the most serious patients, either in crisis or in the throes of mental decompensation, were kept. This outpatient psychiatric system was the work of Nikolai Semashko, who was close to the ideas of social hygiene and introduced a psychiatric nosology rooted in the individual's social conditions. Russian psychiatrists were one of the first professional groups to support the Bolshevik coup d'état, which promised grandiose social and political change (Lavretsky 1998). The Bolsheviks kept their promise, but not in the way psychiatrists saw it – the late 1930s saw a grandiose and revolutionary unification of theoretical perspectives, including in the field of psychological care. Social hygiene also fell victim to this unification.

The situation did not improve after the war and the death of Stalin. While Western psychiatric hospitals opened their doors in the 60s and 70s, exactly the opposite happened in Russia, where the marginalization of psychiatric hospitals was launched. The ambulatory system began to ossify as it went along: the general practitioner, necessarily present in all polyclinics, was transformed into a distributor of patients to other doctors (Sheiman 2013). The psychiatric hospital was perceived as a special kind of prison. Any psychiatric problem, no matter how minor, was seen as a dangerous illness. A kind of metonymy took place: anyone seeking outpatient psychiatric care was now perceived as potentially dangerous and exposed to social expulsion and isolation in a special prison. To this day, psychiatric institutions are disparagingly, but carefully, referred to as "*durka*" (consonant with the Russian word "*durak*", mad). The words "schizo", "schizophrenic" and "autistic" are still common swear words in everyday language. The Soviet authorities' use of psychiatric services for political purposes (suppression of opponents) contributed to Russians' distrust of all forms of psychopractice. An essential clinical metaphor in schizoanalysis, schizophrenia, dementia praecox, contained explicit political connotations in the Soviet context, associated with repressive state practices and abuses. Slow-onset schizophrenia", referred to by Snezhnevsky as a "non-psychotic variety" (the phenomenon analysts today would call ordinary or white psychosis), became the hallmark of punitive psychiatry, used by the Soviet state from the 1960s onwards to combat dissidents. We should also mention another aspect of the Russian context. While in some parts of the world psychologists may have become a more "friendly" alternative to the psychiatrist, for Russians, any psy practitioner – psychiatrist, psychologist, psychotherapist, psychoanalyst – is perceived as a doctor and, therefore, as part of a frightening psychiatric machine. In hospital, patients periodically ask me (G.M.) to look at their stomachs or complain of coughing. The fact that, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, psychotherapy was largely perceived as therapy through suggestion or hypnosis also creates specific expectations in people. In such an environment, the general population is more likely to turn to life coaches, esotericism or a bottle of vodka than to a mental health system.

In addition to the clinical aspects of the Russian situation, there is also the social theme. Russia has not escaped the neoliberal ideology of excessive success, repressively imposed happiness, and guilt and despair over the impossibility of achieving it. In addition to the peculiarity of the Russian clinic, people not only feel broken, but believe they can be fixed like an automaton. What they expect from a shrink's practitioner is that he'll make them well: a position of passivity where a medical or magical manipulation will be performed on the subject. Simple and easy! Repaired, functional again. This explains the proliferation of psychotechniques of all kinds, in which the subject is spoken to by the Lacanian Other in the most malignant psychotic sense: the search for life scenarios in past lives, birth traumas, astrology, hypnosis, coding and other "urban magics", well monetized by late capitalism. It's hard to say whether there's a need for creative, liberating and ontological experimentation behind all this. There is also a pragmatic basis. Quality psychopractice remains, it seems, fairly inaccessible. The use of a highly qualified specialist (which, in Russia, often implies training obtained abroad) remains a prerogative reserved for the upper middle class, but the overheated market for psychology services is rife with practitioners of dubious qualifications, prone to dumping. The total absence of diplomas or other minimum barriers to entry into the profession does not improve the situation.

On the other hand, public institutions don't guarantee specialist qualifications either, and it can be difficult to get to them other than by "ambulance". What's more, people are not prepared to make a long-term contribution to their mental well-being. They'd be more willing to pay ten or a hundred times that amount to an esoteric guide or hypnotist if he promises to "fix" them in a single session. Common psychotherapeutic modalities, which were simply imported after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, come into conflict with the particular social context. For example, due to high divorce rates and male mortality, the nuclear family had been in crisis for almost 20 years. Hence a common Russian anecdote: "Half the country was raised by a homosexual family consisting of a mother and a grandmother". Although the nuclear family is being reinvented in Russia, Anglo American psychoanalysis based on this phenomenon is unwelcome, and its followers resemble either a cargo cult or a Masonic lodge. Freudian psychoanalysis, which is more open and flexible, is better received in some circles, although it does not represent a remarkable social phenomenon. Family systems face similar difficulties. Cognitive behaviorism, on the other hand, only further perverts the already precarious state of the Russian psyche. In such a situation, "humanist" practices of social "caressing" have spread considerably: Gestalt, Rogerianism, positive psychology and their local variants.

Thus, the direct import of schizoanalysis into Russia is impossible, as is the direct import of any other analytic school. Schizoanalysis differs favorably from other schools in that the character of schizoanalysis contradicts the idea of a simple import. Schizoanalysis is an incomplete and contradictory doctrine, not a profound orthodoxy left by the master to his pupils. Nevertheless, it is not so much an analytical assemblage as a metamodel that can be deployed in a variety of fields. Guattari himself, at the start of his *Cartographies*

*schizoanalytiques*, does not present schizoanalysis as a new, more faithful brand of psychoanalysis, nor as a new alternative discipline to it. On the contrary, such a dialectic of contradictions for schizoanalysis is another unwelcome reductionism. Guattari writes that he seeks to liberate all the valuable elements that have been discovered by psychoanalysis from its reductionist layers. If, in a certain national context, it was important for schizoanalysts to distance themselves from psychoanalysis, this is not the case in Russia. Just as, for the Russian, everyone in the clinic is a doctor, any analyst – Guattarian, Winnicottian, Lacanian – will always be the same psychoanalyst. At the same time, in the context created by the trajectory of development of the Russian clinic, it seems more pertinent to distance ourselves not from psychoanalysis, but from psychotherapy: this denomination forms certain expectations in the Russian patient. He expects to be cared for, to have something done to him; he already accepts passivity before it takes place. The use of the root "schiz" as a common swearword also raises the issue of "branding". Schizoanalysis is really difficult to present. Schizoanalysis is actually made up of three projects: a program of philosophy and social theory developed by Guattari with Gilles Deleuze (materialist psychiatry and glossematic ontology); a metamodel; and a clinical practice. If it's not possible to present schizoanalysis as something unified, we suggest moving forward step by step, starting with the clinic – the clearest area of practice – preceded by theoretical research presented at academy-oriented thematic events.

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## ***Ritornelos caosmóticos. Cartografia de encontros com Guattari e Deleuze***

por MARIA LUIZA CARDINALE BAPTISTA

### **Abstract**

This text has the character of an essay, having been written as a report of reflective experience with a cartography of encounters with the authors Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze, resulting from studies, experiences, teaching and research with schizoanalysis for over 30 years. In a personal writing, the researcher focuses on the concept of ritornello as a link that detaches and returns, that intertwines, connects, intensely sensitizes, in the middle of chaosmotic processes – of chaos, of osmosis in the cosmos. The author presents elements of the desiring intensity of the encounters with the authors, in order to share how she has constituted herself as a schizoanalytic subject, in alignment and intertwining with contemporary assumptions of holistic, ecosystemic and complex science. There are signs of schizoanalytic arrangements in personal experience and in the various existential universes of 'co-experience'.

### **Preliminares**

Eu costumo dizer que o texto também tem suas preliminares, assim como as relações mais saborosas. Aquele tempo de enlaçar-se, enamorar-se no outro, sentindo, vivendo, propondo, tocando, afetivando, insinuando-se e misturando-se. Assim, penso também na delícia que é escrever e sentir-pensar uma fala ou uma inscrição desejante, numa proposta do que eu venho chamando de inscricional, que inscreve, cria e aciona, projeta potência de relação, de um devir significação compartilhado, com proposta de entrega e acolhimento amoroso. O conceito sentir pensar é atribuído a Fals Borda, foi difundido amplamente pela obra de Eduardo Galeano. É curioso, no entanto, o que relata o próprio Fals Borda sobre a criação da palavra: “Esse sentipensante que aparece em meus livros não fui eu que inventei. Isso foi lá em um dos pântanos próximos de San Benito Abad, perto de Jegua, lá por esses lugares, que algo aconteceu com um pescador que estava comigo e disse: ‘Olhe para nós, acreditamos que agimos com o coração, mas também usamos a cabeça e quando combinamos as duas coisas, somos sentipensantes.’”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Disponível em: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LbJWqetRuMo&t=33s>. A explicação também está presente no texto Sentipensar: uma Pesquisa em Educação Ambiental com a Literatura de Eduardo Galeano, de Martins & Sampaio (2021).

Assim, começo contando a história do próprio texto e da emoção de ser convidada a produzi-lo. Recebi o convite dos amigos, psicanalistas y filósofos de Moscú y Jerusalén, Gabriel Mart y Dimitri Bochkov, para participar com uma fala na conferencia: "50 años de Anti-Edipo: El esquizoanálisis como práctica multidisciplinar y modelo teórico del contenido, los canales de formación y los efectos del potencial humano", que ocorreu de 28 a 30 de novembro de 2022.

A gentileza e grandiosidade do convite me encantaram. A ideia de estar junto com pessoas de diversas regiões do mundo, conversando sobre Guattari e Deleuze, sobre os pressupostos da Esquizonálise certamente corresponde a uma condição de extrema alegria, no sentido de Espinoza... alegria como potência de agir. Claro que também tinha a nítida dimensão da responsabilidade, pelos mesmos motivos que me traziam alegria. Enfim, em meio ao caos, melhor dizendo, à caosmose do cotidiano da vida, decidi aceitar e produzir uma fala em espanhol – minha língua original é o Português – que seria traduzida para o russo. Pensei: como será isso? Os conceitos, as ideias esquizoanalíticas já são complexas e densas em Português, como será falar um texto, cheio de metáforas, e contar com os riscos de sua tradução. Refleti, refleti e mantive a decisão de aceitar. Talvez este seja mesmo um dos grandes desafios contemporâneos: que aprendamos a nos reconectar entre os povos e os muitos languageares que foram sendo produzidos na deriva histórica da humanidade. Aprender a nos traduzir e acreditar na potência das traduções que outros fazem de nós mesmos. Precisamos tentar, tentar e conseguir entrelaçar mundos e seres, sujeitos e lugares, de tal modo que consigamos compartilhar vivências, sentimentos e pensamentos.

Também penso que, nesse esforço de se soltar na espontaneidade da produção, é preciso acreditar na potência dos afetos, nos laços e intensidades que produzimos e que podem – certamente vão – insinuar-se amorosamente ao outro, como afagos e colos reflexivos, no encontro de quem vibra intensidades abstratas, na produção de afetos e saberes.

Enfim, tratou-se de um convite me muito me honrou e me emocionou. Permaneço honrada por estar entre pensadores e profissionais de diversas regiões do planeta, que tem se vinculado à obra de Félix Guattari e Gilles Deleuze.

O texto é escrito em primeira pessoa do singular, porque não faria sentido, pela expressão que floresce das minhas interações esquizoanalíticas com os autores, negar a mim mesma ou fazer-me desaparecer no processo de aninhar-me com palavras, frases, afetos e ideias ao leitor. Essa reflexão inclusive está no certe da minha tese, apresentada no ano 2000, na Escola de Comunicações e Artes da Universidade de São Paulo, com o título: O Sujeito da Escrita e a Trama Comunicacional.

Assim, penso que não faz sentido falar ou escrever sobre Esquizonálise. Esquizonálise é uma atitude (no sentido de ato no todo). Desse modo, assumo que, no meu texto, estou eu mesma entrelaçada aos autores e colegas pesquisadores que compartilharam comigo reflexões e sentimentos e, ao mesmo tempo, para lembrar



também o professor Umberto Eco (1993) – e suas reflexões sobre o leitor – há também presumidas, já transversalizadas, as presenças dos leitores, a quem um texto como este possa interessar. Assim seguimos com a Cartografia de Encontros, numa viagem que eu convido, eu sou narradora e guia contratada, ao mesmo tempo.

### **Cartografia de Encontros**

Guattari e Deleuze se transformaram, no percurso de mais de 30 anos – desde os anos de 1990 –, em meus amigos de infância, adolescência e vida adulta, sem que eu nunca os tenha encontrado presencialmente. Fico refletindo que aprendi tanto com eles, sobre intensidades abstratas, que essa presença se fez e se faz de tantas outras maneiras, que são maiores que a presença física, propriamente dita.

Eu os saúdo também neste momento, assim como ocorrem em várias situações do meu dia, em que fico imaginando como eles reagiriam diante de algumas situações vividas no meu país, que pensariam sobre absurdos tantos, que estamos vivendo no planeta, que mais poderiam me dizer que pudesse ajudar a agenciar um devir esperança, para as pessoas, para o Brasil, para o Planeta.

A propósito, é interessante que saibam de onde eu falo, escrevo. Vivo grande parte da minha vida, no Brasil, portanto da América do Sul, mais especificamente do Sul do Brasil, onde se localiza Universidade de Caxias do Sul, onde sou professora e pesquisadora, vinculada ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Turismo e Hospitalidade, líder do Amorcomtur! Grupo de Estudos em Comunicação, Turismo, Amorosidade e Autopoise, e professora dos Cursos de Comunicação Social. Também sou professora colaboradora de Universidade do Amazonas, na região Norte do Brasil, localizada a seis mil quilômetros de distância de Caxias do Sul. Isso já sinaliza para uma característica minha, de sujeito desterritorializada constantemente e multiterritorializada. Tenho parcerias com colegas de mais de 15 países, para onde tenho viajado e com quem tenho produzido pesquisa, o que significa que sou a própria desterritorialização e vivo a multiterritorialidade, como estamos experienciando agora.

Bom, vamos avançar. Escolhi falar a partir de quatro palavras: ritornelos, caosmose, cartografia, encontros. Poderia ter escolhido muitas outras palavras/conceitos esquizoanalíticos. Foi mesmo difícil fazer esta escolha. Senti, pensei, refleti e escolhi.

Penso, neste sentido, que esta ‘minha fala’ é uma espécie de ritornelo, um elo que retorna, algo que, ao ser produzido, me reconecta intensa profunda e abstratamente com os laços que estabeleci com Guattari e Deleuze. Durante muito tempo, venho refletindo que ritornelo é uma das chaves de relação entre os seres. O elo que retorna, que se destaca pela intensidade e assim pode produzir conexões, reconexões. Lembrando conexões com Roland Barthes (1984), que também fiz nos meus estudos, eu posso dizer... Ritornelo é o punctum, o que pune, o que me toca em especial em sentido profundo e me faz produzir

movimento. Ritornelo é a faísca de agenciamento da relação entrelaçada, dos laços transversais de sentidos entre os seres.

Sou profissional da área da Comunicação, tenho interesse pelas pessoas, pelas relações, pela subjetividade e, ao longo da minha vida, tenho me questionado sobre como construir estradas até o Outro, até as outras pessoas, seus afetos, suas emoções, seus corações. Sou jornalista de formação, comunicadora social, educadora, pesquisadora, cientista, mãe adotiva e mãe biológica, filha, mulher, pessoa, empresária... interessada em como produzir com-tato... como produzir com-versações e tocar os afetos das pessoas. Nesse sentido, penso que grande parte do que vivemos contemporaneamente é porque desaprendemos a produzir ritornelos e, em função disso, nos desconnectamos afetivamente, em um mundo aparentemente hiperconectado.

O ritornelo é também a produção de entrelaço, o laço que junta, que reúne e que intensa e afetivamente faz fazer sentido junto. O ritornelo, originário da música, nos ensina que somos tocados de muitas maneiras, mas especialmente pelas intensidades que se destacam e agenciam nossos afetos. O ritornelo deve ser celebrado e cultivado. Em certo sentido, penso que, se estamos aqui é porque em meio à profusão de falas e pensamentos do século passado, Guattari e Deleuze se fizeram e fazem RITORNELOS.

Ao mesmo tempo, penso que os ritornelos são caosmóticos e dissipativos. E dizer isso significa fazer referência ao principal traço de nossas existências, em meu entendimento, a partir das minhas vivências entrelaçadas com tantos seres e das minhas 'com-versações' com Guattari, especialmente com Guattari, mas também com Deleuze.

Sinceramente, ao mesmo tempo, acredito na potência enunciativa, para descrever o contemporâneo com maestria, da palavra caosmose. Caos – osmose – no cosmo. Como cristalização de sentidos, a palavra concentra saberes majestosos que têm nos orientado desde a metade do século passado, quando passamos a pensar a ampliação da Teoria Sistêmica, para a compreensão dos Sistemas Abertos e, na visão esquizoanalítica, pela lógica da transversalidade ampla, que nos convoca inclusive a não pensar mais em disciplinas, mas em universos existenciais de produção de sentidos, em contínuas máquinas transpoiéticas, mais que autopoiéticas.

A palavra CAOSMOSE nos conecta com o Big Bang, a grande explosão que é produtora de novos universos. Também nos remete à Teoria do Caos, de Edward Lorenz (in Capra & Luisi, 2014), das orientações de que o caos é produção em lógicas de recursão organizacional, de Edgar Morin, dos saberes do ponto de mutação, a partir do pensamento de Fritjof Capra (1991), da visão holística de Jan Smuts (in Weill, 1991) (pai do termo holismo) e das conexões holísticas com Roberto Crema (1989).

A associação entre as duas palavras se transforma em outra síntese emblemática. Ritornelos Caosmóticos ajudam a compreender ao mesmo tempo a episteme do caos, da osmose, no cosmo, em elos que retornam e se produzem em recursões organizacionais, decorrentes de nós de passagem e de confluência, como nos ensinou o químico Ylia Prigogine (2000, 2009) no estudo das estruturas dissipativas.

Assim, os encontros com Guattari e Deleuze significaram, para mim, o agenciamento de um verdadeiro salto quântico, como nos ensina, entre tantos autores, Amit Goswami (1993), da Índia. Esse salto me fez vibrar em outras lógicas de múltiplas e sincrônicas trajetórias de saberes. Nada mais foi como era antes no meu olhar. Tudo se movimentou no pensamento, sentimento, nos olhares, no movimento do corpo, nos processos de interação com outros seres. Eram os anos de 1990, eu os conheci, Guattari e Deleuze, nos textos, oficinas e vivências múltiplas, em um projeto de aprendizagem de Processos Grupais, em um curso de formação em Porto Alegre, cidade ao Sul do Brasil, em um local que, claro, não por acaso, se chamava Espaço de Vida, coordenado pelas psicólogas Lígia Hecker Ferreira e Carmen Oliveira.

Lembro-me que a primeira ideia que me chamou a atenção, naquele curso, foi a de que para a Esquizoanálise, vale o SUJEITO EM PRODUÇÃO e não o sujeito forjado por traumas ou complexos, como nos vinham ensinando outras visões teóricas. Também me encantei com a ideia de que o inconsciente está presente e em ação o tempo todo, como uma usina de produção, uma máquina desejante constante e que se expressa em cada instante, nos gestos, na respiração, no corpo vibrátil, e não está escondido em uma espécie de quarto dos meus segredos, para se deixar escapar nos sonhos, nos chistes ou nos atos falhos. Inconsciente pleno e potente. Depois, com o tempo, fui entendendo a partir de outras teorias, que a energia inconsciente agencia o sujeito o tempo todo, fazendo-o vibrar, amar, brigar, calar, saltar, silenciar e, literalmente, movimentar mundos, agenciar ritornelos em meio às conexões caosmóticas, em meio às intempéries da vida.

A intensidade da energia inconsciente é a própria intensidade de agenciamento da potência desejante, fundamental para que seja constante fluente e espontaneamente agenciada a teia da vida caosmótica em nós e nos entrelaçamentos osmóticos do cosmo. Ou seja, estamos falando em entrelaçamentos inconscientes que se expressam em feixes de energias geradores de vida, genuínos ingredientes da geração da vida, de que nos ensina Humberto Maturana (1997, 1998, 2015), uma das principais referências quando se fala do estudo do surgimento da vida no planeta, ainda que não se refira a esses feixes com esse linguajar. Tive o privilégio de ser aluna deste grande cientista que, não por acaso, ensinou ao mundo que as espécies vivas surgem de confluências e que, uma vez realizada a mágica da vida, se instala a potência autopoietica, que, por sua vez se produz a partir dos acoplamentos. Guattari e Deleuze vão nos ensinar a pensar os agenciamentos produtivos das máquinas autopoieticas, o que também nos ajudou a ampliar a visão biológica de Maturana, para outros universos existenciais e de conhecimento, permitindo compreender inclusive o acoplamento entre os seres e os dispositivos maquínicos, como também nos ensina um dos parceiros de Marshal McLuhan, Derrick de Kerckhove (1997).

Assim também pude compreender melhor os engendramentos maquínicos nas interações com e entre os meios de comunicação, considerados pelos meus ‘amigos’ Guattari e Deleuze, como equipamentos coletivos de produção de subjetividade, em meio

a tantos outros universos maquínicos e tantas máquinas abstratas, como a Ciência, A Universidade, a Arte, entre tantas.

Neste ponto, eu me dou conta que já estou avançando a Cartografia dos Encontros com Guattari e Deleuze. Ao mesmo tempo, me aciona o ritornelo especial, a partir da palavra Cartografia, com a qual entrei em contato em dois primeiros textos Cartografias do Desejo, de Guattari com Suely Rolnik, uma pensadora brasileira, e Cartografia Sentimental, da própria Suely Rolnik, apresentando sua pesquisa do mestrado. O contato com o conceito e com a ideia de produção de percursos que se inscrevem como acontecem, em meio à mutação da paisagem também marcou profundamente minha vida. Ao mesmo tempo, ao avançar nas leituras esquizoanalíticas, eu encontrava uma ciência aberta ao mundo da emoção e da sensibilidade, ao mundo dos afetos, tão diferente à ciência fria e calculista, a que eu tinha sido até então apresentada.

Nesse novo modo de compreender o ser humano, mas não só o ser humano, de compreender os sistemas de entrelaçamentos numa lógica ecosófica, cuja grandiosidade só fui compreendendo com o tempo, eu me encontrava natural e espontaneamente aconchegada. Era como se tivesse encontrado um porto, um porto caótico e na caoticidade das intensidades abstratas eu me sentia em casa, territorializada, com a tranquilidade de saber que o agenciamento decorrente das desterritorializações não seria nada mais que me perder em descaminhos, que agenciariam outras vidas, outros territórios e que se abririam para o agenciamento de mais e mais potência. Assim, a cartografia se associou às desterritorializações desejanter e eu pude associar essa ideia a tudo na vida, inclusive e principalmente à pesquisa, às práticas e procedimentos operacionais, tendo criado duas estratégias metodológicas denominadas Cartografia dos Saberes e Matrizes Rizomáticas – estratégias de sobrevivência em percursos de investigação qualitativa para a ciência do Mundo N'ovo, o mundo que está para nascer (Baptista 2014, 2020; Baptista & Eme, 2022).

As duas estratégias foram criadas e são utilizadas do modo acoplado, para orientar a produção de pesquisas em cenários caosmóticos de ritornelização. A questão que se interpôs para mim, na década de 1990 era como ensinar Metodologia da Pesquisa, compreendendo e me emocionando com tantas teorias e orientações de vida, que me direcionavam para a visão complexa, ecossistêmica, caosmótica, desterritorializante, dissipativa e holística? Assim, eu entendi também que não poderia ensinar pesquisa ou metodologia como quem propõe que o sujeito se encaixe em dogmas pré-fabricados. Eu queria agenciar desejo pela pesquisa, pela Ciência, e que agenciasse também a potência de cada pesquisador, de cada sujeito, a produzir a partir dos seus caminhos e descaminhos. Assim, naquela época, propus a ideia de que fazer pesquisa é fazer uma viagem investigativa e que, para isso, devemos trabalhar com a lógica cartográfica, de mapeamentos mutantes, de lógicas inscricionais – palavra que criei para representar a ideia de se inscrever, criar e acionar novos mundos de conhecimento.

Desse modo, a Cartografia de Saberes propõe a viagem com o estabelecimento de cinco trilhas. A Cartografia se operacionaliza por trilhas simultâneas, consideradas em sua

dinâmica de produção em contínuo processo. Há uma trilha inicial, que se transforma em sinalizadora para as outras, que são acionadas simultaneamente. Trata-se da Trilha Trama dos ‘Entrelaços Nós da Pesquisa’, que identifica os ‘nós’ investigativos, os focos de trilhas investigativas a serem perseguidas. A estratégia metodológica considera o caráter subjetivo e autoral do pesquisador, sua história, suas inquietações e buscas, na Trilha dos Saberes Pessoais ou Dimensão Subjetiva, em associação a vários outros saberes, em três outras trilhas. A Trilha Trama Teórico-Conceitual-Bibliográfica é o phylum investigativo que possibilita realizar encontros com os saberes dos outros, em coerência e alinhamento derivativo dos núcleos de significação do foco de estudo, os ‘entrelaços nós da pesquisa’. Na Trilha Usina de Produção ou Trama dos Fazeres, há o universo dos fazeres investigativos, em aproximações e ações, com seu caráter de inscrição – inscrição, criação e acionamento de devires – atendendo à singularidade e à complexidade dos universos ecossistêmicos investigados. Em associação, com caráter simultâneo, espontâneo e constante, há a Trilha Dimensão Intuitiva da Pesquisa, reconhecendo que o conhecimento se produz no entrelaçamento de universos potentes, envolvendo as dimensões materiais e imateriais, em coerência com o fato de que a pesquisa é, ela mesma, um universo vivo e transmutante.

Já as Matrizes Rizomáticas são uma estratégia metodológica de sistematização. Foram criadas para ajudar o pesquisador a verificar a coerência interna da pesquisa e as inflexões, os direcionamentos do processo durante e depois de concluída a investigação. A denominação decorre do entendimento de ‘matriz’, como lugar gerador da vida, do que decorre a proposição de que as matrizes expressam os lugares geradores da vida da pesquisa. A complementação rizomática está associada ao conceito de rizoma, de Félix Guattari e Gilles Deleuze (1995), que propõem o rizoma, a partir da transposição da significação da Botânica, como uma espécie de raiz de crescimento irregular e brotações espontâneas sem simetria e regularidade.

Desse modo, as Matrizes Rizomáticas são sistematizações dos ‘lugares geradores da pesquisa’, observando os rumos, as inflexões em suas irregularidades e fluidez, em brotações que se formam, constituem nós, que se desdobram em novos fluxos até a confluência e formação de novos nós, que dão passar para novos fluxos... até chegar em novos nós, e assim sucessivamente. Essa ideia também se alia ao pensamento de Ylia Prigogine, que, desde a Química, propôs o estudo de estrutura dissipativas, com o reconhecimento de nós de confluência e nós de passagem.

Essas estratégias resultam de mais de 30 anos como docente de Metodologia da Pesquisa e orientadora de trabalhos em todos os níveis acadêmicos.

Ainda quero me referir a outras ideias, nessa cartografia de encontros, para finalizar.

A primeira delas é o encontro com a ideia de desejo como potência e não como falta. Essa ideia tem marcado minha vida e alterado em situações micro e macro, tanto as minhas relações como o próprio rumo da minha existência. Para exemplificar, conto uma história pessoal. Eu sempre quis ser mãe. Sou descendente de uma italiana e a ideia de ser

mãe sempre foi algo forte em mim, a imensidão de amor, a força matrística que nos orienta no universo feminino, um devir mãe leoa potente se fez em mim durante a vida. Um diagnóstico, no entanto, de endometriose severa, apareceu para se interpor ao meu sonho, aparentemente ao meu desejo, não fosse ele potência. Meu médico, naquela época, dizia: Maria Luiza para você é impossível. Eu respondia: Não é! Ele insistia: eu já expliquei, pela Medicina não é possível. Seu caso é grave. Você tem endometriose em nível severo. Não é possível engravidar. Eu dizia: é possível! Vou engravidar, é uma questão de tempo, você pode esperar. Ele insistia: já fizemos todos os exames. Não é possível. Eu respondi: você não me conhece bem. Eu sei que vou ser mãe. Eu DESEJO SER MÃE. Então, é uma questão de tempo. Enquanto não engravidar, vou adotar crianças e ser mãe adotiva. Assim, adotei três crianças e, quando já não fazia mais nenhum tratamento, engravidei biologicamente, de uma filha, para surpresa do meu médico. Desejo potente agenciado e fortalecido pelos entrelaçamentos com meus outros filhos. Além disso, a própria experiência de maternagem acadêmica com meus alunos me garantia que o corpo responderia à minha natureza materna, de MÃE, MATRIZ GERADORA DA VIDA E AMOR!

### **Sobre hiências, devires e reticências...**

Assim, talvez a grande síntese dessa cartografia ou, ao menos, o que eu gostaria que ficasse como síntese, esteja na ideia que venho trabalhando, também inspirada em Humberto Maturana, de que precisamos uma revolução matrística, que resgate em nós os traços básicos da família ancestral, no sentido da ética da relação e de amorosidade, laços ético-estéticos de interações transpoiéticas, geradoras de vida plena em uma lógica ecosófica e de superação do antropoceno. Uma lógica em que possamos coexistir com todos os seres, visíveis e invisíveis no planeta. Que possamos resgatar nossos entrelaços de ritornelos e afetivações, entre a caosmose contemporânea e nos direcionarmos para a preservação não só do planeta, de Gaia, mas da coexistência em ritornelos de paz, colaboração e amorosidade.

Guattari e Deleuze são autores que marcaram a minha vida para sempre, como teórica, pessoa intensa afetiva e amorosa, ser desejante no mundo, jornalista, pesquisadora, cientista, mulher, mãe, no agenciamento de um ser que transita por entre as engrenagens maquínicas e se faz em flor em ser, floresceres de amorosidade e autopoiese. As pistas de potência de agenciamento autopoietico e a compreensão do desejo como potência, em combinação com o reconhecimento de que vivemos todos em caosmose e que podemos, assim e por isso mesmo, produzir, ativar ritornelos potentes... são para mim sinalizadores importantes para seguirmos viagem na construção do que eu chamo de o Mundo N'Ovo, e no que venho trabalhando amorosa e intensamente.

Talvez por isso mesmo tenha me surgido a palavra hiências, associada a devires e reticências. Este texto é resultado de uma brotação espontânea, intensa, no entre, na

hiância de vivências tantas com a Esquizoanálise. Ele, o texto, não traz o passado isolado, nem o presente, nem o futuro, concentra multitemporalidades, multiterritorialidades e transversalidades de afetos entre as vivências passadas, as intensidades abstratas sentipensantes da produção da fala, da conversa na Conferência, do texto em revisão e agora em preparação para entrega. Por isso mesmo, o texto não termina... há sempre sinalizações de devires, que também deixo aqui expressas em reticências...

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## ***Ritornelos caosmóticos. Cartografía de encuentros con Guattari y Deleuze***

por MARIA LUIZA CARDINALE BAPTISTA

### **Abstract**

This text has the character of an essay, having been written as a report of reflective experience with a cartography of encounters with the authors Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze, resulting from studies, experiences, teaching and research with schizoanalysis for over 30 years. In a personal writing, the researcher focuses on the concept of ritornello as a link that detaches and returns, that intertwines, connects, intensely sensitizes, in the middle of chaosmotic processes – of chaos, of osmosis in the cosmos. The author presents elements of the desiring intensity of the encounters with the authors, in order to share how she has constituted herself as a schizoanalytic subject, in alignment and intertwining with contemporary assumptions of holistic, ecosystemic and complex science. There are signs of schizoanalytic arrangements in personal experience and in the various existential universes of 'co-experience'.

### **Preliminares**

Suelo decir que el texto también tiene sus preliminares, así como las más deliciosas relaciones. Ese tiempo de entrelazarse, enamorarse del otro, sentir, vivir, proponer, tocar, conmovir, insinuar y mezclar. Así, pienso también en el deleite que es escribir y sentir-pensar un discurso o una inscripción deseante, en una propuesta de lo que vengo llamando *inscricional*, que inscribe, crea y activa, proyecta poder de relación, de devenir significado compartido, con una propuesta de entrega y acogida amorosa. El concepto de sentirpensar se atribuye a Fals Borda y fue ampliamente difundido a través de la obra de Eduardo Galeano. Es curioso, sin embargo, lo que el propio Fals Borda relata sobre la creación de la palabra: “Este sentipensante que aparece en mis libros no fue invención mía. Fue allí en uno de los pantanos cerca de San Benito Abad, cerca de Jegua, por esos parajes, que a un pescador que estaba conmigo le pasó algo y me dijo: 'Míranos, creemos que actuamos con el corazón, pero también usamos la cabeza y cuando combinamos las dos cosas, somos sentipensantes.’”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Disponible en: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LbJWqetRuMo&t=33s>. La explicación también está presente en el texto Sentipensar. uma Pesquisa em Educação Ambiental com a Literatura de Eduardo Galeano, de Martins; Sampaio, 2021.

Entonces, comienzo contando la historia del texto mismo y la emoción de ser invitada a producirlo. Recibí una invitación de los amigos, psicoanalistas y filósofos de Moscú y Jerusalén, Gabriel Mart y Dimitri Bochkov, para participar con una ponencia en la conferencia: "50 años del Anti-Edipo: El esquizoanálisis como práctica multidisciplinar y modelo teórico del contenido, los canales de formación y los efectos del potencial humano", que se llevó a cabo del 28 al 30 de noviembre de 2022.

La amabilidad y la grandeza de la invitación me encantaron. La idea de estar junto a personas de diferentes regiones del mundo, hablando de Guattari y Deleuze, de los presupuestos del Esquizoanálisis corresponde ciertamente a una condición de alegría extrema, en el sentido de Espinoza... alegría como potencia de actuar. Por supuesto, también tuve la clara dimensión de la responsabilidad, por las mismas razones que me dieron alegría. Así que, en medio del caos, mejor dicho, el caos de la vida cotidiana, decidí aceptar y producir un discurso en español -mi idioma original es el portugués- que sería traducido al ruso. Pensé: ¿cómo será esto? Los conceptos, las ideas esquizoanalíticas ya son complejas y densas en portugués, cómo será hablar un texto, lleno de metáforas, y tener en cuenta los riesgos de su traducción. Reflexioné, reflexioné y mantuve la decisión de aceptar. Quizás este sea realmente uno de los grandes desafíos contemporáneos: que aprendamos a reconectarnos entre los pueblos y las tantas lenguas que se han producido en la deriva histórica de la humanidad. Aprender a traducirnos y creer en el poder de las traducciones que los demás hacen de nosotros mismos. Necesitamos intentar, intentar y lograr entrelazar mundos y seres, sujetos y lugares, de tal manera que podamos compartir experiencias, sentimientos y pensamientos.

Pienso también que, en este esfuerzo por desprenderse de la espontaneidad de la producción, es necesario creer en el poder de los afectos, en los lazos e intensidades que producimos y que pueden -ciertamente- insinuarse amorosamente al otro, como caricias y vueltas reflexivas, en el encuentro que vibra intensidades abstractas, en la producción de afectos y saberes.

En síntesis, fue una invitación que me honró y me conmovió mucho. Me siento honrada de estar entre pensadores y profesionales de diferentes regiones del planeta, que han estado vinculados a la obra de Félix Guattari y Gilles Deleuze.

El texto está escrito en primera persona del singular, porque no tendría sentido, desde la expresión que brota de mis interacciones esquizoanalíticas con los autores, negarme o hacerme desaparecer en el proceso de anidarme con palabras, frases, afectos y ideas al lector. Esta reflexión está en el centro de mi tesis, presentada en 2000, en la Facultad de Comunicación y Artes de la Universidad de São Paulo, Brasil, con el título: El Sujeto de la Escritura y la Trama Comunicacional.

Entonces, creo que no tiene sentido hablar o escribir sobre esquizoanálisis. El esquizoanálisis es una actitud (en el sentido de un acto como un todo). De esta forma, asumo que, en mi texto, yo mismo me entrelazo con los autores y compañeros investigadores que compartieron conmigo reflexiones y sentimientos y, al mismo tiempo,

recordar también al profesor Umberto Eco (1993) – y sus reflexiones sobre el lector – también se presume, ya transversalizada, la presencia de lectores, a quienes un texto como este puede resultarles de interés. Así seguimos con la Cartografía de los Encuentros, en un viaje que invito, soy el narradora y el guía contratada a la vez.

### **Cartografía de reuniones**

Guattari y Deleuze se han convertido, a lo largo de más de 30 años – desde los años 90 –, en mis amigos desde la infancia, la adolescencia y la vida adulta, sin haberlos conocido nunca en persona. Sigo reflexionando que aprendí tanto de ellos, de intensidades abstractas, que esta presencia se hizo y se hace de tantas otras formas, que son más grandes que la presencia física misma.

Los saludo también en este momento, tal como lo hazgo en varias situaciones de mi día, en las que sigo imaginando cómo reaccionarían ante algunas situaciones vividas en mi país, qué pensarían de tantos disparates, que estamos viviendo en el planeta, qué más me podrían decir que pueda ayudar a organizar un futuro de esperanza, para las personas, para Brasil, para el Planeta.

Por cierto, es interesante que los lectores sepan desde dónde hablo y escribo. Vivo la mayor parte de mi vida en Brasil, por lo tanto en América del Sur, más específicamente en el Sur de Brasil, donde se encuentra la Universidad de Caxias do Sul, donde soy profesora e investigadora, vinculada al Programa de Posgrado en Turismo y Hospitalidad, líder del Amorcomtur! Grupo de Estudios de Comunicación, Turismo, Amorosidad y Autopoise, y profesora de Cursos de Comunicación Social. También soy profesora colaboradora de la Universidad de Amazonas, en la región Norte de Brasil, ubicada a seis mil kilómetros de Caxias do Sul. Esto ya apunta a una característica mía, como sujeto constantemente desterritorializado y multiterritorializado. Tengo alianzas con colegas de más de 15 países, donde he viajado y con quienes he producido investigaciones, lo que significa que soy la desterritorialización misma y vivo la multiterritorialidad, tal como la estamos viviendo ahora.

Muy bien, sigamos adelante. Elegí hablar a partir de cuatro palabras: ritornelos, caosmosis, cartografía, encuentros. Podría haber elegido muchas otras palabras/conceptos esquizoanalíticos. Fue realmente difícil hacer esta elección. Sentí, pensé, reflexioné y elegí.

Pienso, en ese sentido, que este 'discurso mío' es una especie de ritornelo, un vínculo que regresa, algo que, al producirse, me reconecta intensa y abstractamente con los lazos que establecí con Guattari y Deleuze. Desde hace tiempo vengo reflexionando que el ritornelo es una de las claves de la relación entre los seres. El vínculo que vuelve, que se destaca por su intensidad y así puede producir conexiones, reconexiones. Recordando conexiones con Roland Barthes (1984), que también hice en mis estudios, puedo decir...

Ritornelo es el punctum, lo que traspasa, lo que me toca sobre todo en un sentido profundo y me hace producir movimiento. Ritornelo es la chispa de agencia de la relación entrelazada, de los lazos transversales de significados entre los seres.

Soy profesional en el área de la Comunicación, me interesan las personas, las relaciones, la subjetividad y, a lo largo de mi vida, me he cuestionado sobre cómo construir caminos hacia el Otro, hacia las otras personas, sus afectos, sus emociones, sus corazones Soy periodista de formación, comunicadora social, educadora, investigadora, científica, madre adoptiva y madre biológica, hija, mujer, persona, empresaria... interesada en cómo producir com-tacto... cómo producir conversaciones y tocar los afectos de personas. En ese sentido, creo que gran parte de lo que estamos viviendo hoy es porque hemos desaprendido a producir ritornelos y, en consecuencia, nos hemos desconectado emocionalmente, en un mundo aparentemente hiperconectado.

El ritornelo es también la producción del entretejido, el lazo que une, que junta y que intensa y afectivamente cobra sentido juntos. El ritornelo, originario de la música, nos enseña que somos tocados de muchas maneras, pero especialmente por las intensidades que sobresalen y mediatizan nuestros afectos. El ritornelo debe ser celebrado y cultivado. En cierto sentido, creo que, si estamos aquí, es porque en medio de la profusión de discursos y pensamientos del siglo pasado, Guattari y Deleuze hicieron y hacen RITORNELOS.

Al mismo tiempo, creo que los estribillos son caóticos y disipativos. Y decir esto significa referirse al rasgo principal de nuestras vidas, a mi entender, a partir de mis experiencias entrelazadas con tantos seres y mis 'con-versaciones' con Guattari, especialmente con Guattari, pero también con Deleuze.

Honestamente, al mismo tiempo, creo en el poder enunciativo, para describir con maestría lo contemporáneo, de la palabra caosmosis. Caos – ósmosis – en el cosmos. Como cristalización de significados, la palabra concentra majestuosos conocimientos que nos han orientado desde mediados del siglo pasado, cuando comenzamos a pensar en la expansión de la Teoría Sistémica, para la comprensión de los Sistemas Abiertos y, en la mirada esquizoanalítica, por la lógica de amplia transversalidad, que incluso nos convoca a no pensar más en disciplinas, sino en universos existenciales de producción de sentidos, en continuas máquinas transpoiéticas, más que autopoiéticas.

La palabra caosmosis nos conecta con el Big Bang, la gran explosión que produce nuevos universos. También nos remite a la Teoría del Caos de Edward Lorenz (en Capra; Luisi, 2014), las pautas de que el caos es producción en la lógica de la recursividad organizacional, de Edgar Morin, el conocimiento del punto de mutación, desde el pensamiento de Fritjof Capra (1991), la visión holística de Jan Smuts (en Weill, 1991) (creador del término holismo) y las conexiones holísticas con Roberto Crema (1989).

La asociación entre las dos palabras se convierte en otra síntesis emblemática. Los ritornelos caosmóticos ayudan a comprender, al mismo tiempo, la episteme del caos, de la ósmosis, en el cosmos, en eslabones que regresan y se producen en recursiones

organizacionales, surgidas de nodos de paso y confluencia, como nos enseñó lo químico Ylia Prigogine (2000, 2001 ) en el estudio de estructuras disipativas.

Así, los encuentros con Guattari y Deleuze significaron, para mí, la agencia de un verdadero salto cuántico, como nos enseña, entre tantos autores, Amit Goswami (1993) de la India. Este salto me hizo vibrar en otras lógicas de trayectorias múltiples y sincrónicas de conocimiento. Nada era como antes en mis ojos. Todo se movía en pensamiento, sentimiento, miradas, movimiento corporal, procesos de interacción con otros seres. Era la década de 1990, los conocí, Guattari y Deleuze, en textos, talleres y múltiples experiencias, en un proyecto de aprendizaje sobre Procesos Grupales, en un curso de capacitación en Porto Alegre, una ciudad del sur de Brasil, en un lugar que, claro, no por casualidad, se llamó Espaço de Vida, coordinado por las psicólogas Lígia Hecker Ferreira y Carmen Oliveira.

Recuerdo que la primera idea que me llamó la atención, en ese curso, fue que para el Esquizoanálisis vale el sujeto en producción y no el sujeto forjado por traumas o complejos, como nos venían enseñando otras visiones teóricas. También me encantó la idea de que el inconsciente está presente y en acción todo el tiempo, como una planta de producción, una máquina deseante constante que se expresa en cada momento, en los gestos, en la respiración, en el cuerpo que vibra, y no se oculta. En una especie de cuarto de mis secretos, para dejarse escapar en sueños, bromas o deslices. Inconsciente completo y potente. Luego, con el tiempo, llegué a comprender de otras teorías que la energía inconsciente actúa todo el tiempo sobre el sujeto, haciéndolo vibrar, amar, luchar, callar, saltar, silenciar y, literalmente, mover mundos, actuar estribillos en medio de a conexiones caosmóticas, en medio de las tormentas de la vida.

La intensidad de la energía inconsciente es la misma intensidad de agencia de la potencia deseante, fundamental para que la red de vida caosmótica sea constantemente fluida y espontáneamente agencia en nosotros y en los enredos osmóticos del cosmos. Es decir, estamos hablando de entrelazamientos inconscientes que se expresan en haces de energías generadoras de vida, ingredientes genuinos para la generación de vida, como enseña Humberto Maturana (1997, 1998, 2015), uno de los principales referentes al hablar de la estudio del surgimiento de la vida en el planeta, aunque no se refiere a estos rayos con ese lenguaje. Tuve el privilegio de ser alumna de este gran científico que, no por casualidad, enseñó al mundo que las especies vivas surgen de las confluencias y que, una vez realizada la magia de la vida, se instala la potencia autopoietica que, a su vez, se produce. Por de los acoplamientos. Guattari y Deleuze nos enseñarán a pensar los ensamblajes productivos de las máquinas autopoieticas, lo que también nos ayudó a ampliar la visión biológica de Maturana a otros universos existenciales y de conocimiento, permitiéndonos comprender el acoplamiento entre seres y dispositivos maquínicos, como también nos enseña uno de los socios de Marshal MacLuhan, Derrick de Kerckhove (1997).

De esta manera, también pude comprender mejor los engendramientos maquínicos en

interacciones con y entre los medios de comunicación, considerados por mis 'amigos' Guattari y Deleuze, como equipos colectivos para la producción de subjetividad, en medio de tantos otros. Universos maquínicos y tantas máquinas abstractas, como la Ciencia, la Universidad, el Arte, entre muchas.

En este punto me doy cuenta de que ya estoy avanzando en la Cartografía de los Encuentros con Guattari y Deleuze. Al mismo tiempo, se dispara en mí un ritornelo especial, a partir de la palabra Cartografía, con la que entré en contacto en dos de los primeros textos Cartografías del Deseo, de Guattari con Suely Rolnik, pensadora brasileña, y Cartografía Sentimental, de Suely Rolnik ella misma, presentando su investigación de maestría. El contacto con el concepto y con la idea de producir recorridos que se inscriben sobre la marcha, en medio de paisajes cambiantes, también marcó profundamente mi vida. Al mismo tiempo, en la medida que avanzaba en las lecturas esquizoanalíticas, encontraba una ciencia abierta al mundo de la emoción y la sensibilidad, al mundo de los afectos, tan diferente a la ciencia fría y calculadora que hasta entonces me habían presentado.

En esta nueva forma de entender al ser humano, pero no sólo al ser humano, de entender los sistemas entrelazados en una lógica ecosófica, cuya grandeza sólo comprendí con el tiempo, me encontré natural y espontáneamente abrazada. Era como si hubiera encontrado un puerto, un puerto caótico y en la caoticidad de las intensidades abstractas me sentía como en casa, territorializada, con la tranquilidad de saber que la agencia resultante de las desterritorializaciones no sería más que perderse en desvíos, que se agenciarían otras vidas, otros territorios y eso se abriría a la agencia de cada vez más poder. Así, la cartografía se asoció con desear desterritorializaciones y pude asociar esta idea con todo en la vida, incluyendo y principalmente con la investigación, las prácticas y los procedimientos operativos, habiendo creado dos estrategias metodológicas denominadas Cartografía del Saber y Matrices Rizomáticas – estrategias de supervivencia en caminos de investigación cualitativa para la ciencia de Mundo N'ovo, el mundo que está por nacer (Baptista, 2014, 2020; Baptista; Eme, 2022).

Las dos estrategias fueron creadas y se utilizan de forma acoplada, para orientar la producción de investigaciones en escenarios caosmóticos de ritornelización. La pregunta que me surgió en la década de 1990 fue ¿cómo enseñar Metodología de la Investigación, comprendiendo y moviéndome por tantas teorías y orientaciones de vida, que me encaminaban hacia una mirada compleja, ecosistémica, caosmótica, desterritorializadora, disipativa y holística? Así, entendí también que no podía enseñar investigación o metodología como quien propone que la materia encaje en dogmas prefabricados. Quería gestionar el deseo de investigación, de Ciencia, y también gestionar el poder de cada investigador, de cada sujeto, de producir a partir de sus caminos y desvíos. Entonces, en ese momento, propuse la idea de que investigar es hacer un viaje investigativo y que, para eso, deberíamos trabajar con la lógica cartográfica, de mapeos mutantes, de lógicas inscriptivas, palabra que creé para representar la idea de inscribiendo, creando y

desencadenando nuevos mundos de conocimiento.

Así, la Cartografía del Saber propone el recorrido con el establecimiento de cinco senderos. La cartografía se operacionaliza por senderos simultáneos, considerados en su dinámica de producción en un proceso continuo. Hay una pista inicial, que se convierte en señal para las demás, que se activan simultáneamente. Este es el Sendero Trama de los 'Nodos de investigación', que identifica los 'nodos' de investigación, los focos de los senderos de investigación que se seguirán. La estrategia metodológica considera el carácter subjetivo y autoral del investigador, su historia, sus inquietudes y búsquedas, en la Ruta del Conocimiento Personal o Dimensión Subjetiva, en asociación con varios otros tipos de conocimiento, en otras tres rutas. El Sendero de Trama Teórico-Conceptual-Bibliográfico es el filo investigativo que posibilita realizar encuentros con el saber de otros, en coherencia y alineación derivativa de los significados centrales del foco de estudio, los 'nodos de investigación'. En lo Sendero Planta de Producción o Trama de los Haceres, está el universo de las acciones investigativas, en aproximaciones y acciones, con su carácter de inscripción – inscripción, creación y activación de devenires – teniendo en cuenta la singularidad y complejidad de los universos ecosistémicos investigados. En asociación, con carácter simultáneo, espontáneo y constante, se encuentra la Dimensión Intuitiva del Camino de la Investigación, reconociendo que el conocimiento se produce en el entrelazamiento de universos poderosos, involucrando dimensiones materiales e inmateriales, en consonancia con que la investigación es en sí misma, un universo vivo y cambiante.

Las Matrices Rizomáticas son una estrategia de sistematización metodológica. Fueron creadas para ayudar al investigador a verificar la coherencia interna de la investigación y las inflexiones, las direcciones del proceso durante y después de la conclusión de la investigación. La denominación deriva de la comprensión de 'matriz', como lugar generador de vida, lo que deriva de la proposición de que las matrices expresan los lugares que generan la vida de la investigación. La complementación rizomática está asociada al concepto de rizoma, de Félix Guattari y Gilles Deleuze (1995), quienes proponen el rizoma, a partir de la transposición del significado de Botánica, como una especie de raíz con crecimiento irregular y brotes espontáneos sin simetría y regularidad.

De esta manera, las Matrices Rizomáticas son sistematizaciones de los 'lugares generadores de investigación', observando las direcciones, las inflexiones en sus irregularidades y fluidez, en brotes que forman, constituyen nodos, que se despliegan en nuevos flujos hasta la confluencia y formación de nuevos nodos, que conducen a nuevos flujos... hasta llegar a nuevos nodos, y así sucesivamente. Esta idea también está ligada al pensamiento de Ylia Prigogine, quien desde la Química propuso el estudio de las estructuras disipativas, con el reconocimiento de los nodos de confluencia y los nodos de paso.

Estas estrategias son el resultado de más de 30 años enseñando Metodología de la Investigación y orientando el trabajo en todos los niveles académicos.

Todavía quiero referirme a otras ideas, en esta cartografía de encuentros, para terminar.

El primero de ellos es el encuentro con la idea del deseo como potencia y no como carencia. Esta idea ha marcado mi vida y ha cambiado, en situaciones micro y macro, tanto mis relaciones como el rumbo de mi existencia. Para ejemplificar, cuento una historia personal. Siempre quise ser madre. Soy descendiente de una mujer italiana y la idea de ser madre siempre ha sido algo fuerte en mí, la inmensidad del amor, la fuerza matrística que nos guía en el universo femenino, se hizo en mí una poderosa leona convirtiéndose en madre. durante mi vida. Sin embargo, un diagnóstico de endometriosis severa pareció interferir con mi sueño, aparentemente con mi deseo, si no fuera por la potencia. Mi médico, en ese momento, dijo: Maria Luiza es imposible para ti. Respondí: ¡No lo es! Insistió: Ya expliqué, por Medicina no se puede. Tu caso es grave. Tiene endometriosis severa. Incapaz de quedar embarazada. Dije: ¡es posible! Me voy a quedar embarazada, es cuestión de tiempo, puedes esperar. Insistió: hemos hecho todas las pruebas. No es posible. Le respondí: no me conoces bien. Sé que voy a ser madre. QUIERO SER MADRE. Así que es cuestión de tiempo. Mientras no quede embarazada, voy a adoptar niños y ser madre adoptiva. Entonces, adopté a tres niños y, cuando ya no estaba en tratamiento, quedé embarazada biológicamente de una niña, para sorpresa de mi médico. Poderoso deseo gestionado y fortalecido al entrelazarme con mis otros hijos. Además, la experiencia de maternidad académica con mis alumnos me aseguró que el cuerpo respondería a mi naturaleza materna, de MADRE, MATRIZ GENERADORA DE VIDA Y AMOR!

### **De lagunas, devenires y reticencias...**

Así, quizás la gran síntesis de esta cartografía, o, al menos, lo que me gustaría que quedara como síntesis, radica en la idea que vengo trabajando, también inspirada en Humberto Maturana, de que necesitamos una revolución matrística, que rescata en nosotros los rasgos básicos de la familia ancestral, en el sentido de ética de relación y amor, lazos ético-estéticos de interacciones transpoiéticas, generando una vida plena en una lógica ecosófica y superando el antropoceno. Una lógica en la que podamos convivir con todos los seres, visibles e invisibles del planeta. Que rescatemos nuestros entrecruzamientos de estribillos y afectaciones, en medio de la caosmosis contemporánea y nos encaminemos hacia la preservación no sólo del planeta, de Gaia, sino de la convivencia en estribillos de paz, colaboración y amor.

Guattari y Deleuze son autores que marcaron mi vida para siempre, como teórica, persona intensamente afectiva y amorosa, ser deseante del mundo, periodista, investigadora, científica, mujer, madre, en la agencia de un ser que transita por el los engranajes maquínicos y florecen, florecen del amor y de la autopoiesis. Las pistas sobre el poder de la agencia autopoética y la comprensión del deseo como poder, en



combinación con el reconocimiento de que todos vivimos en caosmosis y que podemos, así y por eso mismo, producir, activar ritornelos potentes... son, para mí, señales importantes para continuar nuestro camino en la construcción de lo que llamo Mundo N'Ovo, y en el que vengo trabajando con amor e intensidad.

Quizá por eso se me ocurrió la palabra lagunas, asociada a devenires y reticencias. Este texto es el resultado de un brote espontáneo, intenso, en el medio, en la brecha de tantas experiencias con el Esquizoanálisis. Él, el texto, no trae el pasado aislado, ni el presente, ni el futuro, concentra multitemporalidades, multiterritorialidades y transversalidades de afectos entre experiencias pasadas, las intensidades abstractas sentimiento-pensantes de la producción del discurso, de la conversación en la Conferencia, del texto bajo revisión y ahora en preparación para su entrega. Por eso mismo, el texto no termina... siempre hay signos de devenires, que también dejo aquí expresados en puntos suspensivos...

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## ***Les processus logique-libidinales d'intersubjectivité dans l'éducation des sourds: les enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire***

par DIMITRI BOCHKOV [ДМИТРИЙ БОЧКОВ]

### **Abstract**

After cochlear implantation, a pre-school child with congenital deafness becomes actively immersed in the stream of non-signifying sounds. By studying with specialist teachers, children with cochlear implants develop the ability to focus on and distinguish sounds, which goes hand in hand with the socialisation and oedipalisation of sound and with certain subjective processes arising from ambivalent corporeal experience. During these individual performative lessons, libidinal processes and operations open up opportunities to create the intersubjective space described by Guattarian positive logic. Thus, in this essay, I seek to reveal the schizoanalytic possibilities in this educational praxis concerning children with cochlear implants. The data was collected through participant observation of a series of classes at a private psychological centre in Moscow.

De nombreux ouvrages consacrés à la culture sourde sont saturés de vocabulaire deleuzien et guattarien. Par exemple, je me réfère ici aux concepts de devenir-sourd (Boldt, Valente 2021) ou de rhizome de sourd (Valente, Boldt 2015) qui côtoient les concepts ontologiques et généralisés comme l'univers ou la modalité d'être de sourd (cf. Kusters, Maartje, O'Brien 2017). Cette justification conceptuelle de la « surdité » comme une nouvelle modalité de l'audition et de la perception – Sourd avec un « S » majuscule – essentiellement repose sur un geste pragmatique, un passage de la langue à l'ontologie. Dans cet essai, je m'intéresse au domaine de l'éducation des sourds, spécialisée pour les enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire et considérée par un grand nombre de représentants de la culture sourde comme une praxis hostile et unifiante. De ce point de vue, l'éducation des sourds crée une convention de l'audition et de l'interaction sonore, une sorte de norme unifiée que l'on peut nommer comme devenir-normal (Friedner 2022).

Sans doute, cette affirmation est certainement politique et pour s'inscrire dans le contexte de ce numéro spécial « 50 ans de *L'Anti-CeDipe* », il convient de la reformuler : on peut dire que la pédagogie des sourds traduit le flux corporel énergétique en un système référentiel de signes. Même de cette manière, l'assertion semble controversée ;

on y reviendra par la suite. Pour le moment, on parle de ce que j'ai puisé dans les conversations avec les enseignants spécialisés pour enfants sourds et de ce que j'ai observé dans un centre d'éducation des sourds à Moscou.

Plus précisément, il s'agit des spécialistes qui travaillent avec les enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire : leur but est d'apprendre aux enfants à collaborer avec les sons et les interpréter proprement. Il me semble qu'il est possible de dénouer certains nœuds de cette pratique afin de saisir certaines possibilités schizoanalytiques.

En étant dans une relation intime avec une personne greffée, un implant cochléaire est un contenant des affects divers ; en fait, c'est une machine technique qui remplit les fonctions de locus psychique des intensités subjectives, des émotions, des fantaisies. Ce faisant, l'implant cochléaire se retrouve bien sûr otage d'un discours médical qui symbolise impitoyablement le corps humain et affecte l'expérience corporelle du sujet. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de technophobie sociale.

Dans le cas des enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire, une machine technique accumule aussi les angoisses des parents. L'enfant perçoit évidemment l'attitude parentale à l'égard de l'implant cochléaire et, comme le dit une enseignante, Mme N., « les enfants jouent parfois, se vexent et se retirent l'implant, une partie externe, naturellement, parce qu'ils se rendent compte que la maman s'en préoccupe ». En ayant une partie externe retirable, détachable ainsi qu'une partie intérieure qui est toujours là, « avec toi », tout d'abord, l'implant cochléaire est un objet ambigu de désir. L'implant reçoit les investissements libidinaux comme « moi » et comme un objet.

Si on utilise une analogie populaire, on peut dire qu'un appareil auditif fonctionne comme des lunettes lorsqu'un implant cochléaire fonctionne comme l'ouïe artificielle ou l'oreille. La directrice d'un organisme à but non lucratif spécialisé sur les implants cochléaires en Russie, *La mélodie de vie*, distingue trois types de bénéficiaires possibles : un enfant d'âge préscolaire atteint de surdité congénitale, une personne adulte qui perd progressivement l'audition sur une période de 5 ans, une personne adulte ayant perdu l'audition à la suite d'un accident.

Pour les deux derniers types, l'implantation est autorisée, car les adultes ont une mémoire sonore formée selon les spécialistes ; le premier cas est plus compliqué, car les jeunes enfants ont l'appareil psychique « plus souple » en étant dépourvus de « conscience sonore ». Ce manque psychique s'est expliqué par la conception que l'enfant entendant généralement accumule toutes les informations sonores au cours de la première année de sa vie.

Selon les enseignants des sourds qui travaillent autant dans les hôpitaux publics que les centres privés, après l'implantation cochléaire, l'enfant se retrouve dans un monde de sons, c'est-à-dire de sons signifiants, sans la connaissance de comment naviguer dans ce monde. Par conséquent, au début du programme d'études, les enseignants apprennent aux enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire les caractéristiques physiques

des sons comme niveau de l'intensité sonore ou différenciations comme présence/absence, brièveté/extension, etc. L'un des enseignants (Mme S.) déclare :

C'est la question de l'absence de sens acoustique: en étant hors du champ de vision de l'enfant, je peux l'appeler par son nom ou taper sur un tambour jusqu'à ce que je sois bleu, mais l'enfant ne tournera pas la tête vers l'arrière.

Le silence est interprété par exemple non pas comme une absence totale de sons comme dans le vide, mais comme des sons qui n'ont pas de « plénitude sémantique ». L'étape suivante consiste à travailler sur le développement de la compréhension du discours de l'autre. Ces cours ont généralement lieu avec des enfants d'âge préscolaire et souvent même d'âge maternel, c'est-à-dire avant la socialisation intégrée. Toutes les classes partagent de manière cruciale la forme interactive et performative du jeu.

J'ai donc observé plusieurs classes avec des enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire dans un centre privé, *C'est intéressant d'écouter*, situé à Moscou. Et puisque la salle où se déroulent les classes et le hall créent un espace sonore commun, les parents qui amènent leur enfant sont au courant de ce qui se passe dans la salle. Dans la même salle de classe, près de la fenêtre, il y a une table pour enfants et deux petites chaises ; la table constitue l'espace du jeu, tandis que la taille des chaises vise à rapprocher la position de l'enseignante (Mme S.) de celle de l'enfant.

Chaque classe commence et se termine par une chanson enfantine sur un hibou et d'autres animaux. Le hibou est ici le personnage principal et, comme on le sait, lorsqu'il chasse la nuit, le hibou se fie davantage à l'ouïe qu'à la vue. Le vol du hibou doit être accompagné d'une chanson sonore et significative. L'enseignante (Mme S.) enfile une marionnette gantée représentant un hibou, imite le vol d'un oiseau en accompagnant la chanson par des gestes que l'enfant doit également répéter.

J'appelle le hibou  
Ohé, ohé [*la paume à la bouche illustre l'appel*]  
Le hibou vole vers nous  
Moi, hibou, je vole de la forêt  
Ce que j'ai vu, ce que j'ai entendu  
Je vais tout vous raconter  
Il y a un vent qui bruisse [*le frottement des paumes illustre le bruissement*]  
Il y a une feuille qui vole [*le mouvement de la main de haut en bas illustre le vol*]  
Il y a un pivert qui tapote [*tapotement des doigts sur la table*]  
Il y a un serpent qui siffle [*sifflement*]  
Il y a une grenouille qui crie [*la main montre la bouche d'une grenouille coassant*]  
Il y a un poisson qui se tait [*le doigt sur la bouche illustre le silence*]

Dès que la chanson est terminée, l'enseignante (Mme S.) pose une main avec le hibou sur la table. Ensuite, le cours consiste en une série de jeux de devinettes : qui produit tel

ou tel son ? Chaque situation sonore créée par l'enseignante (Mme S.) est socialisée et oedipalisée. Chaque son dans la salle est un objet dans le scénario, chaque trajectoire est fixée, chaque son doit avoir une signification. Lorsque l'enfant est distrait, l'enseignante (Mme S.) tente de regagner son attention. Pas de distraction !

Les règles sont généralement basées sur des anticipations et des attentes déçues. Pendant le jeu de devinettes, l'enseignante (Mme S.) peut suggérer une mauvaise réponse et lorsque l'enfant la répète, l'enseignante (Mme S.) répond : « pourquoi ne crois-tu pas tes oreilles ? croix-les ». Ici, le rôle des jouets dans cette action théâtrale est essentiel. À son tour, le hibou joue le rôle d'assistant de l'enseignante (Mme S.) ; tout au long de la leçon, l'enseignante remet le jouet à la main et répète la tâche au nom du hibou. Parfois, l'enseignante (Mme S.) peut lever la main avec le hibou vers l'implant cochléaire d'un enfant et dire : « Je vais te dire un mot à l'oreille ». L'enseignante (Mme S.) et le hibou se concentrent donc sur la partie externe de l'implant cochléaire en la comparant à l'oreille. C'est ainsi que se construisent l'intégrité corporelle et le désir.

Le mot que le hibou dit à l'oreille est extrêmement important. Contrairement à l'enseignante (Mme S.), le hibou ne ment jamais et ne donne jamais de mauvaises réponses. L'enfant fait confiance au hibou comme aux autres jouets. Un enfant, un garçon de 2 ans et 3 mois, joue à un jeu avec l'enseignante (Mme S.) : il doit deviner quel animal fait quel son à l'intérieur de la maison de poupée. À la fin du jeu, les jouets-animaux encouragent le garçon à leur dire « ciao ! ciao ! ». Et lui, il croit, dit « ciao ! ciao ! » et se dirige vers la sortie de la classe. Là, il refuse de continuer le cours, sa mère arrive, puis l'enseignante (Mme S.) nous demande, à moi et à sa mère, de les laisser tranquilles.

Ce n'est pas le jeu lui-même qui impose les règles sociales à l'enfant-agent ; c'est l'enseignante. Pendant le cours, l'enfant s'investit socialement non pas dans le jeu, mais dans l'enseignante elle-même. En fait, on peut dire que ces activités visent à développer une libido sociale de l'enfant par le biais de socialisation et signification des sons : « le monde social constitue la libido biologique, pulsion indifférenciée, en libido sociale, spécifique » (Bourdieu 1994 : 153).

Se référant à la distinction de Freud entre la libido du moi et la libido de l'objet, Bourdieu montre que l'agent social s'investit directement dans le champ social :

J'évoquerais une sculpture qu'on trouve à la cathédrale d'Auch, dans le Gers, sous les sièges du chapitre, et qui représente deux moines en train de se battre pour obtenir le bâton de prieur (Ibid).

Dans cet exemple parlant, cependant, il n'y a pas d'interaction entre les moines eux-mêmes parce qu'ils s'investissent dans le champ social du pouvoir de manière autonome. L'interaction nécessite l'Autre, qui brise l'illusion de la situation : Dieu qui peut arrêter les moines ou le hibou qu'un enfant croit. Le développement libidinal se fait avec l'implication de l'Autre.

Au début du premier essai sur la théorie sexuelle, Freud définit la « libido » comme un moteur instinctif du désir sexuel que l'on peut comparer à la faim. Cette définition s'est ancrée en métapsychologie et a considérablement influencé les conceptualisations ultérieures de la libido en tant qu'énergie, force ou flux qualitatif. Cependant, dans un supplément de 1915 aux trois essais Freud définit la « libido » comme un dispositif quantitatif et analytique : « une force quantitativement variable permettant de mesurer les processus et les transpositions dans le domaine de l'excitation sexuelle » (Freud 1987 : 157-158). Lacan approfondit cette différenciation fondamentale de l'énergie qualitative et quantitative dans le Séminaire 4 (Lacan 5 décembre 1956 : 5(67)), en recourant à l'image d'une usine hydroélectrique dont la puissance potentielle réside dans la cascade d'eau (l'inconscient) sur laquelle elle repose.

L'énergie de cette cascade, selon Lacan, n'a rien à voir avec la réalité naturelle, elle n'apparaît que lors des calculs de l'énergie de la centrale hydroélectrique réalisés par des ingénieurs qui partent des points de référence (la hauteur de la cascade et le débit de l'eau) c'est-à-dire, de la combinaison des signes. La libido, par analogie, représente la médiation de la réalité de l'inconscient (la cascade) par la réalité du sexuel (la combinaison de signes). Lacan poursuit cette réflexion dans le Séminaire 11 (Lacan 29 avril 1964 : 18(315)) de façon topologique en utilisant la notion de libido comme la « colle » qui relie le cross-cap, la bande de Möbius, de l'inconscient et du sexuel (Bochkov 2023).

Bien sûr, il convient de mentionner le mythe de la lamelle : la libido est aussi un organe irréel qui sert de médiateur entre l'inconscient et l'Autre. Il ne s'agit pas d'une invention soudaine dans le séminaire 11 puisque Lacan mentionne également lamelle-libido au colloque de Bonneval en 1960 : ce « n'est pas sa décharge, mais est à décrire plutôt comme l'évagination aller et retour d'un organe » (Lacan 1966 : 168). Cela clarifie les relations de la libido avec les zones érogènes : la libido est un verrou, une écluse. En précisant ces zones érogènes, Lacan mentionne dans le séminaire 11 de façon cruciale que les oreilles ont le privilège de ne pas pouvoir se fermer. Le sujet veut que l'Autre l'invoque, c'est ainsi que cela fonctionne. Cependant, dans l'interprétation de Lacan, l'invocation est avant tout discursive ; le lien entre ce type de pulsion et la sonorité n'est pas clair.

Ces relations entre l'inconscient, lié à l'espace de l'Être (puisque le sujet lacanien est le sujet de l'inconscient) et le sexuel, lié à l'espace du Sens, sont réglées par les opérations logiques de disjonction et de conjonction. Implicitement, dans la conceptualisation de Lacan, la logique interne de la libido, donc une « force quantitativement variable », se rapporte directement à la logique formelle. Autrement dit, la libido selon Lacan est un « calculateur » logique du désir qui existe à l'intersection du sujet inconscient et de l'Autre.

La conjonction (P&Q) fait référence à la séparation lacanienne tandis que la disjonction (PvQ) est l'aliénation lacanienne. Comme les diagrammes de Venn montrent,

le cercle de « P » désigne l'Être (une zone du sujet) tandis que le cercle de « Q » représente le Sens (une zone de l'Autre), et la zone de chevauchement entre les cercles est une zone de non-sens, l'inconscient saisissable. Pour Lacan, le sujet, c'est le sujet de l'inconscient et seule la zone d'intersection est saisissable. L'aliénation illustre l'équilibre (PvQ) qui maintient le sujet dans l'Être et le Sens. En conséquence, le sujet est aliéné à lui-même au profit de l'Autre ; le sujet ne peut être le sujet sans l'Autre. Le choix possible entre l'Être et le Sens serait contre le sujet (Lacan 27 mai 1964 : 19 (432)) – l'option optimale pour le sujet est donc de sauver à la fois l'Être et le Sens par l'aliénation qui est la seule façon de maintenir l'équilibre.

Cela rappelle une stratégie de la classe avec les enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire. Néanmoins, je dois ajouter que les enfants des classes performatives trouvent des moyens pour que les trajets et marche-routes, trajectoires de la libido (Deleuze 1993) aillent au-delà du son social. Habituellement, cela s'exprime dans la pratique régulière de lancer des jouets sur le sol. Il s'agit d'une pratique explicite du plaisir, d'une prise de plaisir dans le son, d'un désir.

On peut retourner aux opérations logiques de l'Être, du Sens et du non-sens. Le point délicat se situe au niveau de la zone de chevauchement qui représente le non-sens. D'une part, c'est ce qui différencie le Sens de l'Être selon la visualisation de Venn du  $P \Leftrightarrow Q$  ou l'équation. Cependant, lors de l'aliénation, cette zone est également indiscernable, car aliénée. D'autre part, c'est le seul point commun entre l'Être et le Sens ; selon la visualisation de P&Q, il n'y a qu'un seul élément, la zone de chevauchement. Cette dernière opération est désignée comme la séparation ; pour Lacan, c'est le manque dans l'Autre et le sujet se trouve dans cet espace de manque dans l'Autre. Le non-sens est ici le seul élément saisissable puisque si le sujet est séparé de l'Autre, il n'est pas pour autant complètement saisissable. Il y a une logique conjonctive de séparation dans le fait de jeter un jouet sur le sol. Il en résulte un certain déséquilibre énergétique.

Ces opérations d'aliénation et de séparation sont intimement associées, comme le montre la formule algébrique suivante :  $(\text{Être}) \vee (\text{Sens}) = (\text{Être}) + (\text{Sens}) - (\text{Être} \& \text{Sens})$ . Lacan ne le montre pas, mais cela signifie que l'aliénation ne peut être calculée sans que la séparation ne le soit et vice versa. Par essence, l'aliénation est une condition de la séparation et vice versa. La socialisation de la libido se caractérise par l'aliénation du sujet. Tout en préférant la capacité de différencier les objets, le sujet devient l'agent social et sacrifie la capacité de différencier son propre désir.

Après l'aliénation, l'agent social identifie son désir au désir de l'Autre et recherche la reconnaissance de l'enseignante. Représentant le champ à investir, l'Autre maintient un tel statu quo jusqu'à ce que le sujet trouve le manque dans l'Autre. Le sujet ne peut prendre conscience de l'existence de l'Autre que par son manque. Ce manque survient lorsque l'Autre trébuche et se rend visible. Par exemple, lorsque l'enfant laisse tomber son jouet, l'enfant voit l'enseignante non pas comme le champ à investir, mais comme



une instance de l'Autre. En conséquence, pendant un moment, le sujet se sépare de l'Autre et peut trouver son propre désir comme pulsion partielle.

En suivant un modèle de l'inconscient qui n'est pas basé sur l'équilibre énergétique, Guattari introduit trois entrées qui remplissent des fonctions logiques similaires et trois niveaux d'inconscient (Guattari 1989) : non-séparabilité (la compatibilité interne entre les entités ; niveau matériel), séparation (la transformation d'inter-entités de l'extérieur ; niveau sémiotique) et quantification (les relations des entités entre la non-séparabilité et séparation ; niveau pragmatique). Ici, dans ce contexte plus compliqué (l'inconscient lacanien ne présuppose pas les niveaux différents), les fonctions logiques ne sont pas fixées, par exemple, la séparation peut être conjonctive et active (Ibid).

C'est important parce qu'à ce moment, l'enseignante apparaît comme une instance d'intersubjectivité. Cela renverse la logique d'un cours ordinaire : il ne s'agit pas d'interagir avec l'autre pour jouer, mais de jouer pour interagir avec un sujet, avec un inter-sujet. Ces moments créent un espace intersubjectif particulier, un espace conjonctif. Rappelons la définition que Guattari donne de la subjectivité :

L'ensemble des conditions qui rendent possible que des instances individuelles et/ou collectives soient en position d'émerger comme Territoire existentiel sui-référentiel, en adjacence ou en rapport de délimitation avec une altérité elle-même subjective (Guattari 1992 : 21).

Cette définition semble également conjonctive, les conditions d'une subjectivité déterminant les conditions d'une autre subjectivité. Il ne s'agit pas d'une tautologie, mais de la logique intersubjective positive suggérée par Guattari. Peut-être l'étape suivante de la séparation lacanienne. Ce n'est pas l'Autre à l'extérieur, c'est l'Autre à l'intérieur, en lui-même l'Autre n'est qu'une partie de l'intersubjectivité, de l'altérité. En lançant son jouet, l'enfant invite l'enseignante à entrer également dans le flux d'énergie, et c'est à elle de choisir de le suivre ou de renvoyer l'enfant à son scénario d'origine. D'une manière générale, suivre l'enfant correspond à l'objectif fixé par les enseignants des enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire avec lesquels j'ai pu m'entretenir.

Une autre enseignante (Mme V.) qui dirige des classes de groupe dit : « Par exemple, si vous regardez le bac à sable, les enfants de deux ans jouent en quelque sorte ensemble, mais ils sont assis tout seuls ». En fait, ils ne sont pas seuls : l'enfant ne s'adresse pas à lui-même, ni aux autres, mais à l'Autre. Néanmoins, la première chose à apprendre est l'interaction, la capacité à s'impliquer dans des relations intersubjectives, dans l'intersection de territoires existentiels.

Revenons à la thèse initiale selon laquelle la pédagogie des sourds est une traduction du flux corporel énergétique en un système de référence. Dans une certaine mesure, cette thèse peut se référer à la pensée de Guattari selon laquelle « dans certains contextes, le sens peut être massivement opposé à des Flux matériels et signalétiques, conçus sur un mode essentiellement passifs » (Guattari 1989 : 36). Selon une

enseignante (Mme V.), leur objectif professionnel est certainement de rendre les interactions sujet-son passives, de sorte que le décodage n'interfère pas avec le processus stable de la communication. Elle illustre cela par une métaphore : « le poisson est le dernier à remarquer l'eau ». Il m'a semblé que cet énoncé contient une différenciation plus productive qu'actif/passif : subjectivité/situation, ou la situation socio-libidinale, le territoire.

Si l'on suit les foncteurs ontologiques, le Flux est relié aux Territoires par le biais d'une discursivité énergétique libidinale. Dans ce contexte, on peut dire que le flux énergétique du son et le système de références dans lequel il est intégré par un enseignant sont dans le même Flux, un Flux matériel, sémiotique et énergétique. Il ne faut pas oublier que le sens naît aussi des fluctuations de la machine, de ce qu'un psychanalyste appellerait la pulsion (Guattari 1992 : 175).

Ici, Guattari utilise l'opération mathématique de l'intégration, en soulignant la relation des Phylums (machiniques) aux Flux et des Univers aux Territoires : « les Phylum constitueront, en quelque sorte, les « intégrales » des Flux et les Univers les « intégrales » des Territoires » (Guattari 1989 : 41).

Le sens est imbriqué dans le Phylum, l'intégrale du Flux, nombre infini de parties d'une valeur infiniment petite. L'intégration fonctionne avec des infinitésimaux en utilisant l'exemple d'une courbe continue représentée comme une ligne brisée. En d'autres termes, dans l'intégration, la courbe continue est divisée, découpée en un nombre fini de segments discrets – l'écart entre eux peut être négligé.

La quantification est donc possible ici, ces infinitésimaux peuvent être additionnés pour connaître l'aire de la figure courbe. L'opération mathématique de l'intégration est très proche de la fonction pratique de la schizoanalyse clinique en ce qu'elle traite de l'infini et de la continuité, de cet incalculable que la psychanalyse comme l'arithmétique ne peut atteindre.

Plus précisément, on peut dire que cette fonction d'intégration est assurée par la libido, la libido schizoanalytique, que Guattari situe dans la zone du Phylum. Le phylum de la libido dénaturalisée est l'intégrale des flux matériels du désir, quelque chose qui permet de le numériser. L'interprétation lacanienne de libido comme un ensemble des opérations logiques ne contredit pas celle-ci de Guattari. Aussi la libido-flux au sens économique, qualitatif – c'est ainsi que Guattari voyait la libido chez Freud – Guattari ne l'annule pas. C'est simplement une question de choix micropolitique.

Ce qui déplaît à Guattari, c'est que la libido en psychanalyse soit devenue un équivalent général et transcendantal, une constante. Et il faut dire que c'est juste : la libido psychanalytique reste un être mythique, une chimère, un piège, c'est-à-dire une notion avec laquelle les analystes contemporains préfèrent malheureusement ne pas s'engager. Contrairement à Lacan, Guattari veut sortir la notion de libido de l'esclavage des pulsions de la vie et de la mort ; le programme libidinal lacanien est construit sur les pulsions de la vie et de la mort. Guattari propose de ne pas dire définitivement adieu au

vocabulaire de Freud, mais d'essayer de travailler avec lui à partir de la théorie des agencements. Guattari propose de ne pas parler de la libido comme d'une pulsion, mais comme d'une expression, de quelque chose qui évalue le désir, et qui introduit un déséquilibre dans la relation du désir (Guattari 1981). C'est ce qui se passe lorsque des enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire jettent un jouet par terre.

Une extension évidente de la pratique de la pédagogie des sourds développant une interprétation schizoanalytique serait l'utilisation de la vibration sonore. Certains enseignants m'ont dit qu'ils utilisaient parfois des jouets spéciaux qui produisent à la fois des sons et des vibrations tactiles. Cette pratique, du moins en Russie, n'est pas très développée, malgré ses avantages évidents. Cette approche engage à la fois les composantes matérielles et sémiotiques du son, démontrant la distinction superficielle entre l'énergétique et sémantique. Il s'agit essentiellement d'un investissement direct du son, de l'affect dans le corps – ce que la psychanalyse prend comme une métaphore, la pédagogie des sourds peut le prendre au pied de la lettre.

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## **À propos du « livre barjot » de L'Anti-Œdipe**

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### **Abstract**

The 50th anniversary of the publication of *Anti-Œdipus* in 1972, just a few years after the events in May-June 1968 in Paris, affords us the opportunity to reflect on the very simple question, what has happened to desire and its 'infinite swarming' (Deleuze 2004: 267)? What has impeded the impetus of *Anti-Œdipus*? Why has the spirit of liberatory desire seemingly faded away and why do the dreams of 1968 appear long gone?

### **Échec**

Deleuze avait-il raison de considérer l'*Anti-Œdipe* comme un échec ? On le voit lorsque Deleuze se lamente auprès de Catherine Backès-Clément de sa frustration face aux (non)effets de 1968 et de son premier livre avec Guattari:

*L'Anti-Œdipe* est après 68: c'était une époque de bouillonnement, de recherche. Aujourd'hui il y a une très forte réaction. C'est toute une économie du livre, une nouvelle politique qui impose le conformisme actuel... le journalisme a pris de plus en plus de pouvoir sur la littérature. Et puis, une masse de romans redécouvrent le thème familial le plus plat, et développent à l'infini tout un papa-maman: c'est inquiétant, quand on se trouve un roman tout fait, préfabriqué, dans la famille qu'on a. C'est vraiment l'année du patrimoine, à cet égard *L'Anti-Œdipe* a été un échec total. (Dosse 2007 : 263)

Dans l'article « L'étudiant, le fou et le Katangais », publié en 1969 et prononcé l'année précédente au III<sup>e</sup> Congrès international de psychodrame, sociodrame et thérapie institutionnelle, Guattari parle des tristement célèbres *Katangais*, les voyous qui ont envahi la Sorbonne et plusieurs autres institutions à travers la France. Les Katangais – le lumpenprolétariat parisien – étaient d'infâmes mercenaires qui occupaient les sous-sols de la Sorbonne. Le mystère entourant les Katangais, dont le nom semble provenir des rebelles katangais de la guerre du Congo, est levé et décrit plus franchement par Seale et McConville comme suit :

Une trentaine de voyous, de petits délinquants, d'anciens légionnaires étrangers, de déserteurs – se faisant appeler « les Katangais » – s'installent dans un sous-sol de la Sorbonne et sèment une terreur incertaine autour d'eux. Ils étaient venus pour aider les étudiants, mais ils ont jeté le discrédit sur eux. Une nuit de la mi-juin, il y eut une bagarre et ils furent mis dehors par un service d'ordre des étudiants, mobilisés par le comité d'occupation. (1968: 109)

Tout en se gardant de parler de leur rôle en tant que classe d'avant-garde impeccable et irréprochable des ouvriers et des étudiants, Guattari parle de la tâche révolutionnaire comme de la suppression même de l'ordre du prolétariat. Simplement, la classe ouvrière doit échapper aux modèles hérités d'organisation et d'institutions. Les distinctions entre l'avant-garde et le prolétariat, le prolétariat et le sous-prolétariat ou le lumpenprolétariat doivent disparaître pour qu'une transformation fondamentale se produise. À leur place doivent émerger de nouvelles subjectivités capables de communiquer de manière transversale. Son argument pourrait être aligné sur les critiques contemporaines de la jeunesse d'aujourd'hui, qui est parfois perçue comme restant enfermée dans des modes de pensée, d'action et de croyance qui l'empêchent de réaliser l'impossible, de penser l'impensable, de créer un monde nouveau pour tous, d'être digne de l'événement (Deleuze; Guattari 1991 : 151). Selon cette lecture, les étudiants sont entravés par « le système imaginaire de castes » (Guattari 2003: 223) et pour Guattari, un mouvement d'insurrection, un véritable mouvement révolutionnaire étudiant, est déterminé et inhibé par des dispositifs, il demeure « encasté dans l'imaginaire » (Ibid.). Guattari soulève l'importante question de savoir comment assurer une communication transversale entre des éléments hétérodoxes, contaminés, disjoints – les Katangais en tant que tels – car ce sont ces groupes qui, en échappant au contrôle social, inventent un autre avenir – *un otro mundo es posible* – un autre monde est possible. De manière spectaculaire, Guattari trouve dans la figure du Katangais planétaire un prototype du « militant révolutionnaire authentique », de « l'homme nouveau » de la future société socialiste (Ibid.: 239).

Le problème de l'université, on l'a bien vu en 68, n'est pas celui *des* étudiants et *des* enseignants, c'est le problème de l'ensemble de la société dans la mesure où se trouvent mis en cause aussi bien le rapport entre la transmission de connaissance, la formation de cadres, le désir des masses que les exigences de l'industrie, etc. (Guattari 2012: 28)

Mai 1968 nous a appris à lire sur les murs et depuis, on a commencé à déchiffrer les graffitis dans les prisons, les asiles et aujourd'hui dans les pissotières. (Guattari 1973: 3; cf. Bradley 2020)

Guattari note que *les événements* ont déclenché des crises et des traumatismes dans l'éducation, mettant en évidence les dysfonctionnements des structures universitaires,

les mauvaises méthodes d'enseignement, les problèmes de santé mentale des étudiants, la nécessité d'offrir des soins psychothérapeutiques aux étudiants et d'autres problèmes propres à la vie étudiante qui existaient dans les années 1960, mais qui n'étaient pas souvent abordés. Il situe dans l'irruption de 1968 la reconnaissance d'une « interaction fondamentale entre les problèmes psychopathologiques individuels et l'entourage social, professionnel et politique » (Guattari 2003: 231). En d'autres termes, la crise de 68 a dramatisé les crises enracinées dans la société française. Guattari examine comment la névrose et la folie peuvent devenir un fondement de la vérité, révélant les problèmes sous-jacents du socius.

La schizoanalyse est l'un des noms que Guattari a donnés au projet de toute une vie de réinventer la psychanalyse et la pratique thérapeutique en l'étendant au champ matériel et social, car le désir est toujours déjà collectif dans sa dimension et son articulation. Sans réinvention, « on a l'inconscient qu'on mérite » (Guattari 1979: 7), dans nos perceptions du monde, dans notre corps, notre territoire et notre sexe, insiste Guattari. Nous avons l'inconscient que nous méritons dans les relations amoureuses, dans la famille, l'école, les quartiers, les usines, les stades et les universités, ajoute-t-il, mais l'inconscient machinique, avec sa production et sa reproduction d'images et de mots, est également « tourné vers l'avenir ». Sa « trame » est le possible lui-même, le possible à fleurs de langage, de peau, de socius, de cosmos, etc. (Ibid.: 8). La question est de savoir comment libérer le désir en refusant le choix entre spontanéité et hiérarchie. Pour Guattari:

Désir libéré, cela veut dire que le désir sort de l'impasse du fantasme individuel privé: il ne s'agit pas de l'adapter, de le socialiser, de le discipliner, mais de l'agencer de telle sorte que son procès ne soit pas interrompu dans un corps social opaque et, qu'au contraire, il aboutisse à une énonciation collective. Ce qui compte, ce n'est pas l'unification autoritaire, mais plutôt une sorte d'essaimage à l'infini des machines désirantes: dans les écoles, les usines, les quartiers, les crèches, les prisons, etc. Donc, pas question de coiffer, de totaliser les mouvements partiels, mais de les brancher sur un même plan de bascule. Tant qu'on en reste à une alternative entre le spontanéisme impuissant des masses et le codage bureaucratique et hiérarchique d'une organisation de parti, les mouvements de libération du désir se feront récupérer, encercler, marginaliser... (Guattari 2012: 77)

En gardant à l'esprit la libération du désir, la figure du schizo, « *l'ange exterminateur* » du capitalisme que l'on trouve dans *L'Anti-Œdipe*, peut être repositionnée et désignée comme Katangais. Une partie de ce projet est une tentative de repenser et de repositionner la crise de la production de la subjectivité qui reste pertinente pour le moment que nous vivons, ce qui équivaut à une crise du désir. Les soi-disant attitudes subjectives de ceux qui échappent au contrôle social peuvent être appelées « les

Katangais du tiers monde ». Qui et où sont les « Katangais du tiers monde » ? Qui sont ceux qui vivent en marge des sociétés industrielles avancées ou ailleurs dans le Sud ?

Quelques questions se posent: quelle est la nature de la « tiers-mondisation » de nos sociétés actuelles qui fait proliférer des éléments criminels-déclassés? Qui et où sont les militants de notre société contemporaine? S'agit-il des pauvres, des détenus, des patients psychiatriques, des étudiants, de la classe des *hackers* (Culp 2022)? Comment expliquer l'explosion nihiliste des comportements autistiques et des passages à l'acte pulsionnels des soi-disant délinquants, le lumpenprolétariat du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle, le *Katangais-étudiant*? Pourquoi le prototype du militant révolutionnaire authentique semble-t-il singulièrement absent, voire anachronique, non seulement des sociétés occidentales, mais aussi des technopoles urbaines de l'autre côté de la planète, à Tokyo, Séoul ou Pékin par exemple? De telles questions exigent un retour à *L'Anti-Œdipe* pour comprendre l'(im)possibilité de la réémergence de la subjectivité telle que Guattari l'appelle, une subjectivité des marges (*emarginati*), une forme de subjectivité qui peut inventer un nouvel ordre social, qui peut invoquer une nouvelle valorisation au-delà de celles « phalocratiques, compétitives, brutales » du même, une nouvelle forme de subjectivité au-delà des machines célibataires capitalistes qui peut affirmer les véritables « devenirs de désir » (Guattari; Rolnik 2007: 408).

Dans quelle mesure l'effondrement du désir, et ce que Deleuze et Guattari, à la suite de Wilhelm Reich, qualifient de désir désirant sa propre répression, nous parle-t-il de notre époque où le monde semble prisonnier de modèles de subjectivité qui ont moins à voir avec le processus schizo qu'avec l'autisme ou des formes d'ipséité mortifère ? Il est donc légitime de se demander – comme le font Deleuze et Guattari dans leur essai « Mai 68 n'a pas eu lieu » –, qu'en est-il dans la tiers-mondisation des sociétés industrielles avancées, dans les vastes métropoles et leurs ghettos, dans l'écologie grise du « tiers monde européen », qu'en est-il « d'un Mai 68 généralisé, d'une bifurcation ou d'une fluctuation amplifiée », et de la possibilité d'un « nouvel internationalisme » (Deleuze 2003: 217)?

Le fait que 2021 ait vu des hommes et des femmes d'une richesse obscène se lancer dans l'espace à des fins touristiques et d'enrichissement personnel, tandis que le reste d'entre nous, humbles êtres vivants, souffrions des effets du changement climatique et de la propagation du coronavirus, semble suggérer que ce n'est pas George Orwell, mais plutôt Aldous Huxley, qui avait raison quant à la trajectoire générale des sociétés occidentales, car Huxley avait prévu que la satisfaction immédiate des pulsions primaires était le véritable secret du contrôle et de la domination. Bernard Stiegler, qui a également écrit sur la sociopathologie et la psychopathologie de 1968 et de ses suites, suit cette ligne d'argumentation en soutenant que ceux qui vivent dans la nouvelle forme de capitalisme culturel souffrent d'une forme de misère spirituelle, car ils trouvent le désir et la sublimation découplés des pulsions. Il note la perte de croyance dans ce qu'il appelle nos sociétés incontrôlables et pour lui, précisément, « *la croyance est un nom du*



*désir* » (Stiegler 2006: 26). Quelle est la nature de ce désir transformé? Il est clair que l'énergie du jeune prolétariat numérique est aujourd'hui dépensée dans d'autres activités que le ferment révolutionnaire. La vie se passe dans l'*addiction* aux jeux vidéo, au porno, aux jeux d'argent, à des formes infinies d'intoxication « pour échapper à la réalité de la journée de travail » (Bradley; Lee 2018: 642).

Une humanité excédentaire est apparue, de nombreux jeunes à travers la planète souffrent d'un chômage et d'un sous-emploi structurels. Dans les vastes bidonvilles du monde, dans nos technopoles urbaines, dans les non-lieux du monde, de nombreux jeunes sont contraints d'embrasser l'économie informelle et l'existence précaire. Le lumpenprolétariat réactionnaire est passé des « vagabonds, criminels, prostituées », parias et intouchables, aux travailleurs précaires et épuisés, aux travailleurs pauvres, au personnel contractuel, au personnel journalier, au personnel contractuel zéro heure et, plus désespérément, au sous-prolétariat ou au sous-prolétariat permanent. Le *lumpenproletariat* est désormais une classe ouvrière mondiale qui réunit le précaire et l'humanité excédentaire.

Alors que des hommes et des femmes riches comme Richard Branson, Yusaku Maezawa et Jeff Bezos gravitaient autour de notre planète, il n'y a pas eu de critique du capitalisme, mais plutôt un massif désaveu collectif et une paralysie politique, alors que nous nous enfouissions encore plus profondément dans les patrons technologique et consumériste. C'est compréhensible compte tenu du sentiment d'anxiété et de stress qui se répand sur la planète, mais il s'agit néanmoins d'un désaveu. L'expression spectaculaire de cette paralysie politique s'est également produite à la fin de la débâcle qu'a été la présidence Trump. Les téléspectateurs du monde entier ont vu des Katangais sans pouvoir pénétrer dans le Capitole, téléphones portables à la main, une génération *selfie* débile se filmant elle-même, sans savoir quoi faire ensuite. Plus préoccupée par les réseaux sociaux, les flux en direct et les *likes* instantanés, la jeunesse américaine privée de ses droits ne s'est jamais posé la question: que se passera-t-il si nous accédons au pouvoir, que se passera-t-il le lendemain? Ces deux actes obscènes de stupidité restent gravés dans ma mémoire. L'un virevolte autour de la planète sans se soucier de l'humanité qui se trouve en dessous. L'autre, la foule de Trumpiste, les nouveaux Katangais de l'apolitisme et de l'appauvrissement le plus misérable.

Les voyous qui ont pris d'assaut le Capitole sont précisément les ignorants décrits par Stiegler ci-dessus. Mais ce n'est pas tout. Leur idiotie laisse ceux qui les regardent tout aussi stupéfaits, car nous, voyeurs, réalisons que c'est nous qui, collectivement, *ne croyons plus en ce monde*. Nous ne croyons pas aux événements qui nous arrivent, comme le dit Deleuze. L'attention ailleurs, nous haussons nonchalamment les épaules et retournons à nos écrans mobiles. Nos vies, leurs vies, sont vraiment comme un mauvais film (Deleuze 1985: 223). En effet, nous pouvons dire ceci: il n'y a pas d'esprit prévalent pour rompre avec l'ordre et la passivité de nos institutions. Je crois que cela est

symptomatique de l'activisme politique d'aujourd'hui.<sup>1</sup> Les choses vont si mal que ce n'est même pas que le capitalisme a perdu son esprit et que la misère spirituelle règne comme le dit Stiegler (2004), mais *en masse* nous avons perdu *notre esprit* dans les technologies de l'esprit et du contrôle. Cette perte est une conséquence de la désublimation, et de la tendance à l'épuisement de la libido. La pathologie sociale de 1968 conduit au déclin du pouvoir de socialisation et au règne des pulsions. Notre époque est celle de la liquidation de toutes les barrières surmoïque. Ce n'est ni l'âge d'or du principe de plaisir, ni la libération des « instincts », mais le règne des pulsions. Face à cet état de fait misérable, « notre tâche la plus difficile » est simplement celle-ci: « croire en ce monde, en cette vie [...] la tâche d'un mode d'existence à découvrir sur notre plan d'immanence aujourd'hui. » (Deleuze; Guattari 1991: 72; voir Bradley; Lee 2018). Le monde a vraiment besoin d'un sursaut et les sociétés incontrôlables ont besoin d'un sursaut et cela, je pense, serait un acte révolutionnaire (2006: 69). Je crois que les outils de la schizoanalyse restent suffisamment aiguisés et précis pour accomplir cette tâche.

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<sup>1</sup> Un certain type d'initiation de groupe permet de spécifier une marque prévalente : une pratique militante réelle dans un contexte social réifié crée un effet de coupure, bien éloigné du sentiment de passivité que donne la participation aux institutions habituelles. Peut-être après coup serai-je amené à considérer que, de ma part, il y avait là l'induction d'un certain activisme, l'illusion d'une efficacité, une fuite en avant... Pourtant, je crois que ceux qui ont fait l'expérience du militantisme dans de telles organisations de jeunesse, organisations de masse, au parti communiste ou dans les groupuscules, ne seront plus jamais comme les autres. Peu importe ici le critère d'efficacité dans la réalité ; certains types d'action, de concertation, traduisent une cassure avec des processus sociaux habituels, et surtout une rupture d'avec les modes de communication et d'effusion hérités de la famille. (Guattari 2003 : 156)

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## ***Undoing the Present, Crystallising the Future: Psychedelic Schizoanalysis***

by ARAGORN ELOFF

### **Abstract**

In this article, I examine the use of psychedelics as a way of fulfilling the tasks of schizoanalysis. Specifically, I will argue that we can view psychedelics as counteractualising agents of ontogenesis and fabulation, observing that, even beyond the long-standing countercultural and therapeutic discourses supporting this view, there is now growing evidence from contemporary neuroscience that they can function as powerful deterritorialising tools right down to the neurobiological level. My interest in discussing psychedelics use in the context of Deleuze and Guattari is neither simply to observe interesting parallels nor to perpetuate the popular misunderstanding of the schizoanalytic project as the liberation of some kind of inchoate universal energy; instead, I would like to propose that psychedelics could aid us – individually and collectively (although, as we will be reminded below, these are already the same thing) – in dismantling the fascisms that surround us and the fascisms that inhabit us by allowing us to create new machinic arrangements of desire or, in Simondon's terms, to facilitate novel transductive couplings that allow for new individuations. Before turning to drugs, bodies and the myriad becomings that inhabit them and which they augur, I reiterate the core principles, theses and tasks of schizoanalysis.

### **Introduction: the delirious**

The question of subjectivity is now returning as a leitmotiv. It is not a natural given any more than air or water. How do we produce it, capture it, enrich it, and permanently reinvent it in a way that renders it compatible with Universes of mutant value? How do we work for its liberation, that is, for its resingularisation?

Félix Guattari (1995: 135)

What is terrifying is our lack of collective imagination in a world that has reached such a boiling point, our myopia before all the 'molecular revolutions' which keep pulling the

rug out from under us, at an accelerated pace.

Félix Guattari (2009: 307)

Half a century after its original publication, thumbing through *Anti-Oedipus* produces an unusual tension: on the one hand, it reads like a romantic paean to the post-68 moment; on the other, the task it sets for us – the schizoanalytic task of locating and eradicating both the molar and the molecular forms of fascism – is perhaps even more apposite now than it was in the heady days of 1972. If, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, “every delirium is first of all the investment of a field that is social, economic, political, cultural, racial and racist, pedagogical, and religious” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 274), then it is surely the case that we live in a particularly delirious moment. With the growing popularity of far-right sentiment around the globe, reflected in the emergence of populist leaders, reactionary movements and the normalisation of the most noxious forms of online discourse, all of it unfolding within the context of spiralling digital complexity, ecological collapse, inter-imperial rivalry and a seemingly omnipresent global economic crisis, we can clearly see the ways in which “everything turns fascist or envelops itself in fascism, the way in which it falls back into archaisms” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 277), and how the “[s]ocial modes of organization that prevail today on earth are not holding up, literally and figuratively” (Guattari 2009: 307). As Guattari observes, at the current juncture, “[h]istory is gripped by crazy parameters: demography, energy, the technological-scientific explosion, pollution, the arms race [...] The earth is deterritorializing itself at top speed” (ibid.). In response to this, a renewed critical focus on social formations and the complex relations between the individual and collective subjectivation processes that emerge from and sustain them is a necessary pretext for any meaningful project of resistance and refiguration or, put otherwise, of “individual and collective reappropriation of the production of subjectivity” (Guattari 1995: 133). Crucially, this project cannot take the form of a mere escape but needs to cause more escapes as it unfolds (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 315) – it needs to make what it is escaping escape through the careful machining of new, experimental arrangements of collective desire. In undertaking this task, Guattari encourages us to distinguish between subjugated groups and subject groups. He observes in this regard how a “subject group endeavours to control its own behaviour” and is thus able to “produce its own tools of elucidation” or collective arrangements<sup>1</sup> of enunciation to become “open to a world beyond its own immediate interests”, whereas subjugated groups tend to express themselves in hierarchical structures and cultivate reactive relations to otherness. To the extent, however, that desire *is* liberated in subject groups

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<sup>1</sup> While the usual English translation of Deleuze and Guattari’s often-used term ‘agencement’ is ‘assemblage’, I have opted for the lesser-used translation ‘arrangement’. Neither properly connote the enactive sense of ‘agency-ing’, but ‘assemblage’ carries with it the weight of serious misreadings within new materialist and object-oriented frameworks (see Buchanan 2021 for a corrective to these). Regardless, the active, participatory sense of the original French term should be recalled throughout.

and the participants can form a heterogeneous – and heterogenetic – collection of singularities with transversal relations, the group can become highly adaptive and creative, locating and eradicating internal micro-fascisms and putting in place a potentially revolutionary processual creativity.

What, however, beyond the proliferation of intuitively appealing neologisms and turns of phrase that mark out a particular Deleuzoguattarian identity, does it mean to ‘liberate our desire in subject groups in order to create a processual heterogenesis against micro-fascism’? If we don’t want the language of ‘desiring-machines’, ‘Bodies without Organs’ and ‘deterritorialisation’ to become just so many *margarine words*<sup>2</sup>, perhaps we need to consider what an actual schizoanalytic practice – one we could enact in the real world against real forms of fascism – would look like. While the idea of schizoanalysis has been fruitfully applied in fields like cultural studies, are there any contemporary *practices* that we could regard as ‘schizoanalytic’? This may seem counterintuitive given that Deleuze and Guattari are explicit about the fact that “[n]o political program will be elaborated within the framework of schizoanalysis” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 380) and that the schiz is “prepared by a subterranean labor of causes, aims, and interests working together” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 378). We are thus unlikely to locate a political practice that calls itself schizoanalytic and, as Ian Buchanan has observed, whatever semblance of a program we could locate in Deleuze and Guattari’s oeuvres is fragmentary and tentative (Buchanan 2020: 5-6). There is not – nor could there ever be – a manual of schizoanalysis. Nor are the architects of desire interested in proposing any kind of utopianism; as Guattari observes, “[u]topia, today, is to believe that current societies will be able to continue along on their merry little way without major upheavals...The true Utopians are conservatives of all shapes and sizes who would like for this ‘to hold up all the same,’ to return to yesterday and the day before yesterday” (Guattari 2009: 307). That said, if we consider what *Anti-Oedipus* describes as the negative and positive tasks of the schizoanalytic project, we can recognise the immanent process-goal of the machining of desire as an anti-fascist practice in several surprising places. In this article, I turn towards one of the more surprising of these places in order to examine the use of psychedelics as a form of schizoanalysis aimed at combatting micro-fascism. Specifically, I will argue that we can view psychedelics as counteractualising agents of ontogenesis and fabulation, observing that, even beyond the long-standing countercultural and therapeutic discourses supporting this view, there is now growing evidence from contemporary neuroscience that they can function as

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<sup>2</sup> “The way activists talk at their meetings is primarily in margarine-words. These may be slogans, phrases whose function is to circulate, not to mean; or they may be certain oily words that slip from mouth to ear, person to machine, situation to scene. One way to recognize margarine-words is repetition: they are used a lot, functioning as code words or passwords, their appropriateness assumed, never shown. Ultimately, this is because their circulation is also the usually unquestioned circulation of moral beliefs; but in any given iteration, the repetition may be well-nigh meaningless, just a little index, gentle reminder of the shared morals rather than harsh mnemotechnic. It is never really clear which is primary, which gives form to which: the morality at work, or the compulsion to repeat in its collusion with the most gregarious drives” (Acosta 2014: 138).

powerful deterritorialising tools right down to the neurobiological level. My interest in discussing psychedelics use in the context of Deleuze and Guattari is neither simply to observe interesting parallels nor to perpetuate the stereotypical popular misunderstanding of the schizoanalytic project as the liberation of some kind of inchoate universal energy<sup>3</sup>; instead, in line with the practical injunction mentioned above, I would like to propose that they could aid us – individually and collectively (although, as we will be reminded below, these are already the same thing) – in dismantling the fascisms that surround us and the fascisms that inhabit us by allowing us to create new machinic arrangements of desire or, in Simondon’s terms, to facilitate novel transductive couplings that allow for new individuations (Simondon 2020: 13-16; 175-180). Before turning to drugs, bodies and the myriad becomings that inhabit them and which they augur, however, it is worth reminding ourselves of the core principles, theses and tasks of schizoanalysis.

### **Prolegomena to any future schizoanalysis**

Desire is an exile, desire is a desert that traverses the body without organs and makes us pass from one of its faces to the other. Never an individual exile, never a personal desert, but a collective exile and a collective desert.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1977: 377)

In this brief diagrammatic reminder of schizoanalysis, I will rely primarily on *Anti-Oedipus*, but I will also gesture towards Guattari’s later solo writings as they reflect a sustained development and continual transformation of the fluid conceptual architecture of the ideas most commonly associated with the first volume of the *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* project. In that book, Deleuze and Guattari scatter various ‘theses’ and ‘tasks’ of schizoanalysis across the last chapter. Drawing these together will provide a provisional framework through which to encounter psychedelics. Foucault of course attempted something like this in the famous introduction to *Anti-Oedipus*, but his polemical take is, when presented in isolation (and no doubt despite his intentions), prone to the above-mentioned popular misreading of the ‘liberation of desire’, so let us instead turn to the body of the text itself. Deleuze and Guattari begin the final chapter by

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<sup>3</sup> “I will take the liberty of questioning all references to undifferentiation, all references to spontaneist mythologies: every time we succeed in assembling devices of expression that escape from the despotism of the dominant system of significances, and that escape from the articulation of all the dominant syntaxizations, we are actually dealing with highly elaborate machinisms” (Guattari and Rolnik 2007: 353).

presenting the negative task – although we should bear in mind that “[t]he negative or destructive task of schizoanalysis is in no way separable from its positive tasks – all these tasks are necessarily undertaken at the same time” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 322) – which is “ultimately that of discovering for every case the nature of the libidinal investments of the social field, their possible internal conflicts, their relationships with the preconscious investments of the same field. their possible conflicts with these-in short, the entire interplay of the desiring-machines and the repression of desire” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 381-2). In other words, schizoanalysis involves a careful analysis of how unconscious desire is machined in each instance as well as how this relates to the preconscious interests that don’t necessarily align with unconscious desire. This machining – because remember, “desire is a machine, a synthesis of machines, a machinic arrangement – desiring-machines” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 296) – is in fact what we could describe, in quasi-Marxist language, as part of the ‘infrastructure’: “[t]he most general principle of schizoanalysis is that desire is always constitutive of a social field” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 348). Desire invests production as social production and desire itself is likewise a form of desiring-production – there is a kind of reciprocal presupposition between desire and production that forms the core of the analytic component of schizoanalysis. When examining a particular social field, “schizoanalysis only asks what place it reserves for desiring-production; what generative role desire enjoys therein; in what forms the conciliation between the regime of desiring-production and the regime of social production is brought about, since in any case it is the same production” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 380). While “all production is at once desiring-production and social production” (296), it is analysed in two distinct yet overlapping ways: first as it affects the preconscious “molar aggregates of social production” and second as it is expressed in the unconscious “molecular multiplicities of desiring production” (380), both of which are collective, machinic regimes that differ merely in their degrees of stratification or, as Deleuze and Guattari put it in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the kinds of lines they form (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 208-31). In the interweaving, resonance and divergence of these lines – the molar lines of identitarian axioms, class belongings and all the manifest content of the social order, as well as the molecular lines limning the hidden content of libidinal investments that belong to a different, often contrary distribution of multiplicities – schizoanalysis then seeks to locate points of rupture – lines of flight and leakage as well as tendencies towards fascisms on all scales. This is distilled in the four theses outlined in the final chapter of *Anti-Oedipus*. The first of these is, as we have already made clear, that “every investment is social, and in any case bears upon a sociohistorical field” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 342). The second is that when examining how desire is machined within a particular social arrangement, we need to “distinguish the unconscious libidinal investment of group or desire, and the preconscious investment of class or interest” (343). As Deleuze and Guattari observe, preconscious investment reflects “large social goals, and concerns the organism and the collective organs, including the arranged vacuoles of lack”



(344), i.e., what we could otherwise refer to as the molar and the manifest. Notably, and similarly to the distinction Deleuze makes in *Difference and Repetition* between the actual and the intensive, it is here, among the fully-established terms and properties – or classes – that comprise the concrete, structured social reality that we can locate lack and exclusive disjunction, things that are missing when we turn to the pure positivity of the subterranean partial<sup>4</sup> flows. It is by examining the *selection* of these flows, Deleuze and Guattari tell us, that we can understand preconscious interests. The third thesis of schizoanalysis reiterates the critique of psychoanalysis that takes place throughout the book by underscoring “the primacy of the libidinal investments of the social field over the familial investment” (356); simply put, it is the former that is expressed in the latter. The fourth and perhaps most important thesis distinguishes “between two poles of social libidinal investment: the paranoiac, reactionary, and fascisizing pole, and the schizoid revolutionary pole” (366). These two poles of *unconscious* desire can be defined by two different relationships to power and molarity. In the case of the molar, desire is invested in the ‘large aggregates’ or dominant social formations (think parties, militant groups, religions, ideologies) that “crush singularities, select them, and regularize those that they retain in codes or axiomatics” (ibid.) or, in other words, territorialise and integrate the flows of desire, recuperating them into the ongoing functioning of current arrangements of power. This mode of investment produces and maintains ‘subjugated groups’, themselves a microcosm of the aggregates they align with. The schizoid revolutionary pole, on the other hand, invests desire in a manner that subordinates dominant power relations and results in a resingularisation – a deterritorialisation and dis-integration that produces lines of escape or overflow that dominant social formations are not able to contain, as well as subject groups with a positive relation to transversal becomings. Of course, as Deleuze and Guattari love to remind us, things are never quite as simple as these binaries – any actual analysis of the investments in a social field will uncover a complex arrangement of flows, some of them preconscious and some unconscious, some of them paranoiac and some of them schizoid. It is always a question of the functioning of this arrangement – this *agency-ing* – and of each of the gradients of distribution that fuel or disrupt it.

With the four theses in mind, how can we better elaborate the positive task of schizoanalysis? If the negative task is the diagramming of the flows of interest and desire, the positive task is that of liberating the primary productive forces of desire so that they can be arranged differently, something that “goes by way of destruction – a whole scouring of the unconscious, a complete curettage” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 311). This curettage is the construction of the Body without Organs “that haunts all forms of socius” (281) and

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<sup>4</sup> As the English translators of *Anti-Oedipus* make clear in a note, Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘partial’, when referring to the flows of desire, in the sense of ‘partial to’, i.e., preferential towards, as opposed to, for instance, Klein’s notion of part(ial) objects as incomplete components of a lost unity. This should be borne in mind when we turn to dynamic systems theory and attractor topologies later.

aims to produce a ‘degree zero’ of intensity or a ‘smoothing’ of space through a counteractualisation that can allow for new individuations, “thereby causing the desiring-machines to start up again” (339). If the way desire is currently machined is through the lack-ist<sup>5</sup> faciality machines of psychoanalysis, capitalism, the State and so forth, then this entails that we “[d]estroy Oedipus, the illusion of the ego, the puppet of the superego, guilt, the law, castration”, and this is by no means “a matter of pious destructions, such as those performed by psychoanalysis under the benevolent neutral eye of the analyst” because these are “Hegel-style destructions, ways of conserving” (311); as is well known, Deleuze and Guattari are profoundly critical of these ‘ways of conserving’. In this regard, as Guattari succinctly argues in *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, “the field of schizoanalysis far exceeds that which psychoanalysts consider their own, that is: 1) an individual oral performance, generally centred on a certain familialist habitus of subjectivity, in the context of developed industrial societies; 2) affective manifestations circumscribed in the etiolated space of the cure” (Guattari 2013: 51). Indeed, there is no representation or interpretation here – the unconscious is nonfigurative and nonsymbolic. Instead, “[t]he schizoanalyst is a mechanic, and schizoanalysis is solely functional” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 322). Like any mechanic or ‘micromechanic’ (339), the schizoanalyst must proceed with great care and patience in following the machinic indices of the populations and groups, the vibrations, flows, schizzes and knots that operate below the level of unified identity, in order to bring about the production of a viable Body without Organs – to botch it, as we know, could be fatal (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 161). Perhaps, however, the schizoanalyst is less a mechanic than a practitioner of *kintsugi*, because “everyone is a little group (*un groupuscule*) and must live as such – or rather, like the Zen tea box broken in a hundred places, whose every crack is repaired with cement made of gold” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 362). Taking apart our egos and presuppositions in order to liberate the prepersonal singularities contained within us and then putting ourselves back together – “assembling the desiring-machines that countersect everyone and group everyone with others” (ibid.) – tentative lines of identity marked by golden threads that glimmer with pre-individual charge. What flows through your veins? What are your desiring-machines?<sup>6</sup> How do they work? How could they work? *You work by breaking down.*

## Psychedelic ontogenesis

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<sup>5</sup> Lack, from Freud to Lacan, is, for Deleuze and Guattari, “[a]n idea originating in bad conscience, and not in the unconscious” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 295).

<sup>6</sup> “[T]he real question of schizoanalysis: What drives your own desiring-machines? What is their functioning? What are the syntheses into which they enter and operate? What use do you make of them, in all the transitions that extend from the molecular to the molar and inversely, and that constitute the cycle whereby the unconscious, remaining a subject, produces and reproduces itself?” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 291)

I have crossed a threshold of consistency. Before the hold of this block of sensation, this nucleus of partial subjectivation, everything was dull, beyond it, I am no longer as I was before, I am swept away by a becoming other, carried beyond my familiar existential Territories.

Félix Guattari (1995: 93)

Such a voyage does not necessarily imply great movements in extension; it becomes immobile, in a room and on a body without organs-an intensive voyage that undoes all the lands for the benefit of the one it is creating.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1977: 319)

In the previous section I recapitulated the core features of the schizoanalytic project in such a way as to lay the groundwork for the discussion we now turn to: psychedelics. Given the foregoing, there is – especially for those who have some experience with the effects of psychedelic compounds – perhaps already a larval sense of how a ‘curettage of the unconscious’ and a ‘liberation of pre-individual singularities’, a micromechanics of subjectivation, are useful ways to conceive of how psychedelics affect us and the transformative possibilities opened up by their judicious use (see Miller 2017; Pollan 2018; Scott; Carhart-Harris 2019 and Read 2021 for some representative overviews). Indeed, while neither Deleuze nor Guattari ever explicitly connect the schizoanalytic project to the ingestion of psychedelics beyond a handful of allusions to Castaneda (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 161-2) and LSD (Deleuze 1990: 56)<sup>7</sup>, their project provides a remarkably insightful framework (or ‘metamodel’) with which to engage the topic, especially when we consider how central ideas like ego-dissolution, enhanced aesthetic experience and an awareness of conditioned ways of experiencing self and world, along with the possibilities for profound moments of catharsis and transformation, are within the psychedelic literature. Early accounts of the ingestion of LSD, mescaline, psilocybin and other so-called ‘classic psychedelics’ are rich with descriptions of how those under

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<sup>7</sup> Interestingly, when drugs are mentioned, it’s often Deleuze who seems more enthusiastic than Guattari. Alluding to the discussion of delirium in *Anti-Oedipus*, for instance, Deleuze, in his ‘Letter to a harsh critic’, has the following to say: [d]rugs can produce delire, so why can't I get into a delire about drugs? Why does your particular version of ‘reality’ have to come into it? You're a pretty unimaginative realist” (Deleuze 1995: 12). Guattari, on the other hand, seems far more cautious: “It’s true that LSD—or drugs in general—can develop perceptual processes, enriching semiotic processes, when they are assembled with a personality such as Henri Michaux. Unfortunately, the Henri Michaux assemblages are not very common, and we can easily find phenomena of implosion, neutralization, impotentialization, or quite simply phenomena of black holes” (Guattari and Rolnik: 405).

their influence were able to see the world anew (Huxley 1963) or gain potentially therapeutically beneficial insight into deep-seated harmful patterns of thought and behaviour (e.g., Lilly 1973; Grof 2008). While such early accounts usually either deferred speculation into how exactly psychedelics achieved these profound effects or proffered explanations that frequently lapsed into the worst metaphysical and pseudo-scientific excesses<sup>8</sup>, including a penchant for crudely caricaturing various forms of Eastern mysticism and indigenous practices, the new, more scientifically rigorous wave of interest in these compounds that has unfolded over the past two decades has employed cutting-edge neuroscientific and psychotherapeutic technologies to develop a set of causal explanations that have the potential to explain not just the neurobiological basis of the psychedelic experience but many of its most salient emergent subjective features too. On the one hand “neuroimaging studies of the psychedelic state are providing tantalising clues about the biological bases of consciousness and self-awareness” (Letheby 2021: 2)<sup>9</sup>, while on the other, data from these studies is fuelling the development of new theoretical paradigms that reiterate many of the intuitive earlier findings while grounding them in a broadly naturalistic worldview. The core principle, however, is that psychedelics function as a kind of ‘unbinding’ (125) or ‘unselfing’ that provisionally dissolves the grip of a hegemonic ‘self-model’ in order to revise it. As Juuso Kähönen explains, “[t]he egocentric perspective can easily become quite constraining, our autobiographical narratives can become impenetrable fences between the world and us, and our existential perspective can become stuck in the mode of egocentric evaluations... [thus] the ability to be able to visit other kinds of perspectives is both existentially and morally important” (Kähönen 2020). Or, as Chris Letheby summarises in the groundbreaking *Philosophy of Psychedelics*<sup>10</sup>, “psychedelic therapy involves the temporary disintegration, and subsequent beneficial revision, of predictive models of the self” (Letheby 2021: 111). It thus “has a two-factor structure: it involves (a) the induction of neural and psychological plasticity at multiple levels, and (b) the discovery and consolidation of new forms of self-modelling” (6). Importantly, and contrary to a dominant assumption within the first wave of psychedelics research, our current understanding is that these “existentially significant changes to self-awareness do not depend on changes to metaphysical beliefs about the

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<sup>8</sup> It should be noted, however, that the lack of rigorous scientific understanding of the effects of psychedelics did not impede the myriad promising psychotherapeutic findings that were made in the ‘first wave’ of psychedelic research from the 1950s and 1960s that was cut short by the backlash against the 60s counterculture (see Lee; Shlain 1994 for a definitive account).

<sup>9</sup> See, for instance, dos Santos et. al. 2020 for a comprehensive survey of the field.

<sup>10</sup> For its many merits, this book, which represents the current gold standard in the field, still relies on a broadly functionalist/computationalist paradigm which, as we will see below, has been challenged in recent years by those working in 4E cognition, particularly the enactivist school associated with Varela, Thompson, di Paolo and others. For their part, some of the more promising contributions in Hauskeller and Sjöstedt-Hughes’s recent edited collection *Philosophy and Psychedelics* (2023) gesture past functionalism/computationalism in the direction of process philosophical, phenomenological and enactivist positions, but there does not yet seem to be any rigorous, sustained work on psychedelics within post-functionalist cognitive science.

ultimate nature of reality” (122). Said otherwise, the transformative capacities of psychedelic compounds seem to rely more upon an immanent self-unfolding than on any appeal to transcendence. With our recently acquired ability to be able to model real time psychedelic-induced changes in connectivity dynamics<sup>11</sup> across brain areas – including the hypothesised ‘Default Mode Network’ (DMN) (Davey; Harrison 2018) and ‘Salience Network’ (SN) that are roughly responsible for ‘normal’ conscious self-representation and attentional focus respectively – using fMRI, PET and/or EEG technologies (Carhart-Harris; Friston 2010), coupled with direct reports from subjects who have ingested a psychedelic (e.g., Carhart-Harris et al. 2012), we have come close to the neurophenomenological ideal proposed by Francisco Varela in his research on the neural substrates of consciousness (Varela 1996) – a non-reductive approach to understanding the links between brain activity and subjective experience. Many of the most popular models that have been developed along these lines base themselves on what is known as the Bayesian brain hypothesis, which is, simply put, the idea that the brain is a prediction engine that iteratively builds and tests models or hypotheses of itself and its environment in order to maintain itself qua embodied system in the face of dissipative tendencies via the minimisation of a quantity known as ‘mismatch’, ‘surprisal’ or ‘free energy’ that represents the divergence between states systems expect to find themselves in and those they in fact find themselves in. The predictive processing framework popularised by Anil Seth (2014) is such a model<sup>12</sup>, as is Karl Friston’s increasingly hegemonic active inference / free energy principle approach, which seeks to unify action and perception as two reciprocal parts of ongoing processes of self-optimisation through belief updating and belief testing via interaction with the world (Friston 2010; 2016; Parr, Pezzulo; Friston 2022)<sup>13</sup>. One of the tools most used in the presentation of these frameworks, and one that should be familiar to those who have benefitted from Manuel deLanda’s singular exposition of Deleuzian philosophy (DeLanda 2002), is dynamic systems theory (DST). DST models systems by extracting each of their salient degrees of freedom (broadly, properties that can change) and presenting these as dimensions of a phase space representing the space of possibility for that system. A simplified atmospheric system, for instance, could be modelled as a three-dimensional space where atmospheric pressure, humidity and temperature each form one of the dimensions. Any particular state of such a system can be represented as a

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<sup>11</sup> Connectivity is discussed in several ways in contemporary neuroscience, often in the context of temporal connectivity, e.g., oscillatory coupling and phase synchronization (Kometer et al. 2015; Atasoy et al. 2017; Grimm et al. 2018; Bedford et al. 2023). This should be borne in mind throughout the below discussion.

<sup>12</sup> As Letheby usefully summarises, predictive processing models depict “the brain as an inference engine that builds hierarchical models of the world in order to predict its future inputs. Any discrepancy between predicted and actual input generates an error signal that must be cancelled, either by updating the model or by acting in the world to alter the source of the discrepant input. The overarching imperative of the brain, on this view, is to minimise error signals by optimising its predictions of sensory inputs” (Letheby 2021: 114).

<sup>13</sup> For a discussion of active inference from a broadly Deleuzoguattarian and Simondonian perspective, see Eloff (2022).

vector within its phase space, i.e., a particular point that has a directionality attached to it connoting the current tendencies of that system. Over time, complex patterns of behaviour are expressed by mapping actual systems as trajectories within phase space, which in turn increasingly define the composition of the space itself as a distribution of likelihoods of outcome for the system, i.e., those areas of the phase space that are more or less tended towards in the behaviour of the system (allowing us, for instance, to predict certain weather conditions based on the patterned interplay of the aforementioned dimensions of an atmospheric system). Technically, this distribution is described as the phase space's attractor and repeller layout, terms whose meaning should be intuitively clear<sup>14</sup>. When modelling systems like the brain using DST, then, we produce phase diagrams that map abstract features of our cognitive architecture viewed as a dynamic system (i.e., as an ever-changing set of linked processes) iteratively exploring and mapping out an attractor space that can in turn be understood as describing brain behaviour or, more ambitiously, the link between neurobiological dynamics and the vicissitudes of conscious experience. Something like this approach has been recently employed by Robin Carhart-Harris, Friston and their fellow researchers to develop an active inference based, partially DST-modelled account known as the *RElaxed Beliefs Under pSychedelics* (REBUS) model of psychedelic experience and its corollary, the *anarchic brain hypothesis* (Carhart-Harris 2018; Carhart-Harris; Friston 2019; see also Eloff 2022 for a Deleuzian account of this framework). Building on work that views psychedelics as agents of neuroplasticity (e.g., Almeida et al. 2019; borne out in Bedford et al. 2023), Carhart-Harris and co. propose that many of the positive effects attributed to psychedelics can be accounted for by the REBUS model by arguing that experiences like ego dissolution and insights into negative patterns of behaviour in fact result from a reduction in the activity of top-down regulatory brain systems like the DMN and SN and the simultaneous increase in bottom-up (or 'anarchic') brain activity. Cast in the language of DST, this behaviour is a temporary flattening of the energy landscape or attractor topology, a perturbation in the usual tendencies of a system that lessens<sup>15</sup> the pull and push of usually dominant attractors and repellers and allows for potentially novel traversals of the space of possibility described by the phase space:

What seems to persist for at least some time after the experience is a flattening of the 'prior landscape': various hypotheses about what kind of person 'I' am are put on a more level playing field, as the relative probabilities assigned to some are decreased,

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<sup>14</sup> For the purposes of this article, I am simplifying matters somewhat; as DeLanda and others have made clear, systems tend asymptotically towards attractors and often exhibit complex or chaotic patterns of behaviour in their proximity, with attractors commonly described with terms like 'steady state', 'cyclical' and 'strange' depending on their specific dynamics. Notably, Guattari mentions attractors, phase spaces and so forth in quite a similar manner to how I am presenting them here in books like *Chaosmosis* (e.g., 95; 116).

<sup>15</sup> Without ever entirely smoothing space, because the BwO is headed towards asymptotically and because "chaos is not pure indifferenciation; it possesses a specific ontological texture. It is inhabited by virtual entities and modalities of alterity which have nothing universal about them" (Guattari 1995: 81).

and to others increased. This flattening of the prior landscape plausibly underlies the feelings of openness, spaciousness, and freedom—the sense of being unburdened—that characterises the short-to-medium-term afterglow (Carhart-Harris; Friston 2019).

While the links we can draw between the neurobiological systems being modelled here and actual subjective experience are provisional, there is nothing inherent to the framework that prevents us from speculating that when viewed as an indirect model of conscious experience, these phase space topologies can be described as a distribution of long-term behavioural dynamics, i.e., what we figuratively describe as the habits, patterns of behaviour and so forth, good or bad, that we accrue over the courses of our lives<sup>16</sup>. The trajectory we're following in the current discussion should be becoming clear; if, as Letheby summarises, the research to date points to the idea that “modulation of the Default Mode and Salience networks seems to be an especially consistent correlate of (i) insightfulness experiences, (ii) ego dissolution, and (iii) lasting psychological benefits” (Letheby 2021: 93), and if contemporary psychedelic science is correct that by perturbing these networks, “psychedelics in effect ‘shake the snow globe’, allowing the system to be subsequently reset into a healthier configuration” (96), then there seems to be a remarkable degree of overlap between the consumption of psychedelics and the practice of schizoanalysis. Here is how Guattari describes schizoanalysis in *Chaosmosis*, for instance:

The Unconscious is intimately connected with the concept: it too is an incorporeal construction which takes possession of subjectivity at the point of its emergence. But it is a concept which at every moment risks becoming clogged up, and which must be constantly cleared of the cultural scoria which threatens to reterritorialise it. It requires reactivating, machinic recharging, due to the virulence of events which set subjectivity into action. (Guattari 1995: 64)

Guattari even appears to come close to something like predictive processing when he asks:

What processes unfold in a consciousness affected by the shock of the unexpected?

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<sup>16</sup> Indeed, this is a central component of the REBUS framework, which Letheby glosses as follows: “psychedelics alter consciousness by perturbing neural processes that encode the precision (or ‘confidence’) that the brain assigns to its own high-level beliefs. Since these high-level beliefs play a central role in the cognitive economy, one flow-on effect is to induce an unconstrained mode of cognition, sending the system on a whirlwind tour (or ‘trip’) through an expanded state space. When phenomenal feelings of uncertainty or puzzlement occur, they result from specific representational activity: from the brain representing its own beliefs as highly imprecise or uncertain” (Letheby 2021: 107). These high-level beliefs are also described as ‘hyperpriors’ and likened “to Kantian categories, to Wittgensteinian ‘hinge’ or ‘framework’ propositions, to the constituents of a Kuhnian paradigm, or to the central nodes of a Quinean web of belief” (Letheby 2021: 119).

How can a mode of thought, a capacity to apprehend, be modified when the surrounding world itself is in the throes of change? How are the representations of an exterior world changed when it is itself in the process of changing? (Guattari 1995: 11-2)

Cultural scoria as attractors and repellers – territories or anti-territories – and machinic recharging as a shaking of the snow globe<sup>17</sup>. The virulence of events that set subjectivity into action as life as it unfolds, diagramming “fields of the possible, tensions in value, relations of heterogeneity, of alterity, of becoming other” (Guattari 1995: 27), oftentimes remarkably unaware that this is happening. To learn “what a subject’s desiring-machines are, how they work, with what syntheses, what bursts of energy in the machine, what constituent misfires, with what flows, what chains, and what becomings in each case” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 339), just hook them up to an fMRI and then give them a psychedelic to set in motion “the destruction of the molar aggregates, the structures and representations that prevent the machine from functioning” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 339), because “schizoanalysis would come to nothing if it did not add to its positive tasks the constant destructive task of disintegrating the normal ego” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 362). *What are your attractors – what machinings of desire do the collective assemblages of enunciation and power formations of the social field express within your psyche? How can these be redistributed? What new ones can we experiment with?* It’s almost too easy: the DMN as the territorialised subject, psychedelics as agents of deterritorialisation. *How do you create yourself a Body without Organs?* “[F]or each case and each situation... construct a map of the unconscious—with its strata, its lines of deterritorialization, its black holes—open to perspectives of experimentation” (Guattari 2011: 170). Then, proceed by weakening “the constraining influence of those priors on the process of probabilistic inference... expanding the space of phenomenologically possible worlds” (Letheby 2021: 121).

### **The thousand faces of the schizoanalytic psychedelic subject**

We always make love with worlds.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1977: 294)

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<sup>17</sup> Interestingly, Guattari explicitly refers to attractors when discussing the idea of the refrain: “the refrain is not based on elements of form, material or ordinary signification, but on the detachment of an existential ‘motif’ (or leitmotiv) which installs itself like an ‘attractor’ within a sensible and significational chaos. The different components conserve their heterogeneity, but are nevertheless captured by a refrain which couples them to the existential Territory of my self. In the case of neurotic identity, sometimes the refrain develops into a ‘hardened’ representation, for example, an obsessive ritual. If for any reason this machine of subjectivation is threatened, the whole personality may implode; this occurs in psychosis where the partial components move off on delirious, hallucinatory lines” (Guattari 1995: 17).



Perhaps it is all a little too easy though, in the sense that schizoanalysis in fact proposes a far more profound view of subjectivity – or rather processes of subjectivation – than can be found in contemporary mainstream psychedelic research. For one, Deleuze and Guattari express deep antipathy towards representational views of the unconscious, contrasting a machinic, non-representational machinery of desire to a ‘theatre of the unconscious’ that goes by way of signification and is amenable to recuperation by psychoanalytic discourse. For them we are not, in other words, “in the presence of a passively representative image, but of a vector of subjectivation” (Guattari 1995: 25). Similarly, they argue against the idea that there are ‘beliefs’ in the unconscious to be uncovered and interpreted. As they aver, there is “no mystery, no hidden universe... nothing to discover in the unconscious” (Guattari 1996: 52). Instead, “[t]he unconscious needs to be created” (ibid.), a view that situates them far from any functionalist-representationalist view of the mind. Here, as John Protevi has demonstrated (Protevi 2013: 155-78), Deleuze and Guattari are far closer to the 4E school of cognition, specifically the enactivist framework originally proposed by Francisco Varela and developed by Evan Thompson (2007), Ezequiel di Paolo (di Paolo, Buhrmann; Barandiaran 2017) and others. On the enactivist view, cognition is a form of sense-making that involves an inter- and intra-systemic tension between processes of self-distinction and processes of self-production<sup>18</sup>. Cognition as sense-making is something systems – human beings for instance – *do*, something that unfolds in relation with environments in ways that render systems and environments differentially entangled via various forms of openness and closure representing processes of self-production and self-distinction respectively (114-6)<sup>19</sup>. Cognition is thus not the abstract reflective symbolic juggling of a circumscribed rational agent, but instead the processual imbrication of systems – themselves complexly nested in recursive networks of reciprocal adaptation – and environments that are similarly complex. Enactivism, as di Paolo and co. have noted (di Paolo, Cuffari; de Jaegher 2018), is thus similar to Simondon’s notion of individuation (2020) which was in turn a substantial influence on Deleuze (1994). The parallels here are especially evident in Varela’s influential view of cognition as involving what he called a ‘meshwork of selfless selves’ (Varela 1991), an assemblage of proto-subjective becomings or larval subjects (Deleuze 1994: 78-9). As Guattari puts it, “[a] thousand machinic propositions constantly work upon each individual, under and over their

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<sup>18</sup> Di Paolo et al. cast this tension in explicitly dialectical terms; it is unclear that this is necessary, however, if we take a Simondonian transductive view wherein disparation, i.e., differences between incommensurable orders, can drive ongoing processes of individuation in a manner Simondon convincingly argues is non-dialectical (2020: 85-6; 111).

<sup>19</sup> Guattari is remarkably close to 4E views of cognition as sense-making when he offers a provisional definition of subjectivity, broadly described, as “[t]he ensemble of conditions which render possible the emergence of individual and/or collective instances as self-referential existential Territories, adjacent, or in a delimiting relation, to an alterity that is itself subjective” (Guattari 1995: 8-9).

speaking heads” (2011: 156) and in this sense, “[s]ubjectivity is in fact plural and polyphonic... [and] recognises no dominant or determinant instance guiding all other forms according to a univocal causality” (Guattari 1995: 1). Similarly, enactivism recognises the reciprocal nature of becomings, or what Simondon would call transductions (2020: 13-6), in its view that systems and environments individuate at the same time as part of the same processes of cognition as sense-making<sup>20</sup>. Guattari seems close to this view when discussing infant development and noting “the inherently trans-subjective character of an infant's early experiences, which do not dissociate the feeling of self from the feeling of the other”; this “nascent subjectivity, which we will continually find in dreams, délire, creative exaltation, or the feeling of love” (Guattari 1995: 6), but which is to some extent present in all experience, is thus for Guattari, as for Simondon, *collective* in the sense that it is “a multiplicity that deploys itself as much beyond the individual, on the side of the socius, as before the person, on the side of preverbal intensities, indicating a logic of affects rather than a logic of delimited sets” (9). Adopting this kind of transversal approach, where cognition is the ongoing enacting of a world-become-subject-become-world, where subjects are a meshwork of larval selves (or where, as Guattari says, “a sense of being-in-itself is established before any discursive scheme, uniquely positioned across an intensive continuum whose distinctive traits are not perceptible by an apparatus of representation but by a... pre-egoic, pre-identificatory agglomeration” (79)) and where “[s]ubjectivity is manufactured just as energy, electricity, and aluminium are” (Guattari and Rolnik 2007: 47), has serious implications for how we think about psychedelics. Instead of viewing them as ‘mind-revealing’ agents in the representationalist sense of the term, they are, in a sense that is true to the etymology of the term *psyche-delic*, *mind-manifesting*, i.e., literally setting in motion a particular viscosity of desire by freeing up the flows from some of the more congealed aspects of habituated practices of sense-making. To be sure, an entire theatre of the unconscious is often expressed in the unfolding of a psychedelic experience – people regularly hallucinates archetypes, transcendent forms and all the names of History as a kind of transformative mythic drama (see, for instance, the discussion of ‘basic perinatal matrices’ in Grof 2008) – but this is just the flotsam of the attractors torn loose from their moorings<sup>21</sup> and drifting past us as we pick up speed

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<sup>20</sup> In *Chaosmosis*, Guattari describes something particularly close to sense-making when he talks about “worlding a complexion of sense” and observes that this “always involves taking hold of a massive and immediate ensemble of contextual diversity, a fusion in an undifferentiated, or rather de-differentiated, whole” (Guattari 1995: 80). On his view, embodiment functions as a “a nucleus of chaosmosis” via which sense-making can unfold as a rapid oscillation between a “state of chaotic ‘grasping’ and the deployment of complexions anchored within worldly coordinates... Formations of sense and States of things are thus chaotised in the very movement of the bringing into existence of their complexity. At the source of a world’s constitution there is always a certain modality of chaotic discomfort in its organicity, functionality and relations of alterity” (Guattari 1995: 80-1).

<sup>21</sup> In this regard, “[a] little additional effort is enough to overturn everything, and to lead us finally toward other far-off places. The schizoanalytic flick of the finger, which restarts the movement, links up again with the tendency, and pushes the simulacra to a point where they cease being artificial images to become indices of the new world. That is what the completion of the process is: not a promised and a

on our “immobile voyage in intensities on the body without organs” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 292) in order to cross “the barriers of non-sense which prohibit access to a-signifying nuclei of subjectivation, the only way to shift petrified systems of modelisation” (Guattari 1995: 68)<sup>22</sup>:

O, the narrator does not homestead in the familial and neurotic lands of Oedipus, there where the global and personal connections are established; he does not remain there, he crosses these lands... until he reaches the unknown country, his own, the unknown land, which alone is created by his own work in progress (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 318).

This entails “brutally intervening each time the subject strikes up the song of myth or intones tragic lines, carrying him back to the factory” of the machinic unconscious in while desire is arranged and rearranged (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 314).

Another fundamental difference between psychedelic therapy and schizoanalysis is that the former tends to operate, despite ostensibly frequent ‘all is one’ mystical experiences that transcend subject/object dualism, within a reasonably straightforward individualist framework of the kind encountered in traditional therapeutic contexts. Here, subjects are viewed as relatively autonomous rational agents whose subjectivity can be exhaustively reduced to personological aspects like familial history and self-actualisation, something we know is anathema to Deleuze and Guattari. As the latter observes, “[t]he individual who we see before us is often nothing but the ‘terminal’ of a whole group of social assemblages... if we don’t get to the core of those assemblages, we embark upon fictitious attitudes” (Guattari and Rolnik 2007: 371). In other words, as mentioned earlier, there is a direct reciprocal presupposition between subjectivation – the machining of desire – and the social field. We are, each of us, “situated at the intersection of numerous vectors of partial subjectivation... connected to a range of expressive and practical

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pre-existing land, but a world created in the process of its tendency, its coming undone, its deterritorialization. The movement of the theater of cruelty; for it is the only theater of production, there where the flows cross the threshold of de territorialization and produce the new land not at all a hope, but a simple “finding,” a “finished design,” where the person who escapes causes other escapes, and marks out the land while deterritorializing himself. An active point of escape where the revolutionary machine, the artistic machine, the scientific machine, and the (schizo) analytic machine become parts and pieces of one another” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 321-2).

<sup>22</sup> The dynamic tension between quasi-narrative experiences of mythic import and the a-signifying preindividual milieu that lies further towards the degree zero of the Body without Organs is alluded to by Guattari in a particularly lucid section of *Schizoanalytic Cartographies* when he observes a “distinction between level I of the Unconscious (where the sites of intensive entities will acquire a weight of intrinsic reference, a systemic or structural ‘truth’) and level II (where these same sites become ontologically precarious and are charged with risks and new potentialities for crystallization)” (Guattari 2013: 58). Similarly, in *Anti-Oedipus* we are told that myth and tragedy are to be “denounced as conscious beliefs or illusions, nothing more than ideas” and that we should pit “the functioning of the desiring-machines against tragedy, against ‘the fatal drama of the personality,’ against ‘the inevitable confusion between mask and actor’” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 299).

registers in direct contact with social life and the outside world” (Guattari 1995: 98-9). As the old saying goes, we cannot separate the ‘personal’ from the ‘political’, and this in a much more profound and material sense than is often supposed. The social and collective nature of subjectivation has especially important implications for how we think about psychedelics when considering the role of what is commonly termed ‘set and setting’. These terms, a mainstay of the psychedelic literature, refer to the ‘mindset’ of someone ingesting a psychedelic (set), which can include everything from their beliefs and aspirations to their anxieties and the amount of stress they’re currently experiencing in their lives, and to the broader context (setting) in which the psychedelic will be experienced, which typically means the physical space, replete with lighting, music, other individuals and so forth. If, however, we are in fact the ‘terminal of a whole group of social assemblages’ and if, on the enactive view, we are complexly entangled with our environment in ongoing processes of sense-making, then instead of thinking of set and setting as two distinct salient aspects that need to be considered vis-à-vis the psychedelic experience, it is perhaps more useful to think about the entire context – from innermost fears to outermost properties of the space we find ourselves in – as a messy assemblage (or agencement, *agency-ing*) of flows and processes that includes everything from the molar aggregates of sex, race and class to the molecular investments of desire and neurochemistry, “the existence of libidinal stratifications, repetitive structures literally mimicking the homeostasis of systems of physical fluctuations at equilibrium (neurotic negotiations between narcissism and object investments, failure syndromes, repetition compulsion)” (Guattari 2013: 53-4), and which is comprised of various tendencies towards deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. The negative task of schizoanalysis is thus also, in part, the limning of the psychedelic assemblage – a careful if necessarily incomplete and tentative delineation of the machining of desire and the collective arrangements of enunciation at play. If we acknowledge that the psychedelic experience can unleash, “[d]esiring machines which break with the great interpersonal and social organic equilibria, which invert orders, play the role of the other as against a politics of auto-centering on the self”, then it is crucial that we undertake this part of the negative task given that the psychedelic set and setting assemblage and in fact “all machinic assemblages harbour — even if in an embryonic state — enunciative zones which are so many desiring proto-machines” (Guattari 1995: 52). As Tarkovsky makes clear in the film *Stalker*, we should always take the trip with someone who is able to understand the zone, a place where the normal laws of physics do not apply, and nothing is as it seems (Tarkovsky 1979). If the preparation is just right, and the deterritorialising dose is high enough, then the death will be a propitious one, setting in motion “a Universe of processual emergence as much as of abolition” (Guattari 1995: 66).

### **An ending, a beginning**

The only acceptable finality of human activity is the production of a subjectivity that is auto-enriching its relation to the world in a continuous fashion.

Félix Guattari (1995: 21)

Death, surprisingly – the death in life that transforms life, a little bit of pure immanence – is something that schizoanalysis and accounts of psychedelic experience are often in agreement on. In fact, for Deleuze and Guattari “[t]he experience of death is the most common of occurrences in the unconscious, precisely because it occurs in life and for life, in every passage or becoming, in every intensity as passage or becoming” (1977: 330). This is death as a new individuation – a flattening of the energy landscape so that the anarchic brain can redistribute the attractor layout and travel along new vectors, “catalysing existential operators capable of acquiring consistence and persistence” (Guattari 1995: 19). As psychedelic neuroscience would have it, “if the DMN and SN perform their integrative functions by modelling the existence of a simple, indivisible entity, sharply bounded and distinct from the external world, then this would explain why disruption to these systems should lead to the feeling that the individual is disintegrating, dying, or merging with the cosmos” (Letheby 2021: 136). Everything is said in a few fine lines from *Anti-Oedipus*: the little death, the loss of ego, the absence of representation and interpretation, the re-machining of desire:

From one aspect to the other, there is not at all a personal deepening, but something quite different: there is a return from the experience of death to the model of death, in the cycle of the desiring-machines. The cycle is closed. For a new departure, since this I is another? The experience of death must have given us exactly enough broadened experience, in order to live and know that the desiring machines do not die. And that the subject as an adjacent part is always a ‘one’ who conducts the experience, not an I who receives the model. For the model itself is not the I either, but the body without organs. And I does not rejoin the model without the model starting out again in the direction of another experience (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 331).

As experienced psychedelic practitioners are wont to remind us, we can botch this death in at least two ways, transforming a potential breakthrough into a breakdown (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 362); on the one hand, we can fight against it, arresting the process and entering the bad trip or, on the other hand, we can come to regard the death itself as the goal, continuing in the void – the line of abolition – as opposed to releasing what Guattari calls coefficients of processual creativity in order to be able to undertake the positive task of fabulating a people to come and a new Earth. As Deleuze and Guattari

say of psychoanalysis become schizoanalysis, the use of psychedelics “ought to be a song of life, or else be worth nothing at all. It ought, practically, to teach us to sing life” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 339). This is a song we make up as we go along, because “[b]eneath the diversity of beings, no univocal ontological plinth is given” (Guattari 1995: 58). Fabulating, singing our immanent song, it is also easy to get lost in the process itself, to exercise the Body without Organs past the point of exhaustion until it lies limp on the plane of consistency, a rhabdomyolysis of desire. In this regard, what psychedelic therapy describes as integration is crucial (Aixalá 2022); instead of endlessly repeating the negative task of schizoanalysis, curotting the unconscious until there is nothing left but scar tissue, we should turn to the positive task of arranging desire otherwise. As Letheby reminds us, “for truly durable change to occur, the induction of plasticity alone does not suffice. New, healthier forms of self-modelling must be discovered during the acute experience, and consolidated during the subsequent period of integration” (2021: 151). Recognising the immediately social nature of desire, the complex imbrication of selves and world, these new forms of modelling and integration, these new Earths, should themselves be social. Seen in this light, several things become immediately apparent. First, any intervention into the arrangements of desire, even at the most personal or molecular levels, is an intervention into molar articulations of the socius. This is not necessarily a bad thing – if political economy is libidinal economy then schizoanalysis is already a form of politics, both at the level of analysis (“the force and the obstinacy of a deterritorialization can only be evaluated through the types of reterritorialization that represent it” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 316)) and in its positive transformative aspect, even when this may not be obvious (“[t]o those who say that escaping is not courageous, we answer: what is not escape and social investment at the same time?” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 316)). Second, this does not, to reiterate an earlier point, mean that the schizoanalytic method entails a program. While the ostensible lack of a single model for revolutionary praxis has become something of a blunt cudgel wielded by those who denigrate the schizoanalytic project as a kind of jejune liberatory naivete (the spectre of an inchoate anarcho-desiring that eschews structure, organization and so forth, and which is, tellingly, strikingly at odds with *Anti-Oedipus’s* constant endorsement of practices of careful *machining* and *arrangement*), any such program would be, as we have seen, profoundly oxymoronic and against the necessarily open-ended nature of schizoanalysis as a practice of counteractualisation and individuation that is, as Guattari underscores, based upon “the definitive non-finality of all systems” (2006: 196), this being its ethical guarantee<sup>23</sup>. Third, while “collective existential mutation will have the last word... large

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<sup>23</sup> “Schizoanalysis does not thus choose one modelisation to the exclusion of another. Within the diverse cartographies in action in a given situation, it tries to make nuclei of virtual autopoiesis discernible, in order to actualise them, by transversalising them, in conferring on them an operative diagrammatism (for example, by a change in the material of Expression), in making them themselves operative within modified assemblages, more open, more processual, more deterritorialised. Schizoanalysis, rather than moving in the direction of reductionist modelisations which simplify the complex, will work towards its

movements of subjectivation don't necessarily develop in the direction of emancipation" (Guattari 1995: 2). As any historian of the 1960s counterculture will remind us, we can trace a short path from the psychedelic love-in of Woodstock to the violence of Altamont, dogmatic LSD cults, hard drugs and, a short while later, Silicon Valley neoliberalism and hippie Trump supporters. That said, we should simultaneously acknowledge the profound nature of the individuations that took place in the 1960s – from Haight-Ashbury to the Panthers to May 68 – which began with “nothing but scattered machinic indexes, first being a quick, powerless deterritorialization, then becoming an abstract machine capable of catalyzing new semiotic assemblages of desire in the social field” (Guattari 2011: 161), and we should remember that these events are all bound up in a single incorporeal Event (Deleuze 1990: 148-53). Fourth, to invoke perhaps the most unlikely sentence in *Anti-Oedipus*, we should admit that “[w]e are all little dogs, we need circuits, and we need to be taken for walks” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 315). We should remind ourselves, in other words, that whatever the romantic attachments we have to the liberatory task of unleashing our desire along lines of psychedelic flight, creating a nomadic war machine to traverse smooth space and redistribute our attractors, “a schizoanalytic intervention is not necessarily ‘extremist’... in a sense, it will frequently require much more prudence than psychoanalysis with its trenchant interpretations and its often unmasterable transferences” (Guattari 2011: 185-6). A careful arranging and rearranging of desire as a simultaneously political and existential-libidinal, molar and molecular, practice of metamodellisation; the machining of meshworks of selfless selves or collective assemblages of enunciation as the individuation of the possibilities of life in such a way as to increase its pre-individual charge and amplify processual creativity; in the end, this resingularisation of radically mutant forms of subjectivity and the world, undertaken “not only for self, but for the whole alterity of the cosmos and for the infinity of times” (Guattari 1995: 53), is the task of schizoanalysis; if we apply ourselves to this task then “different ways of seeing and of making the world, different ways of being and of bringing to light modalities of being will open up, be irrigated and enrich one another” (Guattari 1995: 120). And, for those of us who wish to open up and irrigate psychedelically, it is perhaps especially salient to cultivate “[a] subjectivity of the outside and of wide-open spaces which far from being fearful of finitude — the trials of life, suffering, desire and death — embraces them like a spice essential to the cuisine of life” (Guattari 1995: 89-90)

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complexification, its processual enrichment, towards the consistency of its virtual lines of bifurcation and differentiation, in short towards its ontological heterogeneity” (Guattari 1995: 60-1).

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## ***Emancipatory Technics and Transindividual Cybernetic Machines of Felix Guattari: Ecotechnopoiesis of Splicings***

by MIKHAIL FEDORCHENKO

### **Abstract**

In this paper, I seek to examine Felix Guattari's techno-machinic side of his ecosophical paradigm through the genesis of accelerationist thought, concepts of machinic animism and cybernetic elements of late guattarian works and intuitions. I will analyze anthropological, culturological and technological aspects of machinic ontology and configure the matrix of guattarian philosophy and semiotics with the works of prominent cyberneticists and biologists such as Gilbert Simondon, Humberto Maturana/Francisco Varela and Yuk Hui and others as well as dive deep into Guattari's fascination with Japan and its technomaterialism. The main goal of the paper is to introduce the concept of "splicing" as transindividual methodology of difference of technic and nature that alleviates the antagonisms between them and points out the interconnected nature of these relationships.

### **Accelerate**

In some villages, just the most distant and forgotten, the chairmen of the village councils, together with blacksmiths and clerks, were already building electric power stations near public wells, using motorbikes abandoned by runaway imperialists – at the same time, because of the lack of petrol, the motorbikes' engines were powered by moonshine made of bread, which burned badly, so the engine was supplemented by the local driver's brains – the engines were turning and the light was burning in the dark huts.

Andrey Platonov

Félix Guattari's ecotechnopoiesis represents an important and experimental aspect of hyper-connectionism, machinic animism and machinic ontology within a new transversal relationship of political and technological struggle.

For Deleuze and Guattari, life can only become painful when the reactive forces are victorious. And they are achieving victory through psychoanalysis, which manages to confuse life precisely by convincing it of its imagined essential sickness. Whereas the active, non-reactive life is the joyous movement of the general machinic desire. Deleuze reminds us that active forces assert and reactive forces deny. The distinction between the activity of acceleration and the passivity of speed allows for an onto-methodological matrix of accelerationism, without which, in my view, it is impossible to understand Guattari's ecosophical thought.

A traditional (but, from my point of view, not entirely accurate) distinction of accelerationism can be found in Andrew Culp's *Dark Deleuze*:

Drawing from Deleuze and Guattari's insistence on "accelerating the process" of capitalist deterritorialization to make a revolutionary breakthrough, Land instead suggests that the commodity system "attains its own 'angular momentum'" to become a one-way street impervious to interventions, as it is made up of cosmic-scale processes that are largely blind to human cultural inputs. (Culp 2016: 27).

Thus, it is suggested that, according to Land, the accelerating processes (positive feedback) of capitalism leads to one inescapable finale – an expanding vortex of decay into infinity, with a virtual zero of impersonal urban accumulation at its centre, 'permeable only to that inarticulate ardour which springs from the repressed materiality of the human animal' (Land 1992). Developing these ideas further in the dark enlightenment project, Land points out that the 'darkness' of neo-reaction is the mastering of a mixture of cognitive elitism, racist social Darwinism and the autocracy of the Austrian economic school.

Drawing on Andrew Culp's classification, we can clarify the difference between 'left' and 'right' accelerationism in political and economic terms by varying the main word 'accelerate' in the active voice and 'accelerated' in the passive voice (Culp 2016). In the first case, the subject (implicitly human) of the acceleration process is preserved and the humanist Promethean pathos is preserved, whereas in the second case of impersonal acceleration the subject disappears in the anti-humanist destruction of human security systems, the future is given over to impersonal and nameless external forces, the human subject is denied any control over the fluctuating flows of cold nihilistic transformation, we are accelerated, or rather we are accelerated by something. I think this separation is reductionist and insufficient: these positions have serious gaps, both have grounds and conventions: on the one hand in the political, in the relationship of cooperation and care with the technical machines – that is, with the presupposition of the mysticism of the process and the mysticism of the result, the dynamic chaos of the interaction of liberated

actors, that is, the condition of benevolence of liberated machines, and, on the other hand, in the anti-humanistic – where the grounding in the human perspective remains, acting as a negation. An alternative to these solutions is needed, in which I believe the concept of ‘splicing’, the unconditional accelerationist method, plays a major role.

## **Mechanize**

In developing the concepts of universes of values, showing how the indigenous logic of machinic indices on which the symbolic structures of signifying the Other are built, Guattari points to the relational acceleration of the cosmos and chaos as a dialectical unity: for example, within indigenous cosmologies, the process which O. de Andrade might call anthropophagy – the absorption of the technocentric culture of the West and the juxtaposition of mystery and pre-logic consciousness with it (de Andrade 1976). Thus, in their infinite capacity to absorb other cultures, the Caribs of Andrade found unity in a larger hyperculture that was meant to protect them from the colonizers. The cultural Leviathan of the anthropophagi, which cannot be stopped or broken, absorbs everything it sees, digesting the practices and souls of technology and nature. Practices of other communities must be brought in not as taboos, but as great totems to be defended with great power to ensure not only assimilation but also freedom of autonomy for hyperculture: a chaotic collective dream that transcends physical reality itself, the animistic position of the other.

Guattari redefines the concept of animism, asserting behind it the immanent potential of opening up a process of singularization that is unable to "imposing itself as a relation of immanence to machinic intensities, to this non-discursive, auto-enunciating, auto-valorising, autopoietic node" (Guattari 1995: 38). Machinic animism shows a non-idealist thinking about the subject, overcomes anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism. To clarify the nature of the machine, Guattari refers (besides Mumford) to the work of the biologist F. Varela and H. Maturana, who subdivided machines into two types: allopoetic (producing something other than themselves) and autopoietic (generating and reproducing their assemblages), a sort of coupling of ecotechnical anarchism (Kuchinov 2021), a symbiosis of heterogeneous elements:

In the universe there exist everywhere, with no distinction between living and non-living, “non-discursive *autopoïétique* kernels which engender their own development and their own rules and mechanics. The *autopoïétique* machinic asserts itself as one for self and one for others – non-human others. The for self and the for others cease to be the privilege of humanity. They crystallize wherever assemblages or machines engender differences, alterities, and singularities. (Melitopoulos; Lazzarato: 2012).

"Being has never consisted of anything but machines", wrote L. Bryant in *Onto-Cartography* (Bryant 2014). On the one hand, the "soul of the technical object" is located in the logic of similarity, in the context of immanent reality as such, within the universal spirituality of being. And on the other in the logic of difference, the difference between the cessation of life of a machine-technical object and a biological machine.

According to Guattari, the machine is a complex of technical object and production relations, i.e. people and materials involved in the creation of the machine. The ontological context in Guattari's work appears alongside cybernetic theory oriented to organizing the connections of heterogeneous system elements. There are different types of machines: social machines, technological machines, aesthetic machines, biological machines, crystalline machines, etc:

He thought that it must be a feeling of endless bliss to be in contact with the profound life of every form, to have a soul for rocks, metals, water, and plants, to take into himself, as in a dream, every element of nature, like flowers that breathe with the waxing and waning of the moon. To be a chlorophyll- or a photosynthesis-machine, or at least slip his body into such machines as one part among the others. (Deleuze, Guattari 1983: 15).

Maturana and Varela in «The Tree of Knowledge» outline a proto-machine ontology intersecting with cybernetics, on the basis of which Guattari creates his largest texts on this subject (apart from his joint texts with Deleuze), *The Machinic Unconscious* and *The Lines of Flight*. Maturana and Varela point out that cognition is a complex process of world formation through the interaction between body, brain and external environment, and which is based on the concept of autopoiesis and the principle of self-reproduction of closed (autonomous) systems whose functioning is based on maintaining their dynamic organization. For such a system, there is no environment external to it, but there are internal structural oscillations caused by influences of the environment and which disturb its balance and compensate internal structural changes in constructing a certain model of the world (cognition as an effective action). In an attempt to define what kind of being can be called alive, Maturana and Varela write that:

What are my criteria? Throughout the history of biology, many criteria have been proposed. They all have drawbacks. For instance, some have proposed as a criterion chemical composition, or the capacity to move, or reproduction, or even some combination of those criteria, that is, a list of properties. But how do we know when the list is complete? For instance, if we build a machine capable of reproducing itself, but it is made of iron and plastic and not of molecules, is it living? (Maturana; Varela 1987: 42)

As an answer to this question, the aforementioned anthropologists propose to analyze the dynamics of the system through the relations between its parts and the patterns of their interaction, thus uncovering its autopoietic organization. Maturana and Varela propose the processes of replication (machine production of a unity of the same class, factory machines), copying (a sample unity and a projection procedure for producing an identical sample unity, photocopier machines) and reproduction (a unity splitting in two, resulting in two unities of the same class, printer machines) as ways of generating autopoietic unities. Ontogenesis (the history of structural change of a particular being) does not only concern living matter – Maturana and Varela explicitly state that autopoiesis takes place in all interactions with structurally defined unities (Maturana; Varela: 2019).

In “Ecology of Mind”, G. Bateson addresses these issues explicitly by drawing on cybernetic epistemology, pointing out that all evolving systems are complex cybernetic systems whose stability is maintained by their ability to self-regulate through feedback homeostasis (in which the output is fed back to the input as an initial parameter) (Bateson 2000). Machinic processes are thus either cyber-positive, which translates into absorption and departure from system equilibrium in the pursuit of nomadic and absolute determinism, or cyber-negative, returning feedback processes by being sedentary and reterritorialising. Bateson proposes to reorganize thinking so that it eliminates the human-environment opposition and enables technological overcoming of binary distortions and meta-ordered sequences of events. This position brings him closer to N. Wiener, who in his study of feedback systems discovered that such systems are ubiquitous – in all living (and non-living) organisms (Wiener 2019).

Machinic animism in particular is rooted in Japanese cosmologies, where the distinction between human and non-human, cultural and natural, living and non-living is (somewhat) erased. Thus, F. Gygi writes that the term 'technoanimism' reproduces the bifurcation that it intends to overcome, the bifurcation between the living (anima) and the non-living (technique) (Gygi 2018: 108-109). Instead of technoanimism as an a priori of Japanese culture, Gygi proposes to consider the fluid and concrete practices of animality that lie beyond capitalism. It is necessary to look for technology on the side of animism, technologies of animation that transform the inanimate into the animate. Thus, the corporate practices of technology and body control, the assembly-line slavery of robots, are well suited to the capitalist reversal of animism – not to make the inanimate alive, to breathe in the soul, but to make the living inanimate, to condemn it to death and enslave it to the market. Life, therefore, does not need a soul. This problem is developed in the concept of machinic eros, which can be seen in Guattari's later writings on his trips to Japan.

## **Animate**

Guattari believed that Japanese culture is a mirror in which Western capitalist culture is reflected and that the Japanese themselves internalize it. Although the philosopher did not connect with Japan's underground protest culture (Japanese Red Army, student activists) during his visits, he spent much time analyzing Japanese existential landscapes and their relationship to technology. Thus the tall telecommunication tower in Osaka interpolates and addresses the gods, and the gods respond to capital, manifesting themselves in the plasticity of Japanese culture, which adapts and changes other cultures by placing fragments of structures of the old into the accelerating urban spaces of capitalism. Guattari referred to Tokyo as a city of energy, speed and wealth, a bifurcation point of global political relations, machinic values of desire, machinic eros (Guattari 2015).

Machinic eros, manifested through a series of cultural encounters, means being inside things, being fundamentally connected to technology, producing intangible labour, 'being online' (Guattari 2015). The concept appears in the early 1980s, describing post-Fordism in a machinic sense as pure connectivity, a desire to mediate technological solutions through interfaces and devices. Thus the emergence of the internet, the cultural landscape's fascination with gadgets, speech synthesizers, repetition games, anything that can allopoietically connect oneself to the other, is what emerges with the new stage of capitalism as an affective attachment to technology.

Such machinic values, invention and reconfiguration, are at the core of the processes of production, Guattari argued, criticizing the genesis of the control society in the surrender of oneself to machines of control. In control societies, the subject is modulated in the rituals of capitalist production, where the worker works in his or her own time, including from home, in a state of fundamental precarity. In short, the problem of immaterial labour emerges, where subjectivity will be shaped by the introduction of the political body into the economy and its connection with the modern economic life of commodities and machinic fetishism.

As the plots of numerous science fiction works shows (such as in the 1989 film by S. Tsukamoto's *Tetsuo the Iron Man*, where giving oneself over to machines, joining flesh and metal was an anti-utopian, pervasive invasion of foreign parts into the body, severing its integrity from inside and out) (Brown 2010), that such images of the future may have different political and cultural contexts, and hence an affirmative posthumanist strategy is needed, drawing both on the assemblages of technology and living matter, and on the interpenetration and interconnected nature of such relationships. Such a relationship is called a "splicing", in line with guattarian intuitions of the hyperconnectivity of technological acceleration.

G. Genosko points out that in *Chaosmosis*, Guattari places a lot of emphasis on interfaces, a nexus of new philosophical concepts and cybernetics (Genosko 2002). Guattari opposed the tendency to homogenize culture, in resistance through the technohegemonic realm. Not only did he use the latest technological innovations in everyday life and practice, like Walkman players, but he also conceptualized the way in



which the hotel or taxi could be singularized (big data algorithms), how technology can be miniaturized, how control algorithms can be dehomogenized, and generally thought about technology as something capable of giving the necessary space for micropolitics of freedom and liberation of whatever seeks to be liberated.

## **Cybernetize**

The world of federated networks and societies of control, paradoxically, think of themselves in a common logic of deterritorialisation, as the late Mark Fisher warned in *K-Punk*:

Does all this then mean that ideas of autonomy and self-organization would inevitably be co-opted by the right, and that there is no further political potential in them for the left? Definitely not — far from indicating any deficiency in autonomist ideas, the co-option of these ideas by the right shows that they have continuing potency. (Fisher 2018: 239-240),

Which helps emancipatory initiatives of modernity to emerge from the vicious circle of becoming-reappropriation of emancipatory initiatives that neutralizes any projects of the future. Guattari points to a modulation of control societies where each example of re-appropriation is not the closure of territories of freedom, but the opening of new ones. The dividual relation to technology is an example of machinic subjugation, an example of the potentiality of post-identitarian deterritorialisation, where a cyber-space of splicings is possible. Perhaps this creative approach to technology, to embed it in natural landscapes, as described by Gilbert Simondon in Anita Kashikian's "Saving the Technological Object" (Simondon 1983), and as written about the environment of digital objects by Yuk Hui, can be expressed through the practice of conviviality, a term conceptualized by social theorist Ivan Illich to critique the ideology of industrialism and capitalist Landian acceleration, including its desires, forms and institutions. Conviviality implies a voluntary and creative relationship between people, technology and the environment:

I intend ['conviviality'] to mean autonomous and creative intercourse among persons, and the intercourse of persons with their environment; and this in contrast with the conditioned response of persons to the demands made upon them by others, and by a man-made environment. I consider conviviality to be individual freedom realized in personal interdependence and, as such, an intrinsic ethical value. I believe that, in any society, as conviviality is reduced below a certain level, no amount of industrial productivity can effectively satisfy the needs it creates among society's members. (Illich 2021: 18).

A rejection of industrial ideology does not mean criticism of technology in general. Guattari understood this when he was active in free radio in Bologna. Intuitively, even then, he understood the rhizomatic tendency of networks of control, networks that are simply the regime in which, according to Deleuze in the “Postscript on the Societies of Control”, power operates in 'controlling' societies that have replaced the old 'disciplinary' structures. According to Guattari, such an integrated global order and such network integration will be 'everywhere and nowhere at once'. A cornerstone of the twenty-first century, therefore, is the re-positioning of the question of technology and resistance. A new way of looking at the relationship between philosophy and technology, between organism and machine, the historical development of different forms and levels of matter, technology, nature, overcoming alienation and showing a different perspective on technology of liberation and control in an age of complex algorithmic systems and the birth of artificial intelligence – this is the relevance of Guattari's project of machinic animism in conjunction with Simondon-Hui's thought of the multiplicity of cosmotechnics as a dynamic whole (Hui: 2020). Hui, understanding the development of modern capitalism and its onto-economic flows, tries to revitalize cybernetics as an emancipatory and crypto-accelerationist methodology based on a cosmotechnical understanding of the unity of nature and technology. Guattari, for his part, placing the production of subjectivities and the production of desire in the foreground of his ecosophy, shows how emancipatory desire can work in an "economy of the possible that emerges from a rupture in the economy of the "already-there," the economy of the stratified, the economy of repetition" (Guattari 2015: 37).

### **(A)signify**

By deconstructing the binarism of the subject-object relation, Guattari contrasts the a-signification semiotic with the operation of power, a structured machine of power which takes control of all the other codes, all the other semiotics. It is possible to get out of the relations of power through such "truth of things themselves", through signs encoded cybernetically, by the computer, which works directly, just as physical-chemical processes and technological assemblages of machines – another similarity of thought between Guattari and Hui, who in “Recursivity and Contingency” writes about the contingency of the machinic sign which "means nothing", referring to Guillaume Apollinaire's interpretation by J.F. Lyotard:

“More than anything, artists are men who want to become inhuman.” The part that Lyotard didn't cite continues: “[T]hey seek painfully the traces of inhumanity which are never found in nature. These are the real truths, and beyond them, we know no reality.” For Apollinaire, this truth is always new, since it is never once and for all. It is this contradiction—a verity in constant change—that is opposed to the reduction of

such a verity to communicative writing. The latter could be realized by machines, which are capable of reproducing signs devoid of sense. (Hui 2020: 368).

This a-signifying semiotics of Guattari (Hui calls it second-order cybernetics, that is, a non-mechanistic non-organistic cybernetics devoid of determinism) (Hui 2020) is critical for the machinic unconscious, and simultaneously machinic and anthropological, where, in the spirit of Marx, production relations inhibit productive forces, a non-egalitarian and instrumental attitude towards technology, a totalitarian capitalist semiotic of control, is what inhibits social and technological acceleration (Guattari 2015). In practice today we can see this tendency in the neo-Luddite fear of GPT-4 and the desire of some intellectuals and artists to ban the automating algorithms. And while certainly the use of Large Language Models as a profit force and downsizing tool should be regulated, GTP's ability to be an advanced a-cognition machine allows us to see that the difference between natural and artificial intelligence is infinitesimal, that subjectivation and innovation was born on the boundary of the limits of what is acceptable in science and communicative fields of knowledge.

So much of the fear of automation technology stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of reason, or, to quote Reza Negarestani, that all intelligence is artificial, that both the autonomy of reason (sapience), functionally distinct from sentience in its capacity to engage in discursive practices and the exchange of causality, and the re-examination of the automation of reason in terms of abductive synthesis and deductive analysis, design and reasoning, are necessary to develop and clarify the criteria of Generalized Artificial Intelligence. Freedom of consciousness is the freedom of its constant (self-)reflection, the breakdown of the phenomenological machine, the replacement of the exploitation of nature and technology with the cooperation between them. Such transindividual, animistic assemblages are elements of a sympoietic splicing in a project of technological and social acceleration that unlocks the creativity of the human and nonhuman oppressed in a truly egalitarian future.

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## ***On Generic Schizoanalysis: Reading Anti-Oedipus Alongside Laruelle's Non-Standard Philosophy***

by CHANTELE GRAY

### **Abstract**

This paper brings together Laruelle's project on non-standard philosophy with Deleuze and Guattari's project on schizoanalysis. Laruelle critiques 'standard philosophy' for failing to concede that the Real precedes it and is foreclosed to thought, such that philosophy has no traction on it, meaning philosophy is *not sufficient* for thinking the Real. Non-philosophy is a response to this position and ultimately aims at a 'defetishization' of thought. Departing from this position, I hold that Deleuze and Guattari *perform* non-philosophy in *Anti-Oedipus* through their use of the unconscious and productive forces *as raw materials*, though they do so mainly at the level of subjectivity. For schizoanalysis to become generic it would, however, also have to lose its 'face' because faciality is precisely the Philosophical Decision whereby ordinary, lived reality becomes overcoded. Like the Christ face, the Philosophical Decision functions as a distillation of faciality so that the Human-in-Human, as much as Philosophy, are in need of redemption *from* rather than *by* Christ. Positing a structural parallel between faciality and Laruelle's general theory of victims, I conclude that the generic schizoanalysis of the Victim-in-person as an *ordinary messiah* is a direct response to messianic facialization or the criminal violence of philosophy. My argument, then, is that with a non-philosophical probe-head freed, psychoanalysis can be transformed from a technology of the unconscious into a schizo-dualysis of the Human-in-person – a science founded on the immanent being of the human where any 'loss' is treated as nothing more or less than just that: a generic part of radical lived experience rather than a redoubled object for Freudian or philosophical analysis.

### **A Philosophy of Obstructions, An Obstructive Philosophy**

A bit of perseverance is required. A bit of patience. No doubt, this is a paper about *Anti-Oedipus*, but it requires an introduction to François Laruelle, which is not a straightforward task by any means because non-philosophy is not about exposition, commentary, analysis, critique or interpretation (etc., etc.). At any rate, the introduction is not to the non-philosopher himself: "Laruelle does not exist. There is a 'Laruelle' base [support] for non-philosophy. There is a subject-agent, a contributor, a manufacturer, but that's all" (Laruelle 2012a: 244). And yet, non-philosophy has to be introduced. One of Laruelle's most prominent interlocutors (if that is indeed the right word for a non-

philosophical ‘dialogist’), Rocco Gangle, calls this the ‘pedagogical’ problem of non-philosophy, while Taylor Adkins, a respected translator of Laruelle’s work, has conceded that any apposite primer to non-philosophy “is an illusion” (Ó Maoilearca 2017: 21). The problem is how to introduce non-philosophy without transforming it into what Laruelle calls ‘standard philosophy’. And yet, non-philosophy has to be introduced. John Ó Maoilearca follows the premise of Lars von Trier’s experimental film, *The Five Obstructions* (2003), for this task. In the film, von Trier works with another filmmaker, Jørgen Leth, whom he tasks with remaking his 1968 film, *The Perfect Human* (*Det perfekte menneske*) five times, each according to a restraint prescribed by von Trier. In *All Thoughts Are Equal*, Ó Maoilearca follows a similar procedure by ‘forcing’ non-philosophy via five pathways to ‘perform’ some of the axioms of non-philosophy. These circumventions are, however, not aimed at providing an explanation of Laruelle’s project but rather at suggesting “that anything viewed with sufficient care (the act, practice, or performance of a vision-in-One) can be thoughtful, can correspond to another part of the One, when each is seen as equally Real”, such that a real democratization of thought is achieved (Ó Maoilearca 2015: 42). While this is a rather brilliant method, it takes a book-long project to achieve. The problem thus remains: how to introduce non-philosophy? Perhaps the best one can do is try again, fail again, fail better.

Laruelle’s project on non-philosophy or, as he calls it in his later works, non-standard philosophy, is a provocative and theoretically rich enterprise that takes umbrage with what he refers to as the ‘double transcendence’ (or hallucination) of standard philosophy and its practice of the Philosophical Decision (first transcendence), which is itself grounded in the Principle of Sufficiency (second transcendence). That is, standard philosophy – whether in terms of negation or affirmation – remains conditioned by an *invariant structure* according to which philosophy lays claim to the Real by representing it, even when it professes not to do so. Laruelle notoriously takes aim at ‘philosophies of difference’, including Deleuze’s, to argue the latter point. The crux, for Laruelle, is that the Philosophical Decision constitutes a transcendent maneuver because it either naively believes that it is capable of deciding on the Real, or because it claims to think outside of the Real, all the time reducing the Real to the limits of philosophical thought. As Laruelle says, to philosophize – whether that be as philosophy *qua* philosophy, or as philosophy *qua* anthropology, politics, psychoanalysis, etc. – “is to decide on the Real *and* on thought, which ensues from it” (2013a: 117, emphasis added). This Decision not only refuses the immanent ‘imprint’ or ‘cut’ of the Real, but also cuts (*decaedere*) the human “off from the Real” by way of representation (Mullarkey; Smith 2013: 7). In short, the Philosophical Decision returns *all* philosophy into an idealist position because philosophy advances itself to the site of auto-giveness, thus assuming its own sufficiency according to which anything becomes *philosophizable* (see Laruelle 2013b [1989]: 22 and Laruelle 2015a [2000]: 8). Precisely at this juncture philosophy has already, in advance, overdetermined whatever it aims to give an account of. This is also why Laruelle argues for a structural

parallel between philosophy and photography, both of which lay claim to standard philosophical tropes such as “truth, light, reason, illumination, and the Real” (Fardy 2018: 3) that are used to *frame* the Real by *imposing* a certain totalizing view on it even though the totality of the Real *always transcends and escapes* the limits of philosophy and photography. Standard photography, like standard philosophy, is thus reflective (self-reflective), aiming always to render comprehensible what is ultimately the obscurity (non-comprehensibility) of the Real (see Laruelle 2011: 58).

Non-philosophy – which is then also what non-photography, non-Marxism, a generic psychoanalysis, etc. would do – axiomatically rejects any framing of the Real, holding that the Real is foreclosed to thought, and thus to philosophy. The reason that non-philosophy proceeds via axioms instead of postulates is that it is *performative* rather than *positional*. Axioms thus methodologically *perform* or *ventriloquize* non-philosophy’s own *insufficiency* to determine or lay claim to the Real. Otherwise stated, no thought, and no philosophy, is sufficient to grasp the Real, whether in terms of totality, transcendentals, transcendence or immanence. In contrast to standard philosophy, non-philosophy proceeds from a principle of ‘in-sufficient Real’, meaning it subordinates itself to its immanent cause, the One-in-One or vision-in-One, because it understands the Real to be *in-One*, which is to say given-without-giveness, rather than *in-Being*, or any other similar point of departure such as *in-Difference*. So, the Real is indifferent to thought just as philosophy is insufficient in its relation to (or thought of) the Real, such that the Real does not require a Philosophical Decision (a decision of thought) for the expression or determination of its essence. “Precisely because it is *radical* (and not *absolute*)”, writes Laruelle, “the Real’s sufficiency, that of its immanence without desire or need for thought, implies an insufficiency that is just as ‘radical’ as far as the thought which could be developed according to it” (Laruelle 2013a: 106; emphasis added). Non-philosophy therefore aims to think *from* the (radical immanence of the) Real rather than *for* the Real. As such, there is a non-commutativity of Being and the Real or the One. In this sense, non-philosophy, rather than being a philosophical *position*, is a *posture* towards the Real that does not claim to know or determine it (see Laruelle 2016 [1992]: 12 and Smith 2016a: 86). This posture, and its criticality towards standard philosophy, no doubt makes it seem as though non-philosophy is anti-philosophy, but Laruelle himself states that non-philosophy is neither the end of philosophy, nor a negation thereof, but rather a supplement to it, in the same way that non-Euclidean geometry extends its Euclidean counterpart (Laruelle 2011: vii). We could say that there is an operational parallel between non-Euclidean geometry and non-philosophy because just as non-Euclidean geometry does away with the fifth postulate of parallelism in Euclidean geometry, so non-philosophy does away with parallelisms in standard philosophy, whether that be Spinoza’s mind-body parallelism or the *noesis-noema* parallelism in phenomenology. Terence Blake (n.d.) has suggested that the ‘non’ in non-philosophy also alludes to Bachelard’s *La philosophie du non* (1940) which philosophically traces the linguistic

operator ‘non-’ in mathematics and the sciences. But while this may be the case, at least to some extent, I suspect that Laruelle (and perhaps his interlocutors – though I would be careful to speak for them) would view Bachelard’s philosophy as still being a *philosophy of science*, rather than an instance of philosophy using *the materials of science*, as non-standard philosophy aims to do. Put another way, the argument would be that even though the so-called ‘philosophies of the concept’ – such as those by Cavailles, Bachelard, Canguilhem, Gueroult, Serres, Foucault and, arguably, Simondon and Deleuze – went far in the direction of what Laruelle calls a *science of philosophy*, and even expressed it to some extent, they ultimately remained *philosophies of science*. Yet it seems to me that Blake could be correct to some degree in arguing that Laruelle forms part of this lineage, even if in a ‘non’ manner. Unfortunately, Blake makes the claim without following through on the argument, though the overlaps can easily be observed in passages from *The Philosophy of No (La philosophie du non)* such as the following:

Generalization by negation must include what it denies. Indeed the whole impetus of scientific thought for a century now stems from dialectical generalizations of this sort, which embrace what has been denied. Thus non-Euclidean geometry embraces Euclidean geometry; non-Newtonian mechanics embraces Newtonian mechanics; wave mechanics embraces relativist mechanics. In the domain of physics, Planck’s constant  $h$  seems like a very small discrepancy amid the rules of common-sense science. But, as has often been observed, the removal of  $h$  from the formulae of wave mechanics is all that is required to restore the formulae of classical mechanics. (Bachelard 1968 [1940]: 117)

This passage (and others besides) certainly gives the impression that there are some links between Bachelard’s philosophy of the no and Laruelle’s non-philosophy, at least in the sense that Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry correspond, though readers should not be fooled into thinking that Laruelle’s project is the same as Bachelard’s, or that it is a ‘cheap’ imitation thereof. Lineage or not, Laruelle’s project of non-philosophy stands apart from any standard philosophical project. This tension between a science of philosophy and a philosophy of science does, however, raise an interesting question for me in terms of *Anti-Oedipus* (1983 [1972]) and the ‘scientific’ use of *the materials* of psychoanalysis and Marxism.

To be clear, science, according to Laruelle, is, like non-philosophy, a posture towards knowledge, but it is neither an epistemology, nor a philosophy of science (Schmid 2013: 122). This posture, moreover, presents to philosophy *a way out of philosophizing* because science does not lay claim to knowledge of the Real and does not therefore submit the Real to the principle of Sufficiency. Knowledge is thus *gnostic* for Laruelle, where gnosticism “denotes the ‘equality in principle’ of all knowledges” (Ó Maoilearca 2015: 97–98). But how, if at all, can philosophy become gnostic? And is it possible to transform philosophy from a thought of sufficiency into a ‘rigorous science’ or practice of thought



that refuses the auto-reproduction and meta-justification of the epistemic violence of standard philosophy? Laruelle turns here to Gödel's incompleteness theorem which states that any formal axiomatic mathematical system has some propositions (or truth statements) that cannot be proved or disproved within that system, just as the consistency (or all axioms) of the system itself cannot be proved. Recall that Gödel was responding to projects of his milieu, such as Whitehead and Russell's *Principia Mathematica*, a three-volume work aimed at doing exactly the opposite of what Gödel proved, namely, to provide a formalized mathematical system comprising a set of complete and consistent axioms from which all mathematical truth claims could be derived. The latter position should sound familiar: it is nothing less than the quest for the double transcendence of standard philosophy. Laruelle generalizes Gödel's model to a non-Gödelian one, which amounts to a non-philosophical one, thus responding to standard philosophy in the same way that Gödel does to Whitehead and Russell: by pointing out the finitude of philosophical systems, just as Gödel proved the finitude of mathematical systems. According to Laruelle, this permits a recognition that epistemology *philosophically* organizes and delineates the concepts it uses to describe science, or any other 'regional' knowledge, so reducing all knowledge(s) to the recursive self-analysis and meta-rationalization of standard philosophy. Laruelle's point is that Gödel's condemnation of metascience is in fact a non-philosophical denunciation of "the classical relation of the authority of philosophy over science and its positivist and scientific inversions", including philosophies-*of-science*, philosophies-*in-science* and epistemology, the latter of which functions to reduce the generality of science to particular philosophical positions (Laruelle 2013c [1996]:68). Non-philosophy, in contrast, refuses to place knowledge "over science under this antithetical form" (Schmid 2013: 125), thus refusing philosophical transcendence and the 'epistemo-logical distance' it creates. This epistemo-logical detachment is precisely the formal attribute of objectification ('meta') that reduces knowledge to philosophical reflection and interpretation (Laruelle 2013c: 65). Readers will have noticed the way in which non-philosophy hyphenates words, for example vision-in-One, given-without-givenness or, in the previous sentence, epistemo-logical. These hyphens either specify an elimination of philosophical (epistemological) distance at "the level of the grapheme" (Smith 2016: 53), as in the first two examples or, alternatively, indicate the implicit assumptions of standard philosophical concepts, such as with epistemology, which conjugates *episteme* (knowledge) and *logos* (reason), thereby taking for granted a *reasoned* and *reasonable* auto-justification of philosophical *knowledge*. This is one of the main ways in which non-standard philosophy differs from standard philosophy: it refuses to think itself sufficient to grasp the Real-One. Yet even though absolute knowledge of the Real is impossible, we can, and do, according to Laruelle, have 'regional' (partial or local) knowledge of the Real via science (Fardy 2018: 2), precisely because science relies on a 'generic' practice of thought. That is to say, science has a *generic* commitment to curiosity, experimentation

and the discovery of new knowledge. If philosophy can, like science, make its primary aim to experimentally approach philosophy as raw materials, it could be transformed into a *science of philosophy* insofar as it refuses to decide on a given object – especially the Real – prior to experimentation.

This has a number of consequences. First, instead of positing any sufficiency or knowledge of the Real, a science of philosophy becomes a radical experimentation in generic, ordinary lived experience. Second, instead of philosophy being decisive for the Real, the Real becomes decisive for thought, but only ‘in-the-last-instance’. The concept of determination-in-the-last-instance is, of course, from the work of Althusser or, more accurately, is ‘cloned’ from Althusser’s work via Engels, specifically Engels’s remark that “he and Marx only ever held that the economy was decisive for historical and political change in the last instance” (Fardy 2021: 3). Althusser “extends the critique of ‘economism’ inaugurated by Engels and Marx, but adds the caveat that even the ‘last instance’ of the economy ‘never comes’” (Fardy 2021: 4). Laruelle, for his part, further radicalizes the cloned concept of determination-in-the-last-instance (DLI) by claiming that, alongside One-in-One (the Real), DLI is central to non-philosophy because it is the Real that acts as the determinant, or an immanent causality, but only ever in the last instance – an instance that ‘never comes’ because it never enacts a Philosophical Decision. It thus also refuses a convertibility between different Philosophical Decisions, for example the primacy of Being at times, or Thought (etc.) at other times (see Laruelle 2016: 19). To perform this methodologically, non-philosophy does not create concepts as is done in standard philosophy, for example by Deleuze and Guattari in *What is Philosophy?* (1994 [1991]), because for Laruelle this amounts to little more than an effect of the Philosophical Decision. Non-standard philosophy instead ‘clones’ the raw materials of standard philosophy, thereby neutralizing its propensity to decide on the Real. As Paul Anthony Smith explains, rather than being a copy, image or representation, the clone “carries the same genetic structure as the material it is cloned from” – the ‘genetic material’ here being the Real – but preserves its own identity (2016b: 83). So, (scientific) knowledge proceeds *from* (or is cloned *from*) the (genetic material of the) Real – it is unidirectional. An acceptance of this leads to the third consequence, namely a non-philosophical ‘defetishization’ of thought which not only places philosophy in a humbler position in its relation to the Real, but also performs a profound act of non-epistemic violence. This, then, is where I return to Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus*, and particularly their use of the raw materials of Marxism and psychoanalysis. What I am arguing is that they *perform* non-philosophy in their use of the unconscious and productive forces *as raw materials*. Laruelle claims, in his *Introduction to Non-Marxism*, that it is “impossible, even in Freud and in Marx, and even more so in philosophy, to find the radical concepts of the Real and the uni-versal – only those of the unconscious and productive forces, of desire and work. But after this discovery”, he goes on to write, “psychoanalysis and Marxism take on more than a new meaning – a transformation of their theories into simple materials” (Laruelle

2015a: 68). All this to say, instead of *philosophizing* psychoanalysis or Marxism, thereby deciding on the Real-One, I will argue that Deleuze and Guattari use their concepts *scientifically*, or as raw materials in an experiment.

### Notes on Non-Marxism and Non-Standard Psychoanalysis

In his introduction to *Anti-Oedipus*, Mark Seem, one of the text's translators, argues that even though Deleuze and Guattari refer to both Marx and Freud in the text, "it would be an error to view *Anti-Oedipus* as yet another attempt at a Freud/Marx synthesis" (quoted in Deleuze; Guattari 1983: xviii). This is the first important non-philosophical index because non-standard philosophy requires an "identity *without-synthesis*, a transcendental identity of a 'unilateral duality'" (Laruelle 2013c: 301). Because the Real is foreclosed to thought, and thus to philosophy, yet determinant in-the-last-instance, there is a 'non-relation' between the Real and philosophy, which Laruelle calls 'unilateral duality'. Non-philosophy proceeds *axiomatically* from this position, which is to say it posits "the One as the radically immanent Real", but this One assumes a dualistic non-relation that refuses a synthesis or unity, such as Spinoza's monism might (Laruelle 2012b [2004]: 29). Laruelle calls this style 'uni-laterality', as opposed to the triadic system of philosophy which requires a synthesis that is either immanent to or transcendent of the dyad, such that it both posits and conditions "the theoretico-technical ternary" (Laruelle 2012b: 116). This triple model is sometimes referred to as a 3/2 or 2/3 transcendental invariant matrix, which basically means that philosophy divides the Real (or ordinary reality, as opposed to philosophical reality) into at least two coordinates, usually Thought and Being, and then synthesizes both under the aegis of one of the terms, providing itself simultaneously with "an interiority and an exteriority, an immanence and a transcendence", ultimately giving way to a circular causality – and this, for Laruelle, is even the case of 1/2, as with Difference (Laruelle 2013c: 4). Non-philosophy, on the other hand, is always "2-in-1 in-the-last-instance or 1-(of)-2" (Laruelle 2013c: 4). It may immediately strike the reader that there seems to be a tension here because Deleuze and Guattari *collide*<sup>1</sup> libido and economy in their concept of *desiring-production*, so could it be said that even though they collide these concepts they don't conjoin or collapse them in a synthesis? The answer may seem apparent at first: obviously *desiring-production* is a

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<sup>1</sup> "The collider", writes Laruelle, "is the quasi-transcendental apparatus, indivisibly scientific and philosophical, that accumulates the two properties within a superposed state" (2017: 171). The concept of superposition is from quantum theory and refers to a particle being in two states at the same time (Schrödinger's cat' is often cited as the thought experiment). For Laruelle, superposition can be used to indicate relations between, for example, science and non-philosophy, or philosophy and mathematics, though it also marks a practice for getting out of the usual binds placed on objects by theoretical or formal determinations by acting as a catalyst for more "creative underdetermination or potentialization both in and across a variety of domains" (Gangle; Greve 2017: 10). To 'collide' concepts is thus to keep them in a superposed state, rather than collapsing them into a single philosophical concept.

synthesis – Deleuze and Guattari even talk about syntheses in the book, for example the connective synthesis of production, the disjunctive synthesis of recording, and the conjunctive synthesis of consumption-consummation. At a closer look, however, what they are doing is *describing* (not prescribing, and not philosophizing) how psychoanalysis and capitalism – and especially the marriage between them – come to decide on the Real, thus forcing a synthesis. In terms of connective synthesis, they write:

What is more, castration and oedipalization beget a basic illusion that makes us believe that real desiring-production is answerable to higher formations that integrate it, subject it to transcendent laws, and make it serve a higher social and cultural production; there then appears a kind of “unsticking” of the social field with regard to the production of desire, in whose name all resignations are justified in advance. (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 74)

Notice their description of what Oedipalization – as a representation of the totality of the Real – enacts: not only a Decision of Sufficiency (Oedipus as the Real), but also a determination of the human as always-already Oedipalized. That is, Oedipalization cuts thought off from the Real through its initial decision about how to frame thought and what/how it reflects (on), and then redistributes this cut-off structure philosophically *as if* it has traction on the Real. This is what Laruelle calls *humanist* rather than *human* thought where, instead of the *Human-in-person*, we have a *human-as-subject* – like Heidegger’s *Dasein* – attributed to the fullest extent, but in a way that is separate (or cut off) from ordinary, generic life. Laruelle’s generic orientation or posture is aimed precisely at undercutting standard philosophical delineations such as ‘*Dasein*’, ‘rational man’ or ‘Oedipal person’ and is, therefore, a kind of *reduction* of the grand and the abstract to ordinary, phenomenal and immanent experience (Laruelle 2015b [2012]: xiv). For Laruelle, the kind of Oedipal violence described by Deleuze and Guattari would not only be psychological, but also epistemological, especially when enacted by intellectuals as part of a “new politico-quotidian doxa” which overrepresents its “victim” (i.e., the Oedipal human), thereby acting in the service of Philosophy-with-a-capital-P rather than in the service of life (2015b: 1). Deleuze and Guattari elaborate this problem in their own register, this time in terms of disjunctive synthesis, writing:

Oedipus is like the labyrinth, you only get out by re-entering it – or by making someone else enter it. Oedipus as either problem or solution is the two ends of a ligature that cuts off all desiring-production. The screws are tightened, nothing relating to production can make its way through any longer, except for a far-distant murmur. The unconscious has been crushed, triangulated, and confronted with a choice that is not its own. (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 79)

*With a choice that is not its own* or, as Laruelle says in his essay on generalized analysis (or non-analysis), as a “functional requisition of transcendent entities: Consciousness, the Unconscious, Self, Other, etc. without ever asking how such entities are received and lived” by the human as an ordinary, immanent subject of the science of the Human-in-person (2013d [1989]). Although psychoanalysis may appear, at least sometimes, to treat the human in the latter way, Laruelle argues that when it does so, it is in an already-transcendent form so that the human is treated as *a technology of the unconscious* (its ‘standing-reserve’) according to the sufficiency of psychoanalysis, rather than the unconscious being treated as a science of the Human-in-person. This is, of course, nothing other than the invariant structure of the Philosophical Decision which subordinates any possibility of analysis to philosophizing. If psychoanalysis is to become ‘scientific’ or ‘generic’, it would have to submit itself to the generic human (or what Laruelle understands by the ‘victim’, as will become clearer), thereby integrating analysis into a more *material* and *human* (rather than *materialist* and *humanist*) science that “would henceforth represent a particular case or a given” and renounce the inaccurate generalizations of philosophy in favour of “a scientific type of generalization”, which it would have to learn to distinguish (Laruelle 2013d). Laruelle calls this *non-psychoanalysis*: a “scientific pragmatics of analysis thus generalized within the limits of a really human science” that refuses to conflate the human ‘object’ with philosophical sufficiency, such that it is markedly different from Freudian or any other related analysis (Laruelle 2013d). This, as I will argue later in the paper, is precisely what a generic schizoanalysis would do.

Contextually, as Foucault writes in the introduction to *Anti-Oedipus*, it helps to understand that critical theory in Europe, from about 1945 to 1965, relied on a “certain style of political discourse, a certain ethics of the intellectual”, which required that one “be on familiar terms with Marx”, while not allowing “one’s dreams stray too far from Freud”, or neglecting to “treat sign-systems – the signifier – with the greatest respect” (Foucault in Deleuze; Guattari 1983: xi). Deleuze and Guattari want, naturally, to disrupt this holy trinity, as much as they want to trouble the Oedipalized triad of daddy-mommy-me. But they also recognize the strange ‘status’ of Oedipus: “At times”, they write, “we say that Oedipus is nothing, almost nothing (within the order of desiring-production, even in the child); at other times we say that it is everywhere (in the enterprise of domesticating the unconscious, of representing desire and the unconscious). To be sure, we have never dreamed of saying that psychoanalysis invented Oedipus” (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 121). To say that Oedipus is nothing is a recognition that it *only presents itself* as the Real, as sufficient to the Real, when in reality it is little more than a specific (philosophical) framing of reality, in the same way that “philosophy is already the photography of the World” (Laruelle 2011: 9). Alongside Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari see capitalism as enacting a similar photography of the World – hence their recourse to both Freud and Marx. Jonathan Fardy (2021), Alexander Galloway (2012), Katerina Kolozova (2012) and

Laruelle (2015a) himself have all argued extensively, albeit with individual nuances, that capitalism functions by *axiomatically* assuming that everything, including the Real, is reducible to an exchange value. Deleuze and Guattari, likewise, argue for this position in *Anti-Oedipus*, explaining also *how* capitalism comes to take this axiomatic position. “By substituting money for the very notion of a code”, they write, “it has created an axiomatic of abstract quantities that keeps moving further and further in the direction of the deterritorialization of the socius” (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 33). Far from being an aberration, the propensity capitalism has for absolute deterritorialization is, for Deleuze and Guattari, a condition of its functioning. This is a rather straightforward Marxist position. For it to become a non-Marxist one would require not only a critique of capital, but also of the “imbrication of philosophy and capital” (Fardy 2021: 6), implying that capitalism is not merely an economic violence, but an epistemological one as well, just as we saw with psychoanalysis. For Laruelle, decoupling Marx from Philosophy is a double task: it entails not only the classic question of “how to break with Hegel?”, but also, more generally, how to disentangle form Philosophy-with-a-capital-P, or Philosophy as Sufficiency rather than philosophy “as a particular doctrine” (Laruelle 2015a: 38). It is no secret that Hegel’s project represents the philosophy of synthesis *par excellence*, so for Marxism to break with Hegel, and therefore Philosophy, is to treat the One as a dualistic non-relation that refuses a synthesized unity. For Laruelle, “Marx’s reticence toward Hegel” is an “indication of a non-philosophical instinct *already implicit* in Marx”, even if he did not name it as such (Galloway 2012: 204). Similarly, I would argue that there is a non-philosophical impulse at work in Deleuze and Guattari’s theorization of psychoanalysis and capitalism, the latter especially via their exposition of *contingency*. Whereas Marx argues for a typological and evolutionary three-stage theory that moves from savagery to barbarism to civilization, principally influenced by Lewis Henry Morgan’s book, *Ancient Society; Or: Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization* (1877), Deleuze and Guattari argue that capitalism, like the formation of Statist societies, was always contested and *contingent*. Instead of relying on a historical materialism that develops as distinct stages, each of which progresses in terms of a thesis, antithesis and synthesis, with communism representing the ultimate (metaphysical, and therefore philosophical) synthesis, Deleuze and Guattari argue against the “dreary, colorless dialectic of evolution, aimed at forming a harmonious whole out of heterogeneous bits by rounding off their rough edges” (1983: 116). In a passage that could be a non-philosophical critique of the co-imbrication of capitalism and philosophy, they write: “As a general rule, the problem of the relationships between parts and the whole continues to be rather awkwardly formulated by classic mechanism and vitalism, so long as the whole is considered as a totality derived from the parts, or as an original totality from which the parts emanate, or as a dialectical totalization” (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 44). In a non-philosophical register of cloning, this could read as: Generally, the problem of the relation between philosophy (or capitalism, or capitalist-philosophy, or philo-

capitalism) and the Real continues to be rather awkwardly formulated by standard philosophy, so long as the Real is considered as a totality derived from philosophical interpretation, or as a dialectical totalization that forms a cogent cosmology of meaning, thereby denying the ordinary, generic individual who, like the Real, is irreducible to the framings, concepts and alienations of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and capital. Instead, the Real is “the ‘Lived’ of the ‘Human-in-Human’”, prior to its representative abstractions (Kolozova 2012: 216). Like non-psychoanalysis, non-Marxism is an attempt to describe this ordinary Lived *from* the Real, not *as* the Real, thus acknowledging the non-commutativity of Thought and the Real as a pure dyad that cannot be synthesized. The question now is: Does Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis live up to this or, if not quite, are there enough raw materials in schizoanalysis for it to become a generic practice?

### **A Generic Schizoanalysis, A Generic Pragmatics**

I want to start this section by addressing a critique Laruelle raises against Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus* in his article “La concept d’analyse généralisée ou de ‘non-analyse’”, translated by Taylor Adkins as “The Concept of Generalized Analysis or of ‘Non-Analysis’” (2013d). Having taken some time to explain what non-analysis is, which Laruelle also describes as a ‘pragmatics of the unconscious’ (readers of Deleuze and Guattari will surely recognise ‘pragmatics’ as another term for ‘schizoanalysis’), he writes – and I quote at length:

What’s the point in de-Oedipalizing desire if only to machine it, to fold it to the ultimate restrictive code of desiring machines or to the last fold of “difference”? This combat within philosophy has nothing to do with the scientific safeguarding of analysis and of its real object. If the Unconscious knows neither contradiction nor logic, it will no longer know philosophy, which is an internalizing construction on logic and is inseparable from the latter. Neither formal logic nor combinatory logic, neither logos nor onto-logic, the Unconscious is “hopelessly” empty. It is not a question of again filling it with these substitutes of the imaginary or of the socio-structural. Rather than the last wound, the wound in the last instance or the real wound. And this is not what the Unconscious inflicts upon the Conscious, but what science does to this Unconscious still too full of metaphysical substitutes and transcendent objects; it wounds the residual narcissism of psychoanalysis. (Laruelle 2013d)

Apart from his lengthy meditation on the philosophies of difference of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Deleuze and Derrida in *Philosophies of Difference* (2010b [1986]), Laruelle often makes pithier indictments against Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari, many remaining unexplained, thereby implicitly assuming agreement from the reader – as in

the quote above. (In fairness, many philosophers, including Deleuze and Guattari, do this.) To be clear, for Laruelle Deleuze's theorizations of *Difference* and the *virtual*, as well as Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of the *Body without Organs* (BwO) and the *plane of immanence*, are all examples of philosophical models that start by rejecting dualisms, such as immanence vs transcendence, and then opt for one – immanence in the case of Deleuze and Guattari – but a one that unifies rather than remaining in-One or immanent (to) itself. Laruelle's argument is that even though Deleuze and Guattari claim to *proceed from immanence*, they are actually still laying claim to the Real. According to Laruelle, then, Deleuze and Guattari reduce the Real by making it equivalent to Difference = the virtual = the BwO = the plane of immanence. In *All Thoughts Are Equal*, Ó Maoilearca comes to Deleuze and Guattari's defense, arguing that a concept like the 'plane of immanence' could be read as a "term for the equality of all before Being, the univocity of the Real (where being is said in the same way of every different thing)" (2015: 71). This is a fair reading, though Ó Maoilearca ultimately concedes that Deleuze's invocation of a One-All in a Spinozist vein leaves Deleuze "too much the philosopher for Laruelle's taste" (Ó Maoilearca 2015: 71–72). According to Laruelle, Deleuze and Guattari's concepts succumb, in the end, to a Philosophical Decision, though I would argue that while they do not explicitly argue that the Real (or immanence) is foreclosed to thought – and this is where Laruelle's project is decisive – they do in fact address Sufficiency. This has already been shown in terms of their theorization of psychoanalysis and capitalism, but it could be said of Difference too, at least in the way it is used by Deleuze (rather than, say, Derrida, whose work I am not addressing here). Much has been said about Deleuze's Difference, and I will certainly not recount it all here. Rather, I want to suggest that Difference, rather than being a 'plane' or 'fold' (as Laruelle understands these concepts), is simply *a way of stating the problem of immanence*. Recall that Deleuze says on more than one occasion that problems always get the solutions they deserve because the 'solution' is nothing other than the "conditions under which it is determined as a problem" (1991: 16). When Deleuze talks about 'problems' and 'solutions' he is addressing the relationship between thought and images in thought, which speaks not only to representation – such as representations *of* immanence, or the Real – but also to the image of thought that Philosophy gives to itself, i.e., Sufficiency. Before thought takes place, it therefore "already has an image of what it means to think" (Bénil 2021: 52) – and what it means to think the Real. Having a *new* image of thought would thus be to think *from*, rather than *to*, Difference, which is to say immanence. When Deleuze critiques philosophical thought, especially in the final three of the eight postulates on the dogmatic image of thought, I don't think it is too outrageous to claim that Deleuze himself was already pointing out the false purchase of the Philosophical Decision on the Real. Readers of Deleuze will recall that he elaborates this with reference to non-Euclidean geometry, especially the work of the mathematician, Bernhard Riemann, who further developed Carl Friedrich Gauss's notion of surfaces as spaces in themselves by addressing "a much more general problem:



that of  $n$ -dimensional surfaces or spaces” (DeLanda 2002: 4). Without invoking the container space of a Euclidean object, such as a cube, which would be expressed in terms of the Euclidean values  $x$ ,  $y$  and  $z$  (length, width and height), Riemann showed that only the instantaneous rate of change – the infinitesimal or the velocity at *this* instant – needs to be calculated, which he expressed as  $dy/dx$ . The rate of change of  $x$  with respect to  $y$  is thus done without recourse to a global embedding or *transcendent* space. This is why Deleuze (and Guattari) sometimes speak of  $n-1$ : to indicate that there is no need for a transcendent unity (see Deleuze 1994: 182). To restate this in non-philosophical language, the  $n-1$  renders possible a cloning of the One that does not result in or rely on a synthesis but remains immanent (to) itself, or in-One. Deleuze’s insistence on univocity is therefore not quite the same as a Spinozist one. Difference differentiating itself is a movement *from* immanence rather than *to* it. Laruelle’s argument, in short, that Difference still frames the Real because it functions as a meta-physical principle (see Laruelle 2010b: 27–28). Difference, accordingly, *stands in for* the Real. It could certainly be read this way, and part of the problem for Laruelle is the choice of word here but choosing a word like ‘Real’ does not come without its own semantic encumbrance, laden with Lacanian overtones as it is. Laruelle does, however, make a substantial effort to sidestep this problem methodologically, but what I hope my discussion shows, albeit in brief, is that this is actually a complex argument, especially given Deleuze’s own critique of Philosophy’s dogmatic image of thought (i.e., its sufficiency).<sup>2</sup>

I am not trying to diminish Laruelle’s project by arguing this point; his non-standard philosophical endeavour is unique, and even though I would argue that he, in some sense, takes Deleuze’s project on immanence to its natural conclusion, there are many differences between them. One of the greatest contributions from Laruelle is, as I have already intimated, his methodology for non-philosophically enacting immanence, i.e., his non-epistemology. My point is that while Laruelle argues that Deleuze and Guattari submit desire to philosophical sufficiency, it seems to me that there is a strong case to be made that Difference is a way of posing the problem of immanence, such that the human-in-subject can be given new coordinates which, if not non-philosophical *as such*, does have a larval non-philosophical drive. This is true of *Difference and Repetition* as much as it is for *Anti-Oedipus*. For example, Deleuze and Guattari write: “In like fashion we are compelled to say that *psychoanalysis has its metaphysics* – its name is Oedipus. And that a revolution – this time *materialist* – can proceed only by way of a critique of Oedipus, by denouncing the illegitimate use of the syntheses of the unconscious as found in Oedipal psychoanalysis, so as to rediscover a *transcendental unconscious defined by the immanence of its criteria*, and a corresponding practice that we shall call schizoanalysis” (Deleuze;

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<sup>2</sup> I take some time elaborating this point as much (though not all) of the secondary literature on Laruelle tends to follow his critique of Deleuze (and Guattari) rather than engaging with this tension more substantially. At the same time, I admit that I am not doing Laruelle’s very detailed arguments justice here due to space constraints – and they absolutely do deserve to be engaged with rigorously. My hope is that readers will follow this trail of crumbs.

Guattari 1983: 75, emphasis added). Clearly, granting that Oedipus functions as a metaphysics laying claim to the One is a ‘real kernel’ – a recognition that generically lived reality exceeds philosophical abstraction, which leads to the discovery of what could read either as ‘the One-in-One defined by the immanence of its criteria’ (which is how I read it here) or as ‘a plane of immanence defined by the immanence of its criteria’ (which is how I suspect Laruelle would read it). Laruelle would also argue for a material rather than materialist ‘revolution’ – and here I would take his point (not as philosophical interpretation, but as axiomatic). Elsewhere they write: “It is not the purpose of schizoanalysis to resolve Oedipus, it does not intend to resolve it better than Oedipal psychoanalysis does. Its aim is to de-oedipalize the unconscious in order *to reach the real problems*” (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 81, emphasis added). Here schizoanalysis is presented as a generic practice which, like Laruelle’s non-psychoanalysis, reduces the transcendent foundation of Freudian analysis to something quite ordinary: a “simple *dimension* of human phenomena” (Laruelle 2013d) – to *a* life, which “is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing” which “is itself a life” (Deleuze 2005:11), though whereas Deleuze describes *a* life as *absolute*, it is *radical* for Laruelle. There are many more examples such as these, but rather than arguing about whether Deleuze and Guattari are, on the whole, non-philosophical – which is not the larger point I am trying to make here in any case – there is enough to at least assume a non-philosophical instinct and, as such, I want to think about what a generic schizoanalysis might look like.

Towards the end of *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari outline a negative task of schizoanalysis – “defamiliarizing, de-oedipalizing, decastrating; undoing theater, dream, and fantasy; decoding, deterritorializing” (1983: 381) – as well as two positive tasks, the first being to discover how desiring-machines work, *detached from any foregone interpretations* (1983: 322), and the second being “to reach the investments of unconscious desire of the social field” (1983: 350). These tasks seem to me to be summed up in the second iteration of their project, namely *A Thousand Plateaus*, as: “if human beings have a destiny, it is rather to escape the face, to dismantle the face and facializations, to become imperceptible, to become clandestine” (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 171). This could be phrased differently as: it is the destiny of psychoanalysis to lose its ‘face’, just as it is the destiny of capitalism to lose its ‘face’, because faciality is precisely the Philosophical Decision whereby ordinary, lived reality becomes overcoded. This overcoding effectuates an incorporeal transformation that submits all subjectivation processes to the hierarchical functions of biunivocalization and binarization *in advance*, where the former functions to create mutually opposed groupings (x or y; man or woman; white or black) and the latter to set a normative standard between these, so ensuring measurement (x is better – read more normative and less deviant – than Y) (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 177). The destructive aim of schizoanalysis is thus to undo the mask of faciality in order to allow subjectivation, or individuation, to take place without the predetermined ascription processes and trajectory conditions of faciality. At this point,

however, schizoanalysis remains at the level of the signifier and subjectivity. Deleuze and Guattari themselves say this: “Dismantling the face is the same as breaking through the wall of the signifier and getting out of the black hole of subjectivity” (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 188). They then go on, in the next line, to describe this explicitly as the ‘programme’ and ‘slogan’ of schizoanalysis. For it to become non-philosophical, or a *generic* schizoanalysis, it cannot however remain at the level of subjectivity or individuation as that ‘redeems’ the human-in-subject at only one level, while failing to transform the human-in-subject to the Human-in-Human by delivering it from the sufficiency of the Philosophical Decision. That is, a generic schizoanalysis would also have to be about philosophy losing its face or, positively stated, about philosophy becoming a probe-head rather than being a faciality machine.

Here, a generic schizoanalysis would benefit from Laruelle’s *General Theory of Victims* in which he argues that philosophy is itself the criminal that creates victims by enclosing the Human-in-Human within a Philosophical Decision. That is to say, the Philosophical Decision is itself an enactment of faciality. This being said, Laruelle holds that it is the victim who, paradoxically, can ‘save’ intellectuals by helping them become *generic*. In his words: “there is a single vectorial equation or a vector state for the victim and the intellectual. The intellectual passes through the two states; in general, he [*sic*] helps the victim acquire the power to manifest, judge, and thus ‘save’ the criminal. But he contributes to saving himself (judging himself, condemning himself, etc.) by superposing himself on the victim and abandoning his spontaneously or ‘unconsciously’ criminal side” (Laruelle 2015b: 154). Stated plainly, philosophy, and philosophers, and thus also schizoanalysis, becomes generic by *reducing* the double hallucination of standard philosophy (or standard psychoanalysis) to a phenomenal immanence that, instead of being subject to a principle of logical or philosophical identity, is subjected to a quantum indivisibility that nevertheless remains a non-commutativity of the Real and the Human-in-Human or Victim-in-person (2-in-1 in-the-last-instance or 1-(of)-2). For Laruelle, this is the “underdetermining condition of justice” (2015b: xxi) which requires that philosophy’s Sufficiency be replaced by a Principle of Compassion – not pity, not vengeance and not heroism, as he goes on to explain. Compassion is not reducible to any form of Christian, materialist or humanist sympathy, just as it is not a principle “except in-the-last-instance”, which would render it generic: “universal-without-reason” and “necessary-without-sufficiency” (Laruelle 2015b: 47). This requires thinking humanity as non-facialized – “as indivisible by cultures, communities, and races, while at the same time as not being a transcendent unity like essence or nature” (Laruelle 2015b: 7). Laruelle proposes that this be done not at the level of subjectivity, but at the level of non-epistemology: by rendering the human the ‘object’ of an axiom that is stripped of all philosophical attributes. Yet this axiom would have to simultaneously allow the human to be a ‘subject’ or, more precisely, “the lived or neutralized materiality, what we call an ‘oraxiom’” – the generic or non-philosophical portmanteau that superposes “the oracle

and the axiom, or the axiom-subject” (Laruelle 2015b: 7). Laruelle’s scientific endeavour becomes clear here: rather than collapsing the Victim-in-person into the synthesized object-subject of Philosophy, the cloning of victims becomes the under-determining last instance of intellectuals. Call to mind that Deleuze and Guattari argue that faciality functions according to resonance and redundancy, because in the same way that news headlines tell us what to believe, remember, expect, etc., so too does the ultimate normative face, namely the Christ face. The Christ face thus functions as a distillation of faciality and is redundant precisely because it has been repeated or resonated so many times that the referent is not actually Christ’s face, but a copy (of a copy) thereof. It would seem, then, that the Human-in-Human, as much as Philosophy, are in need of redemption *from* rather than *by* Christ. Laruelle argues that it is the victim who “carries with it resurrection, or rather the prior-to-the-first insurrection, against the dialectic of being and nothingness, which has no real or lived sense” (2015b: 44), because the victim forces a gnostic or generic passivity towards the Real. Instead of *analysis*, a generic schizoanalysis would proceed by way of *dualysis* – a method whereby the strong force of the Philosophical Decision is weakened because it refuses a synthesis or unity of the dyad. To ‘arise’ is to dualyse rather than analyse or synthesize – to bring generic lived experience *back to life* by affirming “the primacy of the glorious body over the duplicity of the world” (Laruelle 2015b: 112). The generic (in)(re)surrection, or non-schizoanalysis, of the Victim-in-person as an *ordinary messiah* is therefore a direct response to messianic facialization or the criminal violence of philosophy. Could it be the line that frees a non-philosophical probe-head?

Deleuze and Guattari remain quite vague on what a probe-head is, but they do give us some indication of what it does: “dismantle the strata in their wake, break through the walls of signifiante, pour out of the holes of subjectivity, fell trees in favor of veritable rhizomes, and steer the flows down lines of positive deterritorialization or creative flight” (1987: 190). It could thus be viewed as a non-philosophical *tool* for un-building the structures of standard psychoanalysis. As a non-schizoanalytic tool it would also transform psychoanalysis from a technology of the unconscious into a schizo-dualysis of the Human-in-person – a science founded on the immanent being of the human, where any ‘loss’ is treated as nothing more or less than just that: a generic immanent part of radical lived experience rather than a redoubled object for Freudian analysis that “can only go to the point of a half-loss, just as it [only] comes to the point of a half-rediscovery” (Laruelle 2013d).

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## *Devenir-psychanalyste avec Guattari*

par GABRIEL MART

### **Abstract**

Encountered by a clinician, schizoanalysis does not speak about analysands at all. It addresses the analyst, it deforms him, and in this deformation it establishes a certain ethical (or ethico-esthetic, perhaps?) position. That, one may coin 'clinical schizoanalysis', is first and foremost a style, a perpetual deformation the analysts of freudian, kleinian or even lacanian background undergo. In order to make way for a subject, an analyst must be prepared to forfeit any previously established hypothesis he has of the analysand, no matter how appealing and coherent they may seem. Moreover, a schizoanalytic orientation demands an ability to forfeit said orientation as well. As one chooses schizoanalysis as an orientation in one's own analytic style, he establishes the condition for creativity to be fulfilled; one does not establish the new orthodoxy of 'guattarism', but engages in continuous becoming-'psychoanalyst with Guattari'. In this essay, I explore the possible sources and practical implications of how guattarian thought might be embraced by mainstream psychoanalytic clinicians today.

Dans ce numéro, mes collègues abordent beaucoup la schizoanalyse en tant que discipline, champ d'expérimentation et pratique de créativité. Cependant, je souhaiterais apporter une perspective différente en proposant de réfléchir à la schizoanalyse non pas comme une discipline particulière, ni même une doctrine, une école, une « psychanalyse guattarienne », mais plutôt comme une orientation pour le psychanalyste, le clinicien, qui définit son propre style analytique individuel.

En effet, il est impossible d'apprendre de Guattari de la même manière que l'on apprend de Dolto, de Winnicott ou de Mannoni. Contrairement aux analystes qui nous ont laissé un corpus assez abondant de cas cliniques très détaillés, Guattari – écrivain prolifique qui est resté avant tout clinicien pendant la plus grande partie de sa vie d'adulte, jusqu'à sa mort – a très peu écrit sur son travail clinique (Lacan non plus d'ailleurs). À part le célèbre article sur le cas de R.A. (Guattari 1972), les illustrations cliniques de Guattari sont disséminées ici et là dans les actes des séminaires qu'il a animés à La Borde, dans ses carnets de notes et dans ses lettres. Tout cela, qui rend compte de son style analytique personnel, semble peu applicable à des fins didactiques conventionnelles. Par ailleurs, la psychanalyse résiste à la didactique conventionnelle. Contrairement à l'éducation dans d'autres professions, il y a une transmission analytique. La formation (ce qui rend beaucoup mieux compte du jeu de signes impliqué dans ce

processus) de l'analyste se fait essentiellement par la dé-formation de ses idées et de ses croyances existantes, en dialogue avec la discipline et ses collègues. Cette formation est celle de son inconscient et, par conséquent, cette déformation est analogue à l'inconscient : elle est dynamique, perpétuelle et sans point final (je me conforme ici aux idées du psychanalyste Vincent Perdigon de la Fédération des Ateliers de Psychanalyse (Gaucher ; Perdigon, 2007)). C'est de cela que je veux discuter ici : du potentiel déformant et mutant de la pensée guattarienne pour le psychanalyste. Cela semble tout à fait en accord avec l'esprit de la schizoanalyse en tant que pratique clinique. Ce que l'on pourrait appeler la « schizoanalyse clinique » est avant tout un style, une déformation en cours, que des analystes d'origine freudienne, kleinienne ou même lacanienne endurent. Plus encore, contrairement à l'idée reçue, Guattari lui-même est étranger au négativisme ; tout le caractère de son programme réside dans l'inverse, dans la créativité.

Avant de commencer à aborder les possibles implications de cette orientation, je tiens à préciser quelques points clés de la pratique psychanalytique qui sont pertinents dans le contexte de mon essai. En 2003, en France, alors que la psychanalyse était fortement menacée par l'oppression de l'État, un Groupe de contact s'est formé pour s'y opposer. Ce groupe d'analystes réunit, selon leur propre définition, les « freudiens français » (Société psychanalytique de Paris, Association psychanalytique de France, 4e groupe) et les « freudiens français avec Lacan »<sup>1</sup> (Espace analytique, Société de psychanalyse freudienne, Mouvement Cout Freudien, Association freudienne internationale, Fondation européenne pour la psychanalyse, etc.). Dans le cadre de leurs activités, le Groupe de contact a proposé plusieurs points<sup>2</sup> de définition de la psychanalyse. Les trois premiers concernent les concepts fondamentaux, tandis que les quatrième et cinquième traitent directement des aspects méthodologiques de la pratique clinique. Ce sont ces derniers qui retiennent le plus mon attention dans le cadre de mes réflexions :

La psychanalyse cherche – sans aucune volonté d'adaptation à quelque modèle préétabli que ce soit – à éliminer autant que faire se peut toute suggestion (Bernard n.d.).

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<sup>1</sup> Il faut noter que le concept de lacanisme ou d'"analyse lacanienne" n'est pas articulé ici. Les fondements problématiques et idéologiques de ce concept méritent une étude distincte.

<sup>2</sup> 1) La psychanalyse est une investigation de processus mentaux inaccessibles autrement et une méthode thérapeutique qui se fonde sur la découverte freudienne et son enrichissement ainsi que l'extension de son champ d'application; 2) La référence à l'inconscient comme au transfert lui est indispensable et exclut toute formation à qui n'en a pas fait l'expérience personnelle sur le divan; 3) La psychanalyse inclut la pratique de variantes de la cure adaptées à l'organisation psychique de certains patients; 4) La psychanalyse se démarque de toutes les autres méthodes psychologiques et psychothérapeutiques car en privilégiant l'interprétation du transfert, au lieu de l'utiliser, elle cherche – sans aucune volonté d'adaptation à quelque modèle préétabli que ce soit – à éliminer autant que faire se peut toute suggestion; 5) Comme conséquence logique de ces principes se dégage la nécessité d'un cadre de la cure en relation avec l'éthique psychanalytique requérant du praticien une neutralité et une confidentialité confondues à la technique même de la psychanalyse.



C'est dans cette partie de la définition de la psychanalyse que je trouve une occasion de situer une orientation « guattarienne » pour le psychanalyste. Avant d'aborder les effets des déformations que le contact avec Guattari peut apporter au psychanalyste – en particulier en ce qui concerne son style analytique personnel – je vais expliquer le contenu de cet élément.

La psychanalyse est une méthode d'investigation des processus mentaux et une méthode thérapeutique qui s'exerce principalement par la pratique de la parole. L'analyste crée, par une position d'écoute spécifique, un espace pour la parole et pour la subjectivation de son analysant. Il s'agit d'un espace où l'on peut déposer ce qui a été refoulé et le dépasser, afin de trouver de nouveaux modes de subjectivation ou, comme le dit Jean-Pierre Winter, psychanalyste français, « se souvenir pour pouvoir enfin oublier » (Winter 2019).

Jacques Lacan disait, en plaisantant, qu'on pouvait imaginer un analyste muet, mais pas un analyste sourd. L'analyste va écouter l'analysant et, de temps à autre, dire quelque chose, faire un commentaire. Toutefois, les paroles de l'analyste font en réalité partie de l'écoute : l'interprétation n'a pas pour but d'expliquer quelque chose à l'analysant, de lui transmettre un savoir sur lui-même, ou de se conformer à un modèle que l'analyste veut imposer, mais précisément le contraire. L'interprétation, à travers des questionnements, des ponctuations et la création d'équivoques, ainsi que par l'introduction de ruptures dans le tissu du discours de l'analysant, crée un espace dans lequel il est possible d'introduire quelque chose de nouveau. L'interprétation ouvre la possibilité de co-produire un nouveau territoire pour le sujet.

La manière et le moment où un analyste donne son interprétation sont l'un des aspects les plus visibles et les plus évidents du style analytique personnel d'un clinicien. L'analyste français Paul Denis a posé une hypothèse en demi-teinte : les cliniciens dont l'analyste était « bavard » et donnait beaucoup d'interprétations ont tendance à devenir plus taciturnes pour ne pas dire trop de choses inappropriées (Denis 2015). Peut-être existe-t-il une telle tendance... Toutefois, il me semble utile de souligner un autre aspect de l'observation concernant l'analyste « bavard ». En restant psychanalyste freudien ou kleinien, etc., l'analyste peut utiliser la « schizoanalyse » pour orienter son style de travail personnel. Afin de donner de l'espace au sujet, il faut être prêt à abandonner ses anciennes hypothèses sur l'analysant, aussi fines et belles qu'elles puissent paraître. Pour éviter toute contrainte, suggestion ou adaptation à un modèle préétabli, il faut pouvoir renoncer non seulement aux modèles extrinsèques (tels que les clichés sociaux ou théoriques psychanalytiques), mais aussi à celui qui ne semble plus être extrinsèque, celui qui s'est formé au cours de cette analyse particulière avec ce même analysant. Une interprétation qui stimule la subjectivation, qui a un effet analytique, n'est possible qu'à partir de « l'ici », de la position dans laquelle se trouve l'analysant à ce moment particulier et à qui il

s'adresse là. Du transfert<sup>3</sup>. Non pas de l'« Œdipe », du « là-bas » de la théorie analytique générale ou de celle sur le sujet, sur l'analysant, que l'analyste s'est construite au cours du travail. Sinon, l'analyste fait partie de la névrose de l'analysant en s'immergeant trop dans le contenu du discours. Et lorsqu'il s'immerge dans l'« Œdipe », il perd tout contact avec la substance subjective.

Par ailleurs, en ce qui concerne le « psychanalyste avec Guattari », il faut faire un pas de plus. L'orientation « schizoanalytique » pour le psychanalyste ne se limite pas à l'orientation vers les processus de subjectivation plutôt que vers le contenu du discours. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de la capacité de renoncer à ses hypothèses sur l'analysant ou aux concepts et schémas établis appris au cours de l'institut psychanalytique. C'est également la capacité de renoncer à l'orientation elle-même ! Ce que fait Guattari, non seulement dans *L'Anti-Œdipe*, mais également avant et après, n'est pas un nihilisme systématique, mais plutôt une capacité positive à effectuer une telle opération douloureuse de renonciation à des schémas appris et très chers au cœur de chaque analyste. Il s'agit de choisir en faveur de ce qui est adéquat et pertinent pour la situation analytique particulière à ce moment-là. La schizoanalyse n'est pas un projet d'enterrement de Freud. Guattari lui-même ne nie ni Freud, ni la castration, ni la composante familiale dans le développement psychique du jeune sujet. Lorsque cela est approprié pour le matériel, Guattari lui-même revient à Freud et même à Œdipe (par exemple, voir le séminaire *À propos d'un rêve : Systruc* (Guattari 1984), où Guattari analyse son propre rêve). Dans son commentaire sur le cas de R.A. dans *Psychanalyse et transversalité*, Guattari déplore le mauvais usage de l'Œdipe par les analystes : il serait illusoire de penser qu'il y a quelque chose à lire dans l'ordre de l'être ou dans l'ordre du monde perdu. De même, il serait vain de penser que la reconstruction de l'être mythique, au-delà de toute origine historique, peut être institutionnalisée comme propédeutique psychanalytique ou comme une maïeutique. Compte tenu des processus réels impliqués dans le traitement thérapeutique ou dans la formation de l'organisation thérapeutique, se référer à ce type de simplification mytho-linguistique ne mène nulle part ailleurs que dans l'abîme de la spéculation. Il est crucial de comprendre que l'important réside dans le message ainsi que dans l'objet porteur et la base de ce message (Guattari 1972).

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<sup>3</sup> Ici, on peut faire un détour et remarquer un certain parallélisme entre ce dont je discute maintenant et les idées du psychanalyste Massoud Khan, un proche élève de Donald Winnicott. Massoud Khan (Khan 1975) observe que le même analysant peut donner des impressions complètement différentes au cours de séances successives, parfois en désaccord avec la structure diagnostique présumée de l'analyste. Hahn explique cela en introduisant le concept de "facettes du Soi" : le sujet n'est pas unidimensionnel et homogène. Il se caractérise plutôt par une multiplicité de facettes qui se tournent vers l'analyste à différents moments de l'analyse. Lorsque nous parlons de l'interprétation "d'ici", il faut également parler de l'interprétation du transfert. Hahn ajoute très justement : l'analyste a lui aussi de nombreuses facettes de ce type. Je propose ici de développer un peu la pensée de Khan, d'y ajouter un élément dynamique. Je propose de changer le concept de facette en concept de plan subjectif. À l'intersection du plan subjectif de l'analyste et du plan subjectif de l'analysant, il y a un transfert et ce même " d'ici " dans lequel l'interprétation est possible. Cette intersection n'est pas permanente, les plans se déforment lorsqu'ils se croisent : l'interprétation contribue à l'émergence d'un nouveau mode de subjectivation.

Il importe peu que l'analyste soit bavard ou préfère demeurer silencieux, pourvu qu'il soit conscient de l'effet analytique de ses paroles et de ses actes. Il n'est pas si important à quelle source conceptuelle il puise pour nourrir une interprétation particulière, quelles règles il suit et celles qu'il modifie si nécessaire.

Aujourd'hui, il arrive fréquemment que les analystes privilégient la cohérence philosophique des leurs propres idées au détriment du matériel et du sujet. Certains ignorent même la souffrance de l'analysant ou du patient si elle ne correspond pas au dispositif philosophique du clinicien.<sup>4</sup> C'est en cela que *L'Anti-Œdipe* s'adresse aux cliniciens. Guattari pressentait déjà il y a cinquante ans le danger d'un « lacanisme » si imposant aujourd'hui. Dans les écrits de certains admirateurs de Lacan, la psychanalyse, qui est pourtant une discipline très proche de l'homme et de la substance du sujet, prend les traits d'une pratique ésotérique qui produit des fantômes conceptuels n'ayant qu'un rapport très indirect avec la réalité (mais qui ont, néanmoins, un lien avec elle, comme tous les fantasmes). La société psychanalytique devient alors une sorte d'hybride entre la loge maçonnique et le parti bolchévique. Les analystes français, qui s'opposent à cette tendance, ne se définissent pas comme « lacaniens » mais comme « psychanalystes avec Lacan », ou encore « freudiens avec Lacan ». Choisir la « schizoanalyse » comme orientation pour notre propre manière d'analyser, c'est créer les conditions nécessaires pour réaliser la créativité inhérente à cette pratique. Nous ne créons pas une nouvelle orthodoxie du « guattarisme », mais nous nous engageons dans un processus de devenir constant, devenir- « psychanalystes avec Guattari ». La schizoanalyse, lorsqu'elle rencontre le clinicien, ne parle pas du tout des analysants, mais plutôt s'adresse à l'analyste lui-même. Elle le déforme et, au cœur de cette déformation, génère une certaine position éthique (ou peut-être éthico-esthétique).

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<sup>4</sup> Je fais ici référence à la fois à des questions politiquement sensibles et controversées telles que l'homosexualité, la transsexualité et à des sujets apparemment classiques tels que la schizophrénie. Je suppose que cela est en dehors de la problématique de mon texte.

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## ***Devenir-psicoanalista con Guattari***

de GABRIEL MART

### **Abstract**

Encountered by a clinician, schizoanalysis does not speak about analysands at all. It addresses the analyst, it deforms him, and in this deformation it establishes a certain ethical (or ethico-esthetic, perhaps?) position. That, one may coin 'clinical schizoanalysis', is first and foremost a style, a perpetual deformation the analysts of freudian, kleinian or even lacanian background undergo. In order to make way for a subject, an analyst must be prepared to forfeit any previously established hypothesis he has of the analysand, no matter how appealing and coherent they may seem. Moreover, a schizoanalytic orientation demands an ability to forfeit said orientation as well. As one chooses schizoanalysis as an orientation in one's own analytic style, he establishes the condition for creativity to be fulfilled; one does not establish the new orthodoxy of 'guattarism', but engages in continuous becoming-'psychoanalyst with Guattari'. In this essay, I explore the possible sources and practical implications of how guattarian thought might be embraced by mainstream psychoanalytic clinicians today.

En este número, mis colegas abordan mucho el esquizoanálisis como disciplina, campo de experimentación y práctica de creatividad. Sin embargo, me gustaría ofrecer una perspectiva diferente al proponer reflexionar sobre el esquizoanálisis no como una disciplina particular, ni siquiera una orientación, una escuela, un "psicoanálisis guattariano", sino más bien como una orientación para el psicoanalista, el clínico, que define su propio estilo analítico individual.

De hecho, es imposible aprender de Guattari de la misma manera que se aprende de Dolto, Winnicott o Mannoni. A diferencia de los analistas que nos han dejado un corpus bastante abundante de casos clínicos muy detallados, Guattari, escritor prolífico que se mantuvo sobre todo como clínico durante la mayor parte de su vida adulta hasta su muerte, escribió muy poco sobre su trabajo clínico (Lacan tampoco). Aparte del famoso artículo sobre el caso R.A. (Guattari 1972), las ilustraciones clínicas de Guattari se dispersan aquí y allá en los actos de los seminarios que impartió en La Borde, en sus cuadernos de notas y en sus cartas. Todo esto, que da cuenta de su estilo analítico personal, parece poco aplicable con fines didácticos convencionales. Además, el psicoanálisis se resiste a la didáctica convencional. A diferencia de la educación en otras profesiones, la transmisión en psicoanálisis se basa en la deformación. La formación del analista se hace esencialmente a través de la deformación de sus ideas y creencias

existentes, en diálogo con la disciplina y sus colegas. Esta formación es específica del inconsciente del analista y, por lo tanto, es análoga al inconsciente: es dinámica, perpetua y sin punto final (me remito aquí a las ideas del psicoanalista Vincent Perdigon de la Federación de Talleres de Psicoanálisis (Gaucher ; Perdigon, 2007)). Es de esto de lo que quiero discutir aquí: del potencial deformante y mutante del pensamiento guattariano para el psicoanalista. Esto parece estar en perfecta consonancia con el espíritu del esquizoanálisis como práctica clínica. Lo que se podría llamar "esquizoanálisis clínico" es, ante todo, un estilo, una deformación en curso, que los analistas de origen freudiano, kleiniano o incluso lacaniano soportan. Más aún, a diferencia de la idea recibida, Guattari mismo es ajeno al negativismo; todo el carácter de su programa reside, por el contrario, en la creatividad.

Antes de empezar a abordar las posibles implicaciones de esta orientación, quiero aclarar algunos puntos clave de la práctica psicoanalítica que son pertinentes en el contexto actual. En 2003, en Francia, cuando el psicoanálisis estaba fuertemente amenazado por la opresión del Estado, se formó un "grupo de contacto" para oponerse. Este grupo de analistas reúne, según su propia definición, a los "freudianos franceses" (Sociedad Psicoanalítica de París, Asociación Psicoanalítica de Francia, 4º Grupo) y los "freudianos franceses con Lacan"<sup>1</sup> (Espacio Analítico, Sociedad de Psicoanálisis Freudiano, Movimiento Cout Freudien, Asociación Freudiana Internacional, Fundación Europea de Psicoanálisis, etc.). Dentro de sus actividades, el Grupo de Contacto propuso varios puntos<sup>2</sup> de definición del psicoanálisis. Los tres primeros se refieren a los conceptos fundamentales, mientras que el cuarto y el quinto tratan directamente los aspectos metodológicos de la práctica clínica. Son estos últimos los que más llaman mi atención en el marco de mis reflexiones:

El psicoanálisis busca - sin ninguna voluntad de adaptación a algún modelo preestablecido - eliminar tanto como sea posible cualquier sugerencia. (Bernard n.d)

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<sup>1</sup> Es importante señalar que en este escrito no se aborda el concepto de lacanismo o "análisis lacaniano". Los fundamentos problemáticos e ideológicos de dicho concepto merecen un estudio aparte.

<sup>2</sup> 1) El psicoanálisis es una exploración de procesos mentales inaccesibles de otra forma, y un método terapéutico basado en el descubrimiento de Freud y su enriquecimiento, así como en la extensión de su campo de aplicación; 2) La referencia al inconsciente y al transferencia es esencial y excluye a aquellos que no han tenido experiencia personal en el diván; 3) El psicoanálisis incluye prácticas de variaciones de tratamiento adaptadas a la organización psíquica de ciertos pacientes; 4) El psicoanálisis se diferencia de otros métodos psicológicos y psicoterapéuticos porque, en lugar de utilizar la transferencia, privilegia su interpretación, buscando eliminar cualquier tipo de sugestión sin la intención de adaptarse a ningún modelo previamente establecido; 5) Como consecuencia lógica de estos principios, se requiere un marco de tratamiento en relación con la ética psicoanalítica, que exige al practicante una neutralidad y confidencialidad integradas a la técnica misma del psicoanálisis.

Es en esta parte de la definición donde encuentro una oportunidad para situar una orientación "guattariana" para el psicoanalista. Antes de abordar las deformaciones que el contacto con Guattari puede provocar en el psicoanalista, especialmente en lo que respecta a su estilo analítico personal, explicaré el contenido de este elemento.

El psicoanálisis es un método de investigación de los procesos mentales y un método terapéutico que se ejerce principalmente a través de la práctica de la palabra. El analista crea, mediante una posición de escucha específica, un espacio para la palabra y para la subjetivación de su analizante. Se trata de un espacio donde se puede depositar lo que ha sido reprimido y superarlo, para encontrar nuevos modos de subjetivación o, como dice Jean-Pierre Winter, psicoanalista francés, "recordar para finalmente olvidar" (Winter, 2019).

Jacques Lacan decía, bromeando, que se podía imaginar un analista mudo, pero no un analista sordo. El analista debe escuchar al analizante y, de vez en cuando, hacer un comentario. Sin embargo, las palabras del analista forman en realidad parte de la escucha: la interpretación no tiene como objetivo explicar algo al analizante, transmitirle un conocimiento sobre sí mismo o conformarse a un modelo que el analista quiera imponer, sino precisamente lo contrario. La interpretación, a través de preguntas, puntuaciones y la creación de equívocos, así como por la introducción de rupturas en el tejido discursivo del analizante, crea un espacio en el que es posible inocular algo nuevo. La interpretación abre la posibilidad de co-producir un nuevo territorio para el sujeto.

La manera y el momento en que un analista da su interpretación son uno de los aspectos más visibles y evidentes del estilo analítico personal de un clínico. El analista francés Paul Denis planteó una hipótesis a medias: los clínicos cuyo analista era "hablador" y daba muchas interpretaciones tienden a volverse más taciturnos para no decir demasiadas cosas inapropiadas (Denis, 2015). Tal vez existe tal tendencia. Sin embargo, me parece útil señalar otro aspecto de la observación sobre el analista "hablador". Al seguir siendo psicoanalista, freudiano o kleiniano, el analista puede usar el "esquizoanálisis" para orientar su estilo de trabajo personal. Para dar espacio al sujeto, hay que estar dispuesto a abandonar sus antiguas hipótesis sobre el analizante, por finas y bellas que puedan parecer. Para evitar cualquier restricción, sugerencia o adaptación a un modelo preestablecido, hay que poder renunciar no solo a los modelos extrínsecos (como los clichés sociales o teóricos psicoanalíticos), sino también a aquel que ya no parece ser extrínseco, aquel que se formó durante este análisis particular con este mismo analizante. Una interpretación que estimula la subjetivación, que tiene un efecto analítico, solo es posible a partir de "aquí", de la posición en la que se encuentra el analizante en este momento particular y a quien se dirige allí. De la transferencia.<sup>3</sup> No del "Edipo", del

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<sup>3</sup> Aquí podemos tomar un desvío y notar cierto paralelismo entre lo que discuto ahora y las ideas del psicoanalista Masud Khan, cercano alumno de Donald Winnicott. Khan (1975) observa que el

"allí" de la teoría analítica general o de aquella sobre el sujeto, sobre el analizante, que el analista se ha construido durante el trabajo. De lo contrario, el analista forma parte de la neurosis del analizante al sumergirse demasiado en el contenido del discurso. Y cuando se sumerge en el "Edipo", pierde todo contacto con la sustancia subjetiva.

En cuanto al "psicoanalista con Guattari", es necesario dar un paso más. La orientación "esquizoanalítica" para el psicoanalista no se limita a la orientación hacia los procesos de subjetivación en lugar del contenido del discurso. No se trata solo de la capacidad de renunciar a sus hipótesis sobre el analizante o a los conceptos y esquemas establecidos aprendidos durante el instituto psicoanalítico. ¡También se trata de la capacidad de renunciar a la propia orientación! Lo que hace Guattari, no solo en Anti-Edipo, sino también antes y después, no es un nihilismo sistemático, sino más bien una capacidad positiva para realizar esta dolorosa operación de renuncia a los esquemas aprendidos y muy queridos en el corazón de cada analista. Se trata de elegir en favor de lo que es adecuado y relevante para la situación analítica particular en ese momento. El esquizoanálisis no es un proyecto para enterrar a Freud. Guattari mismo no niega a Freud, ni la castración, ni el componente familiar en el desarrollo psicológico del joven sujeto. Cuando es apropiado para el material, Guattari mismo regresa a Freud e incluso al Edipo (por ejemplo, ver el seminario "Sobre un sueño: Systruc" (Guattari 1984), donde Guattari analiza su propio sueño). En su comentario sobre el caso de R.A. en "Psicoanálisis y transversalidad", Guattari lamenta el mal uso del Edipo por parte de los analistas: sería ilusorio pensar que hay algo que leer en el orden del ser o en el orden del mundo perdido. Del mismo modo, sería vano pensar que la reconstrucción del ser mítico, más allá de cualquier origen histórico, pueda ser institucionalizada como propedéutica, psicoanalítica o como mayemática. Dados los procesos reales implicados en el tratamiento terapéutico o en la formación de la organización terapéutica, referirse a este tipo de simplificación mitolingüística no lleva a ninguna parte más que al abismo de la especulación. Es crucial comprender que lo importante radica en el mensaje, así como en el objeto portador y la base de este mensaje. (Guattari 1972)

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mismo analizante puede dar impresiones completamente diferentes en sesiones sucesivas, a veces en desacuerdo con la estructura diagnóstica presupuesta por el analista. Khahn explica esto introduciendo el concepto de "facetas del Yo": el sujeto no es unidimensional ni homogéneo, sino que se caracteriza por una multiplicidad de facetas que se vuelven hacia el analista en diferentes momentos del análisis. Al hablar de la interpretación "aquí", también debemos hablar de la interpretación de la transferencia. Hahn agrega muy acertadamente: el analista también tiene muchas facetas de este tipo. Propongo aquí desarrollar un poco el pensamiento de Khan y agregar un elemento dinámico. Propongo cambiar el concepto de faceta por el concepto de plano subjetivo. En la intersección del plano subjetivo del analista y el plano subjetivo del analizante, hay una transferencia y ese mismo "aquí" en el que la interpretación es posible. Esta intersección no es permanente, los planos se deforman cuando se cruzan: la interpretación contribuye a la emergencia de un nuevo modo de subjetivación.



No importa si el analista es hablador o prefiere permanecer en silencio, siempre y cuando sea consciente del efecto analítico de sus palabras y acciones. No es primordial saber de qué fuente conceptual se nutre para formular una interpretación particular, siempre y cuando siga las reglas establecidas y las adapte si es necesario.

En la actualidad, es frecuente que los analistas den prioridad a sus propias ideas en detrimento del material y del sujeto, debido a su coherencia filosófica. Incluso algunos ignoran el sufrimiento del analizante o del paciente si no se ajusta a la concepción filosófica del clínico<sup>4</sup>. Es aquí donde "Anti-Edipo" habla a los clínicos. Hace cincuenta años, Guattari ya percibía el peligro de un "lacanismo", hoy en día es tan imperante. En los escritos de algunos seguidores de Lacan, el psicoanálisis, que es una disciplina muy cercana al hombre y a la sustancia del sujeto, adopta los rasgos de una práctica esotérica que produce fantasmas conceptuales que tienen una relación muy indirecta con la realidad (pero que, sin embargo, tienen algún vínculo con ella, como todos los fantasmas). La sociedad psicoanalítica se convierte entonces en una especie de híbrido entre la logia masónica y el partido bolchevique. Los analistas franceses, que se oponen a esta tendencia, no se definen como "lacanianos" sino como "psicoanalistas con Lacan", o incluso como "freudianos con Lacan". Elegir el "esquizoanálisis" como orientación para nuestra propia manera de analizar, es crear las condiciones necesarias para llevar a cabo la creatividad inherente a esta práctica. No creamos una nueva ortodoxia del "guattarismo", sino que nos comprometemos en un proceso de constante devenir como "psicoanalistas con Guattari". El esquizoanálisis, cuando se encuentra con el clínico, no se dirige directamente a los analizantes, sino más bien al analista mismo. Lo deforma y, en el corazón de esta deformación, genera una cierta posición ética, incluso ético-estética.

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<sup>4</sup> Aquí hago referencia tanto a cuestiones políticamente sensibles y controvertidas como la homosexualidad y la transexualidad, como a temas aparentemente clásicos como la esquizofrenia. Supongo que esto está fuera del alcance de la problemática de mi texto.

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### **Abstract**

Encountered by a clinician, schizoanalysis does not speak about analysands at all. It addresses the analyst, it deforms him, and in this deformation it establishes a certain ethical (or ethico-esthetic, perhaps?) position. That one may coin 'clinical schizoanalysis' is first and foremost a style, a perpetual deformation the analysts of freudian, kleinian or even lacanian background undergo. In order to make way for a subject, an analyst must be prepared to forfeit any previously established hypothesis he has of the analysand, no matter how appealing and coherent they may seem. Moreover, a schizoanalytic orientation demands an ability to forfeit said orientation as well. As one chooses schizoanalysis as an orientation in one's own analytic style, he establishes the condition for creativity to be fulfilled; one does not establish the new orthodoxy of 'guattarism', but engages in continuous becoming-'psychoanalyst with Guattari'. In this essay, I explore the possible sources and practical implications of how guattarian thought might be embraced by mainstream psychoanalytic clinicians today.

In questo numero, i miei colleghi si occupano molto della schizoanalisi come disciplina, campo di sperimentazione e pratica creativa. Tuttavia, vorrei offrire una prospettiva diversa proponendo di riflettere sulla schizoanalisi non come una particolare disciplina, né tantomeno un dottrina, una scuola o una "psicoanalisi guattariana", ma piuttosto come un orientamento per lo psicoanalista, il clinico, che definisce il proprio stile analitico individuale.

Infatti, non è possibile imparare da Guattari allo stesso modo in cui si impara da Dolto, da Winnicott o da Mannoni. A differenza degli analisti che ci hanno lasciato un corpus abbastanza ampio di casi clinici molto dettagliati, Guattari è un prolifico scrittore che è rimasto soprattutto clinico per la maggior parte della sua vita adulta, fino alla sua morte - ha scritto molto poco sul suo lavoro clinico (così come Lacan, del resto). Oltre al celebre articolo sul caso di R.A. (Guattari 1972), gli esempi clinici di Guattari sono disseminati qua e là negli atti dei seminari che ha tenuto a La Borde, nei suoi taccuini e nelle sue lettere. Tutto questo, che dà conto del suo stile analitico personale, sembra poco applicabile per fini didattici convenzionali. Inoltre, la psicoanalisi si oppone alla didattica convenzionale. A differenza dell'istruzione in altre professioni, c'è una trasmissione analitica. La formazione (che rende molto meglio conto del gioco di segni implicato in questo processo) dell'analista avviene essenzialmente attraverso la deformazione delle sue idee e delle sue

credenze esistenti, in dialogo con la disciplina e i suoi colleghi. Questa formazione è quella del suo inconscio e, di conseguenza, questa deformazione è analoga all'inconscio: è dinamica, perpetua e senza punto finale (mi conformo qui alle idee dello psicoanalista Vincent Perdigon della Federazione degli Atelier di Psicoanalisi (Gaucher; Perdigon 2007)). È di questo che voglio discutere qui: del potenziale deformante e mutante del pensiero guattariano per lo psicoanalista. Ciò sembra completamente in accordo con lo spirito della schizoanalisi come pratica clinica. Quello che si potrebbe chiamare "schizoanalisi clinica" è prima di tutto uno stile, una deformazione in corso, che gli analisti di origine freudiana, kleiniana o persino lacaniana subiscono. Inoltre, a differenza dell'idea comune, Guattari stesso è estraneo al negativismo; tutto il carattere del suo programma risiede nell'inverso, nella creatività.

Prima di iniziare ad affrontare le possibili implicazioni di questa prospettiva, desidero precisare alcuni punti chiave della pratica psicoanalitica che sono pertinenti nel contesto del mio saggio. Nel 2003, in Francia, mentre la psicoanalisi era fortemente minacciata dall'oppressione dello Stato, si formò un Gruppo di contatto per opporvisi. Questo gruppo di analisti riuniva, secondo la loro stessa definizione, i "freudiani francesi" (Società Psicoanalitica di Parigi, Associazione Psicoanalitica di Francia, 4° Gruppo) e i "freudiani francesi con Lacan"<sup>1</sup> (Spazio analitico, Società di Psicoanalisi Freudiana, Movimento Cout Freudien, Associazione Freudiana Internazionale, Fondazione europea per la psicoanalisi, ecc.). Nel contesto delle proprie attività, il Gruppo di contatto ha proposto diversi punti<sup>2</sup> di definizione della psicoanalisi. I primi tre riguardano i concetti fondamentali, mentre il quarto e il quinto trattano direttamente gli aspetti metodologici della pratica clinica. Sono questi ultimi che attirano maggiormente la mia attenzione nel contesto delle mie riflessioni:

La psicoanalisi cerca - senza alcuna volontà di adattamento a qualche modello predefinito - di eliminare il più possibile ogni suggerimento. (Bernard s.d.)

È in questa parte della definizione della psicoanalisi che trovo un'occasione per situare un orientamento "guattariano" per lo psicoanalista. Prima di affrontare gli effetti delle

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<sup>1</sup> Occorre notare che qui non verrà articolato il concetto di lacanismo o di "analisi lacaniana". I fondamenti problematici ed ideologici di tale concetto meritano uno studio distinto.

<sup>2</sup> 1) La psicoanalisi è un'indagine sui processi mentali altrimenti inaccessibili e un metodo terapeutico che si fonda sulla scoperta freudiana, arricchita ed estesa, nonché sull'estensione del suo campo di applicazione; 2) Il riferimento all'inconscio e al transfert è indispensabile ed esclude qualsiasi formazione per chi non ha vissuto personalmente l'esperienza sul divano; 3) La psicoanalisi comprende la pratica di varianti della cura adattate all'organizzazione psichica di alcuni pazienti; 4) La psicoanalisi si distingue da tutti gli altri metodi psicologici e psicoterapeutici poiché, privilegiando l'interpretazione del transfert invece di utilizzarlo, cerca - senza alcuna volontà di adattamento a qualsiasi modello preconfezionato - di eliminare, il più possibile, qualsiasi suggerimento; 5) Come logica conseguenza di questi principi, emerge la necessità di un quadro della cura in relazione all'etica psicoanalitica, che richiede dal professionista una neutralità e una riservatezza che si confondono con la tecnica stessa della psicoanalisi.

deformazioni che il contatto con Guattari può apportare allo psicoanalista - in particolare per quanto riguarda il suo stile analitico personale - spiegherò il contenuto di questo elemento.

La psicoanalisi rappresenta una metodologia d'indagine dei processi mentali nonché una terapia che si avvale principalmente della pratica della parola. L'analista, mediante una specifica posizione d'ascolto, crea uno spazio dedicato alla parola e alla soggettivazione dell'analizzando, un luogo in cui è possibile depositare ciò che è stato represso e superarlo, al fine di scoprire nuovi modi di soggettivazione o, come sostiene il noto psicoanalista francese Jean-Pierre Winter, "ricordare per poter finalmente dimenticare" (Winter 2019).

Jacques Lacan, scherzando, affermava che si poteva immaginare un analista muto, ma non sordo. L'analista ascolta l'analizzando e, di tanto in tanto, interviene con qualche parola o commento. Tuttavia, le parole dell'analista fanno effettivamente parte dell'ascolto: l'interpretazione non ha lo scopo di spiegare qualcosa all'analizzando, di trasmettergli una conoscenza di sé, o di conformarsi a un modello che l'analista vuole imporre, bensì precisamente il contrario. L'interpretazione, attraverso interrogativi, pause e creazione di ambiguità, nonché mediante l'introduzione di fratture nel tessuto del discorso dell'analizzando, crea uno spazio in cui è possibile introdurre qualcosa di nuovo. L'interpretazione apre la possibilità di co-produrre un nuovo territorio per il soggetto.

La modalità e il momento in cui un analista fornisce la sua interpretazione sono uno degli aspetti più visibili e evidenti dello stile analitico personale di un clinico. L'analista francese Paul Denis ha avanzato un'ipotesi incerta: i clinici il cui analista era "loquace" e forniva molte interpretazioni tendono a diventare più taciturni per evitare di dire cose inappropriate (Denis 2015). Forse esiste tale tendenza... Tuttavia, mi sembra utile sottolineare un altro aspetto dell'osservazione riguardante l'analista "loquace". Mantenendosi come psicanalista freudiano o kleiniano, ecc., l'analista può utilizzare la "schizoanalisi" per orientare il suo stile di lavoro personale. Al fine di dare spazio al soggetto, è necessario essere pronti ad abbandonare le proprie vecchie ipotesi sull'analizzando, per quanto sottili e belle possano apparire. Per evitare ogni costrizione, suggerimento o adattamento a un modello predefinito, è necessario essere in grado di rinunciare non solo ai modelli estrinseci (come i cliché sociali o i modelli teorici psicoanalitici), ma anche a quello che non sembra più essere estrinseco, ossia, a ciò che si è formato durante quell'analisi particolare con lo stesso analizzando. Un'interpretazione che stimola la soggettivazione, che ha un effetto analitico, è possibile solo a partire dal "qui", dalla posizione in cui si trova l'analizzando in quel momento particolare nel quale ci si sta rivolgendo a lui. Del transfert.<sup>3</sup> Non di "Edipo", del "là" della teoria analitica

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<sup>3</sup> Qui, si può fare una digressione e notare un certo parallelismo tra ciò di cui sto discutendo e le idee dello psicoanalista Masud Khan, un allievo di Donald Winnicott a lui molto vicino. Masud Khan (1975) osserva che lo stesso paziente può dare impressioni completamente diverse durante sedute successive, talvolta in contrasto con la struttura diagnostica presupposta dall'analista. Khan spiega questo introducendo il

generale o di quella sul soggetto, sull'analizzando, che l'analista si è costruito durante il lavoro. Altrimenti, l'analista, immergendosi troppo nel contenuto del discorso, entra a far parte della nevrosi dell'analizzando. E quando si immerge nell'"Edipo", perde ogni contatto con la sostanza soggettiva.

Inoltre, per quanto riguarda lo "psicoanalista con Guattari", è necessario fare un ulteriore passo avanti. L'orientamento "schizoanalitico" per lo psicoanalista non si limita all'orientamento verso i processi di soggettivazione anziché verso il contenuto del discorso. Non si tratta solo della capacità di rinunciare alle proprie ipotesi sull'analizzando o ai concetti e schemi stabiliti appresi durante i corsi all'istituto psicoanalitico. È anche la capacità di rinunciare all'orientamento stesso! Ciò che fa Guattari, non solo in *L'Anti-Edipo*, ma anche prima e dopo, non è applicare un nichilismo sistematico, ma piuttosto una capacità positiva di effettuare una tale dolorosa operazione di rinuncia a schemi appresi e molto cari al cuore di ogni analista.

Si tratta di scegliere ciò che è adeguato e pertinente per la situazione analitica particolare in quel momento. La schizoanalisi non è un progetto di sepoltura di Freud. Lo stesso Guattari non nega né Freud, né la castrazione, né la componente familiare nello sviluppo psichico del giovane soggetto. Quando appropriato per il materiale, Guattari stesso ritorna a Freud e persino ad Edipo (ad esempio, vedere il seminario Su un sogno: Systruc (Guattari 1984), dove Guattari analizza il proprio sogno). Nel suo commento sul caso di R.A. in *Psicoanalisi e transversalità*, Guattari deplora il cattivo uso di Edipo da parte degli analisti: sarebbe illusorio pensare che ci sia qualcosa da leggere nell'ordine dell'essere o nell'ordine del mondo perduto. Allo stesso modo, sarebbe vano pensare che la ricostruzione dell'essere mitico, al di là di ogni origine storica, possa essere istituzionalizzata come propedeutica psicoanalitica o come una maieutica. Dati i processi reali implicati nel trattamento terapeutico o nella formazione dell'organizzazione terapeutica, fare riferimento a questo tipo di semplificazione mito-linguistica non porta da nessuna parte se non all'abisso della speculazione. È cruciale capire che l'importante risiede nel messaggio, così come nell'oggetto portatore e nella base di questo messaggio (Guattari 1972).

Non importa se l'analista sia loquace o preferisca rimanere silenzioso, purché sia consapevole dell'effetto analitico delle sue parole e delle sue azioni. Non è così importante da quale fonte concettuale attinge per nutrire un'interpretazione particolare, quali regole segue e quali modifica se necessario.

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concetto di "sfaccettature del Sé": il soggetto non è unidimensionale e omogeneo. Si caratterizza piuttosto per una molteplicità di sfaccettature che si rivolgono all'analista in momenti diversi dell'analisi. Quando parliamo dell'interpretazione "da qui", dobbiamo anche parlare dell'interpretazione del transfert. Khan aggiunge con grande acume: anche l'analista ha molte sfaccettature di questo tipo. Qui propongo di sviluppare un po' il pensiero di Khan, di aggiungervi un elemento dinamico. Propongo di cambiare il concetto di sfaccettatura in concetto di piano soggettivo. All'intersezione del piano soggettivo dell'analista e del piano soggettivo del paziente c'è un transfert, e questo stesso "da qui" in cui l'interpretazione è possibile. Questa intersezione non è permanente, i piani si deformano quando si incontrano: l'interpretazione contribuisce all'emergere di un nuovo modo di soggettivazione.

Oggi, è frequente che gli analisti privilegino la coerenza filosofica delle proprie idee a discapito del materiale e del soggetto. Alcuni ignorano addirittura la sofferenza dell'analizzando o del paziente se non corrisponde al dispositivo filosofico del clinico.<sup>4</sup> È per questo che *L'Anti-Edipo* si rivolge ai clinici. Guattari aveva già intuito cinquant'anni fa il pericolo di un "lacanismo" oggi così imperante. Nei testi di alcuni ammiratori di Lacan, la psicoanalisi, pur essendo una disciplina molto vicina all'uomo e alla sostanza del soggetto, assume i tratti di una pratica esoterica che produce fantasmi concettuali con un rapporto molto indiretto con la realtà (ma che hanno comunque un legame con essa, come tutti i fantasmi). La società psicoanalitica diventa così una sorta di ibrido tra la loggia massonica e il partito bolscevico. Gli analisti francesi che si oppongono a questa tendenza non si definiscono come "lacaniani", ma come "psicoanalisti con Lacan", o ancora "freudiani con Lacan". Scegliere la "schizoanalisi" come orientamento per il nostro modo di analizzare significa creare le condizioni necessarie per realizzare la creatività insita in questa pratica. Non creiamo una nuova ortodossia del "guattarismo", ma ci impegniamo in un processo di costante divenire, di diventare "psicoanalisti con Guattari". La schizoanalisi, quando incontra il clinico, non parla affatto degli analizzandi, ma si rivolge all'analista stesso. Lo deforma e, al centro di questa deformazione, genera una certa posizione etica (o forse etico-estetica).

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<sup>4</sup> Faccio qui riferimento sia a questioni politicamente sensibili e controverse come l'omosessualità, la transessualità, sia a soggetti apparentemente classici come la schizofrenia. Suppongo che ciò esuli dalla problematica del mio testo.

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## ***La rencontre d'un philosophe et d'un militant politique psychanalyste grâce à une machine à écrire***

par ANNE QUERRIEN

### **Abstract**

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of *Anti-Œdipus*, it is important to acknowledge the pivotal role played by Fanny Deleuze, who typed for Gilles the proliferating texts sent by Félix, which have since been published in *The Anti-Œdipus Papers*. These texts outline the main concepts presented in *Anti-Œdipus*. The political choice, both revolutionary and constructivist, the option of the machinic to get out of the structuralist impotence, lead Guattari to propose a new conception of the unconscious, crossed by "desiring machines". He and Gilles Deleuze revisit the history of humanity, which they conceive as a war between nomadism and sedentariness, for which they hope for new forms of social and family relations. Under the name of schizoanalysis they invite a new way of conducting analysis, more collective than specular, by calling upon history, economics and literature.

La rencontre de Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari, et leur tandem, Deleuze Guattari, la puissance de ce tandem, n'ont pas cessé d'étonner.

Avant leur rencontre Gilles Deleuze était un professeur de philosophie très brillant, au lycée puis à l'université, qui a profondément marqué les élèves qui ont eu la chance de suivre ses cours.

Félix Guattari, fils de petit industriel, mais camarade de classe de jeunes communistes, commence à militer très jeune dans les organisations communistes. Il est influencé par son professeur de sciences naturelles Fernand Oury, qui pratique la méthode pédagogique Freinet, qui vise à produire la solidarité entre les élèves au lieu de la compétition, notamment en fabriquant un journal de classe ou d'école, en faisant des enquêtes à l'extérieur de l'école etc... Fernand Oury le fait adhérer au Mouvement des Auberges de jeunesse, où il rencontre Jean Oury, de six ans son aîné.

C'est Jean Oury qui suscite son intérêt pour la philosophie, pour la psychiatrie, pour les productions artistiques de certains fous. En 1951, il rejoint Jean Oury à la clinique psychiatrique de Saumery dont Jean est devenu directeur en 1949. Ils discutent tous les deux de longues soirées de leur désir de transformer le monde et la psychiatrie. En 1953 Jean Oury, las d'attendre de l'administration les moyens matériels qu'il demande pour

travailler, part avec patients et soignants fonder un nouveau lieu : ce sera la clinique de La Borde.

Félix Guattari a vécu entre La Borde et Paris. À La Borde il s'occupe de l'organisation du travail, de l'ouverture de cette clinique sans murs rendue attractive par plein d'ateliers faits avec des amis extérieurs ; il s'occupe aussi des négociations avec la Sécurité sociale pour inscrire cette tentative dans un cadre économique public, et accessible financièrement aux patients. Jean Oury l'appelle affectueusement son « ministre des affaires extérieures ».

Avec ses amis de l'Union des étudiants communistes, Félix Guattari mène une réflexion théorique et politique marxiste, critique des développements autoritaires de l'Union soviétique, et de la manière dont le Parti communiste français les justifie au nom du socialisme réel. Il critique aussi l'absence de solidarité avec la révolution algérienne, et pratique cette solidarité avec ceux qu'on appelle « les porteurs de valise » ( les militants français qui transportent des tracts ou des armes pour la révolution algérienne). Des militants algériens sont pensionnaires à La Borde

À la fin de la guerre d'Algérie les mouvements de gauche qui avaient soutenu la révolution algérienne ne voient plus quoi faire en France d'autre que soutenir les tentatives communistes dans le monde : Union soviétique, Chine, Cuba, bientôt Vénézuéla. Félix Guattari leur propose une autre perspective politique : élaborer des projets révolutionnaires dans tous les domaines de la vie quotidienne, élaborer des possibilités pour le prolétariat de participer à toutes les activités culturelles, abolir la distance entre intellectuels, ouvriers, et paysans, soit reprendre la ligne révolutionnaire de 1917. Une organisation est fondée dans cette perspective : la FGRI, Fédération des groupes d'études, de recherches, institutionnelles, en référence à la démarche d'Oury dite de psychothérapie institutionnelle.

La participation de Guattari à la clinique de La Borde et son compagnonnage avec Jean Oury l'ont conduit à fréquenter Jacques Lacan, et même à devenir son analysant pendant une dizaine d'années de 1960 à 1970.

Jacques Lacan lui demande en 1969 de faire une note de lecture sur le dernier livre de Gilles Deleuze, *Logique du sens*, qui semble aux élèves de Lacan une poursuite de l'œuvre de ce dernier. Mais la lecture de ce livre et de *Différence et Répétition* du même Deleuze inspire à Guattari un nouvel ordre de réflexion. Ce qui le frappe c'est que Deleuze établit des séries hétérogènes qui sont reliées par un troisième terme qui les entraîne toutes les deux comme une machine. Deleuze en parlant de littérature, en faisant de la philosophie, montre en fonctionnement des « machines désirantes ». La note de lecture se transforme en un texte théorique intitulé « machine et structure » où Guattari développe sa critique, très deleuzienne, de la recherche de structures, de répétitions par les structuralistes et les lacaniens, une recherche qui ferme les situations à l'histoire et à la transformation.

Quand Guattari apporte son texte à la revue de Lacan, *Scilicet*, le gendre de Lacan lui explique qu'il est sorti des limites du lacanisme et qu'il n'est pas question de publier ce texte dans la revue de l'école lacanienne.

Au même moment Gilles Deleuze, épuisé par la sortie d'une salve de livres plus importants les uns que les autres, n'arrive pas à se remettre au travail. L'un de ses anciens élèves, Jean Pierre Muyard, devenu psychiatre à La Borde, conseille à Félix Guattari d'aller le voir. Félix arrive avec son texte *Machine et structure*, qui séduit Deleuze immédiatement. Ce texte faisait le pas dont il avait besoin pour rebondir, sortait de l'impasse de la structure, dont Deleuze, auteur de la rubrique « Structuralisme » dans *l'Encyclopédia Universalis* avait été un des meilleurs introducteurs dans la pensée française. Deleuze propose à Guattari de lui écrire tout ce qui lui passe par la tête. Sa femme Fanny tapera les lettres à la machine d'où mon titre, mettant en valeur, cette première forme de la machine à écrire, le rôle de la femme de Deleuze dans leur agencement.

En janvier 2005 paraissent *Les écrits pour l'Anti-Œdipe* mis en forme par le jeune psychiatre Stéphane Nadaud à partir des textes de Guattari retrouvés dans ses archives. On s'aperçoit tout d'un coup que la plupart des idées mises en œuvre dans *L'Anti-Œdipe* sont jetées dans ces papiers, de façon parfois contradictoire, tel un magma en fusion, que l'écriture de Deleuze a réussi à canaliser, à ordonner, à transformer en une machine de guerre contre la psychanalyse et la famille.

On prend tout d'un coup conscience du fait que cet arrangement à trois Gilles, Félix, Fanny est une véritable machine à écrire, l'agencement par celle qui frappe à la machine de deux séries de pensées hétérogènes : celle appuyée sur les textes littéraires et philosophiques, celle construite à partir de la fréquentation des organisations communistes mixée avec la construction au jour le jour d'un lieu d'accueil pour la folie. Comme le disent Deleuze et Guattari dans *Mille plateaux* ils n'ont pas écrit à deux, mais à beaucoup, prenant les idées chez les amis au fur et à mesure qu'elles se présentent, les transformant en armes contre l'inertie sociale et politique, la régression en France après 68.

### **Les machines désirantes**

Guattari propose donc à Deleuze une vision de l'inconscient et de son traitement bien différente de celle élaborée par Freud à partir de son auto-analyse. Au lieu de remonter les associations d'idées qui se pressent sur le divan jusqu'aux souvenirs d'enfance, ces associations d'idées vont être suivies dans ce qu'elles désignent d'objets partiels non seulement dans l'expérience récente, mais aussi dans les investissements, les choix d'avenir.

Il y a dans le travail analytique de Guattari une inversion du temps, une orientation délibérée vers le futur, vers l'action libre, vers l'appartenance à des groupes nouveaux à créer ou à rencontrer. J'ai fait partie du groupe de schizoanalyse qu'il avait créé peu de temps après la parution de *L'Anti-Œdipe* pour accueillir les personnes qui venaient lui demander conseil pour sortir de leurs blocages existentiels. Tant qu'il s'agissait d'organiser de nouvelles activités, ces groupes ont marché ; mais ils n'ont pas pu traiter les problèmes conjugaux et familiaux qui sont le lot habituel de la psychanalyse.

Côté Deleuze cette vision productrice de l'inconscient, cet usage machinique des associations d'idées, permet de mobiliser tous les souvenirs de lecture littéraires et philosophiques, dans de nouveaux agencements créateurs.

L'inconscient machinique est fait de flux coupés ce qui engendre une nouvelle force comme dans la machine à vapeur. Deleuze aimait à dire que la première machine était formée par le sein maternel et la bouche du bébé qui en extrayait le lait, et trouvait dans cette opération de quoi grandir. Une image qui n'est pas loin de la force dégagée par le piston d'une machine à vapeur. À partir de là tout ce qui coule, et offre la potentialité d'être coupé par un mécanisme de transformation est bon à prendre comme exemple de machine.

Deleuze et Guattari insistent sur le caractère hétérogène des flux agencés par la machine : le capital consiste par exemple en l'agencement d'un flux d'êtres humains, les travailleurs, avec un flux d'argent qui s'incarne dans les machines qui vont exploiter le flux de travailleurs. La puissance du dispositif tient à l'hétérogénéité des deux flux mis en relation de production par la machine.

Deleuze ajoute à l'idée de machine celle de corps sans organes, idée que je n'ai jamais réussi à m'approprier vraiment pour l'instant. Le désir a une surface d'enregistrement, illimitée parce qu'en forme d'œuf, et le désir est adjacent aux machines qui l'emportent vers cet œuf. Alors que Deleuze appuie sa réflexion sur le texte d'Artaud, qui introduit précisément cette notion de corps sans organes, Guattari reste plus sensible aux délires qui émergent dans la clinique, et qui font dire à l'écrivain tous les noms de l'histoire c'est moi.

Le désir complètement différent du besoin, sexuel notamment, emporte au loin, déterritorialise, y compris quand le déplacement est infinitésimal, comme dans la physique quantique. Deleuze et Guattari nous font sortir des dimensions habituelles de la philosophie qui poussent vers l'infiniment grand, l'héroïsme, la masculinité. L'infini qu'ils présentent est plutôt infinitésimal, mais jamais réductible à la stabilité. Apparemment le voyage se passe sur place, mais il est toujours en mouvement et il n'est rendu conscient que par les ratés qu'il occasionne, idée proche de l'analyse par Freud du mot d'esprit.

Dans l'histoire militante de Guattari, toute cette réflexion doit conduire à la constitution de groupes révolutionnaires capables de déjouer l'aliénation capitaliste. Cependant il note après Sartre que trop souvent les groupes sujets, orientés vers l'action,

pratiquant des rapports libres et égaux, se transforment en groupes assujettis, prisonniers de fantasmes de groupe qui les induisent en erreur.

## **Psychanalyse et familialisme**

Deleuze et Guattari critiquent avec véhémence la psychanalyse qui rabat toutes les situations sociales sur le triangle familial papa-maman-moi. Peut-on rassembler sous la figure du père autoritaire l'ensemble hiérarchisé des hommes qui font la guerre aux Vietnamiens et aux Algériens ? N'y a-t-il pas danger pour l'autorité et la hiérarchie quand ces hommes sont politiquement vaincus, quand leurs ennemis deviennent indépendants ? N'est-ce pas dans ces défaites que les soulèvements des années 60-70 puisent leur énergie ?

Guattari a été en analyse avec Lacan de 1960 à 1970. Tout ce qu'on sait par des analysants de ce dernier montre que sa pratique n'était pas du tout conforme à l'image donnée de la cure psychanalytique dans la dénonciation anti-œdipienne, sauf peut-être l'appétit de l'argent. Les années 60 et 70 voient l'éclosion de la pratique professionnelle de la psychologie, appelée au chevet des enfants et adolescents difficiles, mais aussi se risquant à traiter des difficultés conjugales et à résoudre les problèmes d'organisation des grandes entreprises, comme EDF par exemple, grâce à des recherches-actions de psychologie sociale.

Depuis 1947 l'Université délivre des licences de psychologie. À partir de 1956 la sociologie sort également de sa phase empirique pour entrer aussi à l'Université et se distinguer de la philosophie. Parallèlement Jacques Lacan commence à donner des séminaires, régulièrement à partir de 1953 à l'hôpital Sainte Anne puis à l'École normale supérieure.

Il bataille contre l'Egopsychology fondée aux États-Unis par son ancien analyste Rudolf Lowenstein. Jean Oury fait sa connaissance et celle de François Tosquelles auprès duquel il effectue son internat à Saint Alban en 1947. Il y a une riche activité intellectuelle professionnelle parisienne en marge de l'université, animée par des personnalités novatrices, qui ont l'oreille des médias et de la toute nouvelle Organisation mondiale de la santé.

Le texte de Deleuze et Guattari n'a cure de ces deux courants distincts de la psychiatrie. Le courant lacanien, malgré son prestige intellectuel, reste très minoritaire dans la pratique professionnelle. Absent de l'enseignement universitaire dominé par Daniel Lagache, il ne semble pas soucieux de peser sur la psychiatrie, et ne s'intéresse que de loin à la psychothérapie institutionnelle. Celle-ci n'est guère défendue par ce texte qui l'assimile à toutes « les techniques du soin », ce qui ne pouvait que choquer les amis de Guattari qui s'étaient attachés à l'instituer dans plusieurs hôpitaux. Dans ce brûlot Deleuze et Guattari font de l'écart à la norme, du dissensus politique, de la difficulté avec

la famille, le premier pas sur le chemin de la création littéraire ou artistique. Ce n'est évidemment pas en restant envers et contre tout un ou une bonne élève, un bon fils ou une bonne fille, qu'on affirme son désir, puisqu'on l'aliène manifestement à celui de l'école ou de ses parents.

Le complexe d'Œdipe est « un double bind », une injonction contradictoire, qui interdit d'aimer ses parents réellement tout en exigeant de les prendre comme modèles à aimer, ce qui condamne les enfants à l'impuissance, à la castration, ou à la transgression. Mais Deleuze et Guattari ouvrent cet amour à l'homosexualité encore pénalement réprimée à l'époque : l'amour et l'imitation peuvent autant se porter sur le même sexe que sur le sexe opposé. La sexualité n'a pas qu'une fonction reproductive, même si c'est celle que la prohibition de l'inceste met en avant. *L'Anti-Œdipe* paraît peu avant *Le désir homosexuel*, rédigé par Guy Hocquenghem, l'un des fondateurs du FHAR, Front homosexuel d'action révolutionnaire. Ce mouvement lutte pour l'alignement des droits des homosexuels sur ceux des autres citoyens, et surtout essaie de transversaliser l'ensemble des productions culturelles à partir de nouveaux regards pervers sur la sexualité. La revue *Recherches*, dirigée par Guattari, s'en fait l'écho dans son numéro 12 « Trois milliards de pervers, Grande encyclopédie des homosexualités » en 1973.

D'après Deleuze et Guattari, le délire schizo, si on veut bien y être attentif, ne pas le coincer dans le triangle œdipien ou sous des stéréotypes, décrit un double voyage historique, géographique et social d'un côté, intérieur et intensif de l'autre, qui peuvent soit être contractés par la répression et poussés vers la mort, soit contribuer l'un avec l'autre à parcourir le corps sans organes que la schizoanalyse a placé au cœur du processus désirant avec Artaud.

Dans le délire schizo les parents sont des inducteurs parmi d'autres, sans privilège particulier. S'ils prennent place au sein des lignées humaines, des peuples et des races qui emportent le sujet, celui-ci part de fait loin des bases familiales. Deleuze et Guattari estiment pourtant que toutes les formes de thérapie connues d'eux, y compris l'antipsychiatrie, choisissent au contraire de restaurer ces bases familiales, en les modifiant et en les consolidant. C'est qu'il n'existe pas de lieux de vie quotidienne accueillants qui puissent s'y substituer, les hôpitaux et cliniques psychiatriques restant trop peu nombreux et dominés par la pratique de l'enfermement. *L'Anti-Œdipe* les critique nettement moins que la psychanalyse.

Deleuze et Guattari insistent sur le fait que les bases familiales ont été bouleversées et fragilisées pour la plupart des gens par la colonisation, par son abandon, par l'industrialisation, par la mondialisation, et par toutes les transformations sociales qui ont déterritorialisé l'inconscient, transformé les parents en références seulement partielles, parfois évanescentes. Il en découle une ambiguïté du désir qui est souvent investi dans un retour à l'autorité, au culte de la supériorité, dans des attitudes racistes. Mais de nombreuses autres personnes poursuivent le projet de révolutionner les rapports de production et de supprimer l'exploitation. De ce désir on connaît mal la puissance, tant il

est aux prises avec les instances répressives de la société et de la famille. Les machines désirantes se font alors sentir par leurs pannes, par la dépression.

Ces pannes, et cette dépression, ne sont que des indications d'une présence du désir. Elles ne disent rien de son contenu dont le sens n'est en aucun cas défini par la répression. Le désir n'est pas une transgression, une réponse à la répression. Il la précède ; elle l'étouffe et il resurgit. L'institution familiale assume la fonction répressive déléguée par la société et agit le refoulement au plus près des corps des sujets. Le soignant doit reconnaître le désir, faire repartir la production désirante repliée sur le corps sans organes, qu'il s'agisse de névrose ou de psychose. Le peintre ou l'écrivain arrive à « traverser le désert du corps sans organes », à franchir « la barre capitaliste » (Deleuze ; Guattari 1973: 158) « La schizophrénie est à la fois le mur, la percée du mur et les échecs de cette percée » (Ibid. : 162).

### **Sauvages, barbares, civilisés**

Deleuze et Guattari affirment que le capitalisme se forme en agençant les flux décodés, que la schizophrénie fait filer à l'infini : flux du travail, ou, depuis l'opéraïsme italien, flux des vies humaines, déterritorialisées par l'esclavage et le salariat ; flux de l'argent déterritorialisé par toutes les techniques bancaires successives. Le rapport de force semble bien inégal, la déterritorialisation étant manifestement agie par le pouvoir propriétaire et financier ; mais l'infini est du côté de la vie. La bataille ne fait que continuer. Deleuze et Guattari nous en racontent les grandes étapes passées par les « sauvages » qu'on appelle aujourd'hui autochtones, par les « barbares » dont Lacan avait dit qu'ils sont toujours venus de l'est, et par les « civilisés » qui s'auto-défendent.

Cette histoire s'inscrit sur la surface de la terre, corps sans organe de la production désirante humaine première, en formant une machine territoriale qui codait les flux et les code encore dans les poches d'archaïsme qui demeurent sous la domination capitaliste. La première territorialisation est peu hiérarchisée, elle est faite de filiations et d'alliances qui relient tous les membres du groupe humain connu, des prélèvements et des détachements commencent cependant. Le déséquilibre, le mauvais fonctionnement, l'échange inégal, que les anthropologues considèrent négligeables, sont en fait les incidents qui relancent la machine territoriale. Les mythes font passer la conscience collective de l'énergie intensive des corps à l'extension des relations. Cela a été particulièrement bien étudié par Barbara Glowczewski, dans le cas des Rêves des sociétés aborigènes d'Australie.

Et Œdipe chez les « sauvages » ? Il n'est pas plus présent que le chef de famille propriétaire de ses femmes et/ou de ses esclaves et membre d'une assemblée citoyenne dite démocratique. Deleuze et Guattari discutent avec érudition de nombreux travaux d'ethnologues déjà publiés, ou rapportés par leur cercle d'amis africanistes ; si sous

l'influence du magistère lacanien on trouve de l'universalité œdipienne, c'est qu'on croit à l'universalité de la posture intellectuelle d'interprète, qui n'est jamais que la résurrection de la posture du prêtre. Le problème pour Deleuze et Guattari c'est plutôt, là où on est, dans son propre champ de compétences, de machiner, de faire marcher, de mettre en mouvement.

Ils s'élèvent notamment contre la conception échangiste de la société primitive qu'on trouve généralement chez les anthropologues, qui présupposent un équilibre qui n'existe pas, et qui limitent la sphère de la production sociale à la circulation, comme si on était dans des sociétés stationnaires. L'inscription de l'histoire dans les mythes ou les rêves sur la terre, peinte sur les corps, ou gravée par des scarifications, dicte à chacune et à chacun son devoir, décrit la dette qu'il a vis-à-vis de la société. Des mouvements récents font de ces traditions des moyens de défense et de reconquête face aux spoliations dues à la colonisation, mais aussi des instruments de passage individuel au sein de la société hiérarchisée qui accueille chants et peintures pour étendre son répertoire marchand. Ces développements n'existaient pas encore au moment de la rédaction de l'Anti-Œdipe.

L'instauration de la machine despotique et du socius « barbare » coupe les alliances latérales et ne garde que la filiation directe, promeut le racisme typique de l'obéissance à l'autorité transcendante, installe une hiérarchie presque implacable. L'État fait de la terre la propriété privée de son élite et la divise en conséquence. L'impôt transforme la dette sociale en dette infinie, en culpabilité radicale. Il transforme toutes les anciennes inscriptions, et les surcode en relation exclusive à lui. Le despote multiplie les écritures, et soumet le graphisme à la voix, le détache de ses supports anciens. Le signe déterritorialisé n'est plus lié au corps qui l'émet, et devient utilisable de multiples façons. Le signifié devient l'essentiel, puisque plusieurs signifiants y correspondent, celui de la langue du maître et ceux des langues des esclaves ramenés des razzias guerrières : c'est le rapport de subordination « barbare ». Lacan a préféré travailler ce rapport signifiant/signifié plutôt que s'adonner à la régression organisée dans la croyance à l'universalité du complexe d'Œdipe.

La propriété privatisée et la dépendance collective caractérisent l'État, mais la propriété privée entraîne son dépérissement, la faillite des codes centralisés, ce qui oblige l'État et le capitalisme financier à inventer de nouvelles manières de décoder les flux, de gérer les vies humaines, à concrétiser toujours davantage leurs machinations.

C'est par hasard que les flux décodés de propriété, d'argent, de moyens de production, de travailleurs « libres » se sont conjugués dans la machine de production capitaliste, qui transforme avec cynisme, sans se poser de questions, la plus-value de code, en plus-value de flux, en accumulation d'argent. La monnaie qui rémunère les travailleurs, qui est pour eux un revenu, est transformée par les banques avec l'aide de l'État en monnaie de crédit, en outil d'investissement dans la reproduction élargie du rapport d'exploitation. L'État impose le changement des règles de la conversion au fur et à mesure de sa nécessité, à chaque fois qu'il y a crise. Ce changement va du centre vers la périphérie, organise la



poursuite de la déterritorialisation du capitalisme, et le développement du sous-développement et de la pauvreté. En s'appuyant explicitement sur Marx, Deleuze et Guattari expliquent comment la nouvelle production de code par la recherche scientifique et technique est absorbée par le gigantesque appareil d'anti-production que constituent les multiples formes des forces de répression étatiques. L'anti-production produit le manque qui couronne le système et indique la fausse route au désir.

Le capitalisme ne fonctionne qu'à condition d'inhiber la tendance au décodage des flux, à la schizophrénisation, à l'infinisation qui l'anime ; il la remplace par une axiomatique progressive qui la ligote. Le pêcheur et le chasseur diraient : il la prend dans un filet qui se serre de plus en plus au fur et à mesure qu'elle se débat. Le capitalisme et l'État ne saisissent les choses que de manière molaire, statistique, moyenne, alors que les machines désirantes, la déterritorialisation des flux, travaillent au niveau moléculaire, infinitésimal, sans aucun sens repérable et a fortiori assignable depuis l'échelle « normale » de la vie quotidienne. On n'en constate que les effets de masse, quand ils existent ; ils peuvent aller dans des sens différents, voire opposés. Contre cette déterritorialisation moléculaire, ce décodage intensif, l'État capitaliste, chargé de réguler le décodage au niveau molaire, ne peut prendre que de nouvelles mesures de contention, puisées dans les images léguées par les systèmes antérieurs, d'où le sentiment d'archaïsme de son action. Il ne s'agit plus de la lutte des classes chère à Marx : bourgeoisie et prolétariat luttent pour leurs survies respectives et donc coopèrent dans le service du capital dont la domination est garantie par l'État.

Celui-ci reterritorialise à tour de bras les flux qui se décodent, et les soumet à des formes de gouvernement décentralisées pour les neutraliser. Les flux recodés freinent en effet le décodage des flux microscopiques. Le principal instrument de ce recodage c'est la propriété privée de la terre, du logement, de tous les moyens de vivre. Sont-ils transformés par la magie monétaire en moyens de production seulement ? L'expérience des camps qui se multiplient dans le monde montre que, au contraire de ce qu'en dit Agamben, les femmes et les hommes ne vont pas se soumettre tout nu à l'exploitation et à la mort. Elles et ils ont leur quant-à-soi, leur dignité, leur liberté, leur vie, leur rapport à l'infini.

## **Introduction à la schizoanalyse**

Les travaux de Marx, des anthropologues, des économistes, qui ont devancé Deleuze-Guattari, leur permettent de développer avec brio cette histoire des rapports entre le désir et la société. La mobilisation de la monnaie de revenu convertie en monnaie de crédit par les nouvelles règles édictées en 1973 est démontrée d'une manière particulièrement saisissante, alors que ses effets dévastateurs n'en seront observés qu'en 2008 avec la crise des subprimes.

L'introduction à la schizoanalyse, dernier chapitre, me semble plus laborieuse. Elle reprend la critique radicale de l'interprétation psychanalytique en termes d'Œdipe distillée tout au long du livre. Elle prend en compte une question souvent posée par les observateurs de la vie militante : comment se fait-il que les jeunes révolutionnaires enthousiastes se reconvertissent en hommes politiques plus nuancés, voire réactionnaires à un âge plus avancé ?

La schizoanalyse s'engage à s'attacher particulièrement à comprendre les oscillations de l'inconscient entre le pôle paranoïaque, fasciste, raciste, familialiste, moralisant et le pôle déterritorialisé, désirant, révolutionnaire, plein de contradictions. Ce sera un de ses principaux objets. Elle utilisera pour cela les différences entre nomadisme et ségrégation, groupe sujet et groupe assujetti.

Bien que Michel Foucault ait écrit dans la préface à l'édition américaine de *L'Anti-Œdipe* que c'est un manuel de vie non fasciste, il me semble que le manuel n'est pas suffisamment confronté aux méandres de la vie quotidienne et militante, pour être traduit en enseignements concrets, en manières de faire, en chemins d'invention. On en reste à de grands principes dont la description, vue auparavant, de la nature moléculaire des machines désirantes dit qu'elles ne peuvent pas être agies volontairement.

Comment se fait la communication entre l'espace moléculaire où se trament les désirs, et l'espace molaire des représentations qui cadennasse la perception, sauf dans les périodes révolutionnaires de soulèvement collectif ?

Le désir est machine, synthèse de machines, agencement machinique, machines désirantes, mise en mouvement coordonné de molécules qui fait sens, pensée, de manière sous-jacente aux représentations molaires qui sont la seule chose que l'on connaît à l'échelle « normale » de la vie quotidienne, échelle où on prend systématiquement les choses de manière statistique, dans l'ignorance des singularités qui signalent le désir. Peut-on en agissant sur ces représentations, en les détruisant systématiquement par l'analyse, laisser le champ libre au mouvement moléculaire des machines désirantes ? La schizoanalyse n'est pas une contemplation passive, mais une guerre menée contre les stéréotypes, les contre-vérités, qui ensevelissent les machines désirantes.

Cette guerre se mène en expérimentant des dispositifs successifs, qui sont à peine ébauchés quand s'écrit *L'Anti-Œdipe*. Le colloque singulier, siège du transfert typique de la cure psychanalytique traditionnelle, n'est qu'un parmi ces dispositifs, totalement insuffisant pour capter la dispersion des machines désirantes. Il est cependant essentiel dans la schizoanalyse également pour faire le point, se rapporter réciproquement les expérimentations en cours. Ces expérimentations s'expriment à l'échelle molaire par de nouvelles représentations, l'exploration de nouveaux territoires, qui ne sont plus conformes aux exigences de la reproduction sociale à l'inverse d'Œdipe et de la famille nucléaire. Les deux analysants partagent partiellement le même territoire, l'un paie l'autre pour le faire s'intéresser à ses propres choix, au minimum lui consacrer du temps, et lui faire découvrir son nouveau territoire existentiel et ses possibilités d'action.

La cure schizoanalytique n'en est alors qu'à ses balbutiements, et faute de mieux se coule dans d'autres pratiques proches, en particulier psychanalyse et thérapies familiales. Cela pousse Guattari par la suite à élaborer une méta-analyse des pratiques thérapeutiques, afin de pouvoir injecter une perspective schizoanalytique dans n'importe quel type de pratique analytique. C'est l'enjeu de son avant-dernier livre *Cartographies schizoanalytiques*. Faute de mouvements sociaux importants après 68, et sa répression, la cure schizoanalytique ne trouve guère de territoires collectifs auxquels s'accrocher. Elle ne touche que partiellement les membres du CERFI, centre de recherches en sciences sociales autogéré, créé par Guattari et ses amis ; et elle n'y touche que les femmes, qui appartiennent par ailleurs au Mouvement de libération des femmes, créé en France en 1970. La déterritorialisation moléculaire s'exprime alors plutôt dans des créations individuelles, artistiques ou de sciences sociales. Celles-ci sont évidemment tiraillées entre les poussées machiniques de déterritorialisation et les exigences répressives de la représentation sociale.

Le rôle de la schizoanalyse disent Deleuze et Guattari c'est de détruire les résistances à la déterritorialisation, de faire éclater les machines oppressives et avant cela d'en révéler caricaturalement le fonctionnement comme Charlie Chaplin dans le film *Les temps modernes*. Il s'agit par plans successifs de créer une terre nouvelle, de traverser et recomposer différemment les territorialités antérieures. Cette terre nouvelle est fabriquée par les machines désirantes en état de dispersion moléculaire les unes par rapport aux autres, dans des possibilités de rapports multiples ; au niveau molaire elles donnent lieu à des objets partiels d'attraction ou de répulsion désirantes.

En référence aux débats militants d'après 1968, Deleuze et Guattari distinguent les groupes révolutionnaires qui prolongent la déterritorialisation des flux des groupes assujettis qui cherchent à les maintenir dans le cadre existant. Le désir n'est pas conforme à l'intérêt qui se manifeste au niveau préconscient et suit le découpage de la société en classes. C'est la sexualité qui en donne le meilleur aperçu – avec qui désire-t-on s'allier physiquement, mais il s'exprime aussi dans des lignes abstraites, dans ce qui paraît étrange, et n'a rien à voir avec la remémoration du même dont parle la psychanalyse traditionnelle. Les choix amoureux résonnent des vibrations créées et entretenues par des investissements sociaux indicibles autrement.

L'attraction pour la femme ou l'homme est modulée selon qu'il s'agit de quelqu'un de riche ou pauvre, selon la manière dont la personne attirante se situe dans le champ social, dont il ou elle évolue dans des dimensions non humaines, étranges. Les investissements sociaux de désir priment sur les investissements familiaux, les font éclater, les mettent à mal. Ce malaise fonde la demande d'analyse, d'entrée dans une réparation ou dans une poursuite du décalage, de la déterritorialisation.

Le postulat familialiste de la psychanalyse est en fait un postulat personnalologique qui fait de la folie une tare individuelle, un manque à être comme tout le monde. Mais les échecs thérapeutiques ont conduit à en rendre responsable la communauté, et à mettre

en place des thérapies familiales et adaptatives, également tenues en échec par la folie, phénomène asocial présent dans toutes les sociétés. La schizophrénie ne peut pas être contenue dans la famille ou la communauté, car elle est ce qui leur échappe, sous des formes concrètes toujours renouvelées. Cette échappée est angoissante, mais sûre de son impossibilité de compromission. Le rôle de la schizoanalyse est de soutenir cette échappée et de l'aider à trouver des formes d'incarnation suffisantes pour ne pas se laisser aspirer trop rapidement par le corps sans organes et par la mort. Le schizo échappe au postulat de l'unité, du rassemblement, de la névrotisation.

Aujourd'hui où le fascisme relève la tête, multiplie les provocations racistes, la distinction entre le pôle paranoïaque, réactionnaire et fascisant et le pôle schizoïde révolutionnaire est particulièrement utile pour orienter nos pensées et nos actions. Le pôle paranoïaque asservit la production sociale aux ensembles grégaires, en quête d'identité, d'homogénéité, de puissance physique et de « souveraineté sélective » (Deleuze ; Guattari 1973 : 440). Le pôle schizoïde multiplie les ensembles moléculaires dispersés, les lignes de fuite, les dissidences. Ce n'est pas une utopie, cela correspond à l'existence de groupes sujets qui rompent avec le continuum social. L'art connaît aussi cette double polarité : valeur marchande et contenu codé d'un côté, expérimentation et suivi des lignes de désir de l'autre. De même la recherche scientifique est partagée entre le service du pouvoir et la poursuite de la connaissance à l'infini.

### **Les trois écologies et l'écosophie**

Au moment où Deleuze et Guattari écrivaient *L'Anti-Œdipe* les réflexions sur les limites de la croissance commençaient à peine et étaient encore interprétées comme des entraves mises à la nécessaire émancipation du prolétariat. Celle-ci était censée venir notamment d'une utilisation de plus en plus intelligente de la technologie qui libérerait des tâches les plus serviles et favoriserait l'épanouissement de tous. Félix Guattari a eu connaissance du livre de Hans Jonas *Le principe responsabilité* dès sa parution en allemand en 1979, mais n'a pu le lire dans sa version française qu'en 1990. Ce livre lui a fait l'effet d'une véritable bombe : il s'était trompé toute sa vie en assimilant le désir à la production, à la croissance, en chaussant les bottes du marxisme. Il fallait repartir à zéro, sans abandonner pour autant la déterritorialisation, l'inconscient machinique dans la mesure où la machine est le mouvement créé par une hétérogénéité et non un agencement technique destiné à créer plus de vitesse et plus de puissance. Il s'est alors rapproché du mouvement des verts, d'abord des verts allemands, puis des verts français, dont les divisions lui répugnaient. Il s'est même présenté aux élections municipales sur deux listes vertes concurrentes pour souligner la bêtise de ces divisions. Il a créé un bulletin comme il avait fait avant en psychiatrie ou au parti communiste dans tous ses lieux militants, *le Fil vert* qui accueillait des contributions de tous les courants.

*Les trois écologies* est le manifeste qu'il a écrit pour le mouvement vert français et fait paraître en 1989. En voici la quatrième de couverture :

Le drame écologique dans lequel est engagée la planète humaine a longtemps été l'objet d'une méconnaissance systématique. Cette période est désormais révolue. À travers des médias devenus hypersensibles à la répétition des "accidents" écologiques, l'opinion internationale se trouve de plus en plus mobilisée. Tout le monde aujourd'hui parle d'écologie : les politiques, les technocrates, les industriels... Malheureusement toujours en termes de simples "nuisances". Or les perturbations écologiques de l'environnement ne sont que la partie visible d'un mal plus profond et plus considérable, relatif aux façons de vivre et d'être en société sur cette planète. L'écologie environnementale devrait être pensée d'un seul tenant avec l'écologie sociale et l'écologie mentale, à travers une *écosophie* de caractère éthico-politique. Il ne s'agit pas d'unifier arbitrairement sous une idéologie de rechange des domaines foncièrement hétérogènes, mais de faire s'étayer les unes les autres des pratiques innovatrices de recomposition des subjectivités individuelles et collectives, au sein de nouveaux contextes technico-scientifiques et des nouvelles coordonnées géopolitiques. (Guattari 1989 : quatrième de couverture)

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## ***The Meeting of a Philosopher and a Political Activist Psychoanalyst Thanks to a Typewriter***

by ANNE QUERRIEN

### **Abstract**

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of *Anti-Œdipus*, it is important to acknowledge the pivotal role played by Fanny Deleuze, who typed for Gilles the proliferating texts sent by Félix, which have since been published in *The Anti-Œdipus Papers*. These texts outline the main concepts presented in *Anti-Œdipus*. The political choice, both revolutionary and constructivist, the option of the machinic to get out of the structuralist impotence, lead Guattari to propose a new conception of the unconscious, crossed by "desiring machines". He and Gilles Deleuze revisit the history of humanity, which they conceive as a war between nomadism and sedentariness, for which they hope for new forms of social and family relations. Under the name of schizoanalysis they invite a new way of conducting analysis, more collective than specular, by calling upon history, economics and literature.

The meeting of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and their tandem, Deleuze Guattari, the power of this tandem, never ceased to amaze.

Before they met, Gilles Deleuze was a very brilliant philosophy teacher, in high school and then at university, who had a profound effect on the students who had the chance to attend his classes.

Félix Guattari, the son of a small industrialist but a classmate of young communists, began to be active in communist organisations at a very young age. He was influenced by his natural science teacher Fernand Oury, who practised the Freinet teaching method, which aimed to produce solidarity between pupils instead of competition, in particular by producing a class or school newspaper, by carrying out surveys outside the school, etc. Fernand Oury got him to join the Youth Hostel Movement, where he met Jean Oury, who was six years his senior.

It was Jean Oury who aroused his interest in philosophy, psychiatry and the artistic productions of certain mad people. In 1951, he joined Jean Oury at the psychiatric clinic in Saumery, where Jean had become director in 1949. The two of them spent long evenings discussing their desire to transform the world and psychiatry. In 1953 Jean Oury, tired of waiting for the administration to provide him with the material means he needed to work, left with patients and carers to found a new place: the La Borde clinic.

Félix Guattari lived between La Borde and Paris. At La Borde he was in charge of the organisation of the work, of the opening of this clinic without walls, made attractive by many workshops made with outside friends; he was also in charge of the negotiations with the Social Security in order to register this attempt in a public economic framework, and financially accessible to the patients. Jean Oury affectionately called him his "minister of external affairs".

With his friends in the Union of Communist Students, Félix Guattari led a theoretical and political Marxist reflection, criticising the authoritarian developments of the Soviet Union and the way in which the French Communist Party justified them in the name of real socialism. He also criticised the lack of solidarity with the Algerian revolution, and practised this solidarity with the so-called "suitcase carriers" (the French activists who carry leaflets or weapons for the Algerian revolution). Some Algerian militants were boarders at La Borde

at the end of the Algerian war, the left-wing movements that had supported the Algerian revolution could no longer see what to do in France other than to support the communist attempts in the world: Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and soon Venezuela. Félix Guattari proposed another political perspective to them: to elaborate revolutionary projects in all areas of daily life, to elaborate possibilities for the proletariat to participate in all cultural activities, to abolish the distance between intellectuals, workers and peasants, in other words, to take up the revolutionary line of 1917. An organisation was founded in this perspective: the FGERI, Fédération des groupes d'études, de recherches, institutionnelles, in reference to Oury's approach known as institutional psychotherapy.

Guattari's participation in the La Borde clinic and his companionship with Jean Oury led him to frequent Jacques Lacan, and even to become his analysand for about ten years from 1960 to 1970. In 1969, Jacques Lacan asked him to write a reading note on Gilles Deleuze's latest book, *The Logic of Sense*, which seemed to Lacan's students to be a continuation of the latter's work. But reading this book and *Difference and Repetition* by the same Deleuze inspired Guattari to think in a new way. What strikes him is that Deleuze establishes heterogeneous series that are linked by a third term that drives them both like a machine. Deleuze, in talking about literature, in doing philosophy, shows "desiring machines" in operation. The reading note is transformed into a theoretical text entitled "machine and structure" where Guattari develops his very Deleuzian critique of the search for structures and repetitions by the structuralists and Lacanians, a search that closes situations to history and transformation. When Guattari brought his text to Lacan's journal, *Scilicet*, Lacan's son-in-law explained to him that he had gone beyond the limits of Lacanism and that there was no question of publishing this text in the journal of the Lacanian school.

At the same time Gilles Deleuze, exhausted by the release of a series of books, each more important than the last, was unable to get back to work. One of his former students, Jean Pierre Muyard, who had become a psychiatrist at La Borde, advised Félix Guattari to

go and see him. Félix arrived with his text “Machine et structure”, which immediately seduced Deleuze. This text was the step he needed to take in order to bounce back, to get out of the impasse of structure, of which Deleuze, author of the “Structuralism” section in the *Encyclopedia Universalis*, had been one of the best introducers into French thought. Deleuze suggested to Guattari that he write down everything that came to mind. His wife Fanny will type the letters, hence my title, highlighting this first form of the typewriter and the role of Deleuze's wife in their arrangement.

In January 2005, *Les écrits pour l'Anti-Œdipe* was published, edited by the young psychiatrist Stéphane Nadaud from texts by Guattari found in his archives. We suddenly realise that most of the ideas put into practice in *Anti-Oedipus* are thrown into these papers, sometimes in a contradictory way, like a molten magma, which Deleuze's writing has succeeded in channelling, ordering and transforming into a war machine against psychoanalysis and the family.

One suddenly becomes aware of the fact that this three-way arrangement of Gilles, Félix, Fanny is a real writing machine, the arrangement by the one who is typing of two series of heterogeneous thoughts: the one based on literary and philosophical texts, the one built from the frequentation of communist organisations mixed with the day-to-day construction of a place of reception for madness. As Deleuze and Guattari say in *Mille Plateaux*, they did not write in pairs, but in groups, taking ideas from friends as they arose, transforming them into weapons against social and political inertia, the regression in France after 1968.

### **The desiring machines**

Guattari thus proposes to Deleuze a vision of the unconscious and its treatment that is very different from that elaborated by Freud on the basis of his self-analysis. Instead of tracing the associations of ideas that crowd the couch back to childhood memories, these associations of ideas will be followed in what they designate as partial objects not only in recent experience, but also in investments and future choices.

In Guattari's analytical work there is an inversion of time, a deliberate orientation towards the future, towards free action, towards belonging to new groups to be created or encountered. I was part of the schizoanalysis group that he had created shortly after the publication of *Anti-Oedipus* to welcome people who came to ask him for advice on how to get out of their existential blockages. As long as it was a question of organising new activities, these groups worked; but they were unable to deal with the marital and family problems that are the usual lot of psychoanalysis.

For Deleuze, this productive vision of the unconscious, this machinic use of associations of ideas, makes it possible to mobilise all the memories of literary and philosophical readings in new creative arrangements.



The machinic unconscious is made up of cut-off flows which generate a new force as in the steam engine. Deleuze liked to say that the first machine was formed by the mother's breast and the baby's mouth which extracted milk from it, the baby found in this operation the means to grow. An image that is not far from the force released by the piston of a steam engine. From this point on, everything that flows, and offers the potential to be cut by a mechanism of transformation is good to take as an example of a machine.

Deleuze and Guattari insist on the heterogeneous character of the flows arranged by the machine: capital, for example, consists of the arrangement of a flow of human beings, the workers, with a flow of money that is embodied in the machines that will exploit the flow of workers. The power of the device lies in the heterogeneity of the two flows brought into a production relationship by the machine.

Deleuze adds to the idea of the machine that of the body without organs, an idea that I have never really managed to appropriate for the moment. Desire has a recording surface, unlimited because it is egg-shaped, and desire is adjacent to the machines that carry it towards this egg. While Deleuze bases his reflection on Artaud's text, which introduces precisely this notion of a body without organs, Guattari remains more sensitive to the delusions that emerge in the clinic, and which make the fool say all the names in the story are me.

Desire, which is completely different from need, especially sexual need, carries away, deterritorializes, even when the displacement is infinitesimal, as in quantum physics. Deleuze and Guattari take us out of the usual dimensions of philosophy that push towards the infinitely great, heroism, masculinity. The infinite they present is rather infinitely small, but never reducible to stability. Apparently, the journey takes place on the spot, but it is always in motion and is only made conscious by the misfires it causes, an idea close to Freud's analysis of the spirit word.

In Guattari's militant history, all this reflection must go through the constitution of revolutionary groups capable of thwarting capitalist alienation. However, he notes after Sartre that all too often subject groups, oriented towards action, practising free and equal relations, are transformed into subjugated groups, prisoners of group fantasies that mislead them.

### **Psychoanalysis and familialism**

Deleuze and Guattari vehemently criticise psychoanalysis, which reduces all social situations to the father-mother-me family triangle. Can we gather under the figure of the authoritarian father the hierarchical group of men who wage war against the Vietnamese and the Algerians? Is there not a danger to authority and hierarchy when these men are politically defeated, when their enemies become independent? Is it not in these defeats that the uprisings of the 1960s and 1970s drew their energy?

Guattari was in analysis with Lacan from 1960 to 1970. Everything we know from Lacan's analyses shows that his practice did not conform at all to the image given of the psychoanalytic cure in the anti-oedipal denunciation, except perhaps the appetite for money. The 1960s and 1970s saw the emergence of professional psychology, which was called to the bedside of difficult children and adolescents, but also ventured to deal with marital difficulties and to solve the organisational problems of large companies, such as EDF, for example, thanks to action research in social psychology.

Since 1947, the University has been awarding psychology degrees. From 1956 onwards, sociology also emerged from its empirical phase and entered the university, distinguishing itself from philosophy. At the same time, Jacques Lacan began to give seminars, regularly from 1953 onwards at the Hôpital Sainte Anne and then at the Ecole normale supérieure.

He fights against the Egopsychology founded in the United States by his former analyst Rudolf Lowenstein. Jean Oury met him and François Tosquelles with whom he did his internship at Saint Alban in 1947. There was a rich professional intellectual activity in Paris on the fringes of the university, animated by innovative personalities, who had the ear of the media and of the new World Health Organisation.

Deleuze and Guattari's text does not care about these two distinct currents in psychiatry. The Lacanian current, in spite of its intellectual prestige, remains very much in the minority in professional practice. Absent from university teaching dominated by Daniel Lagache, it does not seem to be concerned with influencing psychiatry, and is only remotely interested in institutional psychotherapy. The latter is hardly defended by this text, which assimilates it to all the "techniques of care", which could only shock Guattari's friends who had endeavoured to institute it in several hospitals. In this scorcher Deleuze and Guattari make the deviation from the norm, the political dissensus, the difficulty with the family, the first step on the path of literary or artistic creation. It is obviously not by remaining a good student, a good son or daughter, against all odds, that one affirms one's desire, since one obviously alienates it from that of the school or one's parents.

The Oedipus complex is a 'double bind', a contradictory injunction, which forbids one to really love one's parents while at the same time demanding that one take them as models to be loved, which condemns children to impotence, castration, or transgression. But Deleuze and Guattari open up this love to homosexuality, which was still criminally repressed at the time: love and imitation can be directed as much towards the same sex as towards the opposite sex. Sexuality does not only have a reproductive function, even if this is what the prohibition of incest emphasises. *Anti-Oedipus* appeared shortly before *Homosexual Desire*, written by Guy Hocquenghem, one of the founders of the FHAR, Front homosexuel d'action révolutionnaire. This movement fights for the alignment of homosexuals' rights with those of other citizens, and above all tries to transversalise all cultural productions based on new perverse views on sexuality. The journal *Recherches*, directed by Guattari, echoed this in its number 12 "Trois milliards de pervers. Grande

encyclopédie des homosexualités [Three billion perverts. Great encyclopedia of homosexualities]" in 1973.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the schizo delirium, if one is willing to be attentive to it, not to wedge it into the oedipal triangle or under stereotypes, describes a double historical, geographical and social journey, on the one hand, and an inner and intensive one on the other, which can either be contracted by repression and pushed towards death, or contribute with each other to travel through the body without organs that schizoanalysis placed at the heart of the desiring process with Artaud.

In the schizo delirium, the parents are inducers among others, without any particular privilege. If they take their place within human lineages, peoples and races that carry the subject away, the latter in fact leaves far from the family bases. Deleuze and Guattari believe, however, that all forms of therapy known to them, including anti-psychiatry, choose instead to restore these family bases, modifying and consolidating them. This is because there are no welcoming places of daily life that can take their place, as too few psychiatric hospitals and clinics remain dominated by the practice of confinement.

Deleuze and Guattari insist on the fact that family bases have been disrupted and weakened for most people by colonisation, by its abandonment, by industrialisation, by globalisation, and by all the social transformations that have deterritorialised the unconscious, transforming parents into only partial, sometimes evanescent references. The result is an ambiguity of desire which is often invested in a return to authority, to the cult of superiority, in racist attitudes. But many other people pursue the project of revolutionising the relations of production and abolishing exploitation. The power of this desire is not well known, since it is so much in conflict with the repressive authorities of society and the family. The machines of desire then make themselves felt through their breakdowns, through depression.

These breakdowns, and this depression, are only indications of the presence of desire. They say nothing about its content, whose meaning is in no way defined by repression. Desire is not a transgression, a response to repression. It precedes it; it suffocates it and resurfaces. It is partly nourished by the legacy of the family institution, but the latter mainly assumes the repressive function delegated to it by society and acts to repress it as closely as possible to the bodies of the subjects. The carer must recognise the desire, make the desire production folded on the body without organs start again, whether it is neurosis or psychosis. The painter or writer manages to "traverse the desert of the body without organs", to cross "the capitalist barrier" (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 133) "Schizophrenia is at once the wall, the breaking through this wall, and the failures of this breakthrough" (Ibid.: 136).

### **Savages, barbarians, civilised**

Deleuze and Guattari assert that capitalism is formed by arranging decoded flows, which schizophrenia makes spin endlessly: the flow of labour, or, since Italian operaism, the flow of human lives, deterritorialised by slavery and wage-labour; the flow of money deterritorialised by all the successive banking techniques. The balance of power seems to be unequal, deterritorialisation being clearly driven by the owner and financial power; but infinity is on the side of life. The battle continues the whole time long. Deleuze and Guattari tell us the great stages passed by the 'savages' we now call indigenous, by the invading 'barbarians', and by the 'civilised' who defend themselves.

This history is inscribed on the surface of the earth, the organless body of the first human desiring production, forming a territorial machine that coded the flows and still codes them in the pockets of archaism that remain under capitalist domination. The first territorialisation is not very hierarchical, it is made of filiations and alliances that link all the members of the known human group, but withdrawals and detachments begin. Imbalance, malfunctioning, unequal exchange, which anthropologists consider negligible, are in fact the incidents that revive the territorial machine. Myths shift the collective consciousness from the intensive energy of bodies to the extension of relationships. This has been particularly well studied by Barbara Glowczewski, in the case of the Dreams of Australian Aboriginal societies.

And what about Oedipus among the 'savages'? He is no more present than the head of a family who owns his wives and/or slaves and is a member of a so-called democratic citizen assembly. Deleuze and Guattari discuss with erudition numerous works of ethnologists already published or reported by their circle of Africanist friends; if under the influence of the Lacanian magisterium one finds Oedipal universality, it is because they believe in the universality of the intellectual posture of interpreter, which is never more than the resurrection of the posture of the priest. The problem for Deleuze and Guattari is rather, where one is, in one's own field of competence, to machine, to make work, to set in motion.

In particular, they speak out against the exchangeist conception of primitive society generally found among anthropologists, who presuppose an equilibrium that does not exist, and who limit the sphere of social production to circulation, as if we were in stationary societies. The inscription of history in myths or dreams on the earth, painted on bodies or engraved by scarification, dictates to each and every person his or her duty, describes the debt he or she owes to society. Recent movements have turned these traditions into means of defence and reclamation in the face of spoliation due to colonisation, but also into instruments of individual passage within the hierarchical society that welcomes songs and paintings to extend its market repertoire. These developments did not yet exist at the time of the writing of the Anti-Oedipus.

The establishment of the despotic machine and the 'barbarian' socius cuts off lateral alliances and keeps only direct descent, promotes the racism typical of obedience to transcendent authority, and establishes an almost implacable hierarchy. The state makes

land the private property of its elite and divides it accordingly. The tax transforms the social debt into an infinite debt, into radical guilt. It transforms all the old inscriptions, and over-codes them into an exclusive relationship to it. The despot multiplies writing, and submits graphics to the voice, detaching it from its ancient supports. The deterritorialised, written sign is no longer linked to the body that emits it and becomes usable in many ways. The signified becomes the essential, since several signifiers correspond to it, that of the master's language and those of the languages of the slaves brought back from the war raids: this is the relationship of 'barbarian' subordination.

Privatised property and collective dependence characterise the state, but private property leads to its decline, to the bankruptcy of centralised codes, which forces the state and financial capitalism to invent new ways of decoding flows, of managing human lives, of concretising their machinations ever more.

It is by chance that the decoded flows of property, of money, of means of production, of "free" workers have been combined in the capitalist production machine, which cynically transforms, without question, the surplus value of code, into surplus value of flow, into the accumulation of money. The money which remunerates the workers, which is for them an income, is transformed by the banks with the help of the state into credit money, into a tool for investment in the enlarged reproduction of the exploitation relation. The state imposes the change of the rules of conversion as and when it is necessary, each time there is a crisis. This change moves from the centre to the periphery, organises the further deterritorialisation of capitalism, and the development of underdevelopment and poverty. Drawing explicitly on Marx, Deleuze and Guattari explain how the new production of code through scientific and technical research is absorbed by the gigantic apparatus of anti-production constituted by the multiple forms of state repressive forces. Anti-production produces the lack that crowns the system and points the wrong way to desire.

Capitalism only functions on condition that it inhibits the tendency to decode flows, to schizophrenisation, to infinitisation that animates it; it replaces it with a progressive axiomatic that binds it. The fisherman and the hunter would say: he catches it in a net that gets tighter and tighter as it struggles. Capitalism and the state only grasp things in a molar, statistical, average way, whereas the desiring machines, the deterritorialisation of flows, work at the molecular, infinitesimal level, without any identifiable meaning, let alone one that can be assigned from the "normal" scale of daily life. We can only see the mass effects, when they exist; they can go in different, even opposite directions. Against this molecular deterritorialisation, this intensive decoding, the capitalist state, charged with regulating decoding at the molar level, can only take new measures of restraint, drawn from the images bequeathed by previous systems, hence the archaic feeling of its action. It is no longer a question of the class struggle dear to Marx: bourgeoisie and proletariat struggle for their respective survival and therefore cooperate in the service of capital whose domination is guaranteed by the state.

The latter reterritorializes the flows that are decoded and submits them to decentralized forms of government to neutralize them. The recoded flows in fact slow down the decoding of microscopic flows. The main instrument of this recoding is the private ownership of land, housing, all means of living. Are they transformed by monetary magic into means of production only? The experience of the camps that are multiplying in the world shows that, contrary to what Agamben says, women and men are not going to submit themselves naked to exploitation and death. They have their own self, their own dignity, their own freedom, their own life, their own relationship to the infinite.

### **Introduction to schizoanalysis**

The work of Marx, anthropologists and economists, who preceded Deleuze-Guattari, allows them to brilliantly develop this history of the relationship between desire and society. The mobilisation of income money converted into credit money by the new rules enacted in 1973 is demonstrated in a particularly striking way, even though its devastating effects will only be observed in 2008 with the subprime crisis.

The introduction to schizoanalysis, the last chapter, seems to me more laborious. It takes up the radical critique of the psychoanalytical interpretation in terms of Oedipus distilled throughout the book. It takes into account a question often asked by observers of militant life: how is it that young, enthusiastic revolutionaries turn into more nuanced, even reactionary, politicians in later life?

Schizoanalysis is committed to understanding the oscillations of the unconscious between the paranoid, fascist, racist, familialist, moralising pole and the deterritorialized, desiring, revolutionary pole, full of contradictions. This will be one of its main objects. It will use the differences between nomadism and segregation, subject group and subjugated group.

Although Michel Foucault wrote in the preface to the American edition of *Anti-Oedipus* that it is a non-fascist manual of life, it seems to me that the manual is not sufficiently confronted with the meanders of daily and militant life to be translated into concrete lessons, ways of doing things, paths of invention. We are left with grand principles which the description, seen before, of the molecular nature of desiring machines.

How is the communication between the molecular space where desires are woven, and the molar space of representations which locks up perception, except in revolutionary periods of collective uprising?

Desire is a machine, a synthesis of machines, a machinic arrangement, a desiring machine, a coordinated setting in motion of molecules that makes sense, thought, in a way that underlies the molar representations that are the only thing we know on the "normal" scale of daily life, a scale where we systematically take things in a statistical way, in ignorance of the singularities that signal desire. By acting on these representations, by

systematically destroying them through analysis, can we leave the field free for the molecular movement of the desiring machines? Schizoanalysis is not a passive contemplation but a war machine against the stereotypes, the untruths, which bury the desiring machines.

This war is waged by experimenting with successive devices, which were barely sketched out when *The Ant-Oedipus* was written. The singular colloquy, the seat of transference typical of the traditional psychoanalytic treatment, is only one of these devices, totally insufficient to capture the dispersion of the desiring machines. However, it is also essential in schizoanalysis in order to take stock, to relate to each other the experiments in progress. These experiments are expressed on a molar scale by new representations, the exploration of new territories, which no longer conform to the requirements of social reproduction in contrast to Oedipus and the nuclear family. The two analysands partially share the same territory, one pays the other to take an interest in his or her own choices, at least to devote time to him or her, and to help him or her discover his or her new existential territory and possibilities of action.

The schizoanalytic cure was then in its infancy, and for lack of anything better, it was integrated into other similar practices, in particular psychoanalysis and family therapy. This led Guattari to elaborate a meta-analysis of therapeutic practices, in order to be able to inject a schizoanalytical perspective into any type of analytical practice. This is the aim of his penultimate book *Cartographies schizoanalytiques*. In the absence of important social movements after 1968, and its repression, the schizoanalytic cure hardly finds collective territories to hold on to. It only partially affected the members of the CERFI, a self-managed social science research centre created by Guattari and his friends; and it only affected women, who also belonged to the Women's Liberation Movement, created in France in 1970. Molecular deterritorialisation was expressed more in individual artistic or social science creations. These are obviously torn between the mechanical thrusts of deterritorialisation and the repressive demands of social representation.

The role of schizoanalysis, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is to destroy resistance to deterritorialisation, to shatter oppressive machines and, before that, to caricaturely reveal how they work, like Charlie Chaplin in the film *Modern Times*. It is a matter of creating a new land in successive shots, of crossing and recomposing previous territorialities in a different way. This new land is made by desiring machines in a state of molecular dispersion in relation to each other, in possibilities of multiple relationships; at the molar level they give rise to partial objects of desiring attraction or repulsion.

With reference to the post-1968 militant debates, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between revolutionary groups that extend the deterritorialisation of flows and subjugated groups that seek to maintain them within the existing framework. Desire does not conform to the interest that manifests itself at the preconscious level and follows the division of society into classes. This is best seen in sexuality - with whom one desires to ally oneself physically, but it is also expressed in abstract lines, in what seems strange,

and has nothing to do with the recollection of the same that traditional psychoanalysis speaks of. Love choices resonate with the vibrations created and maintained by otherwise unutterable social investments.

The attraction to a woman or man changes according to whether they are rich or poor, according to the way in which the attractive person is situated in the social field, how he or she evolves in various cultural dimensions. The social investments of desire take precedence over the family investments, breaking them down and undermining them. This malaise is the basis of the demand for analysis, for entry into a reparation or a pursuit of displacement, of deterritorialisation.

The familialist postulate of psychoanalysis is in fact a personalist postulate which makes madness an individual flaw, a failure to be like everyone else. But therapeutic failures have led to the community being blamed for it, and to the introduction of family and adaptive therapies, also held in check by madness, an asocial phenomenon present in all societies. Schizophrenia cannot be contained within the family or the community, because it is what escapes from them, in concrete forms that are always renewed. This escape is distressing but sure of its impossibility of compromise. The role of schizoanalysis is to support this escape and to help it find sufficient forms of embodiment so as not to be sucked in too quickly by the body without organs and by death. The schizo escapes the postulate of unity, of gathering, of neurotization.

Today, when fascism is raising its head and multiplying its racist provocations, the distinction between the paranoid, reactionary and fascist pole and the revolutionary schizoid pole is particularly useful to orient our thoughts and actions. The paranoid pole subjugates social production to gregarious ensembles, seeking identity, homogeneity, physical power and “selective sovereignty” (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 366). The schizoid pole multiplies dispersed molecular ensembles, lines of flight, dissidence. This is not a utopia, it corresponds to the existence of subject groups that break with the social continuum. Art also has this double polarity: market value and coded content on the one hand, experimentation and following lines of desire on the other. Similarly, scientific research is divided between the service of power and the pursuit of infinite knowledge.

### **The three ecologies and ecosophy**

At the time when Deleuze and Guattari wrote *Anti-Oedipus*, reflections on the limits of growth were just beginning and were still interpreted as obstacles to the necessary emancipation of the proletariat. This emancipation was supposed to come from an increasingly intelligent use of technology that would free people from the most servile tasks and favour the fulfilment of all. Félix Guattari became aware of Hans Jonas's book *The Responsibility Principle* when it was published in German in 1979, but only read it in its French version in 1990. This book was like a bomb to him: he had been wrong all his



life by equating desire with production and growth, by putting on the boots of Marxism. It was necessary to start again from scratch, without abandoning deterritorialization, the machinic unconscious insofar as the machine is the movement created by a heterogenesis and not a technical arrangement intended to create more speed and more power. He then got closer to the Green movement, first the German Greens, then the French Greens, whose divisions were repugnant to him. He even ran in the municipal elections in two competing Green lists to highlight the folly of these divisions. He created a newsletter, as he had done before in psychiatry or in the communist party, in all its militant places, the *Fil vert*, which welcomed contributions from all currents.

*The three ecologies* is the manifesto he wrote for the French green movement and published in 1989. Here is the back cover:

The ecological drama in which the human planet is engaged has long been the object of systematic ignorance. This period is now over. Through the media, which have become hypersensitive to the repetition of ecological "accidents", international opinion is increasingly mobilised. Everyone talks about ecology today: politicians, technocrats, industrialists... Unfortunately, they always talk about simple "nuisances". Yet ecological disturbances of the environment are only the visible part of a deeper and more considerable harm, relating to the ways of living and being in society on this planet. Environmental ecology should be thought of as a whole with social ecology and mental ecology, through an ethico-political ecosophy. It is not a question of arbitrarily unifying fundamentally heterogeneous domains under an alternative ideology, but of having innovative practices of recomposition of individual and collective subjectivities support each other, within new technical-scientific contexts and new geopolitical coordinates. (Guattari 1989 : back cover)

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## ***¿Qué es y cómo se reconoce (a) un parano-analista?***

por SERGIO DARIO RAGONESE

### **Abstract**

This text will discuss the relevance of two dominant conceptions in the psi world on the position of schizoanalysis in relation to psychoanalysis, namely the molar and abstract-theoretical opposition between them (one versus the other), and the assimilation of schizoanalysis as an internal variation of psychoanalysis. From some notions such as the paranoid pole and schizophrenic pole, despotic codes, imperial despot, and the relationship between Oedipus and Paranoia, for example, an alternative to those canonical positions will be proposed. This will lead to a different answer to the question: what is it that schizoanalysis opposes in the concrete practices? If it operates in the opposite direction to something (e.g. Oedipus and ontological lack), which figures embody this? Is it specifically about psychoanalysts in general (would this not result in a molar and abstract approach)? These questions can be answered from different problem fields, but here they will not be approached with theoretical pretensions, nor to focus the analysis on the level of macro-social practices, but to study the concrete practices that occur in the field of analytical clinics, trying to extract better tools for them from all this. On the other hand, for all these problems, we will try to propose some properly schizoanalytic answers, avoiding the abusive generalization of some concepts as well as the personalization of the problems, and searching for a pragmatic-functional approach in this respect, trying to forge a conceptual personae [*personnages conceptuels*] that can be embodied and detected in the practices: the parano-analyst.

### **Presentación del problema**

El siguiente texto parte de una pregunta, o mejor dicho, de tres preguntas entrelazadas que habitan ya el título. Este último oficiará de motor para poner en marcha algunas problematizaciones incipientes acerca de una noción, la de *parano-analista*, que fue forjada a partir de algunos desarrollos teóricos que se encuentran en la primera obra escrita de manera conjunta por Gilles Deleuze y Félix Guattari: *El Anti-Edipo. Capitalismo y Esquizofrenia*.

Aquellas preguntas que habitan el título, podrían ser leídas y trabajadas de distintos modos. No se trata de la misma pregunta en el caso de “¿cómo se reconoce un parano-analista?” (a sí mismo/a, por ejemplo) que en el de “¿cómo se reconoce a un parano-analista?”, siendo que en esta última, por incluir la preposición *a*, el sentido de la cuestión

vira hacia el punto de vista de un/a observador/a (cómo alguien reconoce a otro/a como tal). No se trata de un mero juego de lenguaje; en este texto me interesa problematizar ambas direcciones sin confundirlas y contemplando sus articulaciones.

Por otro lado, la primera parte de aquella pregunta (*¿qué es...?*) podría llevarnos a suponer que la noción de *parano-analista* (aún por precisar) referiría a algo que se es, trátase de un Ser, de una cosa, o de cierto tipo de identidad. Pero *el parano-analista*, si es algo, es una noción o un *personaje conceptual* como podríamos pensar con Deleuze y Guattari (Cf. 2011). Uno muy particular, puesto que puede ser encarnado o actualizado en la dinámica vincular y social (ya veremos cómo). Y bien, ¿qué indica esa noción una vez efectuada o instanciada?: señala a un enemigo del esquizoanálisis (no del *esquizoanalista*, cuyo estatuto requeriría otras apreciaciones); pero no lo hace a título de su persona o de su identidad personal, sino a ciertos modos de hacer y de funcionar, a los cuales el esquizoanálisis ha dirigido una gran parte de sus críticas. De este modo, debo explicitar que forjar dicha noción responde a la intención de proponer, inspirándome en las propuestas de ambos autores franceses, una noción más precisa respecto de otra pregunta: *¿a contramano de qué se dirige el esquizoanálisis en la prácticas analíticas?*

Es sabido que la recepción en el mundo psi de aquel primer libro escrito de modo conjunto ha sido conflictiva, llena de malos entendidos, incomprensiones, y reacciones conservadoras, y parece innegable que las críticas que allí se dedican *al psicoanálisis* en general, en su conjunto, merecen reparos y más precisiones dado que, en algunos casos, esta tiene puntos débiles, sean estos ciertos o aparentes. Elisabeth Roudinesco decía que ambos autores *erraron el tiro* (Cf. Dosse 2009); sin embargo, no se puede estar de acuerdo con ella cuando se observan las respuestas conservadoras que *El Anti-Edipo* recibió por parte de los psicoanalistas franceses que no estaban bajo el ala de Lacan (Cf. Chasseguet-Smirgel 1979). Sería más preciso considerar que el problema no es tanto el *tiro* sino, ocasionalmente, el *blanco psi*<sup>1</sup> supuesto (para Roudinesco: la enseñanza de J. Lacan; para otros/as: la generalidad del psicoanálisis y los psicoanalistas). No ahondaré aquí en esos posibles puntos débiles, en si son de estilo de escritura o de contenido conceptual, en su lugar intentaré especificar aquello a lo que el esquizoanálisis (mediante sus *tiros*) se puede oponer mejor. Esto podría ser abordado, por ejemplo, en un plano teórico (sea filosófico, psicológico, sociológico, antropológico, etc), así como en el de las prácticas sociales a nivel macro (problemas del cambio social revolucionario, la lucha contra/desde el capitalismo, etc), y/o en el dominio específico de las prácticas clínicas analíticas, sean estas dirigidas a individuos, grupos, o instituciones. Este texto intenta trabajar sobre este último nivel.

Además, intentaré evitar dos respuestas habituales, muy extendidas en el plano psi: una, la que dice que *el esquizoanálisis se opone al psicoanálisis* (oposición molar, abstracta,

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<sup>1</sup> Explicito lo de *blanco psi*, porque se hace indudable que hay también otros blancos en el mismo.

y teórica)<sup>2</sup>; la otra, que sostiene que *el esquizoanálisis se opone a ciertos psicoanálisis debido a que aquel es una variación interna de este* (el problema de esta última formulación es la asimilación simple que realiza hacia el final). Sin embargo, oposición total y asimilación total no son caminos propiamente esquizoanalíticos para abordar con rigor estos problemas. Así, basándome en propuestas de ambos autores, mediante lo que llamo *parano-analista* o *paranoanalista*, intentaré indicar o formular ese enemigo más concreto y más preciso, en el sentido de que será estudiado a partir de sus prácticas, sus acciones, las consecuencias que estas abren y los modos en que se ejerce el poder y el saber en aquellas. También, la tarea de detectar quien *está haciendo de parano-analista*, requeriría ser aplicada incluso en quienes la utilizan (no se está exento); recordemos que la dupla francesa sostenía que no se trata de criticar al fascista molar que sería otro/a, sino de detectar hasta qué punto nosotros mismos/as estamos actuando en lo molecular de modo fascista.

Quiero hacer aquí una aclaración terminológica: es importante notar que hablaré de *el parano-analista*, utilizando el artículo masculino. Esto es intencional, dado que se trata precisamente de un patrón mayoritario, un universal dominante encarnado, independientemente de los cuerpos (y/o las auto-percepciones subjetivas correspondientes) de quienes lo efectúen en concreto. Recordemos que Deleuze y Guattari referían ya que no hay un *devenir Hombre* porque Hombre (Masculino/Blanco/Europeo/Heterosexual y Racional/Cuerdo/Capaz/Útil) *se es*, no se deviene (Cf. Deleuze; Guattari 2010).

## Desarrollo

Entonces, un *parano-analista* no es un quién, sino un cómo, un modo de hacer y funcionar situado que eventualmente es encarnado por una persona, pero que no se confunde con toda ella<sup>3</sup>. Para leer ese *hacer* en cuestión, tomaré como referencia conceptual lo que Deleuze y Guattari denominan como sus *dos polos del deseo y/o del delirio*, los dos polos de lo inconsciente: esquizofrénico y paranoide. El que hace de *parano-analista*, así, actúa de modo directamente articulado a su polo homónimo: tiene un saber previo, el cual los sucesos eventuales sólo confirman (nunca refutan), y el mismo es racional y sistemático; siempre supone hay alegorías o alusiones que serían las adecuadas y verdaderas; además, no puede elucidar críticamente su propia posición. Su búsqueda intelectual de descifrar códigos, se traduce en sus prácticas en intentar imponer a los demás esos Códigos establecidos en los que él se reconoce (en los que tiene confianza

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<sup>2</sup> Pero en las prácticas no nos las vemos con *El psicoanálisis*, sino con quienes se dicen (y/o se reconocen) psicoanalistas.

<sup>3</sup> De modo similar, Fernando Ulloa gustaba de decir quien *es* psicoanalista en su consultorio, deja de ser tal cuando está en otra situación social que no sea la del encuadre analítico (cuando está con su familia o sus amigos/as, haciendo las compras para su hogar, etc). (Cf. Ulloa 1995.)

o certeza); esto lo vuelve tan conservador como opresor, aunque él no estaría de acuerdo con estos calificativos (fácilmente argumentaría que apunta a un Bien mayor). Esto le vuelve siempre desconfiado respecto de las versiones y explicaciones alternativas, de las que se desinteresa o a las que desestima, cuando no las considera erradas o directamente peligrosas (probablemente se presenten como amenazantes para su sistema racional con ambición totalizante-totalitaria). Recordemos que, en Semiótica, la noción de *Código* se utiliza tanto para los *códigos de significación* (indican qué significan tales o cuales signos o flujos de signos) como para los *códigos de conducta* (indican lo que se debe hacer en tal o cual situación/contexto); Guattari y Deleuze parecen tener en cuenta ambas especificaciones del término.

Para seguir hablando de los paranoanalistas con algunos términos propios de Deleuze y Guattari, diría que estos trabajan también en el sentido de la *máquina paranoica*<sup>4</sup> (que es anti-productiva) repeliendo las *máquinas deseantes* productivas. Por otro lado, más acá o más allá fomentan sutilmente la *represión general*, la *opresión social*, bajo la conservación de lo ya instituido y lo estructurado. Así, el parano-analista trabaja para la *anti-producción*, en tanto que opera de modo contrario a la producción de otras realidades y de un deseo creativo, novedoso, y provocador.

Ahora bien, respecto de la pregunta “¿cómo se reconoce un parano-analista?”, como dije, aquel que encarna lo que denomino un *parano-analista*, no se reconoce a sí mismo como tal. En el cono sur de latinoamerica, lo más habitual es que se reconozca a sí mismo como *psicoanalista* (pero esta correspondencia no es exclusiva ni universal, sólo común y extendida). Podríamos argumentar que la teoría psicoanalítica freudiana ya parecía favorecer a quien se afirma en que la persona que tiene en frente “no quiere mejorar”, “se resiste” (a curarse, a aceptar una verdad), “no se responsabiliza por su parte en aquello de lo que se queja”, “miente”, “niega”, etc. En la terminología de Guattari y Deleuze, podría decirse que la operatoria de los/as psicoanalistas freudianos/as, pero más aún los/as kleinianos/as, ha sido la de reducir lo que sucede a una grilla conceptual general denominada *Código Edípico* (aunque lo que entienden por esto va más allá del Complejo de Edipo freudiano o lacaniano), el que vendría a decir qué significa lo que le sucede a el/la paciente (código de significación), o qué es lo que el analista debe hacer con ello (código de conducta). Más adelante intentaré pensar acerca de algunos factores más que confluyen en esta situación. Pero ya en ese punto, podríamos recordar ciertas palabras de Deleuze y Guattari: “todo el psicoanálisis familiarista, comprendido el psicoanalista en primer lugar, es ajusticiable por un esquizoanálisis. Una sola manera de pasar el tiempo sobre el diván, *esquizoanalizar al psicoanalista*” (1995: 376; el énfasis es mío). Se entenderá esto que me interesa, en medio de estos desarrollos: que se pueda utilizar el esquizoanálisis para analizar al psicoanalista “en primer lugar”, y especialmente evaluando qué idea de *psicoanalista* tienen en mente ambos autores. Ellos explicitan

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<sup>4</sup> No se deben confundir los conceptos de *polo paranoico* (o *paranoide*), *máquina paranoica*, y *catexis paranoica*. Cada uno alude a cuestiones distintas, aunque por supuesto, existan relaciones entre ellas.

algunas cuestiones al respecto, como por ejemplo, que se dirigen al que *edipiza* o *familiariza* (el que relaciona todo con un tipo ideal y burgués de familia nuclear, y sus modelos de conyugalidad, paternalidad, filiación, etc), del que más hablan y al que toman como paradigma de los demás (esta asimilación es argumentalmente problemática por ser muy discutible su pertinencia, pero es la que ellos decidieron hacer). Pero también se refieren al que opera como *sacerdote piadoso* (el estructuralista que bendice la Falta en Ser), así como al *polizonte* moralista, y al *tecnó-psicoanalista* cientificista (Cf. Ibid.: 114). Podríamos decir aquí que en todos esos casos aluden a distintos modos de ubicarse en lo que ellos denominan *polo paranoide*. Desde este, se inyecta a los demás seres vivos (no sólo humanos sino también animales domésticos) aquellas matrices de los códigos respectivos. Y si “Edipo es primero una idea de paranoico adulto, antes de ser un sentimiento infantil de neurótico” (Ibid.: 283) y si el psicoanalista que critican es el que en sus prácticas analíticas se ubica en ese polo paranoide, esto podría reforzar esta propuesta de denominar, más bien, *parano-analistas* a quienes actúan de esos modos, mientras lo hacen. Así, en relación a esa última cita, podría agregar lo siguiente: *Edipo (y la familia nuclear como conjunto de partida) es una idea de parano-analista, antes de ser un sentimiento infantil de neurótico y en lugar de ser una causa universal psicopatológica*. Aunque lo mismo podría decirse de la carencia ontológica del lacanismo.

Ahora, he enfatizado el intentar estar atentos a lo que sucede en las prácticas analíticas y sociales concretas en el nivel microfísico y molecular, así como en el del *entre* vincular, y reconozco que quizás sea poco habitual para el pensamiento psi el dedicarse a estudiar lo que efectivamente se hace (como hacen más comúnmente los sociólogos), dejando de lado las ideas que los actores humanos se dan acerca de eso que hacen, pero es precisamente eso a lo que nos invita el esquizoanálisis. Podríamos recordar al respecto todas las referencias que Deleuze hace a que la filosofía no debe ser sólo teoría, no debe ser cosa de ideas filosóficas, sino que se trata siempre de una filosofía práctica o de una práctica filosófica, siempre un ejercicio accesible a la dimensión más cotidiana de las vidas. Otro tanto, o quizás más incluso, encontramos incesantes apelaciones en Guattari a realizar una pragmática esquizoanalítica y un estudio de los agenciamientos concretos.

### **Del psicoanálisis al paranoanalista**

Uno de los muchos y variados factores que permiten pensar la afinidad del método freudiano con los razonamientos paranoides, lo encontramos en el hecho de que aquel está inspirado, como Freud mismo lo admite en un texto que publicó bajo un seudónimo (*El Moisés de Miguel Ángel* (Freud 2020)), en un método elaborado para detectar las mentiras y engaños de quienes copiaban grandes cuadros para venderlos como si fueran originales. Este último se conoce como el *método indiciario*, desde el que se presta especial atención a los detalles que podrían haber pasado desapercibidos para la conciencia del

estafador (en el caso de G. Morelli), el/la paciente (en Freud y el psicoanálisis), o el ladrón (en el personaje de ficción Sherlock Holmes). Esto es sólo un ejemplo de todo aquello que reafirma en el propio psicoanálisis un modo de razonamiento paranoide: desconfianza a la otredad<sup>5</sup>, desmesurada confianza en las ideas propias, una voluntad de descubrir/inteligir/descifrar una verdad oculta o no evidente, etc; esto, al no poder auto-cuestionarse, tiende a imponerse sobre las demás personas. Sin embargo, aplicar aquel método a personas que consultan por sus padecimientos, tratando a estas como falsificadoras, criminales, mentirosas, y tendiendo a responsabilizarles individualmente (Cf. Guinzburg 2013), se logran consecuencias vinculares que, históricamente, no fueron suficientemente contempladas en su importancia ético-micropolítica (por ejemplo: aún en nuestros días existen los psicoanalistas que intervienen sobre sus pacientes que sufrieron abusos sexuales infantiles interpretándoles que ellos/ellas habrían provocado estos o, cuando menos, obtuvieron un goce al respecto). No es casualidad que Guattari y Deleuze remarquen que este modo de hacer (paranoide) es, no sólo normativizante, sino también opresor/inhibidor/castrador/represor. Una muestra de ello, entre muchas, es la lectura que hacen de la operación de interpretación que Melanie Klein lleva a cabo con su paciente conocido como el caso Dick. “No es sugestión, es terrorismo (...) ¡Di que es Edipo o si no recibirás una bofetada! El psicoanalista nunca pregunta: «¿Qué son para ti tus máquinas deseantes?», sino que exclama: «¡Responde papá-mamá cuando te hablo!»” (Deleuze; Guattari 1995: 50)<sup>6</sup>.

Por supuesto, esos y otros tipos de actitudes despóticas pueden encontrarse en algunos profesionales de otras terapias como las cognitivo-conductuales (claramente diferentes de las psicoanalíticas) que se vuelven operadores rutinarios de técnicas estandarizadas en protocolos internacionales (códigos de conducta), así como fanáticos de la cientificidad de sus teorías de referencia (otro código de significación instituido), las que se miden con una epistemología naturalizada, positivista, y reaccionaria. Sea cuales sean las teorías y/o técnicas en las que se interesa conscientemente y en las que se reconoce a sí mismo, un parano-analista utiliza siempre ciertos *Códigos* como incuestionables, como si fueran su palabra santa o su Verdad revelada, conocida o inteligible. Lo que importa no es si se trata de los libros de Freud, de Beck, de Moreno, o (peor) de ellos mismos, lo relevante es el uso tipo *códice* que hacen al respecto y las consecuencias ético-micropolíticas que se derivan de ello. Como vengo intentando mostrar, un paranoanalista está centrado en el Saber pero su actitud frente a él no es del orden de las ideas, sino que se expresa ya de entrada en *prácticas de subjetivación* de otros/as y actitudes o acciones concretas para con ellos/as. Quizás las acciones de cientos de profesionales cognitivos-conductuales sean aún más fácilmente reconocibles en esta línea para quienes se han formado psicoanalíticamente,

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<sup>5</sup> Por ejemplo, la célebre frase de Freud “*Mi histérica me miente*” ha sido tomada en esta dirección, como argumento para profundizar esa desconfianza.

<sup>6</sup> Curiosamente, el paranoanalista, si tiene *delirios de persecución* (como los habituales en la entidad psicopatológica llamada *paranoia*), estos tienden a ser actuados de modo que él es el perseguidor (algo que lo acerca a los *delirios de acción* de otra entidad similar, llamada *psicosis pasionales*).

pero nuestros autores eligieron reparar en el propio psicoanálisis del que venían (Guattari) o del que se nutrían (Deleuze), dando una advertencia (provocativa) al señalar que allí Edipo no ha llegado (ni con Freud, ni Klein, ni suficientemente a partir de Lacan) al *punto de su auto-crítica*, que es a donde lo lleva el esquizoanálisis.

Los parano-analistas siempre son racionalistas o intelectualistas, de uno u otro modo: consideran que todo es razonable, tiene motivos y causas cognoscibles (la existencia como código descifrable). En ocasiones consideran que se podría inteligir el absoluto si hubiera suficiente tiempo y dedicación. Están centrados, también entonces, en el conocimiento y en el reconocimiento (factores que Jacques Lacan ubicaba en lo que él llamaba *registro imaginario*, el dominio de la significación y el yo, así como de la conciencia, las apariencias y los engaños cotidianos).

Decía que de los dos polos de lo inconsciente, apuntan siempre a mover el péndulo hacia el polo paranoico-segregativo-narcisista/yoico. Pero un esquizoanalista (si usamos esa nominación) no sería quien permanece en el otro polo, el esquizo, y le hace de espejo al paranoico. El ubicarse *en espejo*, en oposición simple de modo de rivalizar personalmente, pertenece también a *lo imaginario* lacaniano y no es esa la propuesta sobria (y concreta) del esquizoanálisis, aun cuando muchos fragmentos de *El Anti-Edipo* puedan llevarnos a caer en esta apariencia de rivalidad, paridad, y oposición global. Aún no se ha logrado poner en circulación una lectura advertida del tipo de provocación humorística e irónica que alberga dicho libro. Pero un esquizoanalista, si eso existe, podría partir de poner en claro que no se opone ni al psicoanalista ni tampoco al paranoanalista. Quien se diga esquizoanalista tampoco podría garantizar estar ubicado exclusivamente en el polo esquizo, cosa que tampoco sería deseable. Más bien, como decían los antiguos filósofos herméticos, se pendula siempre entre un polo y otro. Un/a esquizoanalista, como mínimo, sabe de esa oscilación y está a la espera de detectar cada vez más rápido y mejor, en qué momento él/ella mismo/a está haciendo de paranoanalista, cuando se está convirtiendo en reaccionario/a o en un/a microfascista.

Antes mencionaba los códigos despóticos, y es de resaltar que mediante la construcción del personaje conceptual del *Déspota*, Deleuze y Guattari articulan no sólo cuestiones antropológicas y del psicoanálisis sino que también toman nociones del campo de las nosografías psicopatológicas, al referir que el *Déspota* y el *Paranoico* adulto son análogos. Ese *personaje conceptual*, el del *Déspota*, es paranoico ya no en el sentido psicopatológico, sino en uno funcional, y por ello puede encarnarlo un emperador, un sacerdote o el líder de una secta, un padre celoso de su hijo/a, un analista respecto de su paciente, etc. En todos los casos se trata siempre de figuras que ejercen cierto poder efectivo.

Esta relación entre poder y paranoia, que el esquizoanálisis visibiliza, puede ser rastreada incluso en las descripciones de la psiquiatría clásica, a fines del Siglo diecinueve. El paciente diagnosticado con paranoia tiene *delirios de grandeza* cuando tiene certeza de que él conducirá al pueblo o a la raza o a la humanidad, o que él es el elegido; y tiene un *delirio auto-referencial* cuando no duda de que las otras personas piensan sobre él o le



dedican sus acciones (“puso la música fuerte porque sabe que me molesta”, o “las calaveras en tu sueño muestran que deseas asesinarme y ocupar mi lugar” como le interpretó edípico-paranoicamente S. Freud a C. Jung) (Cf. Jung 2016). Este último tipo de delirio, en realidad, sólo recubre a aquel delirio de grandeza más profundo, ya que este muestra también el darse importancia, como si los/las demás giraran a su alrededor. Pero curiosamente, esa persona de supuesta importancia es quien necesariamente está aterrorizada, como muestra Alan Watts, y quien procede mediante recursos desesperados al respecto. Veamos el caso, por ejemplo de la Iglesia católica, su Rey celestial y sus delegados terrenales, los sacerdotes:

Culturas con gobiernos de carácter monárquico. Para ellos, el creador del universo fue concebido como el rey del universo (“el Rey de los reyes, el Señor de los señores, el único Gobernador de los príncipes...”).

La idea de que debemos arrodillarnos, inclinarnos y postrarnos ante el Señor del universo con humildad y respeto es un remanente de las culturas del antiguo Oriente. ¿Y esto por qué? Básicamente, porque no hay nadie que esté más aterrorizado que un tirano, y por eso siempre lo verás sentado con la espalda contra la pared mientras tú debes acercarte a él desde una altura inferior y con el rostro mirando hacia el suelo. De esta manera no podrás atacarle con un arma. Cuando te acercas a él, en ningún momento te incorporas para mirarle, porque entonces podrías atacarle. Y motivos no te faltarían, porque no hay peor criminal que aquel que, como él, se adueña de tu vida. [...] aquel que tiene el poder tiene total potestad de cometer crímenes contra ti. (Watts 2019: 17-18)

La cita parece bastante clara de por sí, y al hacer un esbozo de genealogía de la figura del sacerdote se ve llevado a relacionarla con una históricamente anterior, la del emperador de los imperios orientales. Esta relación también está presente en *El Anti-Edipo* y allí se articula con los estudios de K. Marx sobre el modo de producción asiático e imperial. Pero además, lo referido permite vislumbrar el temor paranoico de quien está en el lugar de ejercer el Poder real o efectivo, y los recaudos que se toma cuando establece códigos de conducta protocolares (para sus súbditos o los feligreses: arrodillarse y suplicar expresando respeto, humildad, y una actitud servil). Notemos, por otra parte, que aquel miedo y aquella actitud de estar alerta frente a los peligros ciertos e inminentes que podrían ocurrir<sup>7</sup>, sitúa al déspota/paranoico a vivir preferentemente en una sintonía mental: prefiere prever e inteligir, o, en todo caso, comprender retrospectivamente si algo se le ha escapado en el pasado, antes que centrarse en la conexión con su aquí y ahora

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<sup>7</sup> “La administración de una gran seguridad molar organizada tiene como correlato una [...] inseguridad molecular permanente” (Deleuze; Guattari 2010: 220). “Constantemente tememos perder. La seguridad, la gran organización molar que nos sostiene” (Ibid.: 230).

corporal y afectivo (el lugar donde el personaje conceptual llamado *esquizo* se sitúa preferentemente<sup>8</sup>).

En nuestras sociedades occidentales contemporáneas, esta ideación paranoide de parte de un líder despótico, está dejando de ser tan comúnmente encarnada en un gran emperador, un gran Presidente, un líder Religioso, una estrella de rock, etc, como era predominante hasta la mitad del Siglo veinte (época en que comienzan a caer los grandes relatos modernos), y se la encuentra más bien dispersa en neurosis cotidianas, *normopatías*, micro fascismos, y pequeños temores cotidianos (y seguridades defensivas) que pueden sacar lo peor de cada cual. De ese modo hay que tomar lo paranoide de los parano-analistas; no se trata, de ver algo patológico en un terapeuta o analista o lo que sea, sino de captar esa fibra común que emerge entre lo que hacen nuestros *enemigos* y lo que molecularmente hacemos todos los días nosotros/as mismos/as, aun avalados/as y apoyados/as por las instituciones concretas y los instituidos efectivos que dan consistencia teórico-práctica a nuestras intervenciones. Como dije, nunca estamos a salvo de ser también nuestros propios enemigos; pero esto no puede reducirse al viejo discurso judeo-cristiano que decía que el mal está en nosotros/as mismos/as dado que somos pecadores/as y culpables, y que, entonces, *debemos* rezar (según nos ordena el sacerdote-déspota y su Código incuestionable puesto que fue escrito *en nombre de Dios*), so pena de castigo. Aquí se trata de una otra lógica: el enemigo no es sólo interno ni sólo externo y ni siquiera podemos ubicarlo de modo estable en tal o cual persona porque no se trata de una persona ni de una cualidad personal (la personología aquí no nos es útil, como se aprende en *El Anti-Edipo*). Y si un *enemigo* es móvil, sólo se lo puede cazar provisoriamente y con un estar nómada. La posición a la que se quiere invitar, entonces, es la de la *elucidación crítica* (Cf. Fernández 1989) como actividad incesante, inacabable, pero realizable. Se trata de la difícil actitud de mantenerse en la incomodidad; incluso la de darle prioridad. Esto sabiendo incluso que no se puede vivir para siempre en la incomodidad, que nunca se termina de estar allí para siempre o del todo. Se trataría, entonces, de saber y no olvidar que tarde o temprano la comodidad nos atraparé cuando menos lo veamos venir; el cansancio, el temor, o la seguridad nos jugarán una mala pasada; la burocracia nos habrá capturado; el hartazgo o la impulsividad nos forzarán en sentido contrario a la disponibilidad, la lucidez, y la prudencia. Y esos fracasos no deben ser estimados como consecuencias inevitables, sino ser, también, parte del plan; en algún momento, aunque nos digamos esquizoanalistas nos pondremos paranoicos (recordemos el péndulo de polo a polo): no se trata de naturalizar esto como si fuera inevitable y nada pudiéramos hacer sino que, al contrario, nos cabe prepararnos cada vez mejor para que las consecuencias sean cada vez menos graves (ético-micropolíticamente). “El Plan, así concebido, siempre tiene forzosamente que fallar, pero los fallos forman parte integrante

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<sup>8</sup> Este personaje conceptual (el esquizo) que traza el dúo francés en su libro, no debe ser asimilado a la persona concreta que ha recibido el diagnóstico de esquizofrenia, como ellos aclaran.

del plan” (Deleuze; Guattari 2010: 272). De ese modo, el esquizoanálisis propone prepararse para esa otra cosa que aterra a un parano-analista: fallar.

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## ***The Legacy of Deleuze and Guattari in Sociocultural Anthropology<sup>1</sup>***

by SERGEI V. SOKOLOVSKIY

### **Abstract**

In this paper I focus on the reception of Deleuzoguattarian conceptual legacy and the peculiar situation of Russian sociocultural anthropology, distinguishing it from other national traditions of anthropological research. The peculiarity of this situation lies in the stark contrast between the proliferation of Russian translations of Deleuze and Guattari voluminous oeuvre, on the one hand, and the curious absence of any direct influence of their works on various domains and specializations within national tradition of anthropological research, on the other. In documenting this glaring lack of impact, I trace its main reasons to the prevalence of descriptive and experiential nature of the discipline, as well as to the continuing influence of some (post-) Marxist dogma, particularly in the still prevailing modernist interpretation of the subject-object and nature-culture dualisms.

### **Introduction**

It's not a matter of bringing all sorts of things together under a single concept but rather of relating each concept to variables that explain its mutations.

Gilles Deleuze. *Negotiations*

The semi-centennial anniversary of the publication of the French edition of *Anti-Oedipus* presents a fortuitous opportunity for an overview and assessment of the influence of the entire D&G's oeuvre and its rich conceptual toolkit on theories and practices of anthropologists. It is sure too ambitious a task for the allotted space, so I focus on the influence and reception of their ideas on sociocultural anthropology in the country, where this influence remains negligent, or almost entirely absent, the circumstance that

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simplifies my task. This is the case of Russian anthropology, and its interest lies mainly in the fact that the conspicuous absence takes place in the context of burgeoning numbers of translations of D&G's works into Russian<sup>2</sup>.

The dialogue between Deleuze and Guattari, on the one side, and sociocultural anthropology, on the other, has been for a long time one-sided, that is, both scholars regularly turned to the works of anthropologists (notably to Gregory Bateson and Claude Lévi-Strauss, but also Roger Bastide, Laura and Paul Bohannan, Pierre Clastres, Georges Dumézil, Meyer Fortes, Marcel Griaule, Edward Leach, André Leroi-Gourhan, Marcel Mauss, Bronislaw Malinowski, and Victor Turner), borrowing some concepts, terminology or ideas as material for the elaboration of their own conceptual tools<sup>3</sup>. In an effort to escape many of the assumptions, built into ordinary language or used in previous scholarship, the philosophers have thoroughly rethought many of the notions of their predecessors and elaborated new terminology to reference highly original concepts of their own making, e.g. *rhizome*, *assemblage*, *schizoanalysis*, (*de-*, or *re-*) *territorialization*, *transversality*, *lines of flight*, (*trans-*, or *de-*) *coding*, *smooth/striated space*, *nomadism* and *nomad thought*, *cartography/archaeology*, *desiring* and *war machines*, *body without organs*, *exteriority/interiority*, *molar/molecular*, *minoritarian/majoritarian*, the *ontology of becoming*, *flows*, *folds*, *perspective*, *multiplicity*, *intensity*, *plateau*, *disjunctive synthesis*, *faciality*, *univocity*, to name only the most popular. This new terminology is partly responsible for what makes the work of these two thinkers famously difficult to read.

Notwithstanding the difficulties, some anthropologists, although few in number (for

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<sup>2</sup> Admittedly, Russian translations, not mentioning the French originals, in some cases lagged for decades behind the English ones, and this fact alone might explain the delayed acquaintance of Russian audience with the works of the French scholars, e.g. *Logique du sens* [1969] appeared in Russian translation in 1995 (in English in 1990); next in 1997 came *Nietzsche et la philosophie* [1962] (Engl. 1983) and *Le Pli: Leibniz et le baroque* [1988] (Engl. 1992); then in 1998 *Difference et Repetition* [1968] (Engl. 1994), *Foucault* [1986] (Engl. 1988), and *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* [1991] (Engl. 1994) went out of print; in 1999 there appeared the Russian translation of *Proust et Signes* [1964] (in Engl. in 1972); in 2001 *La Philosophic Critique de Kant* [1963] (Engl. 1984) and a volume, comprising *Empirisme et subjectivité: Essai sur la Nature humain selon Hume* [1958] (Engl. 1991), *Le Bergsonism* [1966] (Engl. 1988), and *Spinoza: Philosophie pratique* [1970] (Engl. 1988); in 2001 *Critique et Clinique* [1993] (Engl. 1998); in 2004 both volumes of *Cinema* [1983, 1985] (Engl. 1986, 1989); in 2004 *Pourparlers 1972–1990* [1990] (Engl. 1995). The *Anti-Oedipus* [1972] was published in 2008 (Engl. 1977), and *Mille Plateau* [1980] (Engl. 1987) in 2010. The same year the translation of *Kafka: pour une littérature mineure* [1975] (Engl. 1986) was published. Next came in 2011 *Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation* [1981] (Engl. 2003); in 2015 *Leibnitz lectures* [1980, 1986/87] and finally in 2016 Deleuze's *Lectures on Spinoza*. Without second editions and corrected translations this constitutes the bulk of the D&G translations into Russian.

<sup>3</sup> The D&G's manner of citing and interpretation of the anthropological accounts have been harshly criticized by a comparative literature scholar Christopher Miller (1993, 1998, 2003) and vigorously defended by D&G's translator and scholar Eugene Holland (2003a, b), a debate that illustrates well the uneasy relationships between philosophical and anthropological knowledge-making. Compare, also, Marc Augé, who perceives D&G's position (together with the views of Clastres) as 'neo-evolutionist', adding that "Ethnographic description and phantasy have never been mingled in so cavalier a manner as in the last three or four years, and never have philosophers treated such materials so casually. All and sundry, with great confidence and with a subtly arrogant condescension, scan other peoples' ethnographies (done by others, speaking of others) and decide upon meanings." (Augé [1979] 1982: 91)

the sake of brevity I shall skip the names of those who used the terminology for purely ornamental purposes, due to current fashion, or just yielding to the temptation of an easy claim to cleverness), have engaged either critically or propitiously certain D&G's conceptions to reform their own research domains in a number of fields, notably in anthropology of media, of technology, digital and medical anthropology, material culture studies, political anthropology and post-colonial studies, the research at the intersection of anthropology with studies of biotechnology and body studies, and some other more specialized research areas.

Beyond anthropology proper, assemblage theory, affect theory and new materialism have been decisively influenced by D&G's work. Besides, the creation of an analytical framework that is capable of including humans and non-humans has been a central concern in STS and the 'multi-species' or animal turn, whereas in contemporary anthropology one of its major 'turns', the ontological<sup>4</sup>, has been inspired almost in its entirety by the French thinkers' ideas on multiplicity and perspectivism: e.g. Eduardo Viveiros de Castro in delineating his own version of 'perspectivism' adopted their vocabulary almost wholesale. In his book on Amerindian cosmologies, he states:

The future of the master concept of anthropology – *relation* – depends on how much attention the discipline will end up lending to the concepts of *difference* and *multiplicity*, *becoming* and *disjunctive synthesis*. (Viveiros de Castro 2014: 170, italics added)

Perspectivism, viewed by some anthropologists as the only version of the ontological turn that has affected their discipline (the view, basing on the situation with this turn in the case of anthropology in Russia, I consider mistaken), exemplifies the most evident case of D&G's influence on the current state of anthropological theory. It does not only borrow much from the conceptual toolkit of the French thinkers, but has a direct reference to the fundamental issues of anthropological research, such as the status of indigenous cosmologies/ontologies in their relation to the Western (scientific) ontology (Cf. Henare; Holbraad; Wastell 2007).

The influence of D&G's ideas on other branches and specializations of anthropological knowledge I assess as modest and profound at the same time. It remains modest in the outreach (that is sociologically, in terms of numbers of scholars involved) due to what Paul Rabinow defined as *idiosyncrasy* of the D&G's tropes (Rabinow 2011: 62) that had contributed to the general difficulty of their texts. Few anthropologists ventured into what most of them perceived as philosophical jungles, but those who did, turned out to be at

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<sup>4</sup> To be exact, only one version within the ontological turn variants (precisely Viveiros de Castro perspectivism that influenced quite a number of anthropologists beyond the field of Amerindian studies) is based on of D&G's concepts. Two other influential strands of the turn, each with their own perspectivist version of multiple nature/cultures of indigenous ontologies, and lead by Philippe Descola and Eduardo Kohn, respectively, practically do not mention any of D&G's works.

the same time influential figures in contemporary anthropology, who acted as interpreters and disseminators of delezoguattarian thought in their own fields of research.

### **D&G's Legacy in Western Anthropology**

In order to substantiate the statement on the profound influence on certain anthropological subdisciplines and research fields, I have to document this influence that quite unlike the case of perspectivism remains unconsolidated, that is dispersed among many domains, research topics, issues of concern, and research centres. One of such research directions not mentioned above is the anthropology of time, elaborated in a dialogue with Deleuzian notions of *l'intempestif*, *contemporaneity* and *historicity* by Paul Rabinow (Rabinow 2011: 62–63, 77), who had also creatively explored the concept of *assemblage* (Ibid.: 121–126). Another prominent case of such an influence is the elaboration by the British anthropologist Tim Ingold of the concept of *rhizome* in his relational approach to what he has termed as *being-in-an-environment*. Besides the concept of rhizome, Ingold has creatively used the D&G's ideas on the *lines of flight*, *haecceity*, and *smooth space* to tie together his different explorations of indigenous ways of life and the continuities between animal and human ways of being (Ingold 2000, 2007, 2011). Arjun Appadurai, an American scholar, specializing in economic anthropology, applied the D&G's terms *detrterritorialization* and *flow* in his analysis of globalization (Appadurai 1996, 2002). Princeton-based anthropologists João Biehl and Peter Locke, publishing mostly in the field of medical anthropology, edited an article collection "*Unfinished: The Anthropology of Becoming*" (Biehl, Locke 2017). Its authors found their inspiration in the rich conceptual apparatus, elaborated by D&G. They explain:

In working toward an anthropology of becoming, we have drawn on the work of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (in dialogue with his longtime collaborator Félix Guattari) [...] In Deleuze's writing we find approaches that seem refreshingly ethnographic and unabashedly open-ended – cartography as opposed to archaeology, rhizomes as opposed to deep structures, leaking social fields as opposed to enclosed systems, and lines of flight and deterritorialization forever breaking through the impasses imposed by totalizing forms of power and knowledge. (Biehl, Locke 2017: 7)

All these anthropologists turned out to be what is elsewhere known as 'multipliers' or mediators, due to the fact that other members of the anthropological communities throughout the world came to know many ideas of the D&G legacy, whose influence is discussed here, not directly, but mediated by the interpretations of their eminent colleagues. It is their engagement with D&G's rich conceptual legacy that has informed the fields and domains of anthropological research mentioned above, and that continues

to resonate with many statements of the French philosophers of becoming.

Perhaps less resonant but still effectual were ‘pin-point’ references to certain R&G’s concepts of other leading anthropologists. Among them are Marilyn Strathern, who engaged Deleuzian concepts of *flux* and *cut* in her influential paper “Cutting the Network” (Strathern 1996), Michael Fisher, who elaborated the term *plateau* into his own *ethical plateaus* (Fischer 2004)<sup>5</sup>. Paul Staller, a US Africanist, in discussing the problem of representing complexity and the search “for a set of metaphors that ethnographers, among others, might use to represent” draws our attention to the D&G’s concept of rhizome as alliance and recommends it for ethnographers to use as “a model for thinking about the dizzying array of complex assemblages that constitute contemporary social worlds (Staller 183–184). There were many more mentions and engagements with D&G legacy by the British, US and Brazilian anthropologists, whereas in France, with exceptions of Barbara Glowczewski (2020), who in her recent book used a whole array of the D&G’s concepts, anthropologists as a rule referred to the D&G’s work either casually, or critically. (see *footnote 2*, above).

To sum up, the influences Deleuze and Guattari (in line with other post-structural philosophers – Jacques Derrida, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault) have exerted a perceptible influence on various fields in contemporary Western anthropology. They have been a decisive force behind the turn to non-Cartesian ontologies and epistemologies that problematize the authorial omnipotence and its representational strategies, as well as to politically more engaged anthropological research. The brief inventory of the intersections and dialogues of Western anthropologists with D&G legacy, presented above, is far from exhaustive (for the sake of brevity I have not covered their influence on media and digital anthropology), its main purpose being the comparison with the place of their legacy in the special case of Russian anthropology.

## **The Case of Russian Anthropology**

If we judge by direct references to their works in Russian ethnology and sociocultural anthropology, the D&G’s legacy seems to be almost totally ignored. This looks strange as all the major texts of the French scholars are available in Russian, although some translations are quite recent (see *footnote 1*, above), which might be a factor in delayed reception.

Perspectivism in its various versions (books by Viveiros de Castro, Descola, Kohn and

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<sup>5</sup> Fischer mentions that Paul Rabinow’s most successful and path-breaking ethnographic work on molecular biology in the 1990s *The Making of PCR* (1996), a landmark book in science studies, “was originally a text drawing heavily on the philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, but all such vocabulary and philosophical attempts were excised from the final text, Rabinow explained at the time to me and other friends, so that it could be read by his molecular biology interlocutors, so that the people he wrote about could also read it.” (Fischer 2018: 81)



Löwenhaupt Tsing are available in Russian translations) produced a negligent impact on fieldwork agenda and subsequent analysis: this approach has been implemented only by a couple of Siberianists, who have attempted to see similarities to Amerindian ontologies among indigenous peoples of Southern Siberia (*cf.*: Broz 2007; Tykhteneva 2011, 2012)<sup>6</sup>.

Indirect influences, that is, the impact of D&G's ideas, interpreted and creatively applied by such scholars as Bruno Latour, John Law, Donna Haraway, Annemarie Mol among others, seem to be more important in the Russian case. Latour, who frequently referred to various parts of the D&G' legacy, has been instrumental in institutionalizing a whole new field in Russian social sciences, affecting those domains within anthropology that are related to STS, among them medical anthropology, body studies, media anthropology, and material culture studies<sup>7</sup>. Urban anthropology, due to the impact of Latourian actor-network theory, based on D&G's ontological insights, has been substantially revised to include in its subject all kinds of infrastructures and invisible agents, such as microbes, radioactive and poisonous waste, etc. (Trubina 2010: 154) 'Flat ontologies', underscoring agency of non-human objects, rhizomatic relations within networks, and 'territorializing' forces of the state apparatus received attention in the anthropology of technology (Kuznetsov 2016; Vozyanov, Kuznetsov, Laktyukhina 2017; Vozyanov 2018), urban anthropology (Bychkova, Popova 2012; Karasyova 2020), and political anthropology (Ssorin-Chaikov 2022). The actor-network methodology has transformed some research domains in medical (Mikhel 2021; Kurlenkova 2018; Torlopova 2017, 2018), and in ecological anthropology (Sokolovskiy 2022). However, such endeavors remain marginal among mainstream research ideologies and have not been so far successful to alter the overall positivistic agenda of the national tradition of anthropological research, a situation that could be documented by the programs of many recent professional forums of Russian anthropologists.

This modernist and positivist agenda (an heir of Marxist materialism that dominated all science in Russia till the early 1990s), with its stark dualisms of nature vs. culture, subject vs. object, past vs. present, human vs. animal, matter vs. spirit, mind vs. body, laid all alternative ontologies suspect, and is responsible for their outright rejection on ideological grounds as being 'unscientific', 'speculative, or 'conjectural'. Professional 'myopia', boarding on obscurantism, of many Russian anthropologists has further contributed to labeling all knowledge that contradicted the established dogma as 'quaint', and to denounce scholars, who experimented with new approaches, as 'victims of fashionable fads'.

Another potential factor that might have contributed to the lack of attention to what happens beyond the discipline's boundaries is the deep entrenchment of interdisciplinary barriers, instituted by a number of agencies, such as academic councils, editorial boards, university departments, etc. that engender boundary policing practices and discourage

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<sup>6</sup> For a comprehensive account of the perspectivist turn in anthropology, see: Vaté, Eidson 2021.

<sup>7</sup> For a review of the 'material turn' publications in Russian anthropology, see: Sokolovskiy 2021.

cross-disciplinary ‘borrowings’. Due to such barriers and veto practices, books as *Cannibal Metaphysics* have been perceived as ‘purely philosophical’, that is, not pertaining to the domain of sociocultural anthropology.

Additionally, the legacy of Marxist materialism, still felt in Russian anthropology, remains a factor that prevents accepting such ideas as democracy of things, the agency of non-human material objects, flat ontologies, or symmetric anthropology that are based on D&G’s notion of the entanglement of humans and non-humans in shared networks and intersecting flows of becoming. All these factors explain the relative lack of attention on the side of Russian anthropologists to the D&G’s rich conceptual legacy that is successfully used in other national traditions of anthropological research.

## Conclusion

The D&G’s legacy has made a substantial impact on anthropology of media, technology, on digital and medical anthropology, on political anthropology, as well as on material culture and post-colonial studies. However, this impact on anthropological theories and practices remains geographically limited, as it has been demonstrated by the case of Russian anthropology, where despite the availability of translations of all the major D&G’s works, very few anthropologists are experimenting with the concepts, elaborated by these French scholars.

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## ***Life After Death: the Concept of New Vitality in Schizoanalysis***

by ANELIYA ZEMLYANSKAYA

### **Abstract**

The article is devoted to the analysis of the essence of life in the conception of schizoanalysis by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in the context of modern philosophy's attempts to go beyond the human. On the example of two opposing anthropologies – psychoanalytic and schizoanalytic – the author shows two ontologies of life, correlated with Aristotelian hylomorphism – life of form and life of matter. Building on Freud's later theory of the death drive, it is demonstrated that psychoanalytic thought is a product of Western Aristotelian-Christian culture, in which to be alive means to be “shaped”. In contrast with this view, Deleuze and Guattari propose a new ontology of vitality that goes beyond hylomorphism, in which life is given to “formless” matter. This new lens leads to a rethinking of man's position in the world, placing him on a par with non-human forms of life such as animals, plants, slime, bacteria and even, beyond that, with metal. The author concludes by outlining some philosophical prospects made possible by overcoming anthropocentrism through this recognition of other weird, life.

In the context of critiques of anthropocentrism, contemporary philosophy seeks to find new ways to imagine what it means to be human which don't center our species to the detriment of the rest of the world. In *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari present their joint project of schizoanalysis as an alternative to rigid and violent psychoanalysis, and, in doing so, offer one such way of transcending anthropocentrism. Schizoanalysis can be discussed in different contexts – as psychoanalytic, Marxist, political, aesthetic, or ethical theory. We propose to consider it primarily as a philosophical-anthropological theory. Such a view reveals Deleuze's and Guattari's *project of a new anthropology* based on an ontology of man different from the classical philosophical tradition.

In Western philosophy man has been long considered consistent with the Aristotelian hylomorphic model – as a union of matter and form, body and soul. The soul is the entelechy of the body, it gives it form and motion. Matter is passive, it only has potency, actualising itself through the soul. According to the hylomorphic principle, matter and form are inseparable and have no substantial expression: just as vision cannot exist apart from the eye, the soul is inconceivable apart from the body. However, in one circumstance Aristotle violates this principle: there exists a special part of the

soul – Nous, world mind, immovable and eternal source of the rational part of the soul, capable of separating itself from its material carrier: “When separated it is alone just what it is, and this above is immortal and eternal” (Aristotle 1991: 54). Thus the soul has a privileged position in relation to the body: it is eternal, and since truth in ancient Greece was understood as something eternal and immutable, the soul is endowed with the quality of truth. Human truth is not in the body, but in the soul. This attitude can be traced through medieval scholasticism, where the soul, unlike the body as the receptacle of base instincts, was thought to be the divine part of man, and in modern times, which elevated the human mind over the feelings rooted in the animal body. Thus, if we turn to the history of philosophy, we can soon discover that philosophers were not interested in man in his entirety, but only partially – as a receptacle of the soul, consciousness, mind – in short, only as a form. As a consequence of this attitude, ever since the dawn of New Age epistemology, man has been reduced to the notion of the subject as a bearer of consciousness and cognitive activity.

Deleuze and Guattari discussions of the subject find it well on its way from the integrated subject addressed by Kant to the divided subject central to Freudian thought. Whereas in Kant's philosophy the subject placed in the center of the cognitive process was thought to be simple and rational, S. Freud, and following him Jacques Lacan, called into question such a self-subject revealing that his consciousness is in many respects a product of the unconscious beyond his control. Deleuze and Guattari followed Freud in weakening the subject, but pressed it to its conclusion and rejected the notion altogether, replacing it with “subjectivity” and emphasizing its procedural rather than essential character. This radical gesture also required the rejection of psychoanalysis, which had the Kantian rational subject at its center, albeit under interrogation. Psychoanalysis, based on New Age discourse, aimed at restoring the lost integrity of the subject: at the heart of the analytic process lies the intention to bring the dark unconscious to light and place it under the control of the conscious. That is why Freud, wishing to structure the unconscious, does so according to a clear linear logic: there are oral, anal, and phallic stages of psychosexual development, failures in which lead to the formation of neurotic character structures. There is also a universal plot of the individual's mental life – the Oedipus Complex. Oedipus sets up a symbolic order: here is mother, here is father, and here is me, and relations in this family triangle develop according to a predetermined scenario. However, Deleuze and Guattari remark that such an effort to regulate the unconscious, to subject it to rational logic, is itself neurotic because neurosis, following Freud's own classification, is the desire of the conscious to supplant the unconscious. Thus, the psychoanalyst finds himself in the position of the neurotic.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, in order to escape the oppression of rationality exercised by psychoanalysis, it is necessary to overcome the Oedipus Complex not in the Freudian sense but by stepping outside it, as in reality it is not the hidden content

of the unconscious, but a type of compulsion imposed by psychoanalysts. In the preface to *Anti-Oedipus*, Foucault will call this book “a book on ethics” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: xiii) and the fight against fascism in a broad sense: fascism as everyday behavior, expressed in our love of power and the various forms of domination over us, whether it is the domination of a policeman, a teacher or a psychoanalyst. In an even broader sense, it is about liberation from domination in any form, and in particular from the Oedipal.

Oedipus is a form-forming figure: like a sculptor, he strips away the superfluous from the unconscious and gives it the necessary outline, in other words, he creates a stable subject. But while psychoanalysis centers on the subject as a permanent *structure*, schizoanalysis centers on subjectivity as a continual *process* – the process of desiring-production. Desire is understood here not as individualistic – to emphasise its impersonal nature the authors talk about its machine character – but as a kind of vital energy, an ontological force that constructs the world. This desire has nothing in common with the Oedipus Complex, where it is teleological (because it is strictly channeled and directed towards the figure of the mother or father) and deficient (because it is funded by scarcity). On the contrary, it is aimless and redundant: it is a productive force, a machine that sets in motion the process of the production of reality. The unconscious, at the heart of which is desiring-production, is structured neither linearly like Freud's nor linguistically like Lacan's; it is not structured in any way. It is not a structure but a process, not a centered tree with a strict hierarchy, but a rhizome dispersed by the flows of desire in all directions. Therefore, from a schizoanalytic perspective, man is heterogeneous: he is not a single entity, but an aggregate of many – many molecules that make up the body, each of which is charged with desire.

If the neurotic displaces the unconscious by creating Oedipus in order to hold on to his integrity, the opposite figure, the psychotic, displaces consciousness, undermining it in order to disintegrate into the multitude. If the neurotic wishes to strengthen his subjectivity, the psychotic longs to lose it, to become the pure object of the unconscious, to experience it overwhelming and engulfing him like an oceanic wave. However, both strategies are problematically grounded in the Oedipal: the neurotic is positively attached to the form, while the psychotic is negatively attached, through its negation. The form is constitutive for both:

It would be inaccurate to maintain an Oedipal interpretation for the neuroses, and to reserve an extra-oedipal explanation for the psychoses. There are not two groups, there is no difference in nature between neuroses and psychoses. For in any case desiring-production is the cause, the ultimate cause of both the psychotic subversions that shatter Oedipus or overwhelm it, and of the neurotic reverberations that constitute it. (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 126-127)

The true liberation of the unconscious from the constructs of the mind, however, lies in going beyond Oedipus – into the realm of schizophrenia. Deleuze and Guattari speak of schizophrenia not as a clinical diagnosis but as a process of desire production – the vital activity of the individual presented as a desire machine, unconsciously realizing its desires. The neurotic urge to stabilise and fix the form leads to breakdowns in this process, the psychotic urge to lose the form leads to deviations from it, since “the resistance to Oedipus, the return to the body without organs was still an artificial sphere, O asylum!” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 363).

Overcoming neurosis and psychosis as forms of alienation from reality is possible through the dismantling of all the stable constructions of the mind on which it rests. Stability of constructions is given by solid bodies having a form. Therefore, it is necessary to melt these bodies so that they become a fluid mass, a formless matter. This means entering into the pure process of schizophrenia, a flow free of stable forms. Thus becoming schizophrenic involves the death of the ego:

That is why we speak of an Oedipal-narcissistic machine, at the end of which the ego encounters its own death, as the zero term of a pure abolition that has haunted oedipalized desire from the start, and that is identified now, at the end, as Thanatos. 4, 3, 2, 1, 0 – Oedipus is a race for death. (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 359)

Deleuze and Guattari speak of death as an anthropological transcendence. If classical philosophy thinks of man as a transcendent animal, schizoanalysis proposes taking another transcending step and going beyond the human, beyond the ego. The death of the ego does not mean the death of the human, but a new experience of life – the experience of becoming non-individualized matter-flow, obtained through “decapitation”. One does not die after decapitation. When the head leaves its place, it triggers the dissolution of the hierarchy: the chains holding the organs in place break up and the head sets off on its free journey through the body freed from the violence of the forms.

Yet for man in western culture, a fundamentally hylomorphic model, non-individual life does not exist: *to be alive means to be “formed”*. All other forms of life are perceived as death, a total loss of self. This Aristotelian attitude can be seen within Freud's philosophy, in particular in his theory of the urge to death. According to his thought, man's becoming takes place between two poles, the life and death drives, Eros and Thanatos. If Eros is oriented towards development and complication of the individual, Thanatos is oriented towards regression and simplification: the death impulse is the urge of every living organism to return to the previous stage of development, in the desire to become inorganic matter, as “inanimate things existed before living ones” (Freud 1961: 32). Phenomenologically the urge to death means the urge to rest as inanimate matter in a state of complete rest.



Freud demonstrates the mechanism of this desire for rest using the image of the “undifferentiated vesicle of a substance” (Freud 1961: 20), the elementary living particle symbolizing the human psyche. This vesicle perceives the world as a threat:

This little fragment of living substance is suspended in the middle of an external world charged with the most powerful energies; and it would be killed by the stimulation emanating from these if it were not provided with a protective shield against stimuli. (Freud 1961: 21)

However, it has protection against stimulus provided by the surface of the vesicle, its “cortical layer” – the dead part of the organic matter which does not let the destructive forces of the outside world inwards. This shell must be intact: the closure of the vesicle ensures its safety. Thus, the Freudian subject is separated from and opposed to the world.

Deleuze and Guattari refer to a similar image, that of a circle, to describe the subjectivation process. At the center of this circle are the machines of desire-absolute vitality, the intensity of pure production that works redundantly, without any purpose or reason-and on its surface is the body without organs, a zero intensity that is anti-functional and wants to stop all production processes. The process of subjectification unfolds between two dichotomous poles: the pure intensity of the machine-organ and the zero intensity of the body without organs. These poles are interdependent: just as the surface of an atom cannot exist without a nucleus, the surface of a body without organs forms a unit with the charged machines of desire. The forces of attraction and repulsion act between the center and the surface, generating states of varying intensity. The subject appears on the surface of the circle as an effect, a “recorder”, of the intensities through which it passes. It is transpositional because it does not represent the whole circle but only a part of it, appearing here and there:

It is a strange subject, however, with no fixed identity, wandering about over the body without organs, but always remaining peripheral to the desiring-machines, being defined by the share of the product it takes for itself, garnering here, there, and everywhere a reward in the form of a becoming or an avatar, being born of the states that it consumes and being reborn with each new state. (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 16)

Unlike the Freudian subject which is self-identical and closed off from the outside world, the schizoanalytic fluid subject is neither closed nor separated from the world. If we continue with the Freudian metaphor of vials, he is like Leonid Lipavsky's “bubble”:

Life appears as the following picture. A semiliquid inorganic mass, in which fermentation takes place, tensions and knots of forces come and go. It surges with bubbles, which, adapting, change their shape, stretch out, split into a multitude of

stirring threads, into whole chains of bubbles. All of them grow, tug, tear off, and these torn off parts continue their movements as if nothing had happened and stretch out and grow again. (Lipavsky 1994: 84-85)

According to Lipavsky, there are at least two ways to live: “our way” and “not our way”. Thus, a dead man, a lunatic, an idiot are alive, but the form of their life is fatal for us. If the sleepwalker would not appear in one row with the dead man, then one may think that to live not our way means not humanly in the most literal sense of this word: cellular, parasitic, bacterial, all that lives in the human body. But the sleepwalker is not a bacterium or a dead man: his heart beats in his chest, his lungs are filled with oxygen and he has a completely human appearance. He does not live our way because he leads a “formless” irrational life, he becomes a pure stream, a flow of matter. In this sense, the sleepwalker is no different from the slime bug, bedbug, clothes louse, worm, and other scary creatures – scary because they are “almost liquid”. Paradoxically, the subhuman, to which Lipavsky attributes all body fluids (mucus, blood, saliva, bacteria, viruses, worms, mites, bedbugs), appears closer to man than his neighbor, right inside him. These hideous life forms provoke both horror and contempt: the animate nature of this swarming, impersonal mass seems unnatural.

If the Freudian man has a defense against external influences, but “towards the inside there can be no such shield” (Freud 1961: 23). Freud understood the inner world, from which these forces originate, as primarily a psychic world: surplus unspent energy presses on the psychic apparatus from within, seeking an exit to the outside. But it can also be interpreted literally – as a totality of different kinds of fluids and “almost liquid” beings hiding under our skin. As soon as we get a small cut on our skin, this flow of life erupts and spreads outward in all directions, penetrating into objects and vaporizing. Blood embodies the image of unfocused impersonal life, which “oscillates between certainty and indeterminacy, impersonality and individuation” (Lipavsky 1994: 82).

Matter is man's main fear and object of desire: the urge to death is the unconscious desire to return to a state of absolute inorganic materiality. But while Freud thinks of inorganic matter as dead, Deleuze and Guattari speak of it as a special form of life:

The prodigious idea of *Nonorganic Life* – the very same idea Worringer considered the barbarian idea par excellence – was the invention, the intuition of metallurgy. Metal is neither a thing nor an organism, but a *body* without organs. (Deleuze 2005: 411)

If for Lipavsky matter is predominantly liquid, for Deleuze and Guattari it is a flow in which the solid and the liquid ceaselessly turn into each other. Metal has a similar shape-shifting quality. Metal is rhizomatic: it is capable of being reborn again and again in different forms, both hard and fluid. It lies deep in the Earth and at the same time

pervades its entire surface: “Even the waters, the grasses, the forests and the beasts are inhabited by salts or mineral elements”. Man is neither a solidified metallic form nor a molten metal capable of taking any shape but a metalworker and smith. “The metallurgist” of Deleuze and Guattari is not one who forces metal to follow his will, but one who himself follows the metal:

Rather, artisans are those who follow the matter-flow as pure productivity: therefore in mineral form, and not in vegetable or animal form. They are not of the land, or of the soil, but of the subsoil. Because metal is the pure productivity of matter, those who follow metal are producers of objects par excellence. (Deleuze 2005: 411-412)

If the man of the earth is a man standing on it and cultivating it as an object, the man of the subsoil is immersed in the earth, he acts as part of it. To the agriculturist he appears dead, buried. However, in the subsoil, Deleuze and Guattari say, it is possible to live, but to live not in our own way. It is not a state of absolute fusion with the world in which the animal resides. If every animal, as Georges Bataille wrote, is in a world “like water in water” (Bataille 1989: 19), then man is like metal in matter. He is not dissolved but distributed as the productive force of matter:

It's not a question of being this or that sort of human, but of becoming inhuman, of a universal animal becoming – not seeing yourself as some dumb animal, but unraveling your body's human organization, exploring this or that zone of bodily intensity, with everyone discovering their own particular zones, and the groups, populations, species that inhabit them. (Deleuze 1995: 11)

The anthropological project proposed by Deleuze and Guattari seems, at first glance, to be negative, since it implies the deconstruction of forms. In reality, however, it does not aim at deconstruction, but at overcoming forms: if in the first case we are talking about negative dependence on form, in the second case we are talking about liberation from dependence on form. A person should not cling to the form, as a neurotic does, nor undermine it, as a psychotic does, but build themselves into a being in which form is not substantiated: I am ready to become any form and to reject it at any moment in order to immerse myself in the elements again. The schizophrenic can take any form, because he is independent of it, he does not care about it. His intention is to break through to vitality, to join the element as the beginning of being, where form can be a stage on the way to this joining, but not the final point. This requires entering the mode of gameplay without rules: the schizoanalytic subject is constantly playing, but it is not clear what it is playing at.

Thus, in order to emerge from the anthropological and ecological crises to which man's selfish behavior has led, he needs to build his identity on new foundations: not by opposing himself to other forms of life, but by inserting himself into the same world alongside them. It is necessary to undermine the organism and become a body without

organs, from which absolutely any structure may arise at random, thus equalizing the status of all entities, from bacteria or mucus to plant or man. It is this gesture that will enable man to overcome the anthropocentrism still prevalent in philosophy.

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## ***Introduction – La Schizoanalyse et nous***

par GABRIEL MART & DIMITRI BOCHKOV [ИННОКЕНТИЙ МАРТЫНОВ & ДМИТРИЙ БОЧКОВ]

50 ans de *l'Anti-Œdipe*. Légitiment, cette année a été marquée par une multitude d'événements thématiques, mais aussi évidente que soit la première affirmation, il était encore nécessaire d'en marquer l'impressionnante géographie: il est rare que le sujet permette une telle transgression de la tendance à la domination anglo-américaine dans l'espace académique. Nous – pédagogues, psychanalystes, sociologues, philosophes, critiques et activistes, plus ou moins orientés vers les idées du projet de pensée dont Guattari a présenté la première version (charmante par son caractère contradictoire) avec Deleuze en 1972 – savons bien que les institutions, elles aussi, "parlent", établissant les relations de transfert tout en créant les défenses psychiques, etc. Il semble que notre série de rencontres au cours de l'année anniversaire ait pu nous rappeler ce que nous oublions souvent derrière la molarité du quotidien de notre travail: l'institution apparaît elle-même comme un sujet dans son inconscient. En observant nos collègues (et bien sûr nous-mêmes), nous avons vu que lorsque nous parlons des abstractions sociales et métaphysiques complexes de *L'Anti-Œdipe* depuis la tribune institutionnelle, nous parlons en fait de choses très personnelles: des réfractions locales de la schizoanalyse où le ciblage transforme le discours en parole.

La schizoanalyse et nous. Chaque année, chercheurs et critiques arrivent à inventer de nouveaux truismes sur la pertinence globale de *L'Anti-Œdipe* de l'année N. Sans oser nous inscrire dans cette glorieuse tradition, nous nous limiterons à un constat local qui nous est proche: deux processus différemment orientés, mais complémentaires se déroulent parallèlement en Russie. D'une part, un mouvement spécifique vers la singularité: la Russie tente actuellement de passer de la névrose collective à la névrose individuelle; il semble que ce processus risque d'être inversé par la guerre en Ukraine qui nous ramène à la névrose collective. D'autre part, un mouvement général en Occident vers la réappropriation de l'agentivité, à travers, surtout, l'agencement collectif (on se souvient du triomphe de Reddit sur les grands *traders* de Wall Street et de l'augmentation du cours de la bourse de GameStop). Guattari lui-même se serait sûrement réjoui d'une telle incohérence, mais la pertinence suffit-elle à rendre possible l'importation de la schizoanalyse en Russie ? Dans quel contexte la pensée guattarienne s'inscrit-elle ? Nous avons essayé de spéculer sur les facteurs cliniques, institutionnels et sociaux de la schizoanalyse en Russie. L'inspiration pour cette courte présentation est venue d'un article de Ian Parker (2021) sur Guattari dans la revue *Free Associations*.

Un certain nombre d'ouvrages majeurs de Deleuze et Guattari, notamment

*Capitalisme et schizophrénie* et *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie ?* ont été traduits en russe depuis très longtemps. De même, trois traductions de textes de Guattari, bien que modestes, sont à mentionner ces dernières années: l'essai *Les trois écologies* et l'article « Machine et structure » sont parus en 2019 et notre traduction conjointe de l'article « Un changement de paradigme » a été publiée en 2021 (Guattari 2019a; 2019b; 2021). Mais malgré sa popularité assez large parmi les philosophes, les idées cliniques de Guattari restent presque inconnues dans le milieu russophone. Le générique « schizoanalyse » est rare, de plus en plus remplacé par « de Deleuze ». Tout le monde croit savoir ce qu'est la schizoanalyse, mais ne veut pas la comprendre: lire Deleuze et Guattari est beaucoup plus inconfortable que lire simplement Deleuze. On a tendance d'oublier que Guattari est resté clinicien jusqu'à sa mort, psychanalyste si l'on veut, et qu'il a travaillé non seulement comme psychothérapeute à La Borde, mais qu'il effectuait aussi des séances analytiques privées dans son cabinet rue Saint-Sauveur.

Cependant, il ne s'agit pas d'un problème spécifiquement russe. Dans le monde anglo-américain, la « clinique » est prise en otage avec succès par le Capitalisme Mondial Intégré. La vision de la clinique de santé mentale, imposée par les agents d'assurance, est aujourd'hui déjà légitimement reproduite sans leur participation, par les gens eux-mêmes, qui ont vu la source des identifications chères dans les pratiques de répression mentale: le triumvirat scientifique de la pharmacologie, du neurofascisme et du comportementalisme cognitif (une réorganisation de l'Ego-Psychology américaine qui a perverti la psychanalyse). Avec la victoire de la pharmacologie sur « l'antipsychiatrie », il semble qu'il n'y ait plus de place pour une autre « clinique ».

Est-ce le cas en Russie ? À certains égards, le contexte historique de la Russie recoupe celui de l'Amérique latine: le développement de la médecine et de la santé mentale en Russie, comme en Amérique latine, s'est fait en dehors de l'orbite du monde anglo-américain pendant une période considérable. Un autre point de convergence est l'importante inégalité sociale en termes d'accès aux soins psychothérapeutiques; au Brésil, en Uruguay ou en Argentine, le système public est plus propice à la diffusion et à l'établissement de pratiques psychanalytiques qu'en Russie, même si la « qualité » de ces psychanalyses est remise en question (Tupinamba 2021). Pour comprendre la particularité du contexte russe dans la clinique, un certain nombre de facteurs doivent être pris en compte. En Occident, la pratique de la santé mentale a émergé du milieu hospitalier. Par exemple, en Angleterre, l'hôpital psychiatrique était autrefois un « asile de fous », une prison, et en France, un refuge politique local. Cela a, dans une large mesure, façonné les perceptions de la pratique psy. Si Parker dérive le destin de la schizoanalyse en Occident de l'unité d'hospitalisation, en Russie il devrait être dérivé de l'unité ambulatoire. Depuis les années 1920, la Russie a développé un réseau de dispensaires psychoneurologiques publics – des structures ambulatoires et semi-hospitalières rattachées aux hôpitaux psychiatriques. Le dispensaire psychoneurologique était considéré comme un établissement de soins primaires, au

même titre qu'une polyclinique thérapeutique générale ou une clinique gynécologique. En outre, des cabinets psychothérapeutiques ont été ouverts dans le cadre des polycliniques pour adultes (toutefois, au lieu d'un psychologue praticien, c'est un psychiatre qui y est installé), et des cabinets psychoneurologiques ont été ouverts dans le cadre des polycliniques pédiatriques. Ce système devait permettre d'offrir des soins psychiatriques révolutionnaires aux masses sans les retirer de la société. L'établissement hospitalier, quant à lui, devient le lieu où sont gardés les patients les plus graves, soit en crise, soit en pleine décompensation mentale. Ce système « psy » ambulatoire est l'œuvre de Nikolai Semashko, proche des idées de l'hygiène sociale, qui a introduit la nosologie psychiatrique s'ancrant dans les conditions sociales de l'individu. Les psychiatres russes ont été l'un des premiers groupes professionnels à soutenir le coup d'État bolchevik qui promettait des changements sociaux et politiques grandioses (Lavretsky 1998). Les bolcheviks ont tenu leur promesse, mais pas de la manière dont les pys l'ont perçue – la fin des années 1930 a vu une unification grandiose et révolutionnaire des perspectives théoriques, y compris dans le domaine des soins psychologiques. L'hygiène sociale a également été victime de cette unification.

La situation ne s'est pas améliorée après la guerre et après la mort de Staline. Alors que les hôpitaux psychiatriques occidentaux ont ouvert leurs portes dans les années 60 et 70, c'est exactement le contraire qui est arrivé en Russie où à l'inverse la marginalisation de l'hôpital psychiatrique a été lancée. Le système ambulatoire a commencé à s'ossifier au fur et à mesure: le médecin généraliste, nécessairement présent dans toutes les polycliniques, s'est transformé en distributeur de patients à d'autres médecins (Sheiman 2013). L'hôpital psychiatrique était perçu comme une sorte de prison particulière. Tout problème psychiatrique même peu grave était perçu comme une maladie dangereuse. C'est une sorte de métonymie qui s'est produite: toute personne recherchant des soins psychiatriques ambulatoires est désormais perçue comme potentiellement dangereuse et exposée à l'expulsion sociale et à l'isolement dans une prison spéciale. Jusqu'à aujourd'hui, les institutions psychiatriques sont désignées de manière dépréciative, mais prudente, par le terme « *durka* » (consonant avec le terme russe « *durak* », fou). Les mots "schizo", "schizophrène", "autiste" sont encore des jurons très communs dans le langage quotidien. L'utilisation des services psychiatriques par les autorités soviétiques à des fins politiques (suppression des opposants) a contribué à l'attitude méfiante des Russes à l'égard de toute forme de psychopratique. Une métaphore clinique essentielle à la schizoanalyse, la schizophrénie, la *dementia praecox*, contenait des connotations politiques explicites dans le contexte soviétique, associées aux pratiques et aux abus répressifs de l'État. La « schizophrénie à évolution lente », désignée par Snezhnevsky comme une « variété non psychotique » (le phénomène que les analystes appelleraient aujourd'hui psychose ordinaire ou blanche), est devenue la marque de fabrique de la psychiatrie punitive, utilisée par l'État soviétique à partir des années 1960 pour lutter contre les dissidents. Il faut également mentionner un autre

aspect du contexte russe. Alors que dans certaines parties du monde les psychologues ont pu devenir une alternative plus « amicale » au psychiatre, pour les Russes, tout praticien psy – psychiatre, psychologue, psychothérapeute, psychanalyste – est perçu comme un médecin et, par conséquent, comme un élément d'une machine psychiatrique effrayante. À l'hôpital, les patients me demandent (G.M.) périodiquement de regarder leur estomac ou se plaignent d'une toux. Le fait qu'avant l'effondrement de l'Union soviétique, la psychothérapie était majoritairement perçue comme une thérapie par la suggestion ou l'hypnose crée également des attentes spécifiques chez les gens. Dans un tel environnement, la population en général est plus susceptible de se tourner vers des coachs de vie, l'ésotérisme ou une bouteille de vodka que vers un système de santé mentale.

Au-delà des aspects de la clinique russe, il faut également aborder le thème social. La Russie n'a pas échappé à l'idéologie néolibérale de la réussite à outrance, du bonheur imposé de manière répressive, ainsi que de la culpabilité et du désespoir face à l'impossibilité de l'atteindre. En plus de la particularité de la clinique russe, les gens ne se sentent pas seulement cassés, mais croient qu'ils peuvent être réparés comme un automate. Ce qu'ils attendent d'un praticien de psy, c'est qu'il les fera guérir: une position de passivité où une manipulation médicale ou magique sera effectuée sur le sujet. C'est simple et facile ! Réparé, à nouveau fonctionnel. Cela explique la prolifération des psychotechniques de toutes sortes où le sujet est parlé par l'Autre lacanien dans le sens psychotique le plus malin: la recherche de scénario de vie dans les vies antérieures, traumatismes de la naissance, astrologie, hypnose, codage et autres « magies urbaines », bien monétisées par le capitalisme tardif. Il est difficile de dire s'il y a derrière tout cela un besoin d'expérimentation créative, libératrice et ontologique. On peut également y voir un fondement pragmatique. La psychopratique de qualité reste, semble-t-il, assez inaccessible. Le recours à un spécialiste très qualifié (ce qui, en Russie, implique souvent la formation obtenue à l'étranger) reste une prérogative réservée à la classe moyenne supérieure, mais le marché surchauffé des services psy est truffé de praticiens aux qualifications douteuses, enclins au dumping. L'absence totale de diplôme ou d'autres barrières minimales à l'entrée dans le métier n'améliore pas la situation.

D'autre part, les institutions publiques ne garantissent pas non plus de qualifications spécialisées et il peut être difficile de s'y rendre autrement qu'en « ambulance ». En outre, les gens ne sont pas prêts à contribuer à long terme dans leur bien-être mental. Ils seraient plus disposés à payer dix ou cent fois cette somme à un guide ésotérique ou à un hypnotiseur s'il promet de les « réparer » en une seule séance. Les modalités psychothérapeutiques communes, qui ont été simplement importées après l'effondrement de l'Union soviétique dans les années 1990, entrent en conflit avec le contexte social particulier. Ainsi, en raison du taux élevé de divorce et de mortalité masculine, la famille nucléaire était en crise depuis près de 20 ans. D'où vient une anecdote russe courante: « La moitié du pays a été élevée par une famille homosexuelle



composée d'une mère et d'une grand-mère ». Bien que la famille nucléaire soit en train d'être réinventée en Russie, la psychanalyse anglo-américaine basée sur ce phénomène est mal accueillie et ses adeptes ressemblent soit à un culte du cargo, soit à une loge maçonnique. La psychanalyse freudienne, plus ouverte et plus souple, est mieux accueillie dans certains milieux, bien qu'elle ne représente pas un phénomène social remarquable. Les systèmes familiaux sont confrontés à des difficultés similaires. Le comportementalisme cognitif, quant à lui, ne fait que pervertir davantage l'état déjà précaire de la psyché russe. Dans une telle situation, les pratiques « humanistes » de « caresses » sociales se sont considérablement répandues: Gestalt, Rogerianisme, psychologie positive et leurs variantes locales.

Ainsi, l'importation directe de la schizoanalyse en Russie est impossible, tout comme l'importation directe de n'importe quelle autre école analytique. La schizoanalyse se distingue favorablement des autres écoles en ce que le caractère de la schizoanalyse contredit l'idée d'une importation simple. La schizoanalyse est une doctrine incomplète et contradictoire, pas une orthodoxie profonde laissée par le maître à ses élèves. Néanmoins, elle n'est pas tant un assemblage analytique qu'un métamodèle qui peut se déployer dans des domaines variés. Guattari lui-même, au début de ses *Cartographies schizoanalytiques*, ne présente pas la schizoanalyse comme une nouvelle marque plus fidèle de la psychanalyse ni comme une nouvelle discipline alternative à celle-ci. Au contraire, une telle dialectique des contradictions pour la schizoanalyse est un autre réductionnisme malvenu. Guattari écrit qu'il cherche à libérer tous les éléments de valeur qui ont été découverts par la psychanalyse de ses couches réductionnistes. Si, dans un certain contexte national, il était important que les schizoanalystes se distancient de la psychanalyse, ce n'est pas le cas en Russie. De même que pour le Russe, tout le monde dans la clinique est médecin, tout analyste – guattarien, winnicottien, lacanien – sera toujours le même psychanalyste. En même temps, dans le contexte créé par la trajectoire du développement de la clinique russe, il semble plus pertinent de se distancier non pas de la psychanalyse, mais de la psychothérapie: cette dénomination forme certaines attentes chez le patient russe. Il s'attend à être soigné, que quelque chose lui soit fait, il accepte déjà la passivité avant qu'elle ne se déroule. L'utilisation de la racine « schiz » comme un juron courant soulève également le problème du « *branding* ». La schizoanalyse est vraiment difficile à présenter. La schizoanalyse est en fait constituée de trois projets: un programme de la philosophie et de la théorie sociale développé par Guattari avec Gilles Deleuze (psychiatrie matérialiste et ontologie glossématique); un métamodèle; et une pratique clinique. S'il n'est pas possible de présenter la schizoanalyse comme quelque chose d'unifié, nous suggérons d'avancer pas à pas, en commençant par la clinique – le domaine de pratique le plus clair – précédée par des recherches théoriques présentées lors des événements thématiques orientés vers l'académie.

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## ***Introduction – Schizoanalysis and Us***

by GABRIEL MART & DIMITRI BOCHKOV [ИННОКЕНТИЙ МАРТЫНОВ & ДМИТРИЙ БОЧКОВ]

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50 years of *Anti-Œdipus*. Legitimately, this year has been marked by a multitude of thematic events, but as obvious as the first statement is, it was still necessary to mark its impressive geography: it's rare that the subject allows such a transgression of the Anglo American tendency to dominate academic space. We – pedagogues, psychoanalysts, sociologists, philosophers, critics and activists, more or less oriented towards the ideas of the project of thought of which Guattari presented the first version (charming in its contradictory nature) with Deleuze in 1972 – are well aware that institutions, too, "speak", establishing transference relations while creating psychic defenses and so on. It seems that our series of meetings over the course of the anniversary year has reminded us of what we often forget behind the molarity of our day-to-day work: the institution itself appears as a subject in its unconscious. Observing our colleagues (and, of course, ourselves), we've seen that when we talk about the complex social and metaphysical abstractions of *L'Anti-Œdipus* from the institutional podium, we're actually talking about very personal things: local refractions of schizoanalysis where targeting transforms discourse into speech.

Schizoanalysis and us. Every year, researchers and critics come up with new truisms about the global relevance of *L'Anti-Œdipus* of year n. Without daring to join in this glorious tradition, we'll confine ourselves to a local observation that's close to home: two differently oriented but complementary processes are running in parallel in Russia. On the one hand, a specific movement towards singularity: Russia is currently trying to move from collective neurosis to individual neurosis; it seems that this process risks being reversed by the war in Ukraine, which brings us back to collective neurosis. On the other hand, a general movement in the West towards the reappropriation of agency, through, above all, collective arrangement (we remember Reddit's triumph over the big Wall Street traders and GameStop's stock price rise). Guattari himself would surely have welcomed such incoherence, but is relevance enough to make it possible to import schizoanalysis into Russia? What is the context of Guattari's thinking? We have tried to speculate on the clinical, institutional and social factors of schizoanalysis in Russia. The inspiration for this short presentation came from an article by Ian Parker (2021) on Guattari in the journal *Free Associations*.

A number of major works by Deleuze and Guattari, including *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* and *What is Philosophy?* have been translated into Russian for a very long time. Similarly, three translations of Guattari's texts, albeit modest, are worth mentioning in recent years: the essay *Les trois écologies* and the article "Machine et structure" appeared in 2019, and our joint translation of the article "Un changement de paradigme" was published in 2021 (Guattari 2019a; 2019b; 2021). But despite his fairly widespread popularity among philosophers, Guattari's clinical ideas remain almost unknown in Russian-speaking circles. The generic "schizoanalysis" is rare and increasingly replaced by "Deleuze's". Everyone thinks they know what schizoanalysis is, but doesn't want to understand it: reading Deleuze and Guattari is much more uncomfortable than simply reading Deleuze. We tend to forget that Guattari remained a clinician until his death, a psychoanalyst if you like, and that he not only worked as a psychotherapist at La Borde, but also conducted private analytical sessions in his office on rue Saint-Sauveur.

However, this is not a specifically Russian problem. In the Anglo-American world, the "clinic" is being successfully hijacked by Integrated World Capitalism. The vision of the mental health clinic, imposed by insurance agents, is today already being legitimately reproduced without their participation, by the people themselves, who have seen the source of cherished identification in the practices of mental repression: the scientific triumvirate of pharmacology, neurofascism and cognitive behaviorism (a reorganization of American Ego-Psychology that perverted psychoanalysis). With the victory of pharmacology over "anti-psychiatry", there seems to be no room left for another "clinic".

Is this the case in Russia? In some respects, Russia's historical context overlaps with that of Latin America: the development of medicine and mental health in Russia, as in Latin America, took place outside the orbit of the Anglo-American world for a considerable period. Another point of convergence is the significant social inequality in terms of access to psychotherapeutic care; in Brazil, Uruguay or Argentina, the public system is more conducive to the spread and establishment of psychoanalytic practices than in Russia, even if the "quality" of these psychoanalyses is called into question (Tupinamba 2021). To understand the particularity of the Russian clinical context, a number of factors need to be taken into account. In the West, mental health practice emerged from the hospital environment. For example, in England, the psychiatric hospital was once an "insane asylum", a prison, and in France, a local political refuge. This has, to a large extent, shaped perceptions of psy practice. If Parker derives the fate of schizoanalysis in the West from the inpatient unit, in Russia it should be derived from the outpatient unit. Since the 1920s, Russia has developed a network of public psychoneurological dispensaries – outpatient and semi-outpatient structures attached to psychiatric hospitals. The psychoneurological dispensary was considered a primary care facility, on a par with a general therapeutic polyclinic or gynecological clinic. In addition, psychotherapeutic practices were opened in adult polyclinics (albeit with a psychiatrist instead of a practicing psychologist), and psychoneurological practices were opened in pediatric polyclinics. This system was

intended to bring revolutionary psychiatric care to the masses without removing them from society. Hospitals, on the other hand, became the place where the most serious patients, either in crisis or in the throes of mental decompensation, were kept. This outpatient psychiatric system was the work of Nikolai Semashko, who was close to the ideas of social hygiene and introduced a psychiatric nosology rooted in the individual's social conditions. Russian psychiatrists were one of the first professional groups to support the Bolshevik coup d'état, which promised grandiose social and political change (Lavretsky 1998). The Bolsheviks kept their promise, but not in the way psychiatrists saw it – the late 1930s saw a grandiose and revolutionary unification of theoretical perspectives, including in the field of psychological care. Social hygiene also fell victim to this unification.

The situation did not improve after the war and the death of Stalin. While Western psychiatric hospitals opened their doors in the 60s and 70s, exactly the opposite happened in Russia, where the marginalization of psychiatric hospitals was launched. The ambulatory system began to ossify as it went along: the general practitioner, necessarily present in all polyclinics, was transformed into a distributor of patients to other doctors (Sheiman 2013). The psychiatric hospital was perceived as a special kind of prison. Any psychiatric problem, no matter how minor, was seen as a dangerous illness. A kind of metonymy took place: anyone seeking outpatient psychiatric care was now perceived as potentially dangerous and exposed to social expulsion and isolation in a special prison. To this day, psychiatric institutions are disparagingly, but carefully, referred to as "*durka*" (consonant with the Russian word "*durak*", mad). The words "schizo", "schizophrenic" and "autistic" are still common swear words in everyday language. The Soviet authorities' use of psychiatric services for political purposes (suppression of opponents) contributed to Russians' distrust of all forms of psychopractice. An essential clinical metaphor in schizoanalysis, schizophrenia, dementia praecox, contained explicit political connotations in the Soviet context, associated with repressive state practices and abuses. Slow-onset schizophrenia", referred to by Snezhnevsky as a "non-psychotic variety" (the phenomenon analysts today would call ordinary or white psychosis), became the hallmark of punitive psychiatry, used by the Soviet state from the 1960s onwards to combat dissidents. We should also mention another aspect of the Russian context. While in some parts of the world psychologists may have become a more "friendly" alternative to the psychiatrist, for Russians, any psy practitioner – psychiatrist, psychologist, psychotherapist, psychoanalyst – is perceived as a doctor and, therefore, as part of a frightening psychiatric machine. In hospital, patients periodically ask me (G.M.) to look at their stomachs or complain of coughing. The fact that, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, psychotherapy was largely perceived as therapy through suggestion or hypnosis also creates specific expectations in people. In such an environment, the general population is more likely to turn to life coaches, esotericism or a bottle of vodka than to a mental health system.

In addition to the clinical aspects of the Russian situation, there is also the social theme. Russia has not escaped the neoliberal ideology of excessive success, repressively imposed happiness, and guilt and despair over the impossibility of achieving it. In addition to the peculiarity of the Russian clinic, people not only feel broken, but believe they can be fixed like an automaton. What they expect from a shrink's practitioner is that he'll make them well: a position of passivity where a medical or magical manipulation will be performed on the subject. Simple and easy! Repaired, functional again. This explains the proliferation of psychotechniques of all kinds, in which the subject is spoken to by the Lacanian Other in the most malignant psychotic sense: the search for life scenarios in past lives, birth traumas, astrology, hypnosis, coding and other "urban magics", well monetized by late capitalism. It's hard to say whether there's a need for creative, liberating and ontological experimentation behind all this. There is also a pragmatic basis. Quality psychopractice remains, it seems, fairly inaccessible. The use of a highly qualified specialist (which, in Russia, often implies training obtained abroad) remains a prerogative reserved for the upper middle class, but the overheated market for psychology services is rife with practitioners of dubious qualifications, prone to dumping. The total absence of diplomas or other minimum barriers to entry into the profession does not improve the situation.

On the other hand, public institutions don't guarantee specialist qualifications either, and it can be difficult to get to them other than by "ambulance". What's more, people are not prepared to make a long-term contribution to their mental well-being. They'd be more willing to pay ten or a hundred times that amount to an esoteric guide or hypnotist if he promises to "fix" them in a single session. Common psychotherapeutic modalities, which were simply imported after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, come into conflict with the particular social context. For example, due to high divorce rates and male mortality, the nuclear family had been in crisis for almost 20 years. Hence a common Russian anecdote: "Half the country was raised by a homosexual family consisting of a mother and a grandmother". Although the nuclear family is being reinvented in Russia, Anglo American psychoanalysis based on this phenomenon is unwelcome, and its followers resemble either a cargo cult or a Masonic lodge. Freudian psychoanalysis, which is more open and flexible, is better received in some circles, although it does not represent a remarkable social phenomenon. Family systems face similar difficulties. Cognitive behaviorism, on the other hand, only further perverts the already precarious state of the Russian psyche. In such a situation, "humanist" practices of social "caressing" have spread considerably: Gestalt, Rogerianism, positive psychology and their local variants.

Thus, the direct import of schizoanalysis into Russia is impossible, as is the direct import of any other analytic school. Schizoanalysis differs favorably from other schools in that the character of schizoanalysis contradicts the idea of a simple import. Schizoanalysis is an incomplete and contradictory doctrine, not a profound orthodoxy left by the master to his pupils. Nevertheless, it is not so much an analytical assemblage as a metamodel that can be deployed in a variety of fields. Guattari himself, at the start of his *Cartographies*

*schizoanalytiques*, does not present schizoanalysis as a new, more faithful brand of psychoanalysis, nor as a new alternative discipline to it. On the contrary, such a dialectic of contradictions for schizoanalysis is another unwelcome reductionism. Guattari writes that he seeks to liberate all the valuable elements that have been discovered by psychoanalysis from its reductionist layers. If, in a certain national context, it was important for schizoanalysts to distance themselves from psychoanalysis, this is not the case in Russia. Just as, for the Russian, everyone in the clinic is a doctor, any analyst – Guattarian, Winnicottian, Lacanian – will always be the same psychoanalyst. At the same time, in the context created by the trajectory of development of the Russian clinic, it seems more pertinent to distance ourselves not from psychoanalysis, but from psychotherapy: this denomination forms certain expectations in the Russian patient. He expects to be cared for, to have something done to him; he already accepts passivity before it takes place. The use of the root "schiz" as a common swearword also raises the issue of "branding". Schizoanalysis is really difficult to present. Schizoanalysis is actually made up of three projects: a program of philosophy and social theory developed by Guattari with Gilles Deleuze (materialist psychiatry and glossematic ontology); a metamodel; and a clinical practice. If it's not possible to present schizoanalysis as something unified, we suggest moving forward step by step, starting with the clinic – the clearest area of practice – preceded by theoretical research presented at academy-oriented thematic events.

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## ***Ritornelos caosmóticos. Cartografia de encontros com Guattari e Deleuze***

por MARIA LUIZA CARDINALE BAPTISTA

### **Abstract**

This text has the character of an essay, having been written as a report of reflective experience with a cartography of encounters with the authors Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze, resulting from studies, experiences, teaching and research with schizoanalysis for over 30 years. In a personal writing, the researcher focuses on the concept of ritornello as a link that detaches and returns, that intertwines, connects, intensely sensitizes, in the middle of chaosmotic processes – of chaos, of osmosis in the cosmos. The author presents elements of the desiring intensity of the encounters with the authors, in order to share how she has constituted herself as a schizoanalytic subject, in alignment and intertwining with contemporary assumptions of holistic, ecosystemic and complex science. There are signs of schizoanalytic arrangements in personal experience and in the various existential universes of 'co-experience'.

### **Preliminares**

Eu costumo dizer que o texto também tem suas preliminares, assim como as relações mais saborosas. Aquele tempo de enlaçar-se, enamorar-se no outro, sentindo, vivendo, propondo, tocando, afetivando, insinuando-se e misturando-se. Assim, penso também na delícia que é escrever e sentir-pensar uma fala ou uma inscrição desejante, numa proposta do que eu venho chamando de inscricional, que inscreve, cria e aciona, projeta potência de relação, de um devir significação compartilhado, com proposta de entrega e acolhimento amoroso. O conceito sentir pensar é atribuído a Fals Borda, foi difundido amplamente pela obra de Eduardo Galeano. É curioso, no entanto, o que relata o próprio Fals Borda sobre a criação da palavra: “Esse sentipensante que aparece em meus livros não fui eu que inventei. Isso foi lá em um dos pântanos próximos de San Benito Abad, perto de Jegua, lá por esses lugares, que algo aconteceu com um pescador que estava comigo e disse: ‘Olhe para nós, acreditamos que agimos com o coração, mas também usamos a cabeça e quando combinamos as duas coisas, somos sentipensantes.’”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Disponível em: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LbJWqetRuMo&t=33s>. A explicação também está presente no texto Sentipensar: uma Pesquisa em Educação Ambiental com a Literatura de Eduardo Galeano, de Martins & Sampaio (2021).

Assim, começo contando a história do próprio texto e da emoção de ser convidada a produzi-lo. Recebi o convite dos amigos, psicanalistas y filósofos de Moscú y Jerusalén, Gabriel Mart y Dimitri Bochkov, para participar com uma fala na conferencia: "50 años de Anti-Edipo: El esquizoanálisis como práctica multidisciplinar y modelo teórico del contenido, los canales de formación y los efectos del potencial humano", que ocorreu de 28 a 30 de novembro de 2022.

A gentileza e grandiosidade do convite me encantaram. A ideia de estar junto com pessoas de diversas regiões do mundo, conversando sobre Guattari e Deleuze, sobre os pressupostos da Esquizonálise certamente corresponde a uma condição de extrema alegria, no sentido de Espinoza... alegria como potência de agir. Claro que também tinha a nítida dimensão da responsabilidade, pelos mesmos motivos que me traziam alegria. Enfim, em meio ao caos, melhor dizendo, à caosmose do cotidiano da vida, decidi aceitar e produzir uma fala em espanhol – minha língua original é o Português – que seria traduzida para o russo. Pensei: como será isso? Os conceitos, as ideias esquizoanalíticas já são complexas e densas em Português, como será falar um texto, cheio de metáforas, e contar com os riscos de sua tradução. Refleti, refleti e mantive a decisão de aceitar. Talvez este seja mesmo um dos grandes desafios contemporâneos: que aprendamos a nos reconectar entre os povos e os muitos languageares que foram sendo produzidos na deriva histórica da humanidade. Aprender a nos traduzir e acreditar na potência das traduções que outros fazem de nós mesmos. Precisamos tentar, tentar e conseguir entrelaçar mundos e seres, sujeitos e lugares, de tal modo que consigamos compartilhar vivências, sentimentos e pensamentos.

Também penso que, nesse esforço de se soltar na espontaneidade da produção, é preciso acreditar na potência dos afetos, nos laços e intensidades que produzimos e que podem – certamente vão – insinuar-se amorosamente ao outro, como afagos e colos reflexivos, no encontro de quem vibra intensidades abstratas, na produção de afetos e saberes.

Enfim, tratou-se de um convite me muito me honrou e me emocionou. Permaneço honrada por estar entre pensadores e profissionais de diversas regiões do planeta, que tem se vinculado à obra de Félix Guattari e Gilles Deleuze.

O texto é escrito em primeira pessoa do singular, porque não faria sentido, pela expressão que floresce das minhas interações esquizoanalíticas com os autores, negar a mim mesma ou fazer-me desaparecer no processo de aninhar-me com palavras, frases, afetos e ideias ao leitor. Essa reflexão inclusive está no certe da minha tese, apresentada no ano 2000, na Escola de Comunicações e Artes da Universidade de São Paulo, com o título: O Sujeito da Escrita e a Trama Comunicacional.

Assim, penso que não faz sentido falar ou escrever sobre Esquizonálise. Esquizonálise é uma atitude (no sentido de ato no todo). Desse modo, assumo que, no meu texto, estou eu mesma entrelaçada aos autores e colegas pesquisadores que compartilharam comigo reflexões e sentimentos e, ao mesmo tempo, para lembrar

também o professor Umberto Eco (1993) – e suas reflexões sobre o leitor – há também presumidas, já transversalizadas, as presenças dos leitores, a quem um texto como este possa interessar. Assim seguimos com a Cartografia de Encontros, numa viagem que eu convido, eu sou narradora e guia contratada, ao mesmo tempo.

### **Cartografia de Encontros**

Guattari e Deleuze se transformaram, no percurso de mais de 30 anos – desde os anos de 1990 –, em meus amigos de infância, adolescência e vida adulta, sem que eu nunca os tenha encontrado presencialmente. Fico refletindo que aprendi tanto com eles, sobre intensidades abstratas, que essa presença se fez e se faz de tantas outras maneiras, que são maiores que a presença física, propriamente dita.

Eu os saúdo também neste momento, assim como ocorrem em várias situações do meu dia, em que fico imaginando como eles reagiriam diante de algumas situações vividas no meu país, que pensariam sobre absurdos tantos, que estamos vivendo no planeta, que mais poderiam me dizer que pudesse ajudar a agenciar um devir esperança, para as pessoas, para o Brasil, para o Planeta.

A propósito, é interessante que saibam de onde eu falo, escrevo. Vivo grande parte da minha vida, no Brasil, portanto da América do Sul, mais especificamente do Sul do Brasil, onde se localiza Universidade de Caxias do Sul, onde sou professora e pesquisadora, vinculada ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Turismo e Hospitalidade, líder do Amorcomtur! Grupo de Estudos em Comunicação, Turismo, Amorosidade e Autopoise, e professora dos Cursos de Comunicação Social. Também sou professora colaboradora de Universidade do Amazonas, na região Norte do Brasil, localizada a seis mil quilômetros de distância de Caxias do Sul. Isso já sinaliza para uma característica minha, de sujeito desterritorializada constantemente e multiterritorializada. Tenho parcerias com colegas de mais de 15 países, para onde tenho viajado e com quem tenho produzido pesquisa, o que significa que sou a própria desterritorialização e vivo a multiterritorialidade, como estamos experienciando agora.

Bom, vamos avançar. Escolhi falar a partir de quatro palavras: ritornelos, caosmose, cartografia, encontros. Poderia ter escolhido muitas outras palavras/conceitos esquizoanalíticos. Foi mesmo difícil fazer esta escolha. Senti, pensei, refleti e escolhi.

Penso, neste sentido, que esta ‘minha fala’ é uma espécie de ritornelo, um elo que retorna, algo que, ao ser produzido, me reconecta intensa profunda e abstratamente com os laços que estabeleci com Guattari e Deleuze. Durante muito tempo, venho refletindo que ritornelo é uma das chaves de relação entre os seres. O elo que retorna, que se destaca pela intensidade e assim pode produzir conexões, reconexões. Lembrando conexões com Roland Barthes (1984), que também fiz nos meus estudos, eu posso dizer... Ritornelo é o punctum, o que pune, o que me toca em especial em sentido profundo e me faz produzir

movimento. Ritornelo é a faísca de agenciamento da relação entrelaçada, dos laços transversais de sentidos entre os seres.

Sou profissional da área da Comunicação, tenho interesse pelas pessoas, pelas relações, pela subjetividade e, ao longo da minha vida, tenho me questionado sobre como construir estradas até o Outro, até as outras pessoas, seus afetos, suas emoções, seus corações. Sou jornalista de formação, comunicadora social, educadora, pesquisadora, cientista, mãe adotiva e mãe biológica, filha, mulher, pessoa, empresária... interessada em como produzir com-tato... como produzir com-versações e tocar os afetos das pessoas. Nesse sentido, penso que grande parte do que vivemos contemporaneamente é porque desaprendemos a produzir ritornelos e, em função disso, nos desconectamos afetivamente, em um mundo aparentemente hiperconectado.

O ritornelo é também a produção de entrelaço, o laço que junta, que reúne e que intensa e afetivamente faz fazer sentido junto. O ritornelo, originário da música, nos ensina que somos tocados de muitas maneiras, mas especialmente pelas intensidades que se destacam e agenciam nossos afetos. O ritornelo deve ser celebrado e cultivado. Em certo sentido, penso que, se estamos aqui é porque em meio à profusão de falas e pensamentos do século passado, Guattari e Deleuze se fizeram e fazem RITORNELOS.

Ao mesmo tempo, penso que os ritornelos são caosmóticos e dissipativos. E dizer isso significa fazer referência ao principal traço de nossas existências, em meu entendimento, a partir das minhas vivências entrelaçadas com tantos seres e das minhas 'com-versações' com Guattari, especialmente com Guattari, mas também com Deleuze.

Sinceramente, ao mesmo tempo, acredito na potência enunciativa, para descrever o contemporâneo com maestria, da palavra caosmose. Caos – osmose – no cosmo. Como cristalização de sentidos, a palavra concentra saberes majestosos que têm nos orientado desde a metade do século passado, quando passamos a pensar a ampliação da Teoria Sistêmica, para a compreensão dos Sistemas Abertos e, na visão esquizoanalítica, pela lógica da transversalidade ampla, que nos convoca inclusive a não pensar mais em disciplinas, mas em universos existenciais de produção de sentidos, em contínuas máquinas transpoiéticas, mais que autopoiéticas.

A palavra CAOSMOSE nos conecta com o Big Bang, a grande explosão que é produtora de novos universos. Também nos remete à Teoria do Caos, de Edward Lorenz (in Capra & Luisi, 2014), das orientações de que o caos é produção em lógicas de recursão organizacional, de Edgar Morin, dos saberes do ponto de mutação, a partir do pensamento de Fritjof Capra (1991), da visão holística de Jan Smuts (in Weill, 1991) (pai do termo holismo) e das conexões holísticas com Roberto Crema (1989).

A associação entre as duas palavras se transforma em outra síntese emblemática. Ritornelos Caosmóticos ajudam a compreender ao mesmo tempo a episteme do caos, da osmose, no cosmo, em elos que retornam e se produzem em recursões organizacionais, decorrentes de nós de passagem e de confluência, como nos ensinou o químico Ylia Prigogine (2000, 2009) no estudo das estruturas dissipativas.

Assim, os encontros com Guattari e Deleuze significaram, para mim, o agenciamento de um verdadeiro salto quântico, como nos ensina, entre tantos autores, Amit Goswami (1993), da Índia. Esse salto me fez vibrar em outras lógicas de múltiplas e sincrônicas trajetórias de saberes. Nada mais foi como era antes no meu olhar. Tudo se movimentou no pensamento, sentimento, nos olhares, no movimento do corpo, nos processos de interação com outros seres. Eram os anos de 1990, eu os conheci, Guattari e Deleuze, nos textos, oficinas e vivências múltiplas, em um projeto de aprendizagem de Processos Grupais, em um curso de formação em Porto Alegre, cidade ao Sul do Brasil, em um local que, claro, não por acaso, se chamava Espaço de Vida, coordenado pelas psicólogas Lígia Hecker Ferreira e Carmen Oliveira.

Lembro-me que a primeira ideia que me chamou a atenção, naquele curso, foi a de que para a Esquizoanálise, vale o SUJEITO EM PRODUÇÃO e não o sujeito forjado por traumas ou complexos, como nos vinham ensinando outras visões teóricas. Também me encantei com a ideia de que o inconsciente está presente e em ação o tempo todo, como uma usina de produção, uma máquina desejante constante e que se expressa em cada instante, nos gestos, na respiração, no corpo vibrátil, e não está escondido em uma espécie de quarto dos meus segredos, para se deixar escapar nos sonhos, nos chistes ou nos atos falhos. Inconsciente pleno e potente. Depois, com o tempo, fui entendendo a partir de outras teorias, que a energia inconsciente agencia o sujeito o tempo todo, fazendo-o vibrar, amar, brigar, calar, saltar, silenciar e, literalmente, movimentar mundos, agenciar ritornelos em meio às conexões caosmóticas, em meio às intempéries da vida.

A intensidade da energia inconsciente é a própria intensidade de agenciamento da potência desejante, fundamental para que seja constante fluente e espontaneamente agenciada a teia da vida caosmótica em nós e nos entrelaçamentos osmóticos do cosmo. Ou seja, estamos falando em entrelaçamentos inconscientes que se expressam em feixes de energias geradores de vida, genuínos ingredientes da geração da vida, de que nos ensina Humberto Maturana (1997, 1998, 2015), uma das principais referências quando se fala do estudo do surgimento da vida no planeta, ainda que não se refira a esses feixes com esse linguajar. Tive o privilégio de ser aluna deste grande cientista que, não por acaso, ensinou ao mundo que as espécies vivas surgem de confluências e que, uma vez realizada a mágica da vida, se instala a potência autopoietica, que, por sua vez se produz a partir dos acoplamentos. Guattari e Deleuze vão nos ensinar a pensar os agenciamentos produtivos das máquinas autopoieticas, o que também nos ajudou a ampliar a visão biológica de Maturana, para outros universos existenciais e de conhecimento, permitindo compreender inclusive o acoplamento entre os seres e os dispositivos maquímicos, como também nos ensina um dos parceiros de Marshal McLuhan, Derrick de Kerckhove (1997).

Assim também pude compreender melhor os engendramentos maquímicos nas interações com e entre os meios de comunicação, considerados pelos meus ‘amigos’ Guattari e Deleuze, como equipamentos coletivos de produção de subjetividade, em meio

a tantos outros universos maquínicos e tantas máquinas abstratas, como a Ciência, A Universidade, a Arte, entre tantas.

Neste ponto, eu me dou conta que já estou avançando a Cartografia dos Encontros com Guattari e Deleuze. Ao mesmo tempo, me aciona o ritornelo especial, a partir da palavra Cartografia, com a qual entrei em contato em dois primeiros textos Cartografias do Desejo, de Guattari com Suely Rolnik, uma pensadora brasileira, e Cartografia Sentimental, da própria Suely Rolnik, apresentando sua pesquisa do mestrado. O contato com o conceito e com a ideia de produção de percursos que se inscrevem como acontecem, em meio à mutação da paisagem também marcou profundamente minha vida. Ao mesmo tempo, ao avançar nas leituras esquizoanalíticas, eu encontrava uma ciência aberta ao mundo da emoção e da sensibilidade, ao mundo dos afetos, tão diferente à ciência fria e calculista, a que eu tinha sido até então apresentada.

Nesse novo modo de compreender o ser humano, mas não só o ser humano, de compreender os sistemas de entrelaçamentos numa lógica ecosófica, cuja grandiosidade só fui compreendendo com o tempo, eu me encontrava natural e espontaneamente aconchegada. Era como se tivesse encontrado um porto, um porto caótico e na caoticidade das intensidades abstratas eu me sentia em casa, territorializada, com a tranquilidade de saber que o agenciamento decorrente das desterritorializações não seria nada mais que me perder em descaminhos, que agenciariam outras vidas, outros territórios e que se abririam para o agenciamento de mais e mais potência. Assim, a cartografia se associou às desterritorializações desejanças e eu pude associar essa ideia a tudo na vida, inclusive e principalmente à pesquisa, às práticas e procedimentos operacionais, tendo criado duas estratégias metodológicas denominadas Cartografia dos Saberes e Matrizes Rizomáticas – estratégias de sobrevivência em percursos de investigação qualitativa para a ciência do Mundo N'ovo, o mundo que está para nascer (Baptista 2014, 2020; Baptista & Eme, 2022).

As duas estratégias foram criadas e são utilizadas do modo acoplado, para orientar a produção de pesquisas em cenários caosmóticos de ritornelização. A questão que se interpôs para mim, na década de 1990 era como ensinar Metodologia da Pesquisa, compreendendo e me emocionando com tantas teorias e orientações de vida, que me direcionavam para a visão complexa, ecossistêmica, caosmótica, desterritorializante, dissipativa e holística? Assim, eu entendi também que não poderia ensinar pesquisa ou metodologia como quem propõe que o sujeito se encaixe em dogmas pré-fabricados. Eu queria agenciar desejo pela pesquisa, pela Ciência, e que agenciasse também a potência de cada pesquisador, de cada sujeito, a produzir a partir dos seus caminhos e descaminhos. Assim, naquela época, propus a ideia de que fazer pesquisa é fazer uma viagem investigativa e que, para isso, devemos trabalhar com a lógica cartográfica, de mapeamentos mutantes, de lógicas inscricionais – palavra que criei para representar a ideia de se inscrever, criar e acionar novos mundos de conhecimento.

Desse modo, a Cartografia de Saberes propõe a viagem com o estabelecimento de cinco trilhas. A Cartografia se operacionaliza por trilhas simultâneas, consideradas em sua

dinâmica de produção em contínuo processo. Há uma trilha inicial, que se transforma em sinalizadora para as outras, que são acionadas simultaneamente. Trata-se da Trilha Trama dos ‘Entrelaços Nós da Pesquisa’, que identifica os ‘nós’ investigativos, os focos de trilhas investigativas a serem perseguidas. A estratégia metodológica considera o caráter subjetivo e autoral do pesquisador, sua história, suas inquietações e buscas, na Trilha dos Saberes Pessoais ou Dimensão Subjetiva, em associação a vários outros saberes, em três outras trilhas. A Trilha Trama Teórico-Conceitual-Bibliográfica é o phylum investigativo que possibilita realizar encontros com os saberes dos outros, em coerência e alinhamento derivativo dos núcleos de significação do foco de estudo, os ‘entrelaços nós da pesquisa’. Na Trilha Usina de Produção ou Trama dos Fazeres, há o universo dos fazeres investigativos, em aproximações e ações, com seu caráter de inscrição – inscrição, criação e acionamento de devires – atendendo à singularidade e à complexidade dos universos ecossistêmicos investigados. Em associação, com caráter simultâneo, espontâneo e constante, há a Trilha Dimensão Intuitiva da Pesquisa, reconhecendo que o conhecimento se produz no entrelaçamento de universos potentes, envolvendo as dimensões materiais e imateriais, em coerência com o fato de que a pesquisa é, ela mesma, um universo vivo e transmutante.

Já as Matrizes Rizomáticas são uma estratégia metodológica de sistematização. Foram criadas para ajudar o pesquisador a verificar a coerência interna da pesquisa e as inflexões, os direcionamentos do processo durante e depois de concluída a investigação. A denominação decorre do entendimento de ‘matriz’, como lugar gerador da vida, do que decorre a proposição de que as matrizes expressam os lugares geradores da vida da pesquisa. A complementação rizomática está associada ao conceito de rizoma, de Félix Guattari e Gilles Deleuze (1995), que propõem o rizoma, a partir da transposição da significação da Botânica, como uma espécie de raiz de crescimento irregular e brotações espontâneas sem simetria e regularidade.

Desse modo, as Matrizes Rizomáticas são sistematizações dos ‘lugares geradores da pesquisa’, observando os rumos, as inflexões em suas irregularidades e fluidez, em brotações que se formam, constituem nós, que se desdobram em novos fluxos até a confluência e formação de novos nós, que dão passar para novos fluxos... até chegar em novos nós, e assim sucessivamente. Essa ideia também se alia ao pensamento de Ylia Prigogine, que, desde a Química, propôs o estudo de estrutura dissipativas, com o reconhecimento de nós de confluência e nós de passagem.

Essas estratégias resultam de mais de 30 anos como docente de Metodologia da Pesquisa e orientadora de trabalhos em todos os níveis acadêmicos.

Ainda quero me referir a outras ideias, nessa cartografia de encontros, para finalizar.

A primeira delas é o encontro com a ideia de desejo como potência e não como falta. Essa ideia tem marcado minha vida e alterado em situações micro e macro, tanto as minhas relações como o próprio rumo da minha existência. Para exemplificar, conto uma história pessoal. Eu sempre quis ser mãe. Sou descendente de uma italiana e a ideia de ser

mãe sempre foi algo forte em mim, a imensidão de amor, a força matrística que nos orienta no universo feminino, um devir mãe leoa potente se fez em mim durante a vida. Um diagnóstico, no entanto, de endometriose severa, apareceu para se interpor ao meu sonho, aparentemente ao meu desejo, não fosse ele potência. Meu médico, naquela época, dizia: Maria Luiza para você é impossível. Eu respondia: Não é! Ele insistia: eu já expliquei, pela Medicina não é possível. Seu caso é grave. Você tem endometriose em nível severo. Não é possível engravidar. Eu dizia: é possível! Vou engravidar, é uma questão de tempo, você pode esperar. Ele insistia: já fizemos todos os exames. Não é possível. Eu respondi: você não me conhece bem. Eu sei que vou ser mãe. Eu DESEJO SER MÃE. Então, é uma questão de tempo. Enquanto não engravidar, vou adotar crianças e ser mãe adotiva. Assim, adotei três crianças e, quando já não fazia mais nenhum tratamento, engravidei biologicamente, de uma filha, para surpresa do meu médico. Desejo potente agenciado e fortalecido pelos entrelaçamentos com meus outros filhos. Além disso, a própria experiência de maternagem acadêmica com meus alunos me garantia que o corpo responderia à minha natureza materna, de MÃE, MATRIZ GERADORA DA VIDA E AMOR!

### **Sobre hiências, devires e reticências...**

Assim, talvez a grande síntese dessa cartografia ou, ao menos, o que eu gostaria que ficasse como síntese, esteja na ideia que venho trabalhando, também inspirada em Humberto Maturana, de que precisamos uma revolução matrística, que resgate em nós os traços básicos da família ancestral, no sentido da ética da relação e de amorosidade, laços ético-estéticos de interações transpoiéticas, geradoras de vida plena em uma lógica ecosófica e de superação do antropoceno. Uma lógica em que possamos coexistir com todos os seres, visíveis e invisíveis no planeta. Que possamos resgatar nossos entrelaços de ritornelos e afetivações, entre a caosmose contemporânea e nos direcionarmos para a preservação não só do planeta, de Gaia, mas da coexistência em ritornelos de paz, colaboração e amorosidade.

Guattari e Deleuze são autores que marcaram a minha vida para sempre, como teórica, pessoa intensa afetiva e amorosa, ser desejante no mundo, jornalista, pesquisadora, cientista, mulher, mãe, no agenciamento de um ser que transita por entre as engrenagens maquínicas e se faz em flor em ser, floresceres de amorosidade e autopoiese. As pistas de potência de agenciamento autopoietico e a compreensão do desejo como potência, em combinação com o reconhecimento de que vivemos todos em caosmose e que podemos, assim e por isso mesmo, produzir, ativar ritornelos potentes... são para mim sinalizadores importantes para seguirmos viagem na construção do que eu chamo de o Mundo N'Ovo, e no que venho trabalhando amorosa e intensamente.

Talvez por isso mesmo tenha me surgido a palavra hiências, associada a devires e reticências. Este texto é resultado de uma brotação espontânea, intensa, no entre, na



hiância de vivências tantas com a Esquizoanálise. Ele, o texto, não traz o passado isolado, nem o presente, nem o futuro, concentra multitemporalidades, multiterritorialidades e transversalidades de afetos entre as vivências passadas, as intensidades abstratas sentipensantes da produção da fala, da conversa na Conferência, do texto em revisão e agora em preparação para entrega. Por isso mesmo, o texto não termina... há sempre sinalizações de devires, que também deixo aqui expressas em reticências...

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## ***Ritornelos caosmóticos. Cartografía de encuentros con Guattari y Deleuze***

por MARIA LUIZA CARDINALE BAPTISTA

### **Abstract**

This text has the character of an essay, having been written as a report of reflective experience with a cartography of encounters with the authors Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze, resulting from studies, experiences, teaching and research with schizoanalysis for over 30 years. In a personal writing, the researcher focuses on the concept of ritornello as a link that detaches and returns, that intertwines, connects, intensely sensitizes, in the middle of chaosmotic processes – of chaos, of osmosis in the cosmos. The author presents elements of the desiring intensity of the encounters with the authors, in order to share how she has constituted herself as a schizoanalytic subject, in alignment and intertwining with contemporary assumptions of holistic, ecosystemic and complex science. There are signs of schizoanalytic arrangements in personal experience and in the various existential universes of 'co-experience'.

### **Preliminares**

Suelo decir que el texto también tiene sus preliminares, así como las más deliciosas relaciones. Ese tiempo de entrelazarse, enamorarse del otro, sentir, vivir, proponer, tocar, conmover, insinuar y mezclar. Así, pienso también en el deleite que es escribir y sentir-pensar un discurso o una inscripción deseante, en una propuesta de lo que vengo llamando *inscricional*, que inscribe, crea y activa, proyecta poder de relación, de devenir significado compartido, con una propuesta de entrega y acogida amorosa. El concepto de sentirpensar se atribuye a Fals Borda y fue ampliamente difundido a través de la obra de Eduardo Galeano. Es curioso, sin embargo, lo que el propio Fals Borda relata sobre la creación de la palabra: “Este sentipensante que aparece en mis libros no fue invención mía. Fue allí en uno de los pantanos cerca de San Benito Abad, cerca de Jegua, por esos parajes, que a un pescador que estaba conmigo le pasó algo y me dijo: 'Míranos, creemos que actuamos con el corazón, pero también usamos la cabeza y cuando combinamos las dos cosas, somos sentipensantes.’”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Disponible en: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LbJWqetRuMo&t=33s>. La explicación también está presente en el texto Sentipensar. uma Pesquisa em Educação Ambiental com a Literatura de Eduardo Galeano, de Martins; Sampaio, 2021.

Entonces, comienzo contando la historia del texto mismo y la emoción de ser invitada a producirlo. Recibí una invitación de los amigos, psicoanalistas y filósofos de Moscú y Jerusalén, Gabriel Mart y Dimitri Bochkov, para participar con una ponencia en la conferencia: "50 años del Anti-Edipo: El esquizoanálisis como práctica multidisciplinar y modelo teórico del contenido, los canales de formación y los efectos del potencial humano", que se llevó a cabo del 28 al 30 de noviembre de 2022.

La amabilidad y la grandeza de la invitación me encantaron. La idea de estar junto a personas de diferentes regiones del mundo, hablando de Guattari y Deleuze, de los presupuestos del Esquizoanálisis corresponde ciertamente a una condición de alegría extrema, en el sentido de Espinoza... alegría como potencia de actuar. Por supuesto, también tuve la clara dimensión de la responsabilidad, por las mismas razones que me dieron alegría. Así que, en medio del caos, mejor dicho, el caos de la vida cotidiana, decidí aceptar y producir un discurso en español -mi idioma original es el portugués- que sería traducido al ruso. Pensé: ¿cómo será esto? Los conceptos, las ideas esquizoanalíticas ya son complejas y densas en portugués, cómo será hablar un texto, lleno de metáforas, y tener en cuenta los riesgos de su traducción. Reflexioné, reflexioné y mantuve la decisión de aceptar. Quizás este sea realmente uno de los grandes desafíos contemporáneos: que aprendamos a reconectarnos entre los pueblos y las tantas lenguas que se han producido en la deriva histórica de la humanidad. Aprender a traducirnos y creer en el poder de las traducciones que los demás hacen de nosotros mismos. Necesitamos intentar, intentar y lograr entrelazar mundos y seres, sujetos y lugares, de tal manera que podamos compartir experiencias, sentimientos y pensamientos.

Pienso también que, en este esfuerzo por desprenderse de la espontaneidad de la producción, es necesario creer en el poder de los afectos, en los lazos e intensidades que producimos y que pueden -ciertamente- insinuarse amorosamente al otro, como caricias y vueltas reflexivas, en el encuentro que vibra intensidades abstractas, en la producción de afectos y saberes.

En síntesis, fue una invitación que me honró y me conmovió mucho. Me siento honrada de estar entre pensadores y profesionales de diferentes regiones del planeta, que han estado vinculados a la obra de Félix Guattari y Gilles Deleuze.

El texto está escrito en primera persona del singular, porque no tendría sentido, desde la expresión que brota de mis interacciones esquizoanalíticas con los autores, negarme o hacerme desaparecer en el proceso de anidarme con palabras, frases, afectos y ideas al lector. Esta reflexión está en el centro de mi tesis, presentada en 2000, en la Facultad de Comunicación y Artes de la Universidad de São Paulo, Brasil, con el título: El Sujeto de la Escritura y la Trama Comunicacional.

Entonces, creo que no tiene sentido hablar o escribir sobre esquizoanálisis. El esquizoanálisis es una actitud (en el sentido de un acto como un todo). De esta forma, asumo que, en mi texto, yo mismo me entrelazo con los autores y compañeros investigadores que compartieron conmigo reflexiones y sentimientos y, al mismo tiempo,

recordar también al profesor Umberto Eco (1993) – y sus reflexiones sobre el lector – también se presume, ya transversalizada, la presencia de lectores, a quienes un texto como este puede resultarles de interés. Así seguimos con la Cartografía de los Encuentros, en un viaje que invito, soy el narradora y el guía contratada a la vez.

### **Cartografía de reuniones**

Guattari y Deleuze se han convertido, a lo largo de más de 30 años – desde los años 90 –, en mis amigos desde la infancia, la adolescencia y la vida adulta, sin haberlos conocido nunca en persona. Sigo reflexionando que aprendí tanto de ellos, de intensidades abstractas, que esta presencia se hizo y se hace de tantas otras formas, que son más grandes que la presencia física misma.

Los saludo también en este momento, tal como lo hazgo en varias situaciones de mi día, en las que sigo imaginando cómo reaccionarían ante algunas situaciones vividas en mi país, qué pensarían de tantos disparates, que estamos viviendo en el planeta, qué más me podrían decir que pueda ayudar a organizar un futuro de esperanza, para las personas, para Brasil, para el Planeta.

Por cierto, es interesante que los lectores sepan desde dónde hablo y escribo. Vivo la mayor parte de mi vida en Brasil, por lo tanto en América del Sur, más específicamente en el Sur de Brasil, donde se encuentra la Universidad de Caxias do Sul, donde soy profesora e investigadora, vinculada al Programa de Posgrado en Turismo y Hospitalidad, líder del Amorcomtur! Grupo de Estudios de Comunicación, Turismo, Amorosidad y Autopoise, y profesora de Cursos de Comunicación Social. También soy profesora colaboradora de la Universidad de Amazonas, en la región Norte de Brasil, ubicada a seis mil kilómetros de Caxias do Sul. Esto ya apunta a una característica mía, como sujeto constantemente desterritorializado y multiterritorializado. Tengo alianzas con colegas de más de 15 países, donde he viajado y con quienes he producido investigaciones, lo que significa que soy la desterritorialización misma y vivo la multiterritorialidad, tal como la estamos viviendo ahora.

Muy bien, sigamos adelante. Elegí hablar a partir de cuatro palabras: ritornelos, caosmosis, cartografía, encuentros. Podría haber elegido muchas otras palabras/conceptos esquizoanalíticos. Fue realmente difícil hacer esta elección. Sentí, pensé, reflexioné y elegí.

Pienso, en ese sentido, que este 'discurso mío' es una especie de ritornelo, un vínculo que regresa, algo que, al producirse, me reconecta intensa y abstractamente con los lazos que establecí con Guattari y Deleuze. Desde hace tiempo vengo reflexionando que el ritornelo es una de las claves de la relación entre los seres. El vínculo que vuelve, que se destaca por su intensidad y así puede producir conexiones, reconexiones. Recordando conexiones con Roland Barthes (1984), que también hice en mis estudios, puedo decir...

Ritornelo es el punctum, lo que traspasa, lo que me toca sobre todo en un sentido profundo y me hace producir movimiento. Ritornelo es la chispa de agencia de la relación entrelazada, de los lazos transversales de significados entre los seres.

Soy profesional en el área de la Comunicación, me interesan las personas, las relaciones, la subjetividad y, a lo largo de mi vida, me he cuestionado sobre cómo construir caminos hacia el Otro, hacia las otras personas, sus afectos, sus emociones, sus corazones Soy periodista de formación, comunicadora social, educadora, investigadora, científica, madre adoptiva y madre biológica, hija, mujer, persona, empresaria... interesada en cómo producir com-tacto... cómo producir conversaciones y tocar los afectos de personas. En ese sentido, creo que gran parte de lo que estamos viviendo hoy es porque hemos desaprendido a producir ritornelos y, en consecuencia, nos hemos desconectado emocionalmente, en un mundo aparentemente hiperconectado.

El ritornelo es también la producción del entretejido, el lazo que une, que junta y que intensa y afectivamente cobra sentido juntos. El ritornelo, originario de la música, nos enseña que somos tocados de muchas maneras, pero especialmente por las intensidades que sobresalen y mediatizan nuestros afectos. El ritornelo debe ser celebrado y cultivado. En cierto sentido, creo que, si estamos aquí, es porque en medio de la profusión de discursos y pensamientos del siglo pasado, Guattari y Deleuze hicieron y hacen RITORNELOS.

Al mismo tiempo, creo que los estribillos son caóticos y disipativos. Y decir esto significa referirse al rasgo principal de nuestras vidas, a mi entender, a partir de mis experiencias entrelazadas con tantos seres y mis 'con-versaciones' con Guattari, especialmente con Guattari, pero también con Deleuze.

Honestamente, al mismo tiempo, creo en el poder enunciativo, para describir con maestría lo contemporáneo, de la palabra caosmosis. Caos – ósmosis – en el cosmos. Como cristalización de significados, la palabra concentra majestuosos conocimientos que nos han orientado desde mediados del siglo pasado, cuando comenzamos a pensar en la expansión de la Teoría Sistémica, para la comprensión de los Sistemas Abiertos y, en la mirada esquizoanalítica, por la lógica de amplia transversalidad, que incluso nos convoca a no pensar más en disciplinas, sino en universos existenciales de producción de sentidos, en continuas máquinas transpoiéticas, más que autopoiéticas.

La palabra caosmosis nos conecta con el Big Bang, la gran explosión que produce nuevos universos. También nos remite a la Teoría del Caos de Edward Lorenz (en Capra; Luisi, 2014), las pautas de que el caos es producción en la lógica de la recursividad organizacional, de Edgar Morin, el conocimiento del punto de mutación, desde el pensamiento de Fritjof Capra (1991), la visión holística de Jan Smuts (en Weill, 1991) (creador del término holismo) y las conexiones holísticas con Roberto Crema (1989).

La asociación entre las dos palabras se convierte en otra síntesis emblemática. Los ritornelos caosmóticos ayudan a comprender, al mismo tiempo, la episteme del caos, de la ósmosis, en el cosmos, en eslabones que regresan y se producen en recursiones

organizacionales, surgidas de nodos de paso y confluencia, como nos enseñó lo químico Ylia Prigogine (2000, 2001 ) en el estudio de estructuras disipativas.

Así, los encuentros con Guattari y Deleuze significaron, para mí, la agencia de un verdadero salto cuántico, como nos enseña, entre tantos autores, Amit Goswami (1993) de la India. Este salto me hizo vibrar en otras lógicas de trayectorias múltiples y sincrónicas de conocimiento. Nada era como antes en mis ojos. Todo se movía en pensamiento, sentimiento, miradas, movimiento corporal, procesos de interacción con otros seres. Era la década de 1990, los conocí, Guattari y Deleuze, en textos, talleres y múltiples experiencias, en un proyecto de aprendizaje sobre Procesos Grupales, en un curso de capacitación en Porto Alegre, una ciudad del sur de Brasil, en un lugar que, claro, no por casualidad, se llamó Espaço de Vida, coordinado por las psicólogas Lígia Hecker Ferreira y Carmen Oliveira.

Recuerdo que la primera idea que me llamó la atención, en ese curso, fue que para el Esquizoanálisis vale el sujeto en producción y no el sujeto forjado por traumas o complejos, como nos venían enseñando otras visiones teóricas. También me encantó la idea de que el inconsciente está presente y en acción todo el tiempo, como una planta de producción, una máquina deseante constante que se expresa en cada momento, en los gestos, en la respiración, en el cuerpo que vibra, y no se oculta. En una especie de cuarto de mis secretos, para dejarse escapar en sueños, bromas o deslices. Inconsciente completo y potente. Luego, con el tiempo, llegué a comprender de otras teorías que la energía inconsciente actúa todo el tiempo sobre el sujeto, haciéndolo vibrar, amar, luchar, callar, saltar, silenciar y, literalmente, mover mundos, actuar estribillos en medio de a conexiones caosmóticas, en medio de las tormentas de la vida.

La intensidad de la energía inconsciente es la misma intensidad de agencia de la potencia deseante, fundamental para que la red de vida caosmótica sea constantemente fluida y espontáneamente agencia en nosotros y en los enredos osmóticos del cosmos. Es decir, estamos hablando de entrelazamientos inconscientes que se expresan en haces de energías generadoras de vida, ingredientes genuinos para la generación de vida, como enseña Humberto Maturana (1997, 1998, 2015), uno de los principales referentes al hablar de la estudio del surgimiento de la vida en el planeta, aunque no se refiere a estos rayos con ese lenguaje. Tuve el privilegio de ser alumna de este gran científico que, no por casualidad, enseñó al mundo que las especies vivas surgen de las confluencias y que, una vez realizada la magia de la vida, se instala la potencia autopoietica que, a su vez, se produce. Por de los acoplamientos. Guattari y Deleuze nos enseñarán a pensar los ensamblajes productivos de las máquinas autopoieticas, lo que también nos ayudó a ampliar la visión biológica de Maturana a otros universos existenciales y de conocimiento, permitiéndonos comprender el acoplamiento entre seres y dispositivos maquínicos, como también nos enseña uno de los socios de Marshal MacLuhan, Derrick de Kerckhove (1997).

De esta manera, también pude comprender mejor los engendramientos maquínicos en

interacciones con y entre los medios de comunicación, considerados por mis 'amigos' Guattari y Deleuze, como equipos colectivos para la producción de subjetividad, en medio de tantos otros. Universos maquínicos y tantas máquinas abstractas, como la Ciencia, la Universidad, el Arte, entre muchas.

En este punto me doy cuenta de que ya estoy avanzando en la Cartografía de los Encuentros con Guattari y Deleuze. Al mismo tiempo, se dispara en mí un ritornelo especial, a partir de la palabra Cartografía, con la que entré en contacto en dos de los primeros textos Cartografías del Deseo, de Guattari con Suely Rolnik, pensadora brasileña, y Cartografía Sentimental, de Suely Rolnik ella misma, presentando su investigación de maestría. El contacto con el concepto y con la idea de producir recorridos que se inscriben sobre la marcha, en medio de paisajes cambiantes, también marcó profundamente mi vida. Al mismo tiempo, en la medida que avanzaba en las lecturas esquizoanalíticas, encontraba una ciencia abierta al mundo de la emoción y la sensibilidad, al mundo de los afectos, tan diferente a la ciencia fría y calculadora que hasta entonces me habían presentado.

En esta nueva forma de entender al ser humano, pero no sólo al ser humano, de entender los sistemas entrelazados en una lógica ecosófica, cuya grandeza sólo comprendí con el tiempo, me encontré natural y espontáneamente abrazada. Era como si hubiera encontrado un puerto, un puerto caótico y en la caoticidad de las intensidades abstractas me sentía como en casa, territorializada, con la tranquilidad de saber que la agencia resultante de las desterritorializaciones no sería más que perderse en desvíos, que se agenciarían otras vidas, otros territorios y eso se abriría a la agencia de cada vez más poder. Así, la cartografía se asoció con desear desterritorializaciones y pude asociar esta idea con todo en la vida, incluyendo y principalmente con la investigación, las prácticas y los procedimientos operativos, habiendo creado dos estrategias metodológicas denominadas Cartografía del Saber y Matrices Rizomáticas – estrategias de supervivencia en caminos de investigación cualitativa para la ciencia de Mundo N'ovo, el mundo que está por nacer (Baptista, 2014, 2020; Baptista; Eme, 2022).

Las dos estrategias fueron creadas y se utilizan de forma acoplada, para orientar la producción de investigaciones en escenarios caosmóticos de ritornelización. La pregunta que me surgió en la década de 1990 fue ¿cómo enseñar Metodología de la Investigación, comprendiendo y moviéndome por tantas teorías y orientaciones de vida, que me encaminaban hacia una mirada compleja, ecosistémica, caosmótica, desterritorializadora, disipativa y holística? Así, entendí también que no podía enseñar investigación o metodología como quien propone que la materia encaje en dogmas prefabricados. Quería gestionar el deseo de investigación, de Ciencia, y también gestionar el poder de cada investigador, de cada sujeto, de producir a partir de sus caminos y desvíos. Entonces, en ese momento, propuse la idea de que investigar es hacer un viaje investigativo y que, para eso, deberíamos trabajar con la lógica cartográfica, de mapeos mutantes, de lógicas inscriptivas, palabra que creé para representar la idea de inscribiendo, creando y



desencadenando nuevos mundos de conocimiento.

Así, la Cartografía del Saber propone el recorrido con el establecimiento de cinco senderos. La cartografía se operacionaliza por senderos simultáneos, considerados en su dinámica de producción en un proceso continuo. Hay una pista inicial, que se convierte en señal para las demás, que se activan simultáneamente. Este es el Sendero Trama de los 'Nodos de investigación', que identifica los 'nodos' de investigación, los focos de los senderos de investigación que se seguirán. La estrategia metodológica considera el carácter subjetivo y autoral del investigador, su historia, sus inquietudes y búsquedas, en la Ruta del Conocimiento Personal o Dimensión Subjetiva, en asociación con varios otros tipos de conocimiento, en otras tres rutas. El Sendero de Trama Teórico-Conceptual-Bibliográfico es el filo investigativo que posibilita realizar encuentros con el saber de otros, en coherencia y alineación derivativa de los significados centrales del foco de estudio, los 'nodos de investigación'. En lo Sendero Planta de Producción o Trama de los Haceres, está el universo de las acciones investigativas, en aproximaciones y acciones, con su carácter de inscripción – inscripción, creación y activación de devenires – teniendo en cuenta la singularidad y complejidad de los universos ecosistémicos investigados. En asociación, con carácter simultáneo, espontáneo y constante, se encuentra la Dimensión Intuitiva del Camino de la Investigación, reconociendo que el conocimiento se produce en el entrelazamiento de universos poderosos, involucrando dimensiones materiales e inmateriales, en consonancia con que la investigación es en sí misma, un universo vivo y cambiante.

Las Matrices Rizomáticas son una estrategia de sistematización metodológica. Fueron creadas para ayudar al investigador a verificar la coherencia interna de la investigación y las inflexiones, las direcciones del proceso durante y después de la conclusión de la investigación. La denominación deriva de la comprensión de 'matriz', como lugar generador de vida, lo que deriva de la proposición de que las matrices expresan los lugares que generan la vida de la investigación. La complementación rizomática está asociada al concepto de rizoma, de Félix Guattari y Gilles Deleuze (1995), quienes proponen el rizoma, a partir de la transposición del significado de Botánica, como una especie de raíz con crecimiento irregular y brotes espontáneos sin simetría y regularidad.

De esta manera, las Matrices Rizomáticas son sistematizaciones de los 'lugares generadores de investigación', observando las direcciones, las inflexiones en sus irregularidades y fluidez, en brotes que forman, constituyen nodos, que se despliegan en nuevos flujos hasta la confluencia y formación de nuevos nodos, que conducen a nuevos flujos... hasta llegar a nuevos nodos, y así sucesivamente. Esta idea también está ligada al pensamiento de Ylia Prigogine, quien desde la Química propuso el estudio de las estructuras disipativas, con el reconocimiento de los nodos de confluencia y los nodos de paso.

Estas estrategias son el resultado de más de 30 años enseñando Metodología de la Investigación y orientando el trabajo en todos los niveles académicos.

Todavía quiero referirme a otras ideas, en esta cartografía de encuentros, para terminar.

El primero de ellos es el encuentro con la idea del deseo como potencia y no como carencia. Esta idea ha marcado mi vida y ha cambiado, en situaciones micro y macro, tanto mis relaciones como el rumbo de mi existencia. Para ejemplificar, cuento una historia personal. Siempre quise ser madre. Soy descendiente de una mujer italiana y la idea de ser madre siempre ha sido algo fuerte en mí, la inmensidad del amor, la fuerza matrística que nos guía en el universo femenino, se hizo en mí una poderosa leona convirtiéndose en madre. durante mi vida. Sin embargo, un diagnóstico de endometriosis severa pareció interferir con mi sueño, aparentemente con mi deseo, si no fuera por la potencia. Mi médico, en ese momento, dijo: Maria Luiza es imposible para ti. Respondí: ¡No lo es! Insistió: Ya expliqué, por Medicina no se puede. Tu caso es grave. Tiene endometriosis severa. Incapaz de quedar embarazada. Dije: ¡es posible! Me voy a quedar embarazada, es cuestión de tiempo, puedes esperar. Insistió: hemos hecho todas las pruebas. No es posible. Le respondí: no me conoces bien. Sé que voy a ser madre. QUIERO SER MADRE. Así que es cuestión de tiempo. Mientras no quede embarazada, voy a adoptar niños y ser madre adoptiva. Entonces, adopté a tres niños y, cuando ya no estaba en tratamiento, quedé embarazada biológicamente de una niña, para sorpresa de mi médico. Poderoso deseo gestionado y fortalecido al entrelazarme con mis otros hijos. Además, la experiencia de maternidad académica con mis alumnos me aseguró que el cuerpo respondería a mi naturaleza materna, de MADRE, MATRIZ GENERADORA DE VIDA Y AMOR!

### **De lagunas, devenires y reticencias...**

Así, quizás la gran síntesis de esta cartografía, o, al menos, lo que me gustaría que quedara como síntesis, radica en la idea que vengo trabajando, también inspirada en Humberto Maturana, de que necesitamos una revolución matrística, que rescata en nosotros los rasgos básicos de la familia ancestral, en el sentido de ética de relación y amor, lazos ético-estéticos de interacciones transpoiéticas, generando una vida plena en una lógica ecosófica y superando el antropoceno. Una lógica en la que podamos convivir con todos los seres, visibles e invisibles del planeta. Que rescatemos nuestros entrecruzamientos de estribillos y afectaciones, en medio de la caosmosis contemporánea y nos encaminemos hacia la preservación no sólo del planeta, de Gaia, sino de la convivencia en estribillos de paz, colaboración y amor.

Guattari y Deleuze son autores que marcaron mi vida para siempre, como teórica, persona intensamente afectiva y amorosa, ser deseante del mundo, periodista, investigadora, científica, mujer, madre, en la agencia de un ser que transita por el los engranajes maquínicos y florecen, florecen del amor y de la autopoiesis. Las pistas sobre el poder de la agencia autopoética y la comprensión del deseo como poder, en

combinación con el reconocimiento de que todos vivimos en caosmosis y que podemos, así y por eso mismo, producir, activar ritornelos potentes... son, para mí, señales importantes para continuar nuestro camino en la construcción de lo que llamo Mundo N'Ovo, y en el que vengo trabajando con amor e intensidad.

Quizá por eso se me ocurrió la palabra lagunas, asociada a devenires y reticencias. Este texto es el resultado de un brote espontáneo, intenso, en el medio, en la brecha de tantas experiencias con el Esquizoanálisis. Él, el texto, no trae el pasado aislado, ni el presente, ni el futuro, concentra multitemporalidades, multiterritorialidades y transversalidades de afectos entre experiencias pasadas, las intensidades abstractas sentimiento-pensantes de la producción del discurso, de la conversación en la Conferencia, del texto bajo revisión y ahora en preparación para su entrega. Por eso mismo, el texto no termina... siempre hay signos de devenires, que también dejo aquí expresados en puntos suspensivos...

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## ***Les processus logique-libidinales d'intersubjectivité dans l'éducation des sourds: les enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire***

par DIMITRI BOCHKOV [ДМИТРИЙ БОЧКОВ]

### **Abstract**

After cochlear implantation, a pre-school child with congenital deafness becomes actively immersed in the stream of non-signifying sounds. By studying with specialist teachers, children with cochlear implants develop the ability to focus on and distinguish sounds, which goes hand in hand with the socialisation and oedipalisation of sound and with certain subjective processes arising from ambivalent corporeal experience. During these individual performative lessons, libidinal processes and operations open up opportunities to create the intersubjective space described by Guattarian positive logic. Thus, in this essay, I seek to reveal the schizoanalytic possibilities in this educational praxis concerning children with cochlear implants. The data was collected through participant observation of a series of classes at a private psychological centre in Moscow.

De nombreux ouvrages consacrés à la culture sourde sont saturés de vocabulaire deleuzien et guattarien. Par exemple, je me réfère ici aux concepts de devenir-sourd (Boldt, Valente 2021) ou de rhizome de sourd (Valente, Boldt 2015) qui côtoient les concepts ontologiques et généralisés comme l'univers ou la modalité d'être de sourd (cf. Kusters, Maartje, O'Brien 2017). Cette justification conceptuelle de la « surdité » comme une nouvelle modalité de l'audition et de la perception – Sourd avec un « S » majuscule – essentiellement repose sur un geste pragmatique, un passage de la langue à l'ontologie. Dans cet essai, je m'intéresse au domaine de l'éducation des sourds, spécialisée pour les enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire et considérée par un grand nombre de représentants de la culture sourde comme une praxis hostile et unifiante. De ce point de vue, l'éducation des sourds crée une convention de l'audition et de l'interaction sonore, une sorte de norme unifiée que l'on peut nommer comme devenir-normal (Friedner 2022).

Sans doute, cette affirmation est certainement politique et pour s'inscrire dans le contexte de ce numéro spécial « 50 ans de *L'Anti-CeDipe* », il convient de la reformuler : on peut dire que la pédagogie des sourds traduit le flux corporel énergétique en un système référentiel de signes. Même de cette manière, l'assertion semble controversée ;

on y reviendra par la suite. Pour le moment, on parle de ce que j'ai puisé dans les conversations avec les enseignants spécialisés pour enfants sourds et de ce que j'ai observé dans un centre d'éducation des sourds à Moscou.

Plus précisément, il s'agit des spécialistes qui travaillent avec les enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire : leur but est d'apprendre aux enfants à collaborer avec les sons et les interpréter proprement. Il me semble qu'il est possible de dénouer certains nœuds de cette pratique afin de saisir certaines possibilités schizoanalytiques.

En étant dans une relation intime avec une personne greffée, un implant cochléaire est un contenant des affects divers ; en fait, c'est une machine technique qui remplit les fonctions de locus psychique des intensités subjectives, des émotions, des fantaisies. Ce faisant, l'implant cochléaire se retrouve bien sûr otage d'un discours médical qui symbolise impitoyablement le corps humain et affecte l'expérience corporelle du sujet. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de technophobie sociale.

Dans le cas des enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire, une machine technique accumule aussi les angoisses des parents. L'enfant perçoit évidemment l'attitude parentale à l'égard de l'implant cochléaire et, comme le dit une enseignante, Mme N., « les enfants jouent parfois, se vexent et se retirent l'implant, une partie externe, naturellement, parce qu'ils se rendent compte que la maman s'en préoccupe ». En ayant une partie externe retirable, détachable ainsi qu'une partie intérieure qui est toujours là, « avec toi », tout d'abord, l'implant cochléaire est un objet ambigu de désir. L'implant reçoit les investissements libidinaux comme « moi » et comme un objet.

Si on utilise une analogie populaire, on peut dire qu'un appareil auditif fonctionne comme des lunettes lorsqu'un implant cochléaire fonctionne comme l'ouïe artificielle ou l'oreille. La directrice d'un organisme à but non lucratif spécialisé sur les implants cochléaires en Russie, *La mélodie de vie*, distingue trois types de bénéficiaires possibles : un enfant d'âge préscolaire atteint de surdité congénitale, une personne adulte qui perd progressivement l'audition sur une période de 5 ans, une personne adulte ayant perdu l'audition à la suite d'un accident.

Pour les deux derniers types, l'implantation est autorisée, car les adultes ont une mémoire sonore formée selon les spécialistes ; le premier cas est plus compliqué, car les jeunes enfants ont l'appareil psychique « plus souple » en étant dépourvus de « conscience sonore ». Ce manque psychique s'est expliqué par la conception que l'enfant entendant généralement accumule toutes les informations sonores au cours de la première année de sa vie.

Selon les enseignants des sourds qui travaillent autant dans les hôpitaux publics que les centres privés, après l'implantation cochléaire, l'enfant se retrouve dans un monde de sons, c'est-à-dire de sons signifiants, sans la connaissance de comment naviguer dans ce monde. Par conséquent, au début du programme d'études, les enseignants apprennent aux enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire les caractéristiques physiques

des sons comme niveau de l'intensité sonore ou différenciations comme présence/absence, brièveté/extension, etc. L'un des enseignants (Mme S.) déclare :

C'est la question de l'absence de sens acoustique: en étant hors du champ de vision de l'enfant, je peux l'appeler par son nom ou taper sur un tambour jusqu'à ce que je sois bleu, mais l'enfant ne tournera pas la tête vers l'arrière.

Le silence est interprété par exemple non pas comme une absence totale de sons comme dans le vide, mais comme des sons qui n'ont pas de « plénitude sémantique ». L'étape suivante consiste à travailler sur le développement de la compréhension du discours de l'autre. Ces cours ont généralement lieu avec des enfants d'âge préscolaire et souvent même d'âge maternel, c'est-à-dire avant la socialisation intégrée. Toutes les classes partagent de manière cruciale la forme interactive et performative du jeu.

J'ai donc observé plusieurs classes avec des enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire dans un centre privé, *C'est intéressant d'écouter*, situé à Moscou. Et puisque la salle où se déroulent les classes et le hall créent un espace sonore commun, les parents qui amènent leur enfant sont au courant de ce qui se passe dans la salle. Dans la même salle de classe, près de la fenêtre, il y a une table pour enfants et deux petites chaises ; la table constitue l'espace du jeu, tandis que la taille des chaises vise à rapprocher la position de l'enseignante (Mme S.) de celle de l'enfant.

Chaque classe commence et se termine par une chanson enfantine sur un hibou et d'autres animaux. Le hibou est ici le personnage principal et, comme on le sait, lorsqu'il chasse la nuit, le hibou se fie davantage à l'ouïe qu'à la vue. Le vol du hibou doit être accompagné d'une chanson sonore et significative. L'enseignante (Mme S.) enfile une marionnette gantée représentant un hibou, imite le vol d'un oiseau en accompagnant la chanson par des gestes que l'enfant doit également répéter.

J'appelle le hibou  
Ohé, ohé [*la paume à la bouche illustre l'appel*]  
Le hibou vole vers nous  
Moi, hibou, je vole de la forêt  
Ce que j'ai vu, ce que j'ai entendu  
Je vais tout vous raconter  
Il y a un vent qui bruisse [*le frottement des paumes illustre le bruissement*]  
Il y a une feuille qui vole [*le mouvement de la main de haut en bas illustre le vol*]  
Il y a un pivert qui tapote [*tapotement des doigts sur la table*]  
Il y a un serpent qui siffle [*sifflement*]  
Il y a une grenouille qui crie [*la main montre la bouche d'une grenouille coassant*]  
Il y a un poisson qui se tait [*le doigt sur la bouche illustre le silence*]

Dès que la chanson est terminée, l'enseignante (Mme S.) pose une main avec le hibou sur la table. Ensuite, le cours consiste en une série de jeux de devinettes : qui produit tel

ou tel son ? Chaque situation sonore créée par l'enseignante (Mme S.) est socialisée et oedipalisée. Chaque son dans la salle est un objet dans le scénario, chaque trajectoire est fixée, chaque son doit avoir une signification. Lorsque l'enfant est distrait, l'enseignante (Mme S.) tente de regagner son attention. Pas de distraction !

Les règles sont généralement basées sur des anticipations et des attentes déçues. Pendant le jeu de devinettes, l'enseignante (Mme S.) peut suggérer une mauvaise réponse et lorsque l'enfant la répète, l'enseignante (Mme S.) répond : « pourquoi ne crois-tu pas tes oreilles ? croix-les ». Ici, le rôle des jouets dans cette action théâtrale est essentiel. À son tour, le hibou joue le rôle d'assistant de l'enseignante (Mme S.) ; tout au long de la leçon, l'enseignante remet le jouet à la main et répète la tâche au nom du hibou. Parfois, l'enseignante (Mme S.) peut lever la main avec le hibou vers l'implant cochléaire d'un enfant et dire : « Je vais te dire un mot à l'oreille ». L'enseignante (Mme S.) et le hibou se concentrent donc sur la partie externe de l'implant cochléaire en la comparant à l'oreille. C'est ainsi que se construisent l'intégrité corporelle et le désir.

Le mot que le hibou dit à l'oreille est extrêmement important. Contrairement à l'enseignante (Mme S.), le hibou ne ment jamais et ne donne jamais de mauvaises réponses. L'enfant fait confiance au hibou comme aux autres jouets. Un enfant, un garçon de 2 ans et 3 mois, joue à un jeu avec l'enseignante (Mme S.) : il doit deviner quel animal fait quel son à l'intérieur de la maison de poupée. À la fin du jeu, les jouets-animaux encouragent le garçon à leur dire « ciao ! ciao ! ». Et lui, il croit, dit « ciao ! ciao ! » et se dirige vers la sortie de la classe. Là, il refuse de continuer le cours, sa mère arrive, puis l'enseignante (Mme S.) nous demande, à moi et à sa mère, de les laisser tranquilles.

Ce n'est pas le jeu lui-même qui impose les règles sociales à l'enfant-agent ; c'est l'enseignante. Pendant le cours, l'enfant s'investit socialement non pas dans le jeu, mais dans l'enseignante elle-même. En fait, on peut dire que ces activités visent à développer une libido sociale de l'enfant par le biais de socialisation et signification des sons : « le monde social constitue la libido biologique, pulsion indifférenciée, en libido sociale, spécifique » (Bourdieu 1994 : 153).

Se référant à la distinction de Freud entre la libido du moi et la libido de l'objet, Bourdieu montre que l'agent social s'investit directement dans le champ social :

J'évoquerais une sculpture qu'on trouve à la cathédrale d'Auch, dans le Gers, sous les sièges du chapitre, et qui représente deux moines en train de se battre pour obtenir le bâton de prieur (Ibid).

Dans cet exemple parlant, cependant, il n'y a pas d'interaction entre les moines eux-mêmes parce qu'ils s'investissent dans le champ social du pouvoir de manière autonome. L'interaction nécessite l'Autre, qui brise l'illusion de la situation : Dieu qui peut arrêter les moines ou le hibou qu'un enfant croit. Le développement libidinal se fait avec l'implication de l'Autre.



Au début du premier essai sur la théorie sexuelle, Freud définit la « libido » comme un moteur instinctif du désir sexuel que l'on peut comparer à la faim. Cette définition s'est ancrée en métapsychologie et a considérablement influencé les conceptualisations ultérieures de la libido en tant qu'énergie, force ou flux qualitatif. Cependant, dans un supplément de 1915 aux trois essais Freud définit la « libido » comme un dispositif quantitatif et analytique : « une force quantitativement variable permettant de mesurer les processus et les transpositions dans le domaine de l'excitation sexuelle » (Freud 1987 : 157-158). Lacan approfondit cette différenciation fondamentale de l'énergie qualitative et quantitative dans le Séminaire 4 (Lacan 5 décembre 1956 : 5(67)), en recourant à l'image d'une usine hydroélectrique dont la puissance potentielle réside dans la cascade d'eau (l'inconscient) sur laquelle elle repose.

L'énergie de cette cascade, selon Lacan, n'a rien à voir avec la réalité naturelle, elle n'apparaît que lors des calculs de l'énergie de la centrale hydroélectrique réalisés par des ingénieurs qui partent des points de référence (la hauteur de la cascade et le débit de l'eau) c'est-à-dire, de la combinaison des signes. La libido, par analogie, représente la médiation de la réalité de l'inconscient (la cascade) par la réalité du sexuel (la combinaison de signes). Lacan poursuit cette réflexion dans le Séminaire 11 (Lacan 29 avril 1964 : 18(315)) de façon topologique en utilisant la notion de libido comme la « colle » qui relie le cross-cap, la bande de Möbius, de l'inconscient et du sexuel (Bochkov 2023).

Bien sûr, il convient de mentionner le mythe de la lamelle : la libido est aussi un organe irréel qui sert de médiateur entre l'inconscient et l'Autre. Il ne s'agit pas d'une invention soudaine dans le séminaire 11 puisque Lacan mentionne également lamelle-libido au colloque de Bonneval en 1960 : ce « n'est pas sa décharge, mais est à décrire plutôt comme l'évagination aller et retour d'un organe » (Lacan 1966 : 168). Cela clarifie les relations de la libido avec les zones érogènes : la libido est un verrou, une écluse. En précisant ces zones érogènes, Lacan mentionne dans le séminaire 11 de façon cruciale que les oreilles ont le privilège de ne pas pouvoir se fermer. Le sujet veut que l'Autre l'invoque, c'est ainsi que cela fonctionne. Cependant, dans l'interprétation de Lacan, l'invocation est avant tout discursive ; le lien entre ce type de pulsion et la sonorité n'est pas clair.

Ces relations entre l'inconscient, lié à l'espace de l'Être (puisque le sujet lacanien est le sujet de l'inconscient) et le sexuel, lié à l'espace du Sens, sont réglées par les opérations logiques de disjonction et de conjonction. Implicitement, dans la conceptualisation de Lacan, la logique interne de la libido, donc une « force quantitativement variable », se rapporte directement à la logique formelle. Autrement dit, la libido selon Lacan est un « calculateur » logique du désir qui existe à l'intersection du sujet inconscient et de l'Autre.

La conjonction (P&Q) fait référence à la séparation lacanienne tandis que la disjonction (PvQ) est l'aliénation lacanienne. Comme les diagrammes de Venn montrent,

le cercle de « P » désigne l'Être (une zone du sujet) tandis que le cercle de « Q » représente le Sens (une zone de l'Autre), et la zone de chevauchement entre les cercles est une zone de non-sens, l'inconscient saisissable. Pour Lacan, le sujet, c'est le sujet de l'inconscient et seule la zone d'intersection est saisissable. L'aliénation illustre l'équilibre (PvQ) qui maintient le sujet dans l'Être et le Sens. En conséquence, le sujet est aliéné à lui-même au profit de l'Autre ; le sujet ne peut être le sujet sans l'Autre. Le choix possible entre l'Être et le Sens serait contre le sujet (Lacan 27 mai 1964 : 19 (432)) – l'option optimale pour le sujet est donc de sauver à la fois l'Être et le Sens par l'aliénation qui est la seule façon de maintenir l'équilibre.

Cela rappelle une stratégie de la classe avec les enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire. Néanmoins, je dois ajouter que les enfants des classes performatives trouvent des moyens pour que les trajets et marche-routes, trajectoires de la libido (Deleuze 1993) aillent au-delà du son social. Habituellement, cela s'exprime dans la pratique régulière de lancer des jouets sur le sol. Il s'agit d'une pratique explicite du plaisir, d'une prise de plaisir dans le son, d'un désir.

On peut retourner aux opérations logiques de l'Être, du Sens et du non-sens. Le point délicat se situe au niveau de la zone de chevauchement qui représente le non-sens. D'une part, c'est ce qui différencie le Sens de l'Être selon la visualisation de Venn du  $P \Leftrightarrow Q$  ou l'équation. Cependant, lors de l'aliénation, cette zone est également indiscernable, car aliénée. D'autre part, c'est le seul point commun entre l'Être et le Sens ; selon la visualisation de P&Q, il n'y a qu'un seul élément, la zone de chevauchement. Cette dernière opération est désignée comme la séparation ; pour Lacan, c'est le manque dans l'Autre et le sujet se trouve dans cet espace de manque dans l'Autre. Le non-sens est ici le seul élément saisissable puisque si le sujet est séparé de l'Autre, il n'est pas pour autant complètement saisissable. Il y a une logique conjonctive de séparation dans le fait de jeter un jouet sur le sol. Il en résulte un certain déséquilibre énergétique.

Ces opérations d'aliénation et de séparation sont intimement associées, comme le montre la formule algébrique suivante :  $(\text{Être}) \vee (\text{Sens}) = (\text{Être}) + (\text{Sens}) - (\text{Être} \& \text{Sens})$ . Lacan ne le montre pas, mais cela signifie que l'aliénation ne peut être calculée sans que la séparation ne le soit et vice versa. Par essence, l'aliénation est une condition de la séparation et vice versa. La socialisation de la libido se caractérise par l'aliénation du sujet. Tout en préférant la capacité de différencier les objets, le sujet devient l'agent social et sacrifie la capacité de différencier son propre désir.

Après l'aliénation, l'agent social identifie son désir au désir de l'Autre et recherche la reconnaissance de l'enseignante. Représentant le champ à investir, l'Autre maintient un tel statu quo jusqu'à ce que le sujet trouve le manque dans l'Autre. Le sujet ne peut prendre conscience de l'existence de l'Autre que par son manque. Ce manque survient lorsque l'Autre trébuche et se rend visible. Par exemple, lorsque l'enfant laisse tomber son jouet, l'enfant voit l'enseignante non pas comme le champ à investir, mais comme

une instance de l'Autre. En conséquence, pendant un moment, le sujet se sépare de l'Autre et peut trouver son propre désir comme pulsion partielle.

En suivant un modèle de l'inconscient qui n'est pas basé sur l'équilibre énergétique, Guattari introduit trois entrées qui remplissent des fonctions logiques similaires et trois niveaux d'inconscient (Guattari 1989) : non-séparabilité (la compatibilité interne entre les entités ; niveau matériel), séparation (la transformation d'inter-entités de l'extérieur ; niveau sémiotique) et quantification (les relations des entités entre la non-séparabilité et séparation ; niveau pragmatique). Ici, dans ce contexte plus compliqué (l'inconscient lacanien ne présuppose pas les niveaux différents), les fonctions logiques ne sont pas fixées, par exemple, la séparation peut être conjonctive et active (Ibid).

C'est important parce qu'à ce moment, l'enseignante apparaît comme une instance d'intersubjectivité. Cela renverse la logique d'un cours ordinaire : il ne s'agit pas d'interagir avec l'autre pour jouer, mais de jouer pour interagir avec un sujet, avec un inter-sujet. Ces moments créent un espace intersubjectif particulier, un espace conjonctif. Rappelons la définition que Guattari donne de la subjectivité :

L'ensemble des conditions qui rendent possible que des instances individuelles et/ou collectives soient en position d'émerger comme Territoire existentiel sui-référentiel, en adjacence ou en rapport de délimitation avec une altérité elle-même subjective (Guattari 1992 : 21).

Cette définition semble également conjonctive, les conditions d'une subjectivité déterminant les conditions d'une autre subjectivité. Il ne s'agit pas d'une tautologie, mais de la logique intersubjective positive suggérée par Guattari. Peut-être l'étape suivante de la séparation lacanienne. Ce n'est pas l'Autre à l'extérieur, c'est l'Autre à l'intérieur, en lui-même l'Autre n'est qu'une partie de l'intersubjectivité, de l'altérité. En lançant son jouet, l'enfant invite l'enseignante à entrer également dans le flux d'énergie, et c'est à elle de choisir de le suivre ou de renvoyer l'enfant à son scénario d'origine. D'une manière générale, suivre l'enfant correspond à l'objectif fixé par les enseignants des enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire avec lesquels j'ai pu m'entretenir.

Une autre enseignante (Mme V.) qui dirige des classes de groupe dit : « Par exemple, si vous regardez le bac à sable, les enfants de deux ans jouent en quelque sorte ensemble, mais ils sont assis tout seuls ». En fait, ils ne sont pas seuls : l'enfant ne s'adresse pas à lui-même, ni aux autres, mais à l'Autre. Néanmoins, la première chose à apprendre est l'interaction, la capacité à s'impliquer dans des relations intersubjectives, dans l'intersection de territoires existentiels.

Revenons à la thèse initiale selon laquelle la pédagogie des sourds est une traduction du flux corporel énergétique en un système de référence. Dans une certaine mesure, cette thèse peut se référer à la pensée de Guattari selon laquelle « dans certains contextes, le sens peut être massivement opposé à des Flux matériels et signalétiques, conçus sur un mode essentiellement passifs » (Guattari 1989 : 36). Selon une

enseignante (Mme V.), leur objectif professionnel est certainement de rendre les interactions sujet-son passives, de sorte que le décodage n'interfère pas avec le processus stable de la communication. Elle illustre cela par une métaphore : « le poisson est le dernier à remarquer l'eau ». Il m'a semblé que cet énoncé contient une différenciation plus productive qu'actif/passif : subjectivité/situation, ou la situation socio-libidinale, le territoire.

Si l'on suit les foncteurs ontologiques, le Flux est relié aux Territoires par le biais d'une discursivité énergétique libidinale. Dans ce contexte, on peut dire que le flux énergétique du son et le système de références dans lequel il est intégré par un enseignant sont dans le même Flux, un Flux matériel, sémiotique et énergétique. Il ne faut pas oublier que le sens naît aussi des fluctuations de la machine, de ce qu'un psychanalyste appellerait la pulsion (Guattari 1992 : 175).

Ici, Guattari utilise l'opération mathématique de l'intégration, en soulignant la relation des Phylums (machiniques) aux Flux et des Univers aux Territoires : « les Phylum constitueront, en quelque sorte, les « intégrales » des Flux et les Univers les « intégrales » des Territoires » (Guattari 1989 : 41).

Le sens est imbriqué dans le Phylum, l'intégrale du Flux, nombre infini de parties d'une valeur infiniment petite. L'intégration fonctionne avec des infinitésimaux en utilisant l'exemple d'une courbe continue représentée comme une ligne brisée. En d'autres termes, dans l'intégration, la courbe continue est divisée, découpée en un nombre fini de segments discrets – l'écart entre eux peut être négligé.

La quantification est donc possible ici, ces infinitésimaux peuvent être additionnés pour connaître l'aire de la figure courbe. L'opération mathématique de l'intégration est très proche de la fonction pratique de la schizoanalyse clinique en ce qu'elle traite de l'infini et de la continuité, de cet incalculable que la psychanalyse comme l'arithmétique ne peut atteindre.

Plus précisément, on peut dire que cette fonction d'intégration est assurée par la libido, la libido schizoanalytique, que Guattari situe dans la zone du Phylum. Le phylum de la libido dénaturalisée est l'intégrale des flux matériels du désir, quelque chose qui permet de le numériser. L'interprétation lacanienne de libido comme un ensemble des opérations logiques ne contredit pas celle-ci de Guattari. Aussi la libido-flux au sens économique, qualitatif – c'est ainsi que Guattari voyait la libido chez Freud – Guattari ne l'annule pas. C'est simplement une question de choix micropolitique.

Ce qui déplaît à Guattari, c'est que la libido en psychanalyse soit devenue un équivalent général et transcendantal, une constante. Et il faut dire que c'est juste : la libido psychanalytique reste un être mythique, une chimère, un piège, c'est-à-dire une notion avec laquelle les analystes contemporains préfèrent malheureusement ne pas s'engager. Contrairement à Lacan, Guattari veut sortir la notion de libido de l'esclavage des pulsions de la vie et de la mort ; le programme libidinal lacanien est construit sur les pulsions de la vie et de la mort. Guattari propose de ne pas dire définitivement adieu au

vocabulaire de Freud, mais d'essayer de travailler avec lui à partir de la théorie des agencements. Guattari propose de ne pas parler de la libido comme d'une pulsion, mais comme d'une expression, de quelque chose qui évalue le désir, et qui introduit un déséquilibre dans la relation du désir (Guattari 1981). C'est ce qui se passe lorsque des enfants porteurs d'un implant cochléaire jettent un jouet par terre.

Une extension évidente de la pratique de la pédagogie des sourds développant une interprétation schizoanalytique serait l'utilisation de la vibration sonore. Certains enseignants m'ont dit qu'ils utilisaient parfois des jouets spéciaux qui produisent à la fois des sons et des vibrations tactiles. Cette pratique, du moins en Russie, n'est pas très développée, malgré ses avantages évidents. Cette approche engage à la fois les composantes matérielles et sémiotiques du son, démontrant la distinction superficielle entre l'énergétique et sémantique. Il s'agit essentiellement d'un investissement direct du son, de l'affect dans le corps – ce que la psychanalyse prend comme une métaphore, la pédagogie des sourds peut le prendre au pied de la lettre.

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## **À propos du « livre barjot » de L'Anti-Œdipe**

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traduction par JEAN-SÉBASTIEN LABERGE

### **Abstract**

The 50th anniversary of the publication of *Anti-Œdipus* in 1972, just a few years after the events in May-June 1968 in Paris, affords us the opportunity to reflect on the very simple question, what has happened to desire and its 'infinite swarming' (Deleuze 2004: 267)? What has impeded the impetus of *Anti-Œdipus*? Why has the spirit of liberatory desire seemingly faded away and why do the dreams of 1968 appear long gone?

### **Échec**

Deleuze avait-il raison de considérer l'*Anti-Œdipe* comme un échec ? On le voit lorsque Deleuze se lamente auprès de Catherine Backès-Clément de sa frustration face aux (non)effets de 1968 et de son premier livre avec Guattari:

*L'Anti-Œdipe* est après 68: c'était une époque de bouillonnement, de recherche. Aujourd'hui il y a une très forte réaction. C'est toute une économie du livre, une nouvelle politique qui impose le conformisme actuel... le journalisme a pris de plus en plus de pouvoir sur la littérature. Et puis, une masse de romans redécouvrent le thème familial le plus plat, et développent à l'infini tout un papa-maman: c'est inquiétant, quand on se trouve un roman tout fait, préfabriqué, dans la famille qu'on a. C'est vraiment l'année du patrimoine, à cet égard *L'Anti-Œdipe* a été un échec total. (Dosse 2007 : 263)

Dans l'article « L'étudiant, le fou et le Katangais », publié en 1969 et prononcé l'année précédente au III<sup>e</sup> Congrès international de psychodrame, sociodrame et thérapie institutionnelle, Guattari parle des tristement célèbres *Katangais*, les voyous qui ont envahi la Sorbonne et plusieurs autres institutions à travers la France. Les Katangais – le lumpenprolétariat parisien – étaient d'infâmes mercenaires qui occupaient les sous-sols de la Sorbonne. Le mystère entourant les Katangais, dont le nom semble provenir des rebelles katangais de la guerre du Congo, est levé et décrit plus franchement par Seale et McConville comme suit :

Une trentaine de voyous, de petits délinquants, d'anciens légionnaires étrangers, de déserteurs – se faisant appeler « les Katangais » – s'installent dans un sous-sol de la Sorbonne et sèment une terreur incertaine autour d'eux. Ils étaient venus pour aider les étudiants, mais ils ont jeté le discrédit sur eux. Une nuit de la mi-juin, il y eut une bagarre et ils furent mis dehors par un service d'ordre des étudiants, mobilisés par le comité d'occupation. (1968: 109)

Tout en se gardant de parler de leur rôle en tant que classe d'avant-garde impeccable et irréprochable des ouvriers et des étudiants, Guattari parle de la tâche révolutionnaire comme de la suppression même de l'ordre du prolétariat. Simplement, la classe ouvrière doit échapper aux modèles hérités d'organisation et d'institutions. Les distinctions entre l'avant-garde et le prolétariat, le prolétariat et le sous-prolétariat ou le lumpenprolétariat doivent disparaître pour qu'une transformation fondamentale se produise. À leur place doivent émerger de nouvelles subjectivités capables de communiquer de manière transversale. Son argument pourrait être aligné sur les critiques contemporaines de la jeunesse d'aujourd'hui, qui est parfois perçue comme restant enfermée dans des modes de pensée, d'action et de croyance qui l'empêchent de réaliser l'impossible, de penser l'impensable, de créer un monde nouveau pour tous, d'être digne de l'événement (Deleuze; Guattari 1991 : 151). Selon cette lecture, les étudiants sont entravés par « le système imaginaire de castes » (Guattari 2003: 223) et pour Guattari, un mouvement d'insurrection, un véritable mouvement révolutionnaire étudiant, est déterminé et inhibé par des dispositifs, il demeure « encasté dans l'imaginaire » (Ibid.). Guattari soulève l'importante question de savoir comment assurer une communication transversale entre des éléments hétérodoxes, contaminés, disjoints – les Katangais en tant que tels – car ce sont ces groupes qui, en échappant au contrôle social, inventent un autre avenir – *un otro mundo es posible* – un autre monde est possible. De manière spectaculaire, Guattari trouve dans la figure du Katangais planétaire un prototype du « militant révolutionnaire authentique », de « l'homme nouveau » de la future société socialiste (Ibid.: 239).

Le problème de l'université, on l'a bien vu en 68, n'est pas celui *des* étudiants et *des* enseignants, c'est le problème de l'ensemble de la société dans la mesure où se trouvent mis en cause aussi bien le rapport entre la transmission de connaissance, la formation de cadres, le désir des masses que les exigences de l'industrie, etc. (Guattari 2012: 28)

Mai 1968 nous a appris à lire sur les murs et depuis, on a commencé à déchiffrer les graffitis dans les prisons, les asiles et aujourd'hui dans les pissotières. (Guattari 1973: 3; cf. Bradley 2020)

Guattari note que *les événements* ont déclenché des crises et des traumatismes dans l'éducation, mettant en évidence les dysfonctionnements des structures universitaires,



les mauvaises méthodes d'enseignement, les problèmes de santé mentale des étudiants, la nécessité d'offrir des soins psychothérapeutiques aux étudiants et d'autres problèmes propres à la vie étudiante qui existaient dans les années 1960, mais qui n'étaient pas souvent abordés. Il situe dans l'irruption de 1968 la reconnaissance d'une « interaction fondamentale entre les problèmes psychopathologiques individuels et l'entourage social, professionnel et politique » (Guattari 2003: 231). En d'autres termes, la crise de 68 a dramatisé les crises enracinées dans la société française. Guattari examine comment la névrose et la folie peuvent devenir un fondement de la vérité, révélant les problèmes sous-jacents du socius.

La schizoanalyse est l'un des noms que Guattari a donnés au projet de toute une vie de réinventer la psychanalyse et la pratique thérapeutique en l'étendant au champ matériel et social, car le désir est toujours déjà collectif dans sa dimension et son articulation. Sans réinvention, « on a l'inconscient qu'on mérite » (Guattari 1979: 7), dans nos perceptions du monde, dans notre corps, notre territoire et notre sexe, insiste Guattari. Nous avons l'inconscient que nous méritons dans les relations amoureuses, dans la famille, l'école, les quartiers, les usines, les stades et les universités, ajoute-t-il, mais l'inconscient machinique, avec sa production et sa reproduction d'images et de mots, est également « tourné vers l'avenir ». Sa « trame » est le possible lui-même, le possible à fleurs de langage, de peau, de socius, de cosmos, etc. (Ibid.: 8). La question est de savoir comment libérer le désir en refusant le choix entre spontanéité et hiérarchie. Pour Guattari:

Désir libéré, cela veut dire que le désir sort de l'impasse du fantasme individuel privé: il ne s'agit pas de l'adapter, de le socialiser, de le discipliner, mais de l'agencer de telle sorte que son procès ne soit pas interrompu dans un corps social opaque et, qu'au contraire, il aboutisse à une énonciation collective. Ce qui compte, ce n'est pas l'unification autoritaire, mais plutôt une sorte d'essaimage à l'infini des machines désirantes: dans les écoles, les usines, les quartiers, les crèches, les prisons, etc. Donc, pas question de coiffer, de totaliser les mouvements partiels, mais de les brancher sur un même plan de bascule. Tant qu'on en reste à une alternative entre le spontanéisme impuissant des masses et le codage bureaucratique et hiérarchique d'une organisation de parti, les mouvements de libération du désir se feront récupérer, encercler, marginaliser... (Guattari 2012: 77)

En gardant à l'esprit la libération du désir, la figure du schizo, « *l'ange exterminateur* » du capitalisme que l'on trouve dans *L'Anti-Œdipe*, peut être repositionnée et désignée comme Katangais. Une partie de ce projet est une tentative de repenser et de repositionner la crise de la production de la subjectivité qui reste pertinente pour le moment que nous vivons, ce qui équivaut à une crise du désir. Les soi-disant attitudes subjectives de ceux qui échappent au contrôle social peuvent être appelées « les

Katangais du tiers monde ». Qui et où sont les « Katangais du tiers monde » ? Qui sont ceux qui vivent en marge des sociétés industrielles avancées ou ailleurs dans le Sud ?

Quelques questions se posent: quelle est la nature de la « tiers-mondisation » de nos sociétés actuelles qui fait proliférer des éléments criminels-déclassés? Qui et où sont les militants de notre société contemporaine? S'agit-il des pauvres, des détenus, des patients psychiatriques, des étudiants, de la classe des *hackers* (Culp 2022)? Comment expliquer l'explosion nihiliste des comportements autistiques et des passages à l'acte pulsionnels des soi-disant délinquants, le lumpenprolétariat du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle, le *Katangais-étudiant*? Pourquoi le prototype du militant révolutionnaire authentique semble-t-il singulièrement absent, voire anachronique, non seulement des sociétés occidentales, mais aussi des technopoles urbaines de l'autre côté de la planète, à Tokyo, Séoul ou Pékin par exemple? De telles questions exigent un retour à *L'Anti-Cédipe* pour comprendre l'(im)possibilité de la réémergence de la subjectivité telle que Guattari l'appelle, une subjectivité des marges (*emarginati*), une forme de subjectivité qui peut inventer un nouvel ordre social, qui peut invoquer une nouvelle valorisation au-delà de celles « phallogocratiques, compétitives, brutales » du même, une nouvelle forme de subjectivité au-delà des machines célibataires capitalistes qui peut affirmer les véritables « devenirs de désir » (Guattari; Rolnik 2007: 408).

Dans quelle mesure l'effondrement du désir, et ce que Deleuze et Guattari, à la suite de Wilhelm Reich, qualifient de désir désirant sa propre répression, nous parle-t-il de notre époque où le monde semble prisonnier de modèles de subjectivité qui ont moins à voir avec le processus schizo qu'avec l'autisme ou des formes d'ipséité mortifère ? Il est donc légitime de se demander – comme le font Deleuze et Guattari dans leur essai « Mai 68 n'a pas eu lieu » –, qu'en est-il dans la tiers-mondisation des sociétés industrielles avancées, dans les vastes métropoles et leurs ghettos, dans l'écologie grise du « tiers monde européen », qu'en est-il « d'un Mai 68 généralisé, d'une bifurcation ou d'une fluctuation amplifiée », et de la possibilité d'un « nouvel internationalisme » (Deleuze 2003: 217)?

Le fait que 2021 ait vu des hommes et des femmes d'une richesse obscène se lancer dans l'espace à des fins touristiques et d'enrichissement personnel, tandis que le reste d'entre nous, humbles êtres vivants, souffrions des effets du changement climatique et de la propagation du coronavirus, semble suggérer que ce n'est pas George Orwell, mais plutôt Aldous Huxley, qui avait raison quant à la trajectoire générale des sociétés occidentales, car Huxley avait prévu que la satisfaction immédiate des pulsions primaires était le véritable secret du contrôle et de la domination. Bernard Stiegler, qui a également écrit sur la sociopathologie et la psychopathologie de 1968 et de ses suites, suit cette ligne d'argumentation en soutenant que ceux qui vivent dans la nouvelle forme de capitalisme culturel souffrent d'une forme de misère spirituelle, car ils trouvent le désir et la sublimation découplés des pulsions. Il note la perte de croyance dans ce qu'il appelle nos sociétés incontrôlables et pour lui, précisément, « *la croyance est un nom du*

*désir* » (Stiegler 2006: 26). Quelle est la nature de ce désir transformé? Il est clair que l'énergie du jeune prolétariat numérique est aujourd'hui dépensée dans d'autres activités que le ferment révolutionnaire. La vie se passe dans l'*addiction* aux jeux vidéo, au porno, aux jeux d'argent, à des formes infinies d'intoxication « pour échapper à la réalité de la journée de travail » (Bradley; Lee 2018: 642).

Une humanité excédentaire est apparue, de nombreux jeunes à travers la planète souffrent d'un chômage et d'un sous-emploi structurels. Dans les vastes bidonvilles du monde, dans nos technopoles urbaines, dans les non-lieux du monde, de nombreux jeunes sont contraints d'embrasser l'économie informelle et l'existence précaire. Le lumpenprolétariat réactionnaire est passé des « vagabonds, criminels, prostituées », parias et intouchables, aux travailleurs précaires et épuisés, aux travailleurs pauvres, au personnel contractuel, au personnel journalier, au personnel contractuel zéro heure et, plus désespérément, au sous-prolétariat ou au sous-prolétariat permanent. Le *lumpenproletariat* est désormais une classe ouvrière mondiale qui réunit le précaire et l'humanité excédentaire.

Alors que des hommes et des femmes riches comme Richard Branson, Yusaku Maezawa et Jeff Bezos gravitaient autour de notre planète, il n'y a pas eu de critique du capitalisme, mais plutôt un massif désaveu collectif et une paralysie politique, alors que nous nous enfouissions encore plus profondément dans les patrons technologique et consumériste. C'est compréhensible compte tenu du sentiment d'anxiété et de stress qui se répand sur la planète, mais il s'agit néanmoins d'un désaveu. L'expression spectaculaire de cette paralysie politique s'est également produite à la fin de la débâcle qu'a été la présidence Trump. Les téléspectateurs du monde entier ont vu des Katangais sans pouvoir pénétrer dans le Capitole, téléphones portables à la main, une génération *selfie* débile se filmant elle-même, sans savoir quoi faire ensuite. Plus préoccupée par les réseaux sociaux, les flux en direct et les *likes* instantanés, la jeunesse américaine privée de ses droits ne s'est jamais posé la question: que se passera-t-il si nous accédons au pouvoir, que se passera-t-il le lendemain? Ces deux actes obscènes de stupidité restent gravés dans ma mémoire. L'un virevolte autour de la planète sans se soucier de l'humanité qui se trouve en dessous. L'autre, la foule de Trumpiste, les nouveaux Katangais de l'apolitisme et de l'appauvrissement le plus misérable.

Les voyous qui ont pris d'assaut le Capitole sont précisément les ignorants décrits par Stiegler ci-dessus. Mais ce n'est pas tout. Leur idiotie laisse ceux qui les regardent tout aussi stupéfaits, car nous, voyeurs, réalisons que c'est nous qui, collectivement, *ne croyons plus en ce monde*. Nous ne croyons pas aux événements qui nous arrivent, comme le dit Deleuze. L'attention ailleurs, nous haussons nonchalamment les épaules et retournons à nos écrans mobiles. Nos vies, leurs vies, sont vraiment comme un mauvais film (Deleuze 1985: 223). En effet, nous pouvons dire ceci: il n'y a pas d'esprit prévalent pour rompre avec l'ordre et la passivité de nos institutions. Je crois que cela est

symptomatique de l'activisme politique d'aujourd'hui.<sup>1</sup> Les choses vont si mal que ce n'est même pas que le capitalisme a perdu son esprit et que la misère spirituelle règne comme le dit Stiegler (2004), mais *en masse* nous avons perdu *notre esprit* dans les technologies de l'esprit et du contrôle. Cette perte est une conséquence de la désublimation, et de la tendance à l'épuisement de la libido. La pathologie sociale de 1968 conduit au déclin du pouvoir de socialisation et au règne des pulsions. Notre époque est celle de la liquidation de toutes les barrières surmoïque. Ce n'est ni l'âge d'or du principe de plaisir, ni la libération des « instincts », mais le règne des pulsions. Face à cet état de fait misérable, « notre tâche la plus difficile » est simplement celle-ci: « croire en ce monde, en cette vie [...] la tâche d'un mode d'existence à découvrir sur notre plan d'immanence aujourd'hui. » (Deleuze; Guattari 1991: 72; voir Bradley; Lee 2018). Le monde a vraiment besoin d'un sursaut et les sociétés incontrôlables ont besoin d'un sursaut et cela, je pense, serait un acte révolutionnaire (2006: 69). Je crois que les outils de la schizoanalyse restent suffisamment aiguisés et précis pour accomplir cette tâche.

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<sup>1</sup> Un certain type d'initiation de groupe permet de spécifier une marque prévalente : une pratique militante réelle dans un contexte social réifié crée un effet de coupure, bien éloigné du sentiment de passivité que donne la participation aux institutions habituelles. Peut-être après coup serai-je amené à considérer que, de ma part, il y avait là l'induction d'un certain activisme, l'illusion d'une efficacité, une fuite en avant... Pourtant, je crois que ceux qui ont fait l'expérience du militantisme dans de telles organisations de jeunesse, organisations de masse, au parti communiste ou dans les groupuscules, ne seront plus jamais comme les autres. Peu importe ici le critère d'efficacité dans la réalité ; certains types d'action, de concertation, traduisent une cassure avec des processus sociaux habituels, et surtout une rupture d'avec les modes de communication et d'effusion hérités de la famille. (Guattari 2003 : 156)

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## ***Undoing the Present, Crystallising the Future: Psychedelic Schizoanalysis***

by ARAGORN ELOFF

### **Abstract**

In this article, I examine the use of psychedelics as a way of fulfilling the tasks of schizoanalysis. Specifically, I will argue that we can view psychedelics as counteractualising agents of ontogenesis and fabulation, observing that, even beyond the long-standing countercultural and therapeutic discourses supporting this view, there is now growing evidence from contemporary neuroscience that they can function as powerful deterritorialising tools right down to the neurobiological level. My interest in discussing psychedelics use in the context of Deleuze and Guattari is neither simply to observe interesting parallels nor to perpetuate the popular misunderstanding of the schizoanalytic project as the liberation of some kind of inchoate universal energy; instead, I would like to propose that psychedelics could aid us – individually and collectively (although, as we will be reminded below, these are already the same thing) – in dismantling the fascisms that surround us and the fascisms that inhabit us by allowing us to create new machinic arrangements of desire or, in Simondon's terms, to facilitate novel transductive couplings that allow for new individuations. Before turning to drugs, bodies and the myriad becomings that inhabit them and which they augur, I reiterate the core principles, theses and tasks of schizoanalysis.

### **Introduction: the delirious**

The question of subjectivity is now returning as a leitmotiv. It is not a natural given any more than air or water. How do we produce it, capture it, enrich it, and permanently reinvent it in a way that renders it compatible with Universes of mutant value? How do we work for its liberation, that is, for its resingularisation?

Félix Guattari (1995: 135)

What is terrifying is our lack of collective imagination in a world that has reached such a boiling point, our myopia before all the 'molecular revolutions' which keep pulling the

rug out from under us, at an accelerated pace.

Félix Guattari (2009: 307)

Half a century after its original publication, thumbing through *Anti-Oedipus* produces an unusual tension: on the one hand, it reads like a romantic paean to the post-68 moment; on the other, the task it sets for us – the schizoanalytic task of locating and eradicating both the molar and the molecular forms of fascism – is perhaps even more apposite now than it was in the heady days of 1972. If, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, “every delirium is first of all the investment of a field that is social, economic, political, cultural, racial and racist, pedagogical, and religious” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 274), then it is surely the case that we live in a particularly delirious moment. With the growing popularity of far-right sentiment around the globe, reflected in the emergence of populist leaders, reactionary movements and the normalisation of the most noxious forms of online discourse, all of it unfolding within the context of spiralling digital complexity, ecological collapse, inter-imperial rivalry and a seemingly omnipresent global economic crisis, we can clearly see the ways in which “everything turns fascist or envelops itself in fascism, the way in which it falls back into archaisms” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 277), and how the “[s]ocial modes of organization that prevail today on earth are not holding up, literally and figuratively” (Guattari 2009: 307). As Guattari observes, at the current juncture, “[h]istory is gripped by crazy parameters: demography, energy, the technological-scientific explosion, pollution, the arms race [...] The earth is deterritorializing itself at top speed” (ibid.). In response to this, a renewed critical focus on social formations and the complex relations between the individual and collective subjectivation processes that emerge from and sustain them is a necessary pretext for any meaningful project of resistance and refiguration or, put otherwise, of “individual and collective reappropriation of the production of subjectivity” (Guattari 1995: 133). Crucially, this project cannot take the form of a mere escape but needs to cause more escapes as it unfolds (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 315) – it needs to make what it is escaping escape through the careful machining of new, experimental arrangements of collective desire. In undertaking this task, Guattari encourages us to distinguish between subjugated groups and subject groups. He observes in this regard how a “subject group endeavours to control its own behaviour” and is thus able to “produce its own tools of elucidation” or collective arrangements<sup>1</sup> of enunciation to become “open to a world beyond its own immediate interests”, whereas subjugated groups tend to express themselves in hierarchical structures and cultivate reactive relations to otherness. To the extent, however, that desire *is* liberated in subject groups

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<sup>1</sup> While the usual English translation of Deleuze and Guattari’s often-used term ‘agencement’ is ‘assemblage’, I have opted for the lesser-used translation ‘arrangement’. Neither properly connote the enactive sense of ‘agency-ing’, but ‘assemblage’ carries with it the weight of serious misreadings within new materialist and object-oriented frameworks (see Buchanan 2021 for a corrective to these). Regardless, the active, participatory sense of the original French term should be recalled throughout.

and the participants can form a heterogeneous – and heterogenetic – collection of singularities with transversal relations, the group can become highly adaptive and creative, locating and eradicating internal micro-fascisms and putting in place a potentially revolutionary processual creativity.

What, however, beyond the proliferation of intuitively appealing neologisms and turns of phrase that mark out a particular Deleuzoguattarian identity, does it mean to ‘liberate our desire in subject groups in order to create a processual heterogenesis against micro-fascism’? If we don’t want the language of ‘desiring-machines’, ‘Bodies without Organs’ and ‘deterritorialisation’ to become just so many *margarine words*<sup>2</sup>, perhaps we need to consider what an actual schizoanalytic practice – one we could enact in the real world against real forms of fascism – would look like. While the idea of schizoanalysis has been fruitfully applied in fields like cultural studies, are there any contemporary *practices* that we could regard as ‘schizoanalytic’? This may seem counterintuitive given that Deleuze and Guattari are explicit about the fact that “[n]o political program will be elaborated within the framework of schizoanalysis” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 380) and that the schiz is “prepared by a subterranean labor of causes, aims, and interests working together” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 378). We are thus unlikely to locate a political practice that calls itself schizoanalytic and, as Ian Buchanan has observed, whatever semblance of a program we could locate in Deleuze and Guattari’s oeuvres is fragmentary and tentative (Buchanan 2020: 5-6). There is not – nor could there ever be – a manual of schizoanalysis. Nor are the architects of desire interested in proposing any kind of utopianism; as Guattari observes, “[u]topia, today, is to believe that current societies will be able to continue along on their merry little way without major upheavals...The true Utopians are conservatives of all shapes and sizes who would like for this ‘to hold up all the same,’ to return to yesterday and the day before yesterday” (Guattari 2009: 307). That said, if we consider what *Anti-Oedipus* describes as the negative and positive tasks of the schizoanalytic project, we can recognise the immanent process-goal of the machining of desire as an anti-fascist practice in several surprising places. In this article, I turn towards one of the more surprising of these places in order to examine the use of psychedelics as a form of schizoanalysis aimed at combatting micro-fascism. Specifically, I will argue that we can view psychedelics as counteractualising agents of ontogenesis and fabulation, observing that, even beyond the long-standing countercultural and therapeutic discourses supporting this view, there is now growing evidence from contemporary neuroscience that they can function as

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<sup>2</sup> “The way activists talk at their meetings is primarily in margarine-words. These may be slogans, phrases whose function is to circulate, not to mean; or they may be certain oily words that slip from mouth to ear, person to machine, situation to scene. One way to recognize margarine-words is repetition: they are used a lot, functioning as code words or passwords, their appropriateness assumed, never shown. Ultimately, this is because their circulation is also the usually unquestioned circulation of moral beliefs; but in any given iteration, the repetition may be well-nigh meaningless, just a little index, gentle reminder of the shared morals rather than harsh mnemotechnic. It is never really clear which is primary, which gives form to which: the morality at work, or the compulsion to repeat in its collusion with the most gregarious drives” (Acosta 2014: 138).



powerful deterritorialising tools right down to the neurobiological level. My interest in discussing psychedelics use in the context of Deleuze and Guattari is neither simply to observe interesting parallels nor to perpetuate the stereotypical popular misunderstanding of the schizoanalytic project as the liberation of some kind of inchoate universal energy<sup>3</sup>; instead, in line with the practical injunction mentioned above, I would like to propose that they could aid us – individually and collectively (although, as we will be reminded below, these are already the same thing) – in dismantling the fascisms that surround us and the fascisms that inhabit us by allowing us to create new machinic arrangements of desire or, in Simondon’s terms, to facilitate novel transductive couplings that allow for new individuations (Simondon 2020: 13-16; 175-180). Before turning to drugs, bodies and the myriad becomings that inhabit them and which they augur, however, it is worth reminding ourselves of the core principles, theses and tasks of schizoanalysis.

### **Prolegomena to any future schizoanalysis**

Desire is an exile, desire is a desert that traverses the body without organs and makes us pass from one of its faces to the other. Never an individual exile, never a personal desert, but a collective exile and a collective desert.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1977: 377)

In this brief diagrammatic reminder of schizoanalysis, I will rely primarily on *Anti-Oedipus*, but I will also gesture towards Guattari’s later solo writings as they reflect a sustained development and continual transformation of the fluid conceptual architecture of the ideas most commonly associated with the first volume of the *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* project. In that book, Deleuze and Guattari scatter various ‘theses’ and ‘tasks’ of schizoanalysis across the last chapter. Drawing these together will provide a provisional framework through which to encounter psychedelics. Foucault of course attempted something like this in the famous introduction to *Anti-Oedipus*, but his polemical take is, when presented in isolation (and no doubt despite his intentions), prone to the above-mentioned popular misreading of the ‘liberation of desire’, so let us instead turn to the body of the text itself. Deleuze and Guattari begin the final chapter by

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<sup>3</sup> “I will take the liberty of questioning all references to undifferentiation, all references to spontaneist mythologies: every time we succeed in assembling devices of expression that escape from the despotism of the dominant system of significances, and that escape from the articulation of all the dominant syntaxizations, we are actually dealing with highly elaborate machinisms” (Guattari and Rolnik 2007: 353).

presenting the negative task – although we should bear in mind that “[t]he negative or destructive task of schizoanalysis is in no way separable from its positive tasks – all these tasks are necessarily undertaken at the same time” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 322) – which is “ultimately that of discovering for every case the nature of the libidinal investments of the social field, their possible internal conflicts, their relationships with the preconscious investments of the same field. their possible conflicts with these-in short, the entire interplay of the desiring-machines and the repression of desire” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 381-2). In other words, schizoanalysis involves a careful analysis of how unconscious desire is machined in each instance as well as how this relates to the preconscious interests that don’t necessarily align with unconscious desire. This machining – because remember, “desire is a machine, a synthesis of machines, a machinic arrangement – desiring-machines” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 296) – is in fact what we could describe, in quasi-Marxist language, as part of the ‘infrastructure’: “[t]he most general principle of schizoanalysis is that desire is always constitutive of a social field” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 348). Desire invests production as social production and desire itself is likewise a form of desiring-production – there is a kind of reciprocal presupposition between desire and production that forms the core of the analytic component of schizoanalysis. When examining a particular social field, “schizoanalysis only asks what place it reserves for desiring-production; what generative role desire enjoys therein; in what forms the conciliation between the regime of desiring-production and the regime of social production is brought about, since in any case it is the same production” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 380). While “all production is at once desiring-production and social production” (296), it is analysed in two distinct yet overlapping ways: first as it affects the preconscious “molar aggregates of social production” and second as it is expressed in the unconscious “molecular multiplicities of desiring production” (380), both of which are collective, machinic regimes that differ merely in their degrees of stratification or, as Deleuze and Guattari put it in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the kinds of lines they form (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 208-31). In the interweaving, resonance and divergence of these lines – the molar lines of identitarian axioms, class belongings and all the manifest content of the social order, as well as the molecular lines limning the hidden content of libidinal investments that belong to a different, often contrary distribution of multiplicities – schizoanalysis then seeks to locate points of rupture – lines of flight and leakage as well as tendencies towards fascisms on all scales. This is distilled in the four theses outlined in the final chapter of *Anti-Oedipus*. The first of these is, as we have already made clear, that “every investment is social, and in any case bears upon a sociohistorical field” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 342). The second is that when examining how desire is machined within a particular social arrangement, we need to “distinguish the unconscious libidinal investment of group or desire, and the preconscious investment of class or interest” (343). As Deleuze and Guattari observe, preconscious investment reflects “large social goals, and concerns the organism and the collective organs, including the arranged vacuoles of lack”

(344), i.e., what we could otherwise refer to as the molar and the manifest. Notably, and similarly to the distinction Deleuze makes in *Difference and Repetition* between the actual and the intensive, it is here, among the fully-established terms and properties – or classes – that comprise the concrete, structured social reality that we can locate lack and exclusive disjunction, things that are missing when we turn to the pure positivity of the subterranean partial<sup>4</sup> flows. It is by examining the *selection* of these flows, Deleuze and Guattari tell us, that we can understand preconscious interests. The third thesis of schizoanalysis reiterates the critique of psychoanalysis that takes place throughout the book by underscoring “the primacy of the libidinal investments of the social field over the familial investment” (356); simply put, it is the former that is expressed in the latter. The fourth and perhaps most important thesis distinguishes “between two poles of social libidinal investment: the paranoid, reactionary, and fascisizing pole, and the schizoid revolutionary pole” (366). These two poles of *unconscious* desire can be defined by two different relationships to power and molarity. In the case of the molar, desire is invested in the ‘large aggregates’ or dominant social formations (think parties, militant groups, religions, ideologies) that “crush singularities, select them, and regularize those that they retain in codes or axiomatics” (ibid.) or, in other words, territorialise and integrate the flows of desire, recuperating them into the ongoing functioning of current arrangements of power. This mode of investment produces and maintains ‘subjugated groups’, themselves a microcosm of the aggregates they align with. The schizoid revolutionary pole, on the other hand, invests desire in a manner that subordinates dominant power relations and results in a resingularisation – a deterritorialisation and dis-integration that produces lines of escape or overflow that dominant social formations are not able to contain, as well as subject groups with a positive relation to transversal becomings. Of course, as Deleuze and Guattari love to remind us, things are never quite as simple as these binaries – any actual analysis of the investments in a social field will uncover a complex arrangement of flows, some of them preconscious and some unconscious, some of them paranoid and some of them schizoid. It is always a question of the functioning of this arrangement – this *agency-ing* – and of each of the gradients of distribution that fuel or disrupt it.

With the four theses in mind, how can we better elaborate the positive task of schizoanalysis? If the negative task is the diagramming of the flows of interest and desire, the positive task is that of liberating the primary productive forces of desire so that they can be arranged differently, something that “goes by way of destruction – a whole scouring of the unconscious, a complete curettage” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 311). This curettage is the construction of the Body without Organs “that haunts all forms of socius” (281) and

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<sup>4</sup> As the English translators of *Anti-Oedipus* make clear in a note, Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘partial’, when referring to the flows of desire, in the sense of ‘partial to’, i.e., preferential towards, as opposed to, for instance, Klein’s notion of part(ial) objects as incomplete components of a lost unity. This should be borne in mind when we turn to dynamic systems theory and attractor topologies later.

aims to produce a ‘degree zero’ of intensity or a ‘smoothing’ of space through a counteractualisation that can allow for new individuations, “thereby causing the desiring-machines to start up again” (339). If the way desire is currently machined is through the lack-ist<sup>5</sup> faciality machines of psychoanalysis, capitalism, the State and so forth, then this entails that we “[d]estroy Oedipus, the illusion of the ego, the puppet of the superego, guilt, the law, castration”, and this is by no means “a matter of pious destructions, such as those performed by psychoanalysis under the benevolent neutral eye of the analyst” because these are “Hegel-style destructions, ways of conserving” (311); as is well known, Deleuze and Guattari are profoundly critical of these ‘ways of conserving’. In this regard, as Guattari succinctly argues in *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, “the field of schizoanalysis far exceeds that which psychoanalysts consider their own, that is: 1) an individual oral performance, generally centred on a certain familialist habitus of subjectivity, in the context of developed industrial societies; 2) affective manifestations circumscribed in the etiolated space of the cure” (Guattari 2013: 51). Indeed, there is no representation or interpretation here – the unconscious is nonfigurative and nonsymbolic. Instead, “[t]he schizoanalyst is a mechanic, and schizoanalysis is solely functional” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 322). Like any mechanic or ‘micromechanic’ (339), the schizoanalyst must proceed with great care and patience in following the machinic indices of the populations and groups, the vibrations, flows, schizzes and knots that operate below the level of unified identity, in order to bring about the production of a viable Body without Organs – to botch it, as we know, could be fatal (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 161). Perhaps, however, the schizoanalyst is less a mechanic than a practitioner of *kintsugi*, because “everyone is a little group (*un groupuscule*) and must live as such – or rather, like the Zen tea box broken in a hundred places, whose every crack is repaired with cement made of gold” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 362). Taking apart our egos and presuppositions in order to liberate the prepersonal singularities contained within us and then putting ourselves back together – “assembling the desiring-machines that countersect everyone and group everyone with others” (ibid.) – tentative lines of identity marked by golden threads that glimmer with pre-individual charge. What flows through your veins? What are your desiring-machines?<sup>6</sup> How do they work? How could they work? *You work by breaking down.*

## Psychedelic ontogenesis

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<sup>5</sup> Lack, from Freud to Lacan, is, for Deleuze and Guattari, “[a]n idea originating in bad conscience, and not in the unconscious” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 295).

<sup>6</sup> “[T]he real question of schizoanalysis: What drives your own desiring-machines? What is their functioning? What are the syntheses into which they enter and operate? What use do you make of them, in all the transitions that extend from the molecular to the molar and inversely, and that constitute the cycle whereby the unconscious, remaining a subject, produces and reproduces itself?” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 291)

I have crossed a threshold of consistency. Before the hold of this block of sensation, this nucleus of partial subjectivation, everything was dull, beyond it, I am no longer as I was before, I am swept away by a becoming other, carried beyond my familiar existential Territories.

Félix Guattari (1995: 93)

Such a voyage does not necessarily imply great movements in extension; it becomes immobile, in a room and on a body without organs-an intensive voyage that undoes all the lands for the benefit of the one it is creating.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1977: 319)

In the previous section I recapitulated the core features of the schizoanalytic project in such a way as to lay the groundwork for the discussion we now turn to: psychedelics. Given the foregoing, there is – especially for those who have some experience with the effects of psychedelic compounds – perhaps already a larval sense of how a ‘curettage of the unconscious’ and a ‘liberation of pre-individual singularities’, a micromechanics of subjectivation, are useful ways to conceive of how psychedelics affect us and the transformative possibilities opened up by their judicious use (see Miller 2017; Pollan 2018; Scott; Carhart-Harris 2019 and Read 2021 for some representative overviews). Indeed, while neither Deleuze nor Guattari ever explicitly connect the schizoanalytic project to the ingestion of psychedelics beyond a handful of allusions to Castaneda (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 161-2) and LSD (Deleuze 1990: 56)<sup>7</sup>, their project provides a remarkably insightful framework (or ‘metamodel’) with which to engage the topic, especially when we consider how central ideas like ego-dissolution, enhanced aesthetic experience and an awareness of conditioned ways of experiencing self and world, along with the possibilities for profound moments of catharsis and transformation, are within the psychedelic literature. Early accounts of the ingestion of LSD, mescaline, psilocybin and other so-called ‘classic psychedelics’ are rich with descriptions of how those under

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<sup>7</sup> Interestingly, when drugs are mentioned, it’s often Deleuze who seems more enthusiastic than Guattari. Alluding to the discussion of delirium in *Anti-Oedipus*, for instance, Deleuze, in his ‘Letter to a harsh critic’, has the following to say: [d]rugs can produce delire, so why can't I get into a delire about drugs? Why does your particular version of ‘reality’ have to come into it? You're a pretty unimaginative realist” (Deleuze 1995: 12). Guattari, on the other hand, seems far more cautious: “It’s true that LSD—or drugs in general—can develop perceptual processes, enriching semiotic processes, when they are assembled with a personality such as Henri Michaux. Unfortunately, the Henri Michaux assemblages are not very common, and we can easily find phenomena of implosion, neutralization, impotentialization, or quite simply phenomena of black holes” (Guattari and Rolnik: 405).

their influence were able to see the world anew (Huxley 1963) or gain potentially therapeutically beneficial insight into deep-seated harmful patterns of thought and behaviour (e.g., Lilly 1973; Grof 2008). While such early accounts usually either deferred speculation into how exactly psychedelics achieved these profound effects or proffered explanations that frequently lapsed into the worst metaphysical and pseudo-scientific excesses<sup>8</sup>, including a penchant for crudely caricaturing various forms of Eastern mysticism and indigenous practices, the new, more scientifically rigorous wave of interest in these compounds that has unfolded over the past two decades has employed cutting-edge neuroscientific and psychotherapeutic technologies to develop a set of causal explanations that have the potential to explain not just the neurobiological basis of the psychedelic experience but many of its most salient emergent subjective features too. On the one hand “neuroimaging studies of the psychedelic state are providing tantalising clues about the biological bases of consciousness and self-awareness” (Letheby 2021: 2)<sup>9</sup>, while on the other, data from these studies is fuelling the development of new theoretical paradigms that reiterate many of the intuitive earlier findings while grounding them in a broadly naturalistic worldview. The core principle, however, is that psychedelics function as a kind of ‘unbinding’ (125) or ‘unselfing’ that provisionally dissolves the grip of a hegemonic ‘self-model’ in order to revise it. As Juuso Kähönen explains, “[t]he egocentric perspective can easily become quite constraining, our autobiographical narratives can become impenetrable fences between the world and us, and our existential perspective can become stuck in the mode of egocentric evaluations... [thus] the ability to be able to visit other kinds of perspectives is both existentially and morally important” (Kähönen 2020). Or, as Chris Letheby summarises in the groundbreaking *Philosophy of Psychedelics*<sup>10</sup>, “psychedelic therapy involves the temporary disintegration, and subsequent beneficial revision, of predictive models of the self” (Letheby 2021: 111). It thus “has a two-factor structure: it involves (a) the induction of neural and psychological plasticity at multiple levels, and (b) the discovery and consolidation of new forms of self-modelling” (6). Importantly, and contrary to a dominant assumption within the first wave of psychedelics research, our current understanding is that these “existentially significant changes to self-awareness do not depend on changes to metaphysical beliefs about the

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<sup>8</sup> It should be noted, however, that the lack of rigorous scientific understanding of the effects of psychedelics did not impede the myriad promising psychotherapeutic findings that were made in the ‘first wave’ of psychedelic research from the 1950s and 1960s that was cut short by the backlash against the 60s counterculture (see Lee; Shlain 1994 for a definitive account).

<sup>9</sup> See, for instance, dos Santos et. al. 2020 for a comprehensive survey of the field.

<sup>10</sup> For its many merits, this book, which represents the current gold standard in the field, still relies on a broadly functionalist/computationalist paradigm which, as we will see below, has been challenged in recent years by those working in 4E cognition, particularly the enactivist school associated with Varela, Thompson, di Paolo and others. For their part, some of the more promising contributions in Hauskeller and Sjöstedt-Hughes’s recent edited collection *Philosophy and Psychedelics* (2023) gesture past functionalism/computationalism in the direction of process philosophical, phenomenological and enactivist positions, but there does not yet seem to be any rigorous, sustained work on psychedelics within post-functionalist cognitive science.

ultimate nature of reality” (122). Said otherwise, the transformative capacities of psychedelic compounds seem to rely more upon an immanent self-unfolding than on any appeal to transcendence. With our recently acquired ability to be able to model real time psychedelic-induced changes in connectivity dynamics<sup>11</sup> across brain areas – including the hypothesised ‘Default Mode Network’ (DMN) (Davey; Harrison 2018) and ‘Salience Network’ (SN) that are roughly responsible for ‘normal’ conscious self-representation and attentional focus respectively – using fMRI, PET and/or EEG technologies (Carhart-Harris; Friston 2010), coupled with direct reports from subjects who have ingested a psychedelic (e.g., Carhart-Harris et. al. 2012), we have come close to the neurophenomenological ideal proposed by Francisco Varela in his research on the neural substrates of consciousness (Varela 1996) – a non-reductive approach to understanding the links between brain activity and subjective experience. Many of the most popular models that have been developed along these lines base themselves on what is known as the Bayesian brain hypothesis, which is, simply put, the idea that the brain is a prediction engine that iteratively builds and tests models or hypotheses of itself and its environment in order to maintain itself qua embodied system in the face of dissipative tendencies via the minimisation of a quantity known as ‘mismatch’, ‘surprisal’ or ‘free energy’ that represents the divergence between states systems expect to find themselves in and those they in fact find themselves in. The predictive processing framework popularised by Anil Seth (2014) is such a model<sup>12</sup>, as is Karl Friston’s increasingly hegemonic active inference / free energy principle approach, which seeks to unify action and perception as two reciprocal parts of ongoing processes of self-optimisation through belief updating and belief testing via interaction with the world (Friston 2010; 2016; Parr, Pezzulo; Friston 2022)<sup>13</sup>. One of the tools most used in the presentation of these frameworks, and one that should be familiar to those who have benefitted from Manuel deLanda’s singular exposition of Deleuzian philosophy (DeLanda 2002), is dynamic systems theory (DST). DST models systems by extracting each of their salient degrees of freedom (broadly, properties that can change) and presenting these as dimensions of a phase space representing the space of possibility for that system. A simplified atmospheric system, for instance, could be modelled as a three-dimensional space where atmospheric pressure, humidity and temperature each form one of the dimensions. Any particular state of such a system can be represented as a

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<sup>11</sup> Connectivity is discussed in several ways in contemporary neuroscience, often in the context of temporal connectivity, e.g., oscillatory coupling and phase synchronization (Kometer et al. 2015; Atasoy et al. 2017; Grimm et al. 2018; Bedford et al. 2023). This should be borne in mind throughout the below discussion.

<sup>12</sup> As Letheby usefully summarises, predictive processing models depict “the brain as an inference engine that builds hierarchical models of the world in order to predict its future inputs. Any discrepancy between predicted and actual input generates an error signal that must be cancelled, either by updating the model or by acting in the world to alter the source of the discrepant input. The overarching imperative of the brain, on this view, is to minimise error signals by optimising its predictions of sensory inputs” (Letheby 2021: 114).

<sup>13</sup> For a discussion of active inference from a broadly Deleuzoguattarian and Simondonian perspective, see Eloff (2022).

vector within its phase space, i.e., a particular point that has a directionality attached to it connoting the current tendencies of that system. Over time, complex patterns of behaviour are expressed by mapping actual systems as trajectories within phase space, which in turn increasingly define the composition of the space itself as a distribution of likelihoods of outcome for the system, i.e., those areas of the phase space that are more or less tended towards in the behaviour of the system (allowing us, for instance, to predict certain weather conditions based on the patterned interplay of the aforementioned dimensions of an atmospheric system). Technically, this distribution is described as the phase space's attractor and repeller layout, terms whose meaning should be intuitively clear<sup>14</sup>. When modelling systems like the brain using DST, then, we produce phase diagrams that map abstract features of our cognitive architecture viewed as a dynamic system (i.e., as an ever-changing set of linked processes) iteratively exploring and mapping out an attractor space that can in turn be understood as describing brain behaviour or, more ambitiously, the link between neurobiological dynamics and the vicissitudes of conscious experience. Something like this approach has been recently employed by Robin Carhart-Harris, Friston and their fellow researchers to develop an active inference based, partially DST-modelled account known as the *RElaxed Beliefs Under pSychedelics* (REBUS) model of psychedelic experience and its corollary, the *anarchic brain hypothesis* (Carhart-Harris 2018; Carhart-Harris; Friston 2019; see also Eloff 2022 for a Deleuzian account of this framework). Building on work that views psychedelics as agents of neuroplasticity (e.g., Almeida et al. 2019; borne out in Bedford et al. 2023), Carhart-Harris and co. propose that many of the positive effects attributed to psychedelics can be accounted for by the REBUS model by arguing that experiences like ego dissolution and insights into negative patterns of behaviour in fact result from a reduction in the activity of top-down regulatory brain systems like the DMN and SN and the simultaneous increase in bottom-up (or 'anarchic') brain activity. Cast in the language of DST, this behaviour is a temporary flattening of the energy landscape or attractor topology, a perturbation in the usual tendencies of a system that lessens<sup>15</sup> the pull and push of usually dominant attractors and repellers and allows for potentially novel traversals of the space of possibility described by the phase space:

What seems to persist for at least some time after the experience is a flattening of the 'prior landscape': various hypotheses about what kind of person 'I' am are put on a more level playing field, as the relative probabilities assigned to some are decreased,

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<sup>14</sup> For the purposes of this article, I am simplifying matters somewhat; as DeLanda and others have made clear, systems tend asymptotically towards attractors and often exhibit complex or chaotic patterns of behaviour in their proximity, with attractors commonly described with terms like 'steady state', 'cyclical' and 'strange' depending on their specific dynamics. Notably, Guattari mentions attractors, phase spaces and so forth in quite a similar manner to how I am presenting them here in books like *Chaosmosis* (e.g., 95; 116).

<sup>15</sup> Without ever entirely smoothing space, because the BwO is headed towards asymptotically and because "chaos is not pure indifferenciation; it possesses a specific ontological texture. It is inhabited by virtual entities and modalities of alterity which have nothing universal about them" (Guattari 1995: 81).



and to others increased. This flattening of the prior landscape plausibly underlies the feelings of openness, spaciousness, and freedom—the sense of being unburdened—that characterises the short-to-medium-term afterglow (Carhart-Harris; Friston 2019).

While the links we can draw between the neurobiological systems being modelled here and actual subjective experience are provisional, there is nothing inherent to the framework that prevents us from speculating that when viewed as an indirect model of conscious experience, these phase space topologies can be described as a distribution of long-term behavioural dynamics, i.e., what we figuratively describe as the habits, patterns of behaviour and so forth, good or bad, that we accrue over the courses of our lives<sup>16</sup>. The trajectory we're following in the current discussion should be becoming clear; if, as Letheby summarises, the research to date points to the idea that “modulation of the Default Mode and Salience networks seems to be an especially consistent correlate of (i) insightfulness experiences, (ii) ego dissolution, and (iii) lasting psychological benefits” (Letheby 2021: 93), and if contemporary psychedelic science is correct that by perturbing these networks, “psychedelics in effect ‘shake the snow globe’, allowing the system to be subsequently reset into a healthier configuration” (96), then there seems to be a remarkable degree of overlap between the consumption of psychedelics and the practice of schizoanalysis. Here is how Guattari describes schizoanalysis in *Chaosmosis*, for instance:

The Unconscious is intimately connected with the concept: it too is an incorporeal construction which takes possession of subjectivity at the point of its emergence. But it is a concept which at every moment risks becoming clogged up, and which must be constantly cleared of the cultural scoria which threatens to reterritorialise it. It requires reactivating, machinic recharging, due to the virulence of events which set subjectivity into action. (Guattari 1995: 64)

Guattari even appears to come close to something like predictive processing when he asks:

What processes unfold in a consciousness affected by the shock of the unexpected?

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<sup>16</sup> Indeed, this is a central component of the REBUS framework, which Letheby glosses as follows: “psychedelics alter consciousness by perturbing neural processes that encode the precision (or ‘confidence’) that the brain assigns to its own high-level beliefs. Since these high-level beliefs play a central role in the cognitive economy, one flow-on effect is to induce an unconstrained mode of cognition, sending the system on a whirlwind tour (or ‘trip’) through an expanded state space. When phenomenal feelings of uncertainty or puzzlement occur, they result from specific representational activity: from the brain representing its own beliefs as highly imprecise or uncertain” (Letheby 2021: 107). These high-level beliefs are also described as ‘hyperpriors’ and likened “to Kantian categories, to Wittgensteinian ‘hinge’ or ‘framework’ propositions, to the constituents of a Kuhnian paradigm, or to the central nodes of a Quinean web of belief” (Letheby 2021: 119).

How can a mode of thought, a capacity to apprehend, be modified when the surrounding world itself is in the throes of change? How are the representations of an exterior world changed when it is itself in the process of changing? (Guattari 1995: 11-2)

Cultural scoria as attractors and repellers – territories or anti-territories – and machinic recharging as a shaking of the snow globe<sup>17</sup>. The virulence of events that set subjectivity into action as life as it unfolds, diagramming “fields of the possible, tensions in value, relations of heterogeneity, of alterity, of becoming other” (Guattari 1995: 27), oftentimes remarkably unaware that this is happening. To learn “what a subject’s desiring-machines are, how they work, with what syntheses, what bursts of energy in the machine, what constituent misfires, with what flows, what chains, and what becomings in each case” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 339), just hook them up to an fMRI and then give them a psychedelic to set in motion “the destruction of the molar aggregates, the structures and representations that prevent the machine from functioning” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 339), because “schizoanalysis would come to nothing if it did not add to its positive tasks the constant destructive task of disintegrating the normal ego” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 362). *What are your attractors – what machinings of desire do the collective assemblages of enunciation and power formations of the social field express within your psyche? How can these be redistributed? What new ones can we experiment with?* It’s almost too easy: the DMN as the territorialised subject, psychedelics as agents of deterritorialisation. *How do you create yourself a Body without Organs?* “[F]or each case and each situation... construct a map of the unconscious—with its strata, its lines of deterritorialization, its black holes—open to perspectives of experimentation” (Guattari 2011: 170). Then, proceed by weakening “the constraining influence of those priors on the process of probabilistic inference... expanding the space of phenomenologically possible worlds” (Letheby 2021: 121).

### **The thousand faces of the schizoanalytic psychedelic subject**

We always make love with worlds.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1977: 294)

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<sup>17</sup> Interestingly, Guattari explicitly refers to attractors when discussing the idea of the refrain: “the refrain is not based on elements of form, material or ordinary signification, but on the detachment of an existential ‘motif’ (or leitmotiv) which installs itself like an ‘attractor’ within a sensible and significational chaos. The different components conserve their heterogeneity, but are nevertheless captured by a refrain which couples them to the existential Territory of my self. In the case of neurotic identity, sometimes the refrain develops into a ‘hardened’ representation, for example, an obsessive ritual. If for any reason this machine of subjectivation is threatened, the whole personality may implode; this occurs in psychosis where the partial components move off on delirious, hallucinatory lines” (Guattari 1995: 17).

Perhaps it is all a little too easy though, in the sense that schizoanalysis in fact proposes a far more profound view of subjectivity – or rather processes of subjectivation – than can be found in contemporary mainstream psychedelic research. For one, Deleuze and Guattari express deep antipathy towards representational views of the unconscious, contrasting a machinic, non-representational machinery of desire to a ‘theatre of the unconscious’ that goes by way of signification and is amenable to recuperation by psychoanalytic discourse. For them we are not, in other words, “in the presence of a passively representative image, but of a vector of subjectivation” (Guattari 1995: 25). Similarly, they argue against the idea that there are ‘beliefs’ in the unconscious to be uncovered and interpreted. As they aver, there is “no mystery, no hidden universe... nothing to discover in the unconscious” (Guattari 1996: 52). Instead, “[t]he unconscious needs to be created” (ibid.), a view that situates them far from any functionalist-representationalist view of the mind. Here, as John Protevi has demonstrated (Protevi 2013: 155-78), Deleuze and Guattari are far closer to the 4E school of cognition, specifically the enactivist framework originally proposed by Francisco Varela and developed by Evan Thompson (2007), Ezequiel di Paolo (di Paolo, Buhrmann; Barandiaran 2017) and others. On the enactivist view, cognition is a form of sense-making that involves an inter- and intra-systemic tension between processes of self-distinction and processes of self-production<sup>18</sup>. Cognition as sense-making is something systems – human beings for instance – *do*, something that unfolds in relation with environments in ways that render systems and environments differentially entangled via various forms of openness and closure representing processes of self-production and self-distinction respectively (114-6)<sup>19</sup>. Cognition is thus not the abstract reflective symbolic juggling of a circumscribed rational agent, but instead the processual imbrication of systems – themselves complexly nested in recursive networks of reciprocal adaptation – and environments that are similarly complex. Enactivism, as di Paolo and co. have noted (di Paolo, Cuffari; de Jaegher 2018), is thus similar to Simondon’s notion of individuation (2020) which was in turn a substantial influence on Deleuze (1994). The parallels here are especially evident in Varela’s influential view of cognition as involving what he called a ‘meshwork of selfless selves’ (Varela 1991), an assemblage of proto-subjective becomings or larval subjects (Deleuze 1994: 78-9). As Guattari puts it, “[a] thousand machinic propositions constantly work upon each individual, under and over their

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<sup>18</sup> Di Paolo et al. cast this tension in explicitly dialectical terms; it is unclear that this is necessary, however, if we take a Simondonian transductive view wherein disparation, i.e., differences between incommensurable orders, can drive ongoing processes of individuation in a manner Simondon convincingly argues is non-dialectical (2020: 85-6; 111).

<sup>19</sup> Guattari is remarkably close to 4E views of cognition as sense-making when he offers a provisional definition of subjectivity, broadly described, as “[t]he ensemble of conditions which render possible the emergence of individual and/or collective instances as self-referential existential Territories, adjacent, or in a delimiting relation, to an alterity that is itself subjective” (Guattari 1995: 8-9).

speaking heads” (2011: 156) and in this sense, “[s]ubjectivity is in fact plural and polyphonic... [and] recognises no dominant or determinant instance guiding all other forms according to a univocal causality” (Guattari 1995: 1). Similarly, enactivism recognises the reciprocal nature of becomings, or what Simondon would call transductions (2020: 13-6), in its view that systems and environments individuate at the same time as part of the same processes of cognition as sense-making<sup>20</sup>. Guattari seems close to this view when discussing infant development and noting “the inherently trans-subjective character of an infant's early experiences, which do not dissociate the feeling of self from the feeling of the other”; this “nascent subjectivity, which we will continually find in dreams, délire, creative exaltation, or the feeling of love” (Guattari 1995: 6), but which is to some extent present in all experience, is thus for Guattari, as for Simondon, *collective* in the sense that it is “a multiplicity that deploys itself as much beyond the individual, on the side of the socius, as before the person, on the side of preverbal intensities, indicating a logic of affects rather than a logic of delimited sets” (9). Adopting this kind of transversal approach, where cognition is the ongoing enacting of a world-become-subject-become-world, where subjects are a meshwork of larval selves (or where, as Guattari says, “a sense of being-in-itself is established before any discursive scheme, uniquely positioned across an intensive continuum whose distinctive traits are not perceptible by an apparatus of representation but by a... pre-egoic, pre-identificatory agglomeration” (79)) and where “[s]ubjectivity is manufactured just as energy, electricity, and aluminium are” (Guattari and Rolnik 2007: 47), has serious implications for how we think about psychedelics. Instead of viewing them as ‘mind-revealing’ agents in the representationalist sense of the term, they are, in a sense that is true to the etymology of the term *psyche-delic*, *mind-manifesting*, i.e., literally setting in motion a particular viscosity of desire by freeing up the flows from some of the more congealed aspects of habituated practices of sense-making. To be sure, an entire theatre of the unconscious is often expressed in the unfolding of a psychedelic experience – people regularly hallucinates archetypes, transcendent forms and all the names of History as a kind of transformative mythic drama (see, for instance, the discussion of ‘basic perinatal matrices’ in Grof 2008) – but this is just the flotsam of the attractors torn loose from their moorings<sup>21</sup> and drifting past us as we pick up speed

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<sup>20</sup> In *Chaosmosis*, Guattari describes something particularly close to sense-making when he talks about “worlding a complexion of sense” and observes that this “always involves taking hold of a massive and immediate ensemble of contextual diversity, a fusion in an undifferentiated, or rather de-differentiated, whole” (Guattari 1995: 80). On his view, embodiment functions as a “a nucleus of chaosmosis” via which sense-making can unfold as a rapid oscillation between a “state of chaotic ‘grasping’ and the deployment of complexions anchored within worldly coordinates... Formations of sense and States of things are thus chaotised in the very movement of the bringing into existence of their complexity. At the source of a world’s constitution there is always a certain modality of chaotic discomfort in its organicity, functionality and relations of alterity” (Guattari 1995: 80-1).

<sup>21</sup> In this regard, “[a] little additional effort is enough to overturn everything, and to lead us finally toward other far-off places. The schizoanalytic flick of the finger, which restarts the movement, links up again with the tendency, and pushes the simulacra to a point where they cease being artificial images to become indices of the new world. That is what the completion of the process is: not a promised and a

on our “immobile voyage in intensities on the body without organs” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 292) in order to cross “the barriers of non-sense which prohibit access to a-signifying nuclei of subjectivation, the only way to shift petrified systems of modelisation” (Guattari 1995: 68)<sup>22</sup>:

O, the narrator does not homestead in the familial and neurotic lands of Oedipus, there where the global and personal connections are established; he does not remain there, he crosses these lands... until he reaches the unknown country, his own, the unknown land, which alone is created by his own work in progress (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 318).

This entails “brutally intervening each time the subject strikes up the song of myth or intones tragic lines, carrying him back to the factory” of the machinic unconscious in while desire is arranged and rearranged (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 314).

Another fundamental difference between psychedelic therapy and schizoanalysis is that the former tends to operate, despite ostensibly frequent ‘all is one’ mystical experiences that transcend subject/object dualism, within a reasonably straightforward individualist framework of the kind encountered in traditional therapeutic contexts. Here, subjects are viewed as relatively autonomous rational agents whose subjectivity can be exhaustively reduced to personological aspects like familial history and self-actualisation, something we know is anathema to Deleuze and Guattari. As the latter observes, “[t]he individual who we see before us is often nothing but the ‘terminal’ of a whole group of social assemblages... if we don’t get to the core of those assemblages, we embark upon fictitious attitudes” (Guattari and Rolnik 2007: 371). In other words, as mentioned earlier, there is a direct reciprocal presupposition between subjectivation – the machining of desire – and the social field. We are, each of us, “situated at the intersection of numerous vectors of partial subjectivation... connected to a range of expressive and practical

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pre-existing land, but a world created in the process of its tendency, its coming undone, its deterritorialization. The movement of the theater of cruelty; for it is the only theater of production, there where the flows cross the threshold of de territorialization and produce the new land not at all a hope, but a simple “finding,” a “finished design,” where the person who escapes causes other escapes, and marks out the land while deterritorializing himself. An active point of escape where the revolutionary machine, the artistic machine, the scientific machine, and the (schizo) analytic machine become parts and pieces of one another” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 321-2).

<sup>22</sup> The dynamic tension between quasi-narrative experiences of mythic import and the a-signifying preindividual milieu that lies further towards the degree zero of the Body without Organs is alluded to by Guattari in a particularly lucid section of *Schizoanalytic Cartographies* when he observes a “distinction between level I of the Unconscious (where the sites of intensive entities will acquire a weight of intrinsic reference, a systemic or structural ‘truth’) and level II (where these same sites become ontologically precarious and are charged with risks and new potentialities for crystallization)” (Guattari 2013: 58). Similarly, in *Anti-Oedipus* we are told that myth and tragedy are to be “denounced as conscious beliefs or illusions, nothing more than ideas” and that we should pit “the functioning of the desiring-machines against tragedy, against ‘the fatal drama of the personality,’ against ‘the inevitable confusion between mask and actor’” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 299).

registers in direct contact with social life and the outside world” (Guattari 1995: 98-9). As the old saying goes, we cannot separate the ‘personal’ from the ‘political’, and this in a much more profound and material sense than is often supposed. The social and collective nature of subjectivation has especially important implications for how we think about psychedelics when considering the role of what is commonly termed ‘set and setting’. These terms, a mainstay of the psychedelic literature, refer to the ‘mindset’ of someone ingesting a psychedelic (set), which can include everything from their beliefs and aspirations to their anxieties and the amount of stress they’re currently experiencing in their lives, and to the broader context (setting) in which the psychedelic will be experienced, which typically means the physical space, replete with lighting, music, other individuals and so forth. If, however, we are in fact the ‘terminal of a whole group of social assemblages’ and if, on the enactive view, we are complexly entangled with our environment in ongoing processes of sense-making, then instead of thinking of set and setting as two distinct salient aspects that need to be considered vis-à-vis the psychedelic experience, it is perhaps more useful to think about the entire context – from innermost fears to outermost properties of the space we find ourselves in – as a messy assemblage (or agencement, *agency-ing*) of flows and processes that includes everything from the molar aggregates of sex, race and class to the molecular investments of desire and neurochemistry, “the existence of libidinal stratifications, repetitive structures literally mimicking the homeostasis of systems of physical fluctuations at equilibrium (neurotic negotiations between narcissism and object investments, failure syndromes, repetition compulsion)” (Guattari 2013: 53-4), and which is comprised of various tendencies towards deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. The negative task of schizoanalysis is thus also, in part, the limning of the psychedelic assemblage – a careful if necessarily incomplete and tentative delineation of the machining of desire and the collective arrangements of enunciation at play. If we acknowledge that the psychedelic experience can unleash, “[d]esiring machines which break with the great interpersonal and social organic equilibria, which invert orders, play the role of the other as against a politics of auto-centering on the self”, then it is crucial that we undertake this part of the negative task given that the psychedelic set and setting assemblage and in fact “all machinic assemblages harbour — even if in an embryonic state — enunciative zones which are so many desiring proto-machines” (Guattari 1995: 52). As Tarkovsky makes clear in the film *Stalker*, we should always take the trip with someone who is able to understand the zone, a place where the normal laws of physics do not apply, and nothing is as it seems (Tarkovsky 1979). If the preparation is just right, and the deterritorialising dose is high enough, then the death will be a propitious one, setting in motion “a Universe of processual emergence as much as of abolition” (Guattari 1995: 66).

### **An ending, a beginning**

The only acceptable finality of human activity is the production of a subjectivity that is auto-enriching its relation to the world in a continuous fashion.

Félix Guattari (1995: 21)

Death, surprisingly – the death in life that transforms life, a little bit of pure immanence – is something that schizoanalysis and accounts of psychedelic experience are often in agreement on. In fact, for Deleuze and Guattari “[t]he experience of death is the most common of occurrences in the unconscious, precisely because it occurs in life and for life, in every passage or becoming, in every intensity as passage or becoming” (1977: 330). This is death as a new individuation – a flattening of the energy landscape so that the anarchic brain can redistribute the attractor layout and travel along new vectors, “catalysing existential operators capable of acquiring consistence and persistence” (Guattari 1995: 19). As psychedelic neuroscience would have it, “if the DMN and SN perform their integrative functions by modelling the existence of a simple, indivisible entity, sharply bounded and distinct from the external world, then this would explain why disruption to these systems should lead to the feeling that the individual is disintegrating, dying, or merging with the cosmos” (Letheby 2021: 136). Everything is said in a few fine lines from *Anti-Oedipus*: the little death, the loss of ego, the absence of representation and interpretation, the re-machining of desire:

From one aspect to the other, there is not at all a personal deepening, but something quite different: there is a return from the experience of death to the model of death, in the cycle of the desiring-machines. The cycle is closed. For a new departure, since this I is another? The experience of death must have given us exactly enough broadened experience, in order to live and know that the desiring machines do not die. And that the subject as an adjacent part is always a ‘one’ who conducts the experience, not an I who receives the model. For the model itself is not the I either, but the body without organs. And I does not rejoin the model without the model starting out again in the direction of another experience (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 331).

As experienced psychedelic practitioners are wont to remind us, we can botch this death in at least two ways, transforming a potential breakthrough into a breakdown (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 362); on the one hand, we can fight against it, arresting the process and entering the bad trip or, on the other hand, we can come to regard the death itself as the goal, continuing in the void – the line of abolition – as opposed to releasing what Guattari calls coefficients of processual creativity in order to be able to undertake the positive task of fabulating a people to come and a new Earth. As Deleuze and Guattari

say of psychoanalysis become schizoanalysis, the use of psychedelics “ought to be a song of life, or else be worth nothing at all. It ought, practically, to teach us to sing life” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 339). This is a song we make up as we go along, because “[b]eneath the diversity of beings, no univocal ontological plinth is given” (Guattari 1995: 58). Fabulating, singing our immanent song, it is also easy to get lost in the process itself, to exercise the Body without Organs past the point of exhaustion until it lies limp on the plane of consistency, a rhabdomyolysis of desire. In this regard, what psychedelic therapy describes as integration is crucial (Aixalá 2022); instead of endlessly repeating the negative task of schizoanalysis, curotting the unconscious until there is nothing left but scar tissue, we should turn to the positive task of arranging desire otherwise. As Letheby reminds us, “for truly durable change to occur, the induction of plasticity alone does not suffice. New, healthier forms of self-modelling must be discovered during the acute experience, and consolidated during the subsequent period of integration” (2021: 151). Recognising the immediately social nature of desire, the complex imbrication of selves and world, these new forms of modelling and integration, these new Earths, should themselves be social. Seen in this light, several things become immediately apparent. First, any intervention into the arrangements of desire, even at the most personal or molecular levels, is an intervention into molar articulations of the socius. This is not necessarily a bad thing – if political economy is libidinal economy then schizoanalysis is already a form of politics, both at the level of analysis (“the force and the obstinacy of a deterritorialization can only be evaluated through the types of reterritorialization that represent it” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 316)) and in its positive transformative aspect, even when this may not be obvious (“[t]o those who say that escaping is not courageous, we answer: what is not escape and social investment at the same time?” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 316)). Second, this does not, to reiterate an earlier point, mean that the schizoanalytic method entails a program. While the ostensible lack of a single model for revolutionary praxis has become something of a blunt cudgel wielded by those who denigrate the schizoanalytic project as a kind of jejune liberatory naivete (the spectre of an inchoate anarcho-desiring that eschews structure, organization and so forth, and which is, tellingly, strikingly at odds with *Anti-Oedipus’s* constant endorsement of practices of careful *machining* and *arrangement*), any such program would be, as we have seen, profoundly oxymoronic and against the necessarily open-ended nature of schizoanalysis as a practice of counteractualisation and individuation that is, as Guattari underscores, based upon “the definitive non-finality of all systems” (2006: 196), this being its ethical guarantee<sup>23</sup>. Third, while “collective existential mutation will have the last word... large

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<sup>23</sup> “Schizoanalysis does not thus choose one modelisation to the exclusion of another. Within the diverse cartographies in action in a given situation, it tries to make nuclei of virtual autopoiesis discernible, in order to actualise them, by transversalising them, in conferring on them an operative diagrammatism (for example, by a change in the material of Expression), in making them themselves operative within modified assemblages, more open, more processual, more deterritorialised. Schizoanalysis, rather than moving in the direction of reductionist modelisations which simplify the complex, will work towards its



movements of subjectivation don't necessarily develop in the direction of emancipation" (Guattari 1995: 2). As any historian of the 1960s counterculture will remind us, we can trace a short path from the psychedelic love-in of Woodstock to the violence of Altamont, dogmatic LSD cults, hard drugs and, a short while later, Silicon Valley neoliberalism and hippie Trump supporters. That said, we should simultaneously acknowledge the profound nature of the individuations that took place in the 1960s – from Haight-Ashbury to the Panthers to May 68 – which began with “nothing but scattered machinic indexes, first being a quick, powerless deterritorialization, then becoming an abstract machine capable of catalyzing new semiotic assemblages of desire in the social field” (Guattari 2011: 161), and we should remember that these events are all bound up in a single incorporeal Event (Deleuze 1990: 148-53). Fourth, to invoke perhaps the most unlikely sentence in *Anti-Oedipus*, we should admit that “[w]e are all little dogs, we need circuits, and we need to be taken for walks” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 315). We should remind ourselves, in other words, that whatever the romantic attachments we have to the liberatory task of unleashing our desire along lines of psychedelic flight, creating a nomadic war machine to traverse smooth space and redistribute our attractors, “a schizoanalytic intervention is not necessarily ‘extremist’... in a sense, it will frequently require much more prudence than psychoanalysis with its trenchant interpretations and its often unmasterable transferences” (Guattari 2011: 185-6). A careful arranging and rearranging of desire as a simultaneously political and existential-libidinal, molar and molecular, practice of metamodellisation; the machining of meshworks of selfless selves or collective assemblages of enunciation as the individuation of the possibilities of life in such a way as to increase its pre-individual charge and amplify processual creativity; in the end, this resingularisation of radically mutant forms of subjectivity and the world, undertaken “not only for self, but for the whole alterity of the cosmos and for the infinity of times” (Guattari 1995: 53), is the task of schizoanalysis; if we apply ourselves to this task then “different ways of seeing and of making the world, different ways of being and of bringing to light modalities of being will open up, be irrigated and enrich one another” (Guattari 1995: 120). And, for those of us who wish to open up and irrigate psychedelically, it is perhaps especially salient to cultivate “[a] subjectivity of the outside and of wide-open spaces which far from being fearful of finitude — the trials of life, suffering, desire and death — embraces them like a spice essential to the cuisine of life” (Guattari 1995: 89-90)

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complexification, its processual enrichment, towards the consistency of its virtual lines of bifurcation and differentiation, in short towards its ontological heterogeneity” (Guattari 1995: 60-1).

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## ***Emancipatory Technics and Transindividual Cybernetic Machines of Felix Guattari: Ecotechnopoiesis of Splicings***

by MIKHAIL FEDORCHENKO

### **Abstract**

In this paper, I seek to examine Felix Guattari's techno-machinic side of his ecosophical paradigm through the genesis of accelerationist thought, concepts of machinic animism and cybernetic elements of late guattarian works and intuitions. I will analyze anthropological, culturological and technological aspects of machinic ontology and configure the matrix of guattarian philosophy and semiotics with the works of prominent cyberneticists and biologists such as Gilbert Simondon, Humberto Maturana/Francisco Varela and Yuk Hui and others as well as dive deep into Guattari's fascination with Japan and its technomaterialism. The main goal of the paper is to introduce the concept of "splicing" as transindividual methodology of difference of technic and nature that alleviates the antagonisms between them and points out the interconnected nature of these relationships.

### **Accelerate**

In some villages, just the most distant and forgotten, the chairmen of the village councils, together with blacksmiths and clerks, were already building electric power stations near public wells, using motorbikes abandoned by runaway imperialists – at the same time, because of the lack of petrol, the motorbikes' engines were powered by moonshine made of bread, which burned badly, so the engine was supplemented by the local driver's brains – the engines were turning and the light was burning in the dark huts.

Andrey Platonov

Félix Guattari's ecotechnopoiesis represents an important and experimental aspect of hyper-connectionism, machinic animism and machinic ontology within a new transversal relationship of political and technological struggle.

For Deleuze and Guattari, life can only become painful when the reactive forces are victorious. And they are achieving victory through psychoanalysis, which manages to confuse life precisely by convincing it of its imagined essential sickness. Whereas the active, non-reactive life is the joyous movement of the general machinic desire. Deleuze reminds us that active forces assert and reactive forces deny. The distinction between the activity of acceleration and the passivity of speed allows for an onto-methodological matrix of accelerationism, without which, in my view, it is impossible to understand Guattari's ecosophical thought.

A traditional (but, from my point of view, not entirely accurate) distinction of accelerationism can be found in Andrew Culp's *Dark Deleuze*:

Drawing from Deleuze and Guattari's insistence on "accelerating the process" of capitalist deterritorialization to make a revolutionary breakthrough, Land instead suggests that the commodity system "attains its own 'angular momentum'" to become a one-way street impervious to interventions, as it is made up of cosmic-scale processes that are largely blind to human cultural inputs. (Culp 2016: 27).

Thus, it is suggested that, according to Land, the accelerating processes (positive feedback) of capitalism leads to one inescapable finale – an expanding vortex of decay into infinity, with a virtual zero of impersonal urban accumulation at its centre, 'permeable only to that inarticulate ardour which springs from the repressed materiality of the human animal' (Land 1992). Developing these ideas further in the dark enlightenment project, Land points out that the 'darkness' of neo-reaction is the mastering of a mixture of cognitive elitism, racist social Darwinism and the autocracy of the Austrian economic school.

Drawing on Andrew Culp's classification, we can clarify the difference between 'left' and 'right' accelerationism in political and economic terms by varying the main word 'accelerate' in the active voice and 'accelerated' in the passive voice (Culp 2016). In the first case, the subject (implicitly human) of the acceleration process is preserved and the humanist Promethean pathos is preserved, whereas in the second case of impersonal acceleration the subject disappears in the anti-humanist destruction of human security systems, the future is given over to impersonal and nameless external forces, the human subject is denied any control over the fluctuating flows of cold nihilistic transformation, we are accelerated, or rather we are accelerated by something. I think this separation is reductionist and insufficient: these positions have serious gaps, both have grounds and conventions: on the one hand in the political, in the relationship of cooperation and care with the technical machines – that is, with the presupposition of the mysticism of the process and the mysticism of the result, the dynamic chaos of the interaction of liberated

actors, that is, the condition of benevolence of liberated machines, and, on the other hand, in the anti-humanistic – where the grounding in the human perspective remains, acting as a negation. An alternative to these solutions is needed, in which I believe the concept of ‘splicing’, the unconditional accelerationist method, plays a major role.

## **Mechanize**

In developing the concepts of universes of values, showing how the indigenous logic of machinic indices on which the symbolic structures of signifying the Other are built, Guattari points to the relational acceleration of the cosmos and chaos as a dialectical unity: for example, within indigenous cosmologies, the process which O. de Andrade might call anthropophagy – the absorption of the technocentric culture of the West and the juxtaposition of mystery and pre-logic consciousness with it (de Andrade 1976). Thus, in their infinite capacity to absorb other cultures, the Caribs of Andrade found unity in a larger hyperculture that was meant to protect them from the colonizers. The cultural Leviathan of the anthropophagi, which cannot be stopped or broken, absorbs everything it sees, digesting the practices and souls of technology and nature. Practices of other communities must be brought in not as taboos, but as great totems to be defended with great power to ensure not only assimilation but also freedom of autonomy for hyperculture: a chaotic collective dream that transcends physical reality itself, the animistic position of the other.

Guattari redefines the concept of animism, asserting behind it the immanent potential of opening up a process of singularization that is unable to "imposing itself as a relation of immanence to machinic intensities, to this non-discursive, auto-enunciating, auto-valorising, autopoietic node" (Guattari 1995: 38). Machinic animism shows a non-idealist thinking about the subject, overcomes anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism. To clarify the nature of the machine, Guattari refers (besides Mumford) to the work of the biologist F. Varela and H. Maturana, who subdivided machines into two types: allopoetic (producing something other than themselves) and autopoietic (generating and reproducing their assemblages), a sort of coupling of ecotechnical anarchism (Kuchinov 2021), a symbiosis of heterogeneous elements:

In the universe there exist everywhere, with no distinction between living and non-living, “non-discursive *autopoïétique* kernels which engender their own development and their own rules and mechanics. The *autopoïétique* machinic asserts itself as one for self and one for others – non-human others. The for self and the for others cease to be the privilege of humanity. They crystallize wherever assemblages or machines engender differences, alterities, and singularities. (Melitopoulos; Lazzarato: 2012).

"Being has never consisted of anything but machines", wrote L. Bryant in *Onto-Cartography* (Bryant 2014). On the one hand, the "soul of the technical object" is located in the logic of similarity, in the context of immanent reality as such, within the universal spirituality of being. And on the other in the logic of difference, the difference between the cessation of life of a machine-technical object and a biological machine.

According to Guattari, the machine is a complex of technical object and production relations, i.e. people and materials involved in the creation of the machine. The ontological context in Guattari's work appears alongside cybernetic theory oriented to organizing the connections of heterogeneous system elements. There are different types of machines: social machines, technological machines, aesthetic machines, biological machines, crystalline machines, etc:

He thought that it must be a feeling of endless bliss to be in contact with the profound life of every form, to have a soul for rocks, metals, water, and plants, to take into himself, as in a dream, every element of nature, like flowers that breathe with the waxing and waning of the moon. To be a chlorophyll- or a photosynthesis-machine, or at least slip his body into such machines as one part among the others. (Deleuze, Guattari 1983: 15).

Maturana and Varela in «The Tree of Knowledge» outline a proto-machine ontology intersecting with cybernetics, on the basis of which Guattari creates his largest texts on this subject (apart from his joint texts with Deleuze), *The Machinic Unconscious* and *The Lines of Flight*. Maturana and Varela point out that cognition is a complex process of world formation through the interaction between body, brain and external environment, and which is based on the concept of autopoiesis and the principle of self-reproduction of closed (autonomous) systems whose functioning is based on maintaining their dynamic organization. For such a system, there is no environment external to it, but there are internal structural oscillations caused by influences of the environment and which disturb its balance and compensate internal structural changes in constructing a certain model of the world (cognition as an effective action). In an attempt to define what kind of being can be called alive, Maturana and Varela write that:

What are my criteria? Throughout the history of biology, many criteria have been proposed. They all have drawbacks. For instance, some have proposed as a criterion chemical composition, or the capacity to move, or reproduction, or even some combination of those criteria, that is, a list of properties. But how do we know when the list is complete? For instance, if we build a machine capable of reproducing itself, but it is made of iron and plastic and not of molecules, is it living? (Maturana; Varela 1987: 42)



As an answer to this question, the aforementioned anthropologists propose to analyze the dynamics of the system through the relations between its parts and the patterns of their interaction, thus uncovering its autopoietic organization. Maturana and Varela propose the processes of replication (machine production of a unity of the same class, factory machines), copying (a sample unity and a projection procedure for producing an identical sample unity, photocopier machines) and reproduction (a unity splitting in two, resulting in two unities of the same class, printer machines) as ways of generating autopoietic unities. Ontogenesis (the history of structural change of a particular being) does not only concern living matter – Maturana and Varela explicitly state that autopoiesis takes place in all interactions with structurally defined unities (Maturana; Varela: 2019).

In “Ecology of Mind”, G. Bateson addresses these issues explicitly by drawing on cybernetic epistemology, pointing out that all evolving systems are complex cybernetic systems whose stability is maintained by their ability to self-regulate through feedback homeostasis (in which the output is fed back to the input as an initial parameter) (Bateson 2000). Machinic processes are thus either cyber-positive, which translates into absorption and departure from system equilibrium in the pursuit of nomadic and absolute determinism, or cyber-negative, returning feedback processes by being sedentary and reterritorialising. Bateson proposes to reorganize thinking so that it eliminates the human-environment opposition and enables technological overcoming of binary distortions and meta-ordered sequences of events. This position brings him closer to N. Wiener, who in his study of feedback systems discovered that such systems are ubiquitous – in all living (and non-living) organisms (Wiener 2019).

Machinic animism in particular is rooted in Japanese cosmologies, where the distinction between human and non-human, cultural and natural, living and non-living is (somewhat) erased. Thus, F. Gygi writes that the term 'technoanimism' reproduces the bifurcation that it intends to overcome, the bifurcation between the living (anima) and the non-living (technique) (Gygi 2018: 108-109). Instead of technoanimism as an a priori of Japanese culture, Gygi proposes to consider the fluid and concrete practices of animality that lie beyond capitalism. It is necessary to look for technology on the side of animism, technologies of animation that transform the inanimate into the animate. Thus, the corporate practices of technology and body control, the assembly-line slavery of robots, are well suited to the capitalist reversal of animism – not to make the inanimate alive, to breathe in the soul, but to make the living inanimate, to condemn it to death and enslave it to the market. Life, therefore, does not need a soul. This problem is developed in the concept of machinic eros, which can be seen in Guattari's later writings on his trips to Japan.

## **Animate**

Guattari believed that Japanese culture is a mirror in which Western capitalist culture is reflected and that the Japanese themselves internalize it. Although the philosopher did not connect with Japan's underground protest culture (Japanese Red Army, student activists) during his visits, he spent much time analyzing Japanese existential landscapes and their relationship to technology. Thus the tall telecommunication tower in Osaka interpolates and addresses the gods, and the gods respond to capital, manifesting themselves in the plasticity of Japanese culture, which adapts and changes other cultures by placing fragments of structures of the old into the accelerating urban spaces of capitalism. Guattari referred to Tokyo as a city of energy, speed and wealth, a bifurcation point of global political relations, machinic values of desire, machinic eros (Guattari 2015).

Machinic eros, manifested through a series of cultural encounters, means being inside things, being fundamentally connected to technology, producing intangible labour, 'being online' (Guattari 2015). The concept appears in the early 1980s, describing post-Fordism in a machinic sense as pure connectivity, a desire to mediate technological solutions through interfaces and devices. Thus the emergence of the internet, the cultural landscape's fascination with gadgets, speech synthesizers, repetition games, anything that can allopoietically connect oneself to the other, is what emerges with the new stage of capitalism as an affective attachment to technology.

Such machinic values, invention and reconfiguration, are at the core of the processes of production, Guattari argued, criticizing the genesis of the control society in the surrender of oneself to machines of control. In control societies, the subject is modulated in the rituals of capitalist production, where the worker works in his or her own time, including from home, in a state of fundamental precarity. In short, the problem of immaterial labour emerges, where subjectivity will be shaped by the introduction of the political body into the economy and its connection with the modern economic life of commodities and machinic fetishism.

As the plots of numerous science fiction works shows (such as in the 1989 film by S. Tsukamoto's *Tetsuo the Iron Man*, where giving oneself over to machines, joining flesh and metal was an anti-utopian, pervasive invasion of foreign parts into the body, severing its integrity from inside and out) (Brown 2010), that such images of the future may have different political and cultural contexts, and hence an affirmative posthumanist strategy is needed, drawing both on the assemblages of technology and living matter, and on the interpenetration and interconnected nature of such relationships. Such a relationship is called a "splicing", in line with guattarian intuitions of the hyperconnectivity of technological acceleration.

G. Genosko points out that in *Chaosmosis*, Guattari places a lot of emphasis on interfaces, a nexus of new philosophical concepts and cybernetics (Genosko 2002). Guattari opposed the tendency to homogenize culture, in resistance through the technohegemonic realm. Not only did he use the latest technological innovations in everyday life and practice, like Walkman players, but he also conceptualized the way in

which the hotel or taxi could be singularized (big data algorithms), how technology can be miniaturized, how control algorithms can be dehomogenized, and generally thought about technology as something capable of giving the necessary space for micropolitics of freedom and liberation of whatever seeks to be liberated.

## **Cybernetize**

The world of federated networks and societies of control, paradoxically, think of themselves in a common logic of deterritorialisation, as the late Mark Fisher warned in *K-Punk*:

Does all this then mean that ideas of autonomy and self-organization would inevitably be co-opted by the right, and that there is no further political potential in them for the left? Definitely not — far from indicating any deficiency in autonomist ideas, the co-option of these ideas by the right shows that they have continuing potency. (Fisher 2018: 239-240),

Which helps emancipatory initiatives of modernity to emerge from the vicious circle of becoming-reappropriation of emancipatory initiatives that neutralizes any projects of the future. Guattari points to a modulation of control societies where each example of re-appropriation is not the closure of territories of freedom, but the opening of new ones. The dividual relation to technology is an example of machinic subjugation, an example of the potentiality of post-identitarian deterritorialisation, where a cyber-space of splicings is possible. Perhaps this creative approach to technology, to embed it in natural landscapes, as described by Gilbert Simondon in Anita Kashikian's "Saving the Technological Object" (Simondon 1983), and as written about the environment of digital objects by Yuk Hui, can be expressed through the practice of conviviality, a term conceptualized by social theorist Ivan Illich to critique the ideology of industrialism and capitalist Landian acceleration, including its desires, forms and institutions. Conviviality implies a voluntary and creative relationship between people, technology and the environment:

I intend ['conviviality'] to mean autonomous and creative intercourse among persons, and the intercourse of persons with their environment; and this in contrast with the conditioned response of persons to the demands made upon them by others, and by a man-made environment. I consider conviviality to be individual freedom realized in personal interdependence and, as such, an intrinsic ethical value. I believe that, in any society, as conviviality is reduced below a certain level, no amount of industrial productivity can effectively satisfy the needs it creates among society's members. (Illich 2021: 18).

A rejection of industrial ideology does not mean criticism of technology in general. Guattari understood this when he was active in free radio in Bologna. Intuitively, even then, he understood the rhizomatic tendency of networks of control, networks that are simply the regime in which, according to Deleuze in the “Postscript on the Societies of Control”, power operates in 'controlling' societies that have replaced the old 'disciplinary' structures. According to Guattari, such an integrated global order and such network integration will be 'everywhere and nowhere at once'. A cornerstone of the twenty-first century, therefore, is the re-positioning of the question of technology and resistance. A new way of looking at the relationship between philosophy and technology, between organism and machine, the historical development of different forms and levels of matter, technology, nature, overcoming alienation and showing a different perspective on technology of liberation and control in an age of complex algorithmic systems and the birth of artificial intelligence – this is the relevance of Guattari's project of machinic animism in conjunction with Simondon-Hui's thought of the multiplicity of cosmotechnics as a dynamic whole (Hui: 2020). Hui, understanding the development of modern capitalism and its onto-economic flows, tries to revitalize cybernetics as an emancipatory and crypto-accelerationist methodology based on a cosmotechnical understanding of the unity of nature and technology. Guattari, for his part, placing the production of subjectivities and the production of desire in the foreground of his ecosophy, shows how emancipatory desire can work in an "economy of the possible that emerges from a rupture in the economy of the "already-there," the economy of the stratified, the economy of repetition" (Guattari 2015: 37).

### **(A)signify**

By deconstructing the binarism of the subject-object relation, Guattari contrasts the a-signification semiotic with the operation of power, a structured machine of power which takes control of all the other codes, all the other semiotics. It is possible to get out of the relations of power through such "truth of things themselves", through signs encoded cybernetically, by the computer, which works directly, just as physical-chemical processes and technological assemblages of machines – another similarity of thought between Guattari and Hui, who in “Recursivity and Contingency” writes about the contingency of the machinic sign which "means nothing", referring to Guillaume Apollinaire's interpretation by J.F. Lyotard:

“More than anything, artists are men who want to become inhuman.” The part that Lyotard didn't cite continues: “[T]hey seek painfully the traces of inhumanity which are never found in nature. These are the real truths, and beyond them, we know no reality.” For Apollinaire, this truth is always new, since it is never once and for all. It is this contradiction—a verity in constant change—that is opposed to the reduction of

such a verity to communicative writing. The latter could be realized by machines, which are capable of reproducing signs devoid of sense. (Hui 2020: 368).

This a-signifying semiotics of Guattari (Hui calls it second-order cybernetics, that is, a non-mechanistic non-organistic cybernetics devoid of determinism) (Hui 2020) is critical for the machinic unconscious, and simultaneously machinic and anthropological, where, in the spirit of Marx, production relations inhibit productive forces, a non-egalitarian and instrumental attitude towards technology, a totalitarian capitalist semiotic of control, is what inhibits social and technological acceleration (Guattari 2015). In practice today we can see this tendency in the neo-Luddite fear of GPT-4 and the desire of some intellectuals and artists to ban the automating algorithms. And while certainly the use of Large Language Models as a profit force and downsizing tool should be regulated, GTP's ability to be an advanced a-cognition machine allows us to see that the difference between natural and artificial intelligence is infinitesimal, that subjectivation and innovation was born on the boundary of the limits of what is acceptable in science and communicative fields of knowledge.

So much of the fear of automation technology stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of reason, or, to quote Reza Negarestani, that all intelligence is artificial, that both the autonomy of reason (sapience), functionally distinct from sentience in its capacity to engage in discursive practices and the exchange of causality, and the re-examination of the automation of reason in terms of abductive synthesis and deductive analysis, design and reasoning, are necessary to develop and clarify the criteria of Generalized Artificial Intelligence. Freedom of consciousness is the freedom of its constant (self-)reflection, the breakdown of the phenomenological machine, the replacement of the exploitation of nature and technology with the cooperation between them. Such transindividual, animistic assemblages are elements of a sympoietic splicing in a project of technological and social acceleration that unlocks the creativity of the human and nonhuman oppressed in a truly egalitarian future.

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## ***On Generic Schizoanalysis: Reading Anti-Oedipus Alongside Laruelle's Non-Standard Philosophy***

by CHANTELE GRAY

### **Abstract**

This paper brings together Laruelle's project on non-standard philosophy with Deleuze and Guattari's project on schizoanalysis. Laruelle critiques 'standard philosophy' for failing to concede that the Real precedes it and is foreclosed to thought, such that philosophy has no traction on it, meaning philosophy is *not sufficient* for thinking the Real. Non-philosophy is a response to this position and ultimately aims at a 'defetishization' of thought. Departing from this position, I hold that Deleuze and Guattari *perform* non-philosophy in *Anti-Oedipus* through their use of the unconscious and productive forces *as raw materials*, though they do so mainly at the level of subjectivity. For schizoanalysis to become generic it would, however, also have to lose its 'face' because faciality is precisely the Philosophical Decision whereby ordinary, lived reality becomes overcoded. Like the Christ face, the Philosophical Decision functions as a distillation of faciality so that the Human-in-Human, as much as Philosophy, are in need of redemption *from* rather than *by* Christ. Positing a structural parallel between faciality and Laruelle's general theory of victims, I conclude that the generic schizoanalysis of the Victim-in-person as an *ordinary messiah* is a direct response to messianic facialization or the criminal violence of philosophy. My argument, then, is that with a non-philosophical probe-head freed, psychoanalysis can be transformed from a technology of the unconscious into a schizo-dualysis of the Human-in-person – a science founded on the immanent being of the human where any 'loss' is treated as nothing more or less than just that: a generic part of radical lived experience rather than a redoubled object for Freudian or philosophical analysis.

### **A Philosophy of Obstructions, An Obstructive Philosophy**

A bit of perseverance is required. A bit of patience. No doubt, this is a paper about *Anti-Oedipus*, but it requires an introduction to François Laruelle, which is not a straightforward task by any means because non-philosophy is not about exposition, commentary, analysis, critique or interpretation (etc., etc.). At any rate, the introduction is not to the non-philosopher himself: "Laruelle does not exist. There is a 'Laruelle' base [support] for non-philosophy. There is a subject-agent, a contributor, a manufacturer, but that's all" (Laruelle 2012a: 244). And yet, non-philosophy has to be introduced. One of Laruelle's most prominent interlocutors (if that is indeed the right word for a non-

philosophical ‘dialogist’), Rocco Gangle, calls this the ‘pedagogical’ problem of non-philosophy, while Taylor Adkins, a respected translator of Laruelle’s work, has conceded that any apposite primer to non-philosophy “is an illusion” (Ó Maoilearca 2017: 21). The problem is how to introduce non-philosophy without transforming it into what Laruelle calls ‘standard philosophy’. And yet, non-philosophy has to be introduced. John Ó Maoilearca follows the premise of Lars von Trier’s experimental film, *The Five Obstructions* (2003), for this task. In the film, von Trier works with another filmmaker, Jørgen Leth, whom he tasks with remaking his 1968 film, *The Perfect Human* (*Det perfekte menneske*) five times, each according to a restraint prescribed by von Trier. In *All Thoughts Are Equal*, Ó Maoilearca follows a similar procedure by ‘forcing’ non-philosophy via five pathways to ‘perform’ some of the axioms of non-philosophy. These circumventions are, however, not aimed at providing an explanation of Laruelle’s project but rather at suggesting “that anything viewed with sufficient care (the act, practice, or performance of a vision-in-One) can be thoughtful, can correspond to another part of the One, when each is seen as equally Real”, such that a real democratization of thought is achieved (Ó Maoilearca 2015: 42). While this is a rather brilliant method, it takes a book-long project to achieve. The problem thus remains: how to introduce non-philosophy? Perhaps the best one can do is try again, fail again, fail better.

Laruelle’s project on non-philosophy or, as he calls it in his later works, non-standard philosophy, is a provocative and theoretically rich enterprise that takes umbrage with what he refers to as the ‘double transcendence’ (or hallucination) of standard philosophy and its practice of the Philosophical Decision (first transcendence), which is itself grounded in the Principle of Sufficiency (second transcendence). That is, standard philosophy – whether in terms of negation or affirmation – remains conditioned by an *invariant structure* according to which philosophy lays claim to the Real by representing it, even when it professes not to do so. Laruelle notoriously takes aim at ‘philosophies of difference’, including Deleuze’s, to argue the latter point. The crux, for Laruelle, is that the Philosophical Decision constitutes a transcendent maneuver because it either naively believes that it is capable of deciding on the Real, or because it claims to think outside of the Real, all the time reducing the Real to the limits of philosophical thought. As Laruelle says, to philosophize – whether that be as philosophy *qua* philosophy, or as philosophy *qua* anthropology, politics, psychoanalysis, etc. – “is to decide on the Real *and* on thought, which ensues from it” (2013a: 117, emphasis added). This Decision not only refuses the immanent ‘imprint’ or ‘cut’ of the Real, but also cuts (*decaedere*) the human “off from the Real” by way of representation (Mullarkey; Smith 2013: 7). In short, the Philosophical Decision returns *all* philosophy into an idealist position because philosophy advances itself to the site of auto-giveness, thus assuming its own sufficiency according to which anything becomes *philosophizable* (see Laruelle 2013b [1989]: 22 and Laruelle 2015a [2000]: 8). Precisely at this juncture philosophy has already, in advance, overdetermined whatever it aims to give an account of. This is also why Laruelle argues for a structural



parallel between philosophy and photography, both of which lay claim to standard philosophical tropes such as “truth, light, reason, illumination, and the Real” (Fardy 2018: 3) that are used to *frame* the Real by *imposing* a certain totalizing view on it even though the totality of the Real *always transcends and escapes* the limits of philosophy and photography. Standard photography, like standard philosophy, is thus reflective (self-reflective), aiming always to render comprehensible what is ultimately the obscurity (non-comprehensibility) of the Real (see Laruelle 2011: 58).

Non-philosophy – which is then also what non-photography, non-Marxism, a generic psychoanalysis, etc. would do – axiomatically rejects any framing of the Real, holding that the Real is foreclosed to thought, and thus to philosophy. The reason that non-philosophy proceeds via axioms instead of postulates is that it is *performative* rather than *positional*. Axioms thus methodologically *perform* or *ventriloquize* non-philosophy’s own *insufficiency* to determine or lay claim to the Real. Otherwise stated, no thought, and no philosophy, is sufficient to grasp the Real, whether in terms of totality, transcendentals, transcendence or immanence. In contrast to standard philosophy, non-philosophy proceeds from a principle of ‘in-sufficient Real’, meaning it subordinates itself to its immanent cause, the One-in-One or vision-in-One, because it understands the Real to be *in-One*, which is to say given-without-giveness, rather than *in-Being*, or any other similar point of departure such as *in-Difference*. So, the Real is indifferent to thought just as philosophy is insufficient in its relation to (or thought of) the Real, such that the Real does not require a Philosophical Decision (a decision of thought) for the expression or determination of its essence. “Precisely because it is *radical* (and not *absolute*)”, writes Laruelle, “the Real’s sufficiency, that of its immanence without desire or need for thought, implies an insufficiency that is just as ‘radical’ as far as the thought which could be developed according to it” (Laruelle 2013a: 106; emphasis added). Non-philosophy therefore aims to think *from* the (radical immanence of the) Real rather than *for* the Real. As such, there is a non-commutativity of Being and the Real or the One. In this sense, non-philosophy, rather than being a philosophical *position*, is a *posture* towards the Real that does not claim to know or determine it (see Laruelle 2016 [1992]: 12 and Smith 2016a: 86). This posture, and its criticality towards standard philosophy, no doubt makes it seem as though non-philosophy is anti-philosophy, but Laruelle himself states that non-philosophy is neither the end of philosophy, nor a negation thereof, but rather a supplement to it, in the same way that non-Euclidean geometry extends its Euclidean counterpart (Laruelle 2011: vii). We could say that there is an operational parallel between non-Euclidean geometry and non-philosophy because just as non-Euclidean geometry does away with the fifth postulate of parallelism in Euclidean geometry, so non-philosophy does away with parallelisms in standard philosophy, whether that be Spinoza’s mind-body parallelism or the *noesis-noema* parallelism in phenomenology. Terence Blake (n.d.) has suggested that the ‘non’ in non-philosophy also alludes to Bachelard’s *La philosophie du non* (1940) which philosophically traces the linguistic

operator ‘non-’ in mathematics and the sciences. But while this may be the case, at least to some extent, I suspect that Laruelle (and perhaps his interlocutors – though I would be careful to speak for them) would view Bachelard’s philosophy as still being a *philosophy of science*, rather than an instance of philosophy using *the materials of science*, as non-standard philosophy aims to do. Put another way, the argument would be that even though the so-called ‘philosophies of the concept’ – such as those by Cavailles, Bachelard, Canguilhem, Gueroult, Serres, Foucault and, arguably, Simondon and Deleuze – went far in the direction of what Laruelle calls a *science of philosophy*, and even expressed it to some extent, they ultimately remained *philosophies of science*. Yet it seems to me that Blake could be correct to some degree in arguing that Laruelle forms part of this lineage, even if in a ‘non’ manner. Unfortunately, Blake makes the claim without following through on the argument, though the overlaps can easily be observed in passages from *The Philosophy of No (La philosophie du non)* such as the following:

Generalization by negation must include what it denies. Indeed the whole impetus of scientific thought for a century now stems from dialectical generalizations of this sort, which embrace what has been denied. Thus non-Euclidean geometry embraces Euclidean geometry; non-Newtonian mechanics embraces Newtonian mechanics; wave mechanics embraces relativist mechanics. In the domain of physics, Planck’s constant  $h$  seems like a very small discrepancy amid the rules of common-sense science. But, as has often been observed, the removal of  $h$  from the formulae of wave mechanics is all that is required to restore the formulae of classical mechanics. (Bachelard 1968 [1940]: 117)

This passage (and others besides) certainly gives the impression that there are some links between Bachelard’s philosophy of the no and Laruelle’s non-philosophy, at least in the sense that Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry correspond, though readers should not be fooled into thinking that Laruelle’s project is the same as Bachelard’s, or that it is a ‘cheap’ imitation thereof. Lineage or not, Laruelle’s project of non-philosophy stands apart from any standard philosophical project. This tension between a science of philosophy and a philosophy of science does, however, raise an interesting question for me in terms of *Anti-Oedipus* (1983 [1972]) and the ‘scientific’ use of *the materials* of psychoanalysis and Marxism.

To be clear, science, according to Laruelle, is, like non-philosophy, a posture towards knowledge, but it is neither an epistemology, nor a philosophy of science (Schmid 2013: 122). This posture, moreover, presents to philosophy *a way out of philosophizing* because science does not lay claim to knowledge of the Real and does not therefore submit the Real to the principle of Sufficiency. Knowledge is thus *gnostic* for Laruelle, where gnosticism “denotes the ‘equality in principle’ of all knowledges” (Ó Maoilearca 2015: 97–98). But how, if at all, can philosophy become gnostic? And is it possible to transform philosophy from a thought of sufficiency into a ‘rigorous science’ or practice of thought

that refuses the auto-reproduction and meta-justification of the epistemic violence of standard philosophy? Laruelle turns here to Gödel's incompleteness theorem which states that any formal axiomatic mathematical system has some propositions (or truth statements) that cannot be proved or disproved within that system, just as the consistency (or all axioms) of the system itself cannot be proved. Recall that Gödel was responding to projects of his milieu, such as Whitehead and Russell's *Principia Mathematica*, a three-volume work aimed at doing exactly the opposite of what Gödel proved, namely, to provide a formalized mathematical system comprising a set of complete and consistent axioms from which all mathematical truth claims could be derived. The latter position should sound familiar: it is nothing less than the quest for the double transcendence of standard philosophy. Laruelle generalizes Gödel's model to a non-Gödelian one, which amounts to a non-philosophical one, thus responding to standard philosophy in the same way that Gödel does to Whitehead and Russell: by pointing out the finitude of philosophical systems, just as Gödel proved the finitude of mathematical systems. According to Laruelle, this permits a recognition that epistemology *philosophically* organizes and delineates the concepts it uses to describe science, or any other 'regional' knowledge, so reducing all knowledge(s) to the recursive self-analysis and meta-rationalization of standard philosophy. Laruelle's point is that Gödel's condemnation of metascience is in fact a non-philosophical denunciation of "the classical relation of the authority of philosophy over science and its positivist and scientific inversions", including philosophies-*of-science*, philosophies-*in-science* and epistemology, the latter of which functions to reduce the generality of science to particular philosophical positions (Laruelle 2013c [1996]:68). Non-philosophy, in contrast, refuses to place knowledge "over science under this antithetical form" (Schmid 2013: 125), thus refusing philosophical transcendence and the 'epistemo-logical distance' it creates. This epistemo-logical detachment is precisely the formal attribute of objectification ('meta') that reduces knowledge to philosophical reflection and interpretation (Laruelle 2013c: 65). Readers will have noticed the way in which non-philosophy hyphenates words, for example vision-in-One, given-without-givenness or, in the previous sentence, epistemo-logical. These hyphens either specify an elimination of philosophical (epistemological) distance at "the level of the grapheme" (Smith 2016: 53), as in the first two examples or, alternatively, indicate the implicit assumptions of standard philosophical concepts, such as with epistemology, which conjugates *episteme* (knowledge) and *logos* (reason), thereby taking for granted a *reasoned* and *reasonable* auto-justification of philosophical *knowledge*. This is one of the main ways in which non-standard philosophy differs from standard philosophy: it refuses to think itself sufficient to grasp the Real-One. Yet even though absolute knowledge of the Real is impossible, we can, and do, according to Laruelle, have 'regional' (partial or local) knowledge of the Real via science (Fardy 2018: 2), precisely because science relies on a 'generic' practice of thought. That is to say, science has a *generic* commitment to curiosity, experimentation

and the discovery of new knowledge. If philosophy can, like science, make its primary aim to experimentally approach philosophy as raw materials, it could be transformed into a *science of philosophy* insofar as it refuses to decide on a given object – especially the Real – prior to experimentation.

This has a number of consequences. First, instead of positing any sufficiency or knowledge of the Real, a science of philosophy becomes a radical experimentation in generic, ordinary lived experience. Second, instead of philosophy being decisive for the Real, the Real becomes decisive for thought, but only ‘in-the-last-instance’. The concept of determination-in-the-last-instance is, of course, from the work of Althusser or, more accurately, is ‘cloned’ from Althusser’s work via Engels, specifically Engels’s remark that “he and Marx only ever held that the economy was decisive for historical and political change in the last instance” (Fardy 2021: 3). Althusser “extends the critique of ‘economism’ inaugurated by Engels and Marx, but adds the caveat that even the ‘last instance’ of the economy ‘never comes’” (Fardy 2021: 4). Laruelle, for his part, further radicalizes the cloned concept of determination-in-the-last-instance (DLI) by claiming that, alongside One-in-One (the Real), DLI is central to non-philosophy because it is the Real that acts as the determinant, or an immanent causality, but only ever in the last instance – an instance that ‘never comes’ because it never enacts a Philosophical Decision. It thus also refuses a convertibility between different Philosophical Decisions, for example the primacy of Being at times, or Thought (etc.) at other times (see Laruelle 2016: 19). To perform this methodologically, non-philosophy does not create concepts as is done in standard philosophy, for example by Deleuze and Guattari in *What is Philosophy?* (1994 [1991]), because for Laruelle this amounts to little more than an effect of the Philosophical Decision. Non-standard philosophy instead ‘clones’ the raw materials of standard philosophy, thereby neutralizing its propensity to decide on the Real. As Paul Anthony Smith explains, rather than being a copy, image or representation, the clone “carries the same genetic structure as the material it is cloned from” – the ‘genetic material’ here being the Real – but preserves its own identity (2016b: 83). So, (scientific) knowledge proceeds *from* (or is cloned *from*) the (genetic material of the) Real – it is unidirectional. An acceptance of this leads to the third consequence, namely a non-philosophical ‘defetishization’ of thought which not only places philosophy in a humbler position in its relation to the Real, but also performs a profound act of non-epistemic violence. This, then, is where I return to Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus*, and particularly their use of the raw materials of Marxism and psychoanalysis. What I am arguing is that they *perform* non-philosophy in their use of the unconscious and productive forces *as raw materials*. Laruelle claims, in his *Introduction to Non-Marxism*, that it is “impossible, even in Freud and in Marx, and even more so in philosophy, to find the radical concepts of the Real and the uni-versal – only those of the unconscious and productive forces, of desire and work. But after this discovery”, he goes on to write, “psychoanalysis and Marxism take on more than a new meaning – a transformation of their theories into simple materials” (Laruelle

2015a: 68). All this to say, instead of *philosophizing* psychoanalysis or Marxism, thereby deciding on the Real-One, I will argue that Deleuze and Guattari use their concepts *scientifically*, or as raw materials in an experiment.

### Notes on Non-Marxism and Non-Standard Psychoanalysis

In his introduction to *Anti-Oedipus*, Mark Seem, one of the text's translators, argues that even though Deleuze and Guattari refer to both Marx and Freud in the text, "it would be an error to view *Anti-Oedipus* as yet another attempt at a Freud/Marx synthesis" (quoted in Deleuze; Guattari 1983: xviii). This is the first important non-philosophical index because non-standard philosophy requires an "identity *without-synthesis*, a transcendental identity of a 'unilateral duality'" (Laruelle 2013c: 301). Because the Real is foreclosed to thought, and thus to philosophy, yet determinant in-the-last-instance, there is a 'non-relation' between the Real and philosophy, which Laruelle calls 'unilateral duality'. Non-philosophy proceeds *axiomatically* from this position, which is to say it posits "the One as the radically immanent Real", but this One assumes a dualistic non-relation that refuses a synthesis or unity, such as Spinoza's monism might (Laruelle 2012b [2004]: 29). Laruelle calls this style 'uni-laterality', as opposed to the triadic system of philosophy which requires a synthesis that is either immanent to or transcendent of the dyad, such that it both posits and conditions "the theoretico-technical ternary" (Laruelle 2012b: 116). This triple model is sometimes referred to as a 3/2 or 2/3 transcendental invariant matrix, which basically means that philosophy divides the Real (or ordinary reality, as opposed to philosophical reality) into at least two coordinates, usually Thought and Being, and then synthesizes both under the aegis of one of the terms, providing itself simultaneously with "an interiority and an exteriority, an immanence and a transcendence", ultimately giving way to a circular causality – and this, for Laruelle, is even the case of 1/2, as with Difference (Laruelle 2013c: 4). Non-philosophy, on the other hand, is always "2-in-1 in-the-last-instance or 1-(of)-2" (Laruelle 2013c: 4). It may immediately strike the reader that there seems to be a tension here because Deleuze and Guattari *collide*<sup>1</sup> libido and economy in their concept of *desiring-production*, so could it be said that even though they collide these concepts they don't conjoin or collapse them in a synthesis? The answer may seem apparent at first: obviously *desiring-production* is a

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<sup>1</sup> "The collider", writes Laruelle, "is the quasi-transcendental apparatus, indivisibly scientific and philosophical, that accumulates the two properties within a superposed state" (2017: 171). The concept of superposition is from quantum theory and refers to a particle being in two states at the same time (Schrödinger's cat' is often cited as the thought experiment). For Laruelle, superposition can be used to indicate relations between, for example, science and non-philosophy, or philosophy and mathematics, though it also marks a practice for getting out of the usual binds placed on objects by theoretical or formal determinations by acting as a catalyst for more "creative underdetermination or potentialization both in and across a variety of domains" (Gangle; Greve 2017: 10). To 'collide' concepts is thus to keep them in a superposed state, rather than collapsing them into a single philosophical concept.

synthesis – Deleuze and Guattari even talk about syntheses in the book, for example the connective synthesis of production, the disjunctive synthesis of recording, and the conjunctive synthesis of consumption-consummation. At a closer look, however, what they are doing is *describing* (not prescribing, and not philosophizing) how psychoanalysis and capitalism – and especially the marriage between them – come to decide on the Real, thus forcing a synthesis. In terms of connective synthesis, they write:

What is more, castration and oedipalization beget a basic illusion that makes us believe that real desiring-production is answerable to higher formations that integrate it, subject it to transcendent laws, and make it serve a higher social and cultural production; there then appears a kind of “unsticking” of the social field with regard to the production of desire, in whose name all resignations are justified in advance. (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 74)

Notice their description of what Oedipalization – as a representation of the totality of the Real – enacts: not only a Decision of Sufficiency (Oedipus as the Real), but also a determination of the human as always-already Oedipalized. That is, Oedipalization cuts thought off from the Real through its initial decision about how to frame thought and what/how it reflects (on), and then redistributes this cut-off structure philosophically *as if* it has traction on the Real. This is what Laruelle calls *humanist* rather than *human* thought where, instead of the *Human-in-person*, we have a *human-as-subject* – like Heidegger’s *Dasein* – attributed to the fullest extent, but in a way that is separate (or cut off) from ordinary, generic life. Laruelle’s generic orientation or posture is aimed precisely at undercutting standard philosophical delineations such as ‘*Dasein*’, ‘rational man’ or ‘Oedipal person’ and is, therefore, a kind of *reduction* of the grand and the abstract to ordinary, phenomenal and immanent experience (Laruelle 2015b [2012]: xiv). For Laruelle, the kind of Oedipal violence described by Deleuze and Guattari would not only be psychological, but also epistemological, especially when enacted by intellectuals as part of a “new politico-quotidian doxa” which overrepresents its “victim” (i.e., the Oedipal human), thereby acting in the service of Philosophy-with-a-capital-P rather than in the service of life (2015b: 1). Deleuze and Guattari elaborate this problem in their own register, this time in terms of disjunctive synthesis, writing:

Oedipus is like the labyrinth, you only get out by re-entering it – or by making someone else enter it. Oedipus as either problem or solution is the two ends of a ligature that cuts off all desiring-production. The screws are tightened, nothing relating to production can make its way through any longer, except for a far-distant murmur. The unconscious has been crushed, triangulated, and confronted with a choice that is not its own. (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 79)

*With a choice that is not its own* or, as Laruelle says in his essay on generalized analysis (or non-analysis), as a “functional requisition of transcendent entities: Consciousness, the Unconscious, Self, Other, etc. without ever asking how such entities are received and lived” by the human as an ordinary, immanent subject of the science of the Human-in-person (2013d [1989]). Although psychoanalysis may appear, at least sometimes, to treat the human in the latter way, Laruelle argues that when it does so, it is in an already-transcendent form so that the human is treated as *a technology of the unconscious* (its ‘standing-reserve’) according to the sufficiency of psychoanalysis, rather than the unconscious being treated as a science of the Human-in-person. This is, of course, nothing other than the invariant structure of the Philosophical Decision which subordinates any possibility of analysis to philosophizing. If psychoanalysis is to become ‘scientific’ or ‘generic’, it would have to submit itself to the generic human (or what Laruelle understands by the ‘victim’, as will become clearer), thereby integrating analysis into a more *material* and *human* (rather than *materialist* and *humanist*) science that “would henceforth represent a particular case or a given” and renounce the inaccurate generalizations of philosophy in favour of “a scientific type of generalization”, which it would have to learn to distinguish (Laruelle 2013d). Laruelle calls this *non-psychoanalysis*: a “scientific pragmatics of analysis thus generalized within the limits of a really human science” that refuses to conflate the human ‘object’ with philosophical sufficiency, such that it is markedly different from Freudian or any other related analysis (Laruelle 2013d). This, as I will argue later in the paper, is precisely what a generic schizoanalysis would do.

Contextually, as Foucault writes in the introduction to *Anti-Oedipus*, it helps to understand that critical theory in Europe, from about 1945 to 1965, relied on a “certain style of political discourse, a certain ethics of the intellectual”, which required that one “be on familiar terms with Marx”, while not allowing “one’s dreams stray too far from Freud”, or neglecting to “treat sign-systems – the signifier – with the greatest respect” (Foucault in Deleuze; Guattari 1983: xi). Deleuze and Guattari want, naturally, to disrupt this holy trinity, as much as they want to trouble the Oedipalized triad of daddy-mommy-me. But they also recognize the strange ‘status’ of Oedipus: “At times”, they write, “we say that Oedipus is nothing, almost nothing (within the order of desiring-production, even in the child); at other times we say that it is everywhere (in the enterprise of domesticating the unconscious, of representing desire and the unconscious). To be sure, we have never dreamed of saying that psychoanalysis invented Oedipus” (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 121). To say that Oedipus is nothing is a recognition that it *only presents itself* as the Real, as sufficient to the Real, when in reality it is little more than a specific (philosophical) framing of reality, in the same way that “philosophy is already the photography of the World” (Laruelle 2011: 9). Alongside Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari see capitalism as enacting a similar photography of the World – hence their recourse to both Freud and Marx. Jonathan Fardy (2021), Alexander Galloway (2012), Katerina Kolozova (2012) and

Laruelle (2015a) himself have all argued extensively, albeit with individual nuances, that capitalism functions by *axiomatically* assuming that everything, including the Real, is reducible to an exchange value. Deleuze and Guattari, likewise, argue for this position in *Anti-Oedipus*, explaining also *how* capitalism comes to take this axiomatic position. “By substituting money for the very notion of a code”, they write, “it has created an axiomatic of abstract quantities that keeps moving further and further in the direction of the deterritorialization of the socius” (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 33). Far from being an aberration, the propensity capitalism has for absolute deterritorialization is, for Deleuze and Guattari, a condition of its functioning. This is a rather straightforward Marxist position. For it to become a non-Marxist one would require not only a critique of capital, but also of the “imbrication of philosophy and capital” (Fardy 2021: 6), implying that capitalism is not merely an economic violence, but an epistemological one as well, just as we saw with psychoanalysis. For Laruelle, decoupling Marx from Philosophy is a double task: it entails not only the classic question of “how to break with Hegel?”, but also, more generally, how to disentangle form Philosophy-with-a-capital-P, or Philosophy as Sufficiency rather than philosophy “as a particular doctrine” (Laruelle 2015a: 38). It is no secret that Hegel’s project represents the philosophy of synthesis *par excellence*, so for Marxism to break with Hegel, and therefore Philosophy, is to treat the One as a dualistic non-relation that refuses a synthesized unity. For Laruelle, “Marx’s reticence toward Hegel” is an “indication of a non-philosophical instinct *already implicit* in Marx”, even if he did not name it as such (Galloway 2012: 204). Similarly, I would argue that there is a non-philosophical impulse at work in Deleuze and Guattari’s theorization of psychoanalysis and capitalism, the latter especially via their exposition of *contingency*. Whereas Marx argues for a typological and evolutionary three-stage theory that moves from savagery to barbarism to civilization, principally influenced by Lewis Henry Morgan’s book, *Ancient Society; Or: Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization* (1877), Deleuze and Guattari argue that capitalism, like the formation of Statist societies, was always contested and *contingent*. Instead of relying on a historical materialism that develops as distinct stages, each of which progresses in terms of a thesis, antithesis and synthesis, with communism representing the ultimate (metaphysical, and therefore philosophical) synthesis, Deleuze and Guattari argue against the “dreary, colorless dialectic of evolution, aimed at forming a harmonious whole out of heterogeneous bits by rounding off their rough edges” (1983: 116). In a passage that could be a non-philosophical critique of the co-imbrication of capitalism and philosophy, they write: “As a general rule, the problem of the relationships between parts and the whole continues to be rather awkwardly formulated by classic mechanism and vitalism, so long as the whole is considered as a totality derived from the parts, or as an original totality from which the parts emanate, or as a dialectical totalization” (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 44). In a non-philosophical register of cloning, this could read as: Generally, the problem of the relation between philosophy (or capitalism, or capitalist-philosophy, or philo-



capitalism) and the Real continues to be rather awkwardly formulated by standard philosophy, so long as the Real is considered as a totality derived from philosophical interpretation, or as a dialectical totalization that forms a cogent cosmology of meaning, thereby denying the ordinary, generic individual who, like the Real, is irreducible to the framings, concepts and alienations of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and capital. Instead, the Real is “the ‘Lived’ of the ‘Human-in-Human’”, prior to its representative abstractions (Kolozova 2012: 216). Like non-psychoanalysis, non-Marxism is an attempt to describe this ordinary Lived *from* the Real, not *as* the Real, thus acknowledging the non-commutativity of Thought and the Real as a pure dyad that cannot be synthesized. The question now is: Does Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis live up to this or, if not quite, are there enough raw materials in schizoanalysis for it to become a generic practice?

### **A Generic Schizoanalysis, A Generic Pragmatics**

I want to start this section by addressing a critique Laruelle raises against Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus* in his article “La concept d’analyse généralisée ou de ‘non-analyse’”, translated by Taylor Adkins as “The Concept of Generalized Analysis or of ‘Non-Analysis’” (2013d). Having taken some time to explain what non-analysis is, which Laruelle also describes as a ‘pragmatics of the unconscious’ (readers of Deleuze and Guattari will surely recognise ‘pragmatics’ as another term for ‘schizoanalysis’), he writes – and I quote at length:

What’s the point in de-Oedipalizing desire if only to machine it, to fold it to the ultimate restrictive code of desiring machines or to the last fold of “difference”? This combat within philosophy has nothing to do with the scientific safeguarding of analysis and of its real object. If the Unconscious knows neither contradiction nor logic, it will no longer know philosophy, which is an internalizing construction on logic and is inseparable from the latter. Neither formal logic nor combinatory logic, neither logos nor onto-logic, the Unconscious is “hopelessly” empty. It is not a question of again filling it with these substitutes of the imaginary or of the socio-structural. Rather than the last wound, the wound in the last instance or the real wound. And this is not what the Unconscious inflicts upon the Conscious, but what science does to this Unconscious still too full of metaphysical substitutes and transcendent objects; it wounds the residual narcissism of psychoanalysis. (Laruelle 2013d)

Apart from his lengthy meditation on the philosophies of difference of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Deleuze and Derrida in *Philosophies of Difference* (2010b [1986]), Laruelle often makes pithier indictments against Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari, many remaining unexplained, thereby implicitly assuming agreement from the reader – as in

the quote above. (In fairness, many philosophers, including Deleuze and Guattari, do this.) To be clear, for Laruelle Deleuze's theorizations of *Difference* and the *virtual*, as well as Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of the *Body without Organs* (BwO) and the *plane of immanence*, are all examples of philosophical models that start by rejecting dualisms, such as immanence vs transcendence, and then opt for one – immanence in the case of Deleuze and Guattari – but a one that unifies rather than remaining in-One or immanent (to) itself. Laruelle's argument is that even though Deleuze and Guattari claim to *proceed from immanence*, they are actually still laying claim to the Real. According to Laruelle, then, Deleuze and Guattari reduce the Real by making it equivalent to Difference = the virtual = the BwO = the plane of immanence. In *All Thoughts Are Equal*, Ó Maoilearca comes to Deleuze and Guattari's defense, arguing that a concept like the 'plane of immanence' could be read as a "term for the equality of all before Being, the univocity of the Real (where being is said in the same way of every different thing)" (2015: 71). This is a fair reading, though Ó Maoilearca ultimately concedes that Deleuze's invocation of a One-All in a Spinozist vein leaves Deleuze "too much the philosopher for Laruelle's taste" (Ó Maoilearca 2015: 71–72). According to Laruelle, Deleuze and Guattari's concepts succumb, in the end, to a Philosophical Decision, though I would argue that while they do not explicitly argue that the Real (or immanence) is foreclosed to thought – and this is where Laruelle's project is decisive – they do in fact address Sufficiency. This has already been shown in terms of their theorization of psychoanalysis and capitalism, but it could be said of Difference too, at least in the way it is used by Deleuze (rather than, say, Derrida, whose work I am not addressing here). Much has been said about Deleuze's Difference, and I will certainly not recount it all here. Rather, I want to suggest that Difference, rather than being a 'plane' or 'fold' (as Laruelle understands these concepts), is simply *a way of stating the problem of immanence*. Recall that Deleuze says on more than one occasion that problems always get the solutions they deserve because the 'solution' is nothing other than the "conditions under which it is determined as a problem" (1991: 16). When Deleuze talks about 'problems' and 'solutions' he is addressing the relationship between thought and images in thought, which speaks not only to representation – such as representations *of* immanence, or the Real – but also to the image of thought that Philosophy gives to itself, i.e., Sufficiency. Before thought takes place, it therefore "already has an image of what it means to think" (Bénil 2021: 52) – and what it means to think the Real. Having a *new* image of thought would thus be to think *from*, rather than *to*, Difference, which is to say immanence. When Deleuze critiques philosophical thought, especially in the final three of the eight postulates on the dogmatic image of thought, I don't think it is too outrageous to claim that Deleuze himself was already pointing out the false purchase of the Philosophical Decision on the Real. Readers of Deleuze will recall that he elaborates this with reference to non-Euclidean geometry, especially the work of the mathematician, Bernhard Riemann, who further developed Carl Friedrich Gauss's notion of surfaces as spaces in themselves by addressing "a much more general problem:

that of  $n$ -dimensional surfaces or spaces” (DeLanda 2002: 4). Without invoking the container space of a Euclidean object, such as a cube, which would be expressed in terms of the Euclidean values  $x$ ,  $y$  and  $z$  (length, width and height), Riemann showed that only the instantaneous rate of change – the infinitesimal or the velocity at *this* instant – needs to be calculated, which he expressed as  $dy/dx$ . The rate of change of  $x$  with respect to  $y$  is thus done without recourse to a global embedding or *transcendent* space. This is why Deleuze (and Guattari) sometimes speak of  $n-1$ : to indicate that there is no need for a transcendent unity (see Deleuze 1994: 182). To restate this in non-philosophical language, the  $n-1$  renders possible a cloning of the One that does not result in or rely on a synthesis but remains immanent (to) itself, or in-One. Deleuze’s insistence on univocity is therefore not quite the same as a Spinozist one. Difference differentiating itself is a movement *from* immanence rather than *to* it. Laruelle’s argument, in short, that Difference still frames the Real because it functions as a meta-physical principle (see Laruelle 2010b: 27–28). Difference, accordingly, *stands in for* the Real. It could certainly be read this way, and part of the problem for Laruelle is the choice of word here but choosing a word like ‘Real’ does not come without its own semantic encumbrance, laden with Lacanian overtones as it is. Laruelle does, however, make a substantial effort to sidestep this problem methodologically, but what I hope my discussion shows, albeit in brief, is that this is actually a complex argument, especially given Deleuze’s own critique of Philosophy’s dogmatic image of thought (i.e., its sufficiency).<sup>2</sup>

I am not trying to diminish Laruelle’s project by arguing this point; his non-standard philosophical endeavour is unique, and even though I would argue that he, in some sense, takes Deleuze’s project on immanence to its natural conclusion, there are many differences between them. One of the greatest contributions from Laruelle is, as I have already intimated, his methodology for non-philosophically enacting immanence, i.e., his non-epistemology. My point is that while Laruelle argues that Deleuze and Guattari submit desire to philosophical sufficiency, it seems to me that there is a strong case to be made that Difference is a way of posing the problem of immanence, such that the human-in-subject can be given new coordinates which, if not non-philosophical *as such*, does have a larval non-philosophical drive. This is true of *Difference and Repetition* as much as it is for *Anti-Oedipus*. For example, Deleuze and Guattari write: “In like fashion we are compelled to say that *psychoanalysis has its metaphysics* – its name is Oedipus. And that a revolution – this time *materialist* – can proceed only by way of a critique of Oedipus, by denouncing the illegitimate use of the syntheses of the unconscious as found in Oedipal psychoanalysis, so as to rediscover a *transcendental unconscious defined by the immanence of its criteria*, and a corresponding practice that we shall call schizoanalysis” (Deleuze;

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<sup>2</sup> I take some time elaborating this point as much (though not all) of the secondary literature on Laruelle tends to follow his critique of Deleuze (and Guattari) rather than engaging with this tension more substantially. At the same time, I admit that I am not doing Laruelle’s very detailed arguments justice here due to space constraints – and they absolutely do deserve to be engaged with rigorously. My hope is that readers will follow this trail of crumbs.

Guattari 1983: 75, emphasis added). Clearly, granting that Oedipus functions as a metaphysics laying claim to the One is a ‘real kernel’ – a recognition that generically lived reality exceeds philosophical abstraction, which leads to the discovery of what could read either as ‘the One-in-One defined by the immanence of its criteria’ (which is how I read it here) or as ‘a plane of immanence defined by the immanence of its criteria’ (which is how I suspect Laruelle would read it). Laruelle would also argue for a material rather than materialist ‘revolution’ – and here I would take his point (not as philosophical interpretation, but as axiomatic). Elsewhere they write: “It is not the purpose of schizoanalysis to resolve Oedipus, it does not intend to resolve it better than Oedipal psychoanalysis does. Its aim is to de-oedipalize the unconscious in order *to reach the real problems*” (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 81, emphasis added). Here schizoanalysis is presented as a generic practice which, like Laruelle’s non-psychoanalysis, reduces the transcendent foundation of Freudian analysis to something quite ordinary: a “simple *dimension* of human phenomena” (Laruelle 2013d) – to *a* life, which “is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing” which “is itself a life” (Deleuze 2005:11), though whereas Deleuze describes *a* life as *absolute*, it is *radical* for Laruelle. There are many more examples such as these, but rather than arguing about whether Deleuze and Guattari are, on the whole, non-philosophical – which is not the larger point I am trying to make here in any case – there is enough to at least assume a non-philosophical instinct and, as such, I want to think about what a generic schizoanalysis might look like.

Towards the end of *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari outline a negative task of schizoanalysis – “defamiliarizing, de-oedipalizing, decastrating; undoing theater, dream, and fantasy; decoding, deterritorializing” (1983: 381) – as well as two positive tasks, the first being to discover how desiring-machines work, *detached from any foregone interpretations* (1983: 322), and the second being “to reach the investments of unconscious desire of the social field” (1983: 350). These tasks seem to me to be summed up in the second iteration of their project, namely *A Thousand Plateaus*, as: “if human beings have a destiny, it is rather to escape the face, to dismantle the face and facializations, to become imperceptible, to become clandestine” (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 171). This could be phrased differently as: it is the destiny of psychoanalysis to lose its ‘face’, just as it is the destiny of capitalism to lose its ‘face’, because faciality is precisely the Philosophical Decision whereby ordinary, lived reality becomes overcoded. This overcoding effectuates an incorporeal transformation that submits all subjectivation processes to the hierarchical functions of biunivocalization and binarization *in advance*, where the former functions to create mutually opposed groupings (x or y; man or woman; white or black) and the latter to set a normative standard between these, so ensuring measurement (x is better – read more normative and less deviant – than Y) (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 177). The destructive aim of schizoanalysis is thus to undo the mask of faciality in order to allow subjectivation, or individuation, to take place without the predetermined ascription processes and trajectory conditions of faciality. At this point,

however, schizoanalysis remains at the level of the signifier and subjectivity. Deleuze and Guattari themselves say this: “Dismantling the face is the same as breaking through the wall of the signifier and getting out of the black hole of subjectivity” (Deleuze; Guattari 1987: 188). They then go on, in the next line, to describe this explicitly as the ‘programme’ and ‘slogan’ of schizoanalysis. For it to become non-philosophical, or a *generic* schizoanalysis, it cannot however remain at the level of subjectivity or individuation as that ‘redeems’ the human-in-subject at only one level, while failing to transform the human-in-subject to the Human-in-Human by delivering it from the sufficiency of the Philosophical Decision. That is, a generic schizoanalysis would also have to be about philosophy losing its face or, positively stated, about philosophy becoming a probe-head rather than being a faciality machine.

Here, a generic schizoanalysis would benefit from Laruelle’s *General Theory of Victims* in which he argues that philosophy is itself the criminal that creates victims by enclosing the Human-in-Human within a Philosophical Decision. That is to say, the Philosophical Decision is itself an enactment of faciality. This being said, Laruelle holds that it is the victim who, paradoxically, can ‘save’ intellectuals by helping them become *generic*. In his words: “there is a single vectorial equation or a vector state for the victim and the intellectual. The intellectual passes through the two states; in general, he [*sic*] helps the victim acquire the power to manifest, judge, and thus ‘save’ the criminal. But he contributes to saving himself (judging himself, condemning himself, etc.) by superposing himself on the victim and abandoning his spontaneously or ‘unconsciously’ criminal side” (Laruelle 2015b: 154). Stated plainly, philosophy, and philosophers, and thus also schizoanalysis, becomes generic by *reducing* the double hallucination of standard philosophy (or standard psychoanalysis) to a phenomenal immanence that, instead of being subject to a principle of logical or philosophical identity, is subjected to a quantum indivisibility that nevertheless remains a non-commutativity of the Real and the Human-in-Human or Victim-in-person (2-in-1 in-the-last-instance or 1-(of)-2). For Laruelle, this is the “underdetermining condition of justice” (2015b: xxi) which requires that philosophy’s Sufficiency be replaced by a Principle of Compassion – not pity, not vengeance and not heroism, as he goes on to explain. Compassion is not reducible to any form of Christian, materialist or humanist sympathy, just as it is not a principle “except in-the-last-instance”, which would render it generic: “universal-without-reason” and “necessary-without-sufficiency” (Laruelle 2015b: 47). This requires thinking humanity as non-facialized – “as indivisible by cultures, communities, and races, while at the same time as not being a transcendent unity like essence or nature” (Laruelle 2015b: 7). Laruelle proposes that this be done not at the level of subjectivity, but at the level of non-epistemology: by rendering the human the ‘object’ of an axiom that is stripped of all philosophical attributes. Yet this axiom would have to simultaneously allow the human to be a ‘subject’ or, more precisely, “the lived or neutralized materiality, what we call an ‘oraxiom’” – the generic or non-philosophical portmanteau that superposes “the oracle

and the axiom, or the axiom-subject” (Laruelle 2015b: 7). Laruelle’s scientific endeavour becomes clear here: rather than collapsing the Victim-in-person into the synthesized object-subject of Philosophy, the cloning of victims becomes the under-determining last instance of intellectuals. Call to mind that Deleuze and Guattari argue that faciality functions according to resonance and redundancy, because in the same way that news headlines tell us what to believe, remember, expect, etc., so too does the ultimate normative face, namely the Christ face. The Christ face thus functions as a distillation of faciality and is redundant precisely because it has been repeated or resonated so many times that the referent is not actually Christ’s face, but a copy (of a copy) thereof. It would seem, then, that the Human-in-Human, as much as Philosophy, are in need of redemption *from* rather than *by* Christ. Laruelle argues that it is the victim who “carries with it resurrection, or rather the prior-to-the-first insurrection, against the dialectic of being and nothingness, which has no real or lived sense” (2015b: 44), because the victim forces a gnostic or generic passivity towards the Real. Instead of *analysis*, a generic schizoanalysis would proceed by way of *dualysis* – a method whereby the strong force of the Philosophical Decision is weakened because it refuses a synthesis or unity of the dyad. To ‘arise’ is to dualyse rather than analyse or synthesize – to bring generic lived experience *back to life* by affirming “the primacy of the glorious body over the duplicity of the world” (Laruelle 2015b: 112). The generic (in)(re)surrection, or non-schizoanalysis, of the Victim-in-person as an *ordinary messiah* is therefore a direct response to messianic facialization or the criminal violence of philosophy. Could it be the line that frees a non-philosophical probe-head?

Deleuze and Guattari remain quite vague on what a probe-head is, but they do give us some indication of what it does: “dismantle the strata in their wake, break through the walls of signifiante, pour out of the holes of subjectivity, fell trees in favor of veritable rhizomes, and steer the flows down lines of positive deterritorialization or creative flight” (1987: 190). It could thus be viewed as a non-philosophical *tool* for un-building the structures of standard psychoanalysis. As a non-schizoanalytic tool it would also transform psychoanalysis from a technology of the unconscious into a schizo-dualysis of the Human-in-person – a science founded on the immanent being of the human, where any ‘loss’ is treated as nothing more or less than just that: a generic immanent part of radical lived experience rather than a redoubled object for Freudian analysis that “can only go to the point of a half-loss, just as it [only] comes to the point of a half-rediscovery” (Laruelle 2013d).

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## *Devenir-psychanalyste avec Guattari*

par GABRIEL MART

### **Abstract**

Encountered by a clinician, schizoanalysis does not speak about analysands at all. It addresses the analyst, it deforms him, and in this deformation it establishes a certain ethical (or ethico-esthetic, perhaps?) position. That, one may coin 'clinical schizoanalysis', is first and foremost a style, a perpetual deformation the analysts of freudian, kleinian or even lacanian background undergo. In order to make way for a subject, an analyst must be prepared to forfeit any previously established hypothesis he has of the analysand, no matter how appealing and coherent they may seem. Moreover, a schizoanalytic orientation demands an ability to forfeit said orientation as well. As one chooses schizoanalysis as an orientation in one's own analytic style, he establishes the condition for creativity to be fulfilled; one does not establish the new orthodoxy of 'guattarism', but engages in continuous becoming-'psychoanalyst with Guattari'. In this essay, I explore the possible sources and practical implications of how guattarian thought might be embraced by mainstream psychoanalytic clinicians today.

Dans ce numéro, mes collègues abordent beaucoup la schizoanalyse en tant que discipline, champ d'expérimentation et pratique de créativité. Cependant, je souhaiterais apporter une perspective différente en proposant de réfléchir à la schizoanalyse non pas comme une discipline particulière, ni même une doctrine, une école, une « psychanalyse guattarienne », mais plutôt comme une orientation pour le psychanalyste, le clinicien, qui définit son propre style analytique individuel.

En effet, il est impossible d'apprendre de Guattari de la même manière que l'on apprend de Dolto, de Winnicott ou de Mannoni. Contrairement aux analystes qui nous ont laissé un corpus assez abondant de cas cliniques très détaillés, Guattari – écrivain prolifique qui est resté avant tout clinicien pendant la plus grande partie de sa vie d'adulte, jusqu'à sa mort – a très peu écrit sur son travail clinique (Lacan non plus d'ailleurs). À part le célèbre article sur le cas de R.A. (Guattari 1972), les illustrations cliniques de Guattari sont disséminées ici et là dans les actes des séminaires qu'il a animés à La Borde, dans ses carnets de notes et dans ses lettres. Tout cela, qui rend compte de son style analytique personnel, semble peu applicable à des fins didactiques conventionnelles. Par ailleurs, la psychanalyse résiste à la didactique conventionnelle. Contrairement à l'éducation dans d'autres professions, il y a une transmission analytique. La formation (ce qui rend beaucoup mieux compte du jeu de signes impliqué dans ce

processus) de l'analyste se fait essentiellement par la dé-formation de ses idées et de ses croyances existantes, en dialogue avec la discipline et ses collègues. Cette formation est celle de son inconscient et, par conséquent, cette déformation est analogue à l'inconscient : elle est dynamique, perpétuelle et sans point final (je me conforme ici aux idées du psychanalyste Vincent Perdigon de la Fédération des Ateliers de Psychanalyse (Gaucher ; Perdigon, 2007)). C'est de cela que je veux discuter ici : du potentiel déformant et mutant de la pensée guattarienne pour le psychanalyste. Cela semble tout à fait en accord avec l'esprit de la schizoanalyse en tant que pratique clinique. Ce que l'on pourrait appeler la « schizoanalyse clinique » est avant tout un style, une déformation en cours, que des analystes d'origine freudienne, kleinienne ou même lacanienne endurent. Plus encore, contrairement à l'idée reçue, Guattari lui-même est étranger au négativisme ; tout le caractère de son programme réside dans l'inverse, dans la créativité.

Avant de commencer à aborder les possibles implications de cette orientation, je tiens à préciser quelques points clés de la pratique psychanalytique qui sont pertinents dans le contexte de mon essai. En 2003, en France, alors que la psychanalyse était fortement menacée par l'oppression de l'État, un Groupe de contact s'est formé pour s'y opposer. Ce groupe d'analystes réunit, selon leur propre définition, les « freudiens français » (Société psychanalytique de Paris, Association psychanalytique de France, 4e groupe) et les « freudiens français avec Lacan »<sup>1</sup> (Espace analytique, Société de psychanalyse freudienne, Mouvement Cout Freudien, Association freudienne internationale, Fondation européenne pour la psychanalyse, etc.). Dans le cadre de leurs activités, le Groupe de contact a proposé plusieurs points<sup>2</sup> de définition de la psychanalyse. Les trois premiers concernent les concepts fondamentaux, tandis que les quatrième et cinquième traitent directement des aspects méthodologiques de la pratique clinique. Ce sont ces derniers qui retiennent le plus mon attention dans le cadre de mes réflexions :

La psychanalyse cherche – sans aucune volonté d'adaptation à quelque modèle préétabli que ce soit – à éliminer autant que faire se peut toute suggestion (Bernard n.d.).

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<sup>1</sup> Il faut noter que le concept de lacanisme ou d'"analyse lacanienne" n'est pas articulé ici. Les fondements problématiques et idéologiques de ce concept méritent une étude distincte.

<sup>2</sup> 1) La psychanalyse est une investigation de processus mentaux inaccessibles autrement et une méthode thérapeutique qui se fonde sur la découverte freudienne et son enrichissement ainsi que l'extension de son champ d'application; 2) La référence à l'inconscient comme au transfert lui est indispensable et exclut toute formation à qui n'en a pas fait l'expérience personnelle sur le divan; 3) La psychanalyse inclut la pratique de variantes de la cure adaptées à l'organisation psychique de certains patients; 4) La psychanalyse se démarque de toutes les autres méthodes psychologiques et psychothérapeutiques car en privilégiant l'interprétation du transfert, au lieu de l'utiliser, elle cherche – sans aucune volonté d'adaptation à quelque modèle préétabli que ce soit – à éliminer autant que faire se peut toute suggestion; 5) Comme conséquence logique de ces principes se dégage la nécessité d'un cadre de la cure en relation avec l'éthique psychanalytique requérant du praticien une neutralité et une confidentialité confondues à la technique même de la psychanalyse.

C'est dans cette partie de la définition de la psychanalyse que je trouve une occasion de situer une orientation « guattarienne » pour le psychanalyste. Avant d'aborder les effets des déformations que le contact avec Guattari peut apporter au psychanalyste – en particulier en ce qui concerne son style analytique personnel – je vais expliquer le contenu de cet élément.

La psychanalyse est une méthode d'investigation des processus mentaux et une méthode thérapeutique qui s'exerce principalement par la pratique de la parole. L'analyste crée, par une position d'écoute spécifique, un espace pour la parole et pour la subjectivation de son analysant. Il s'agit d'un espace où l'on peut déposer ce qui a été refoulé et le dépasser, afin de trouver de nouveaux modes de subjectivation ou, comme le dit Jean-Pierre Winter, psychanalyste français, « se souvenir pour pouvoir enfin oublier » (Winter 2019).

Jacques Lacan disait, en plaisantant, qu'on pouvait imaginer un analyste muet, mais pas un analyste sourd. L'analyste va écouter l'analysant et, de temps à autre, dire quelque chose, faire un commentaire. Toutefois, les paroles de l'analyste font en réalité partie de l'écoute : l'interprétation n'a pas pour but d'expliquer quelque chose à l'analysant, de lui transmettre un savoir sur lui-même, ou de se conformer à un modèle que l'analyste veut imposer, mais précisément le contraire. L'interprétation, à travers des questionnements, des ponctuations et la création d'équivoques, ainsi que par l'introduction de ruptures dans le tissu du discours de l'analysant, crée un espace dans lequel il est possible d'introduire quelque chose de nouveau. L'interprétation ouvre la possibilité de co-produire un nouveau territoire pour le sujet.

La manière et le moment où un analyste donne son interprétation sont l'un des aspects les plus visibles et les plus évidents du style analytique personnel d'un clinicien. L'analyste français Paul Denis a posé une hypothèse en demi-teinte : les cliniciens dont l'analyste était « bavard » et donnait beaucoup d'interprétations ont tendance à devenir plus taciturnes pour ne pas dire trop de choses inappropriées (Denis 2015). Peut-être existe-t-il une telle tendance... Toutefois, il me semble utile de souligner un autre aspect de l'observation concernant l'analyste « bavard ». En restant psychanalyste freudien ou kleinien, etc., l'analyste peut utiliser la « schizoanalyse » pour orienter son style de travail personnel. Afin de donner de l'espace au sujet, il faut être prêt à abandonner ses anciennes hypothèses sur l'analysant, aussi fines et belles qu'elles puissent paraître. Pour éviter toute contrainte, suggestion ou adaptation à un modèle préétabli, il faut pouvoir renoncer non seulement aux modèles extrinsèques (tels que les clichés sociaux ou théoriques psychanalytiques), mais aussi à celui qui ne semble plus être extrinsèque, celui qui s'est formé au cours de cette analyse particulière avec ce même analysant. Une interprétation qui stimule la subjectivation, qui a un effet analytique, n'est possible qu'à partir de « l'ici », de la position dans laquelle se trouve l'analysant à ce moment particulier et à qui il

s'adresse là. Du transfert<sup>3</sup>. Non pas de l'« Œdipe », du « là-bas » de la théorie analytique générale ou de celle sur le sujet, sur l'analysant, que l'analyste s'est construite au cours du travail. Sinon, l'analyste fait partie de la névrose de l'analysant en s'immergeant trop dans le contenu du discours. Et lorsqu'il s'immerge dans l'« Œdipe », il perd tout contact avec la substance subjective.

Par ailleurs, en ce qui concerne le « psychanalyste avec Guattari », il faut faire un pas de plus. L'orientation « schizoanalytique » pour le psychanalyste ne se limite pas à l'orientation vers les processus de subjectivation plutôt que vers le contenu du discours. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de la capacité de renoncer à ses hypothèses sur l'analysant ou aux concepts et schémas établis appris au cours de l'institut psychanalytique. C'est également la capacité de renoncer à l'orientation elle-même ! Ce que fait Guattari, non seulement dans *L'Anti-Œdipe*, mais également avant et après, n'est pas un nihilisme systématique, mais plutôt une capacité positive à effectuer une telle opération douloureuse de renonciation à des schémas appris et très chers au cœur de chaque analyste. Il s'agit de choisir en faveur de ce qui est adéquat et pertinent pour la situation analytique particulière à ce moment-là. La schizoanalyse n'est pas un projet d'enterrement de Freud. Guattari lui-même ne nie ni Freud, ni la castration, ni la composante familiale dans le développement psychique du jeune sujet. Lorsque cela est approprié pour le matériel, Guattari lui-même revient à Freud et même à Œdipe (par exemple, voir le séminaire *À propos d'un rêve : Systruc* (Guattari 1984), où Guattari analyse son propre rêve). Dans son commentaire sur le cas de R.A. dans *Psychanalyse et transversalité*, Guattari déplore le mauvais usage de l'Œdipe par les analystes : il serait illusoire de penser qu'il y a quelque chose à lire dans l'ordre de l'être ou dans l'ordre du monde perdu. De même, il serait vain de penser que la reconstruction de l'être mythique, au-delà de toute origine historique, peut être institutionnalisée comme propédeutique psychanalytique ou comme une maïeutique. Compte tenu des processus réels impliqués dans le traitement thérapeutique ou dans la formation de l'organisation thérapeutique, se référer à ce type de simplification mytho-linguistique ne mène nulle part ailleurs que dans l'abîme de la spéculation. Il est crucial de comprendre que l'important réside dans le message ainsi que dans l'objet porteur et la base de ce message (Guattari 1972).

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<sup>3</sup> Ici, on peut faire un détour et remarquer un certain parallélisme entre ce dont je discute maintenant et les idées du psychanalyste Massoud Khan, un proche élève de Donald Winnicott. Massoud Khan (Khan 1975) observe que le même analysant peut donner des impressions complètement différentes au cours de séances successives, parfois en désaccord avec la structure diagnostique présumée de l'analyste. Hahn explique cela en introduisant le concept de "facettes du Soi" : le sujet n'est pas unidimensionnel et homogène. Il se caractérise plutôt par une multiplicité de facettes qui se tournent vers l'analyste à différents moments de l'analyse. Lorsque nous parlons de l'interprétation "d'ici", il faut également parler de l'interprétation du transfert. Hahn ajoute très justement : l'analyste a lui aussi de nombreuses facettes de ce type. Je propose ici de développer un peu la pensée de Khan, d'y ajouter un élément dynamique. Je propose de changer le concept de facette en concept de plan subjectif. À l'intersection du plan subjectif de l'analyste et du plan subjectif de l'analysant, il y a un transfert et ce même " d'ici " dans lequel l'interprétation est possible. Cette intersection n'est pas permanente, les plans se déforment lorsqu'ils se croisent : l'interprétation contribue à l'émergence d'un nouveau mode de subjectivation.

Il importe peu que l'analyste soit bavard ou préfère demeurer silencieux, pourvu qu'il soit conscient de l'effet analytique de ses paroles et de ses actes. Il n'est pas si important à quelle source conceptuelle il puise pour nourrir une interprétation particulière, quelles règles il suit et celles qu'il modifie si nécessaire.

Aujourd'hui, il arrive fréquemment que les analystes privilégient la cohérence philosophique des leurs propres idées au détriment du matériel et du sujet. Certains ignorent même la souffrance de l'analysant ou du patient si elle ne correspond pas au dispositif philosophique du clinicien.<sup>4</sup> C'est en cela que *L'Anti-Œdipe* s'adresse aux cliniciens. Guattari pressentait déjà il y a cinquante ans le danger d'un « lacanisme » si imposant aujourd'hui. Dans les écrits de certains admirateurs de Lacan, la psychanalyse, qui est pourtant une discipline très proche de l'homme et de la substance du sujet, prend les traits d'une pratique ésotérique qui produit des fantômes conceptuels n'ayant qu'un rapport très indirect avec la réalité (mais qui ont, néanmoins, un lien avec elle, comme tous les fantasmes). La société psychanalytique devient alors une sorte d'hybride entre la loge maçonnique et le parti bolchévique. Les analystes français, qui s'opposent à cette tendance, ne se définissent pas comme « lacaniens » mais comme « psychanalystes avec Lacan », ou encore « freudiens avec Lacan ». Choisir la « schizoanalyse » comme orientation pour notre propre manière d'analyser, c'est créer les conditions nécessaires pour réaliser la créativité inhérente à cette pratique. Nous ne créons pas une nouvelle orthodoxie du « guattarisme », mais nous nous engageons dans un processus de devenir constant, devenir- « psychanalystes avec Guattari ». La schizoanalyse, lorsqu'elle rencontre le clinicien, ne parle pas du tout des analysants, mais plutôt s'adresse à l'analyste lui-même. Elle le déforme et, au cœur de cette déformation, génère une certaine position éthique (ou peut-être éthico-esthétique).

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<sup>4</sup> Je fais ici référence à la fois à des questions politiquement sensibles et controversées telles que l'homosexualité, la transsexualité et à des sujets apparemment classiques tels que la schizophrénie. Je suppose que cela est en dehors de la problématique de mon texte.

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## ***Devenir-psicoanalista con Guattari***

de GABRIEL MART

### **Abstract**

Encountered by a clinician, schizoanalysis does not speak about analysands at all. It addresses the analyst, it deforms him, and in this deformation it establishes a certain ethical (or ethico-esthetic, perhaps?) position. That, one may coin 'clinical schizoanalysis', is first and foremost a style, a perpetual deformation the analysts of freudian, kleinian or even lacanian background undergo. In order to make way for a subject, an analyst must be prepared to forfeit any previously established hypothesis he has of the analysand, no matter how appealing and coherent they may seem. Moreover, a schizoanalytic orientation demands an ability to forfeit said orientation as well. As one chooses schizoanalysis as an orientation in one's own analytic style, he establishes the condition for creativity to be fulfilled; one does not establish the new orthodoxy of 'guattarism', but engages in continuous becoming-'psychoanalyst with Guattari'. In this essay, I explore the possible sources and practical implications of how guattarian thought might be embraced by mainstream psychoanalytic clinicians today.

En este número, mis colegas abordan mucho el esquizoanálisis como disciplina, campo de experimentación y práctica de creatividad. Sin embargo, me gustaría ofrecer una perspectiva diferente al proponer reflexionar sobre el esquizoanálisis no como una disciplina particular, ni siquiera una orientación, una escuela, un "psicoanálisis guattariano", sino más bien como una orientación para el psicoanalista, el clínico, que define su propio estilo analítico individual.

De hecho, es imposible aprender de Guattari de la misma manera que se aprende de Dolto, Winnicott o Mannoni. A diferencia de los analistas que nos han dejado un corpus bastante abundante de casos clínicos muy detallados, Guattari, escritor prolífico que se mantuvo sobre todo como clínico durante la mayor parte de su vida adulta hasta su muerte, escribió muy poco sobre su trabajo clínico (Lacan tampoco). Aparte del famoso artículo sobre el caso R.A. (Guattari 1972), las ilustraciones clínicas de Guattari se dispersan aquí y allá en los actos de los seminarios que impartió en La Borde, en sus cuadernos de notas y en sus cartas. Todo esto, que da cuenta de su estilo analítico personal, parece poco aplicable con fines didácticos convencionales. Además, el psicoanálisis se resiste a la didáctica convencional. A diferencia de la educación en otras profesiones, la transmisión en psicoanálisis se basa en la deformación. La formación del analista se hace esencialmente a través de la deformación de sus ideas y creencias

existentes, en diálogo con la disciplina y sus colegas. Esta formación es específica del inconsciente del analista y, por lo tanto, es análoga al inconsciente: es dinámica, perpetua y sin punto final (me remito aquí a las ideas del psicoanalista Vincent Perdigon de la Federación de Talleres de Psicoanálisis (Gaucher ; Perdigon, 2007)). Es de esto de lo que quiero discutir aquí: del potencial deformante y mutante del pensamiento guattariano para el psicoanalista. Esto parece estar en perfecta consonancia con el espíritu del esquizoanálisis como práctica clínica. Lo que se podría llamar "esquizoanálisis clínico" es, ante todo, un estilo, una deformación en curso, que los analistas de origen freudiano, kleiniano o incluso lacaniano soportan. Más aún, a diferencia de la idea recibida, Guattari mismo es ajeno al negativismo; todo el carácter de su programa reside, por el contrario, en la creatividad.

Antes de empezar a abordar las posibles implicaciones de esta orientación, quiero aclarar algunos puntos clave de la práctica psicoanalítica que son pertinentes en el contexto actual. En 2003, en Francia, cuando el psicoanálisis estaba fuertemente amenazado por la opresión del Estado, se formó un "grupo de contacto" para oponerse. Este grupo de analistas reúne, según su propia definición, a los "freudianos franceses" (Sociedad Psicoanalítica de París, Asociación Psicoanalítica de Francia, 4º Grupo) y los "freudianos franceses con Lacan"<sup>1</sup> (Espacio Analítico, Sociedad de Psicoanálisis Freudiano, Movimiento Cout Freudien, Asociación Freudiana Internacional, Fundación Europea de Psicoanálisis, etc.). Dentro de sus actividades, el Grupo de Contacto propuso varios puntos<sup>2</sup> de definición del psicoanálisis. Los tres primeros se refieren a los conceptos fundamentales, mientras que el cuarto y el quinto tratan directamente los aspectos metodológicos de la práctica clínica. Son estos últimos los que más llaman mi atención en el marco de mis reflexiones:

El psicoanálisis busca - sin ninguna voluntad de adaptación a algún modelo preestablecido - eliminar tanto como sea posible cualquier sugerencia. (Bernard n.d)

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<sup>1</sup> Es importante señalar que en este escrito no se aborda el concepto de lacanismo o "análisis lacaniano". Los fundamentos problemáticos e ideológicos de dicho concepto merecen un estudio aparte.

<sup>2</sup> 1) El psicoanálisis es una exploración de procesos mentales inaccesibles de otra forma, y un método terapéutico basado en el descubrimiento de Freud y su enriquecimiento, así como en la extensión de su campo de aplicación; 2) La referencia al inconsciente y al transferencia es esencial y excluye a aquellos que no han tenido experiencia personal en el diván; 3) El psicoanálisis incluye prácticas de variaciones de tratamiento adaptadas a la organización psíquica de ciertos pacientes; 4) El psicoanálisis se diferencia de otros métodos psicológicos y psicoterapéuticos porque, en lugar de utilizar la transferencia, privilegia su interpretación, buscando eliminar cualquier tipo de sugestión sin la intención de adaptarse a ningún modelo previamente establecido; 5) Como consecuencia lógica de estos principios, se requiere un marco de tratamiento en relación con la ética psicoanalítica, que exige al practicante una neutralidad y confidencialidad integradas a la técnica misma del psicoanálisis.



Es en esta parte de la definición donde encuentro una oportunidad para situar una orientación "guattariana" para el psicoanalista. Antes de abordar las deformaciones que el contacto con Guattari puede provocar en el psicoanalista, especialmente en lo que respecta a su estilo analítico personal, explicaré el contenido de este elemento.

El psicoanálisis es un método de investigación de los procesos mentales y un método terapéutico que se ejerce principalmente a través de la práctica de la palabra. El analista crea, mediante una posición de escucha específica, un espacio para la palabra y para la subjetivación de su analizante. Se trata de un espacio donde se puede depositar lo que ha sido reprimido y superarlo, para encontrar nuevos modos de subjetivación o, como dice Jean-Pierre Winter, psicoanalista francés, "recordar para finalmente olvidar" (Winter, 2019).

Jacques Lacan decía, bromeando, que se podía imaginar un analista mudo, pero no un analista sordo. El analista debe escuchar al analizante y, de vez en cuando, hacer un comentario. Sin embargo, las palabras del analista forman en realidad parte de la escucha: la interpretación no tiene como objetivo explicar algo al analizante, transmitirle un conocimiento sobre sí mismo o conformarse a un modelo que el analista quiera imponer, sino precisamente lo contrario. La interpretación, a través de preguntas, puntuaciones y la creación de equívocos, así como por la introducción de rupturas en el tejido discursivo del analizante, crea un espacio en el que es posible inocular algo nuevo. La interpretación abre la posibilidad de co-producir un nuevo territorio para el sujeto.

La manera y el momento en que un analista da su interpretación son uno de los aspectos más visibles y evidentes del estilo analítico personal de un clínico. El analista francés Paul Denis planteó una hipótesis a medias: los clínicos cuyo analista era "hablador" y daba muchas interpretaciones tienden a volverse más taciturnos para no decir demasiadas cosas inapropiadas (Denis, 2015). Tal vez existe tal tendencia. Sin embargo, me parece útil señalar otro aspecto de la observación sobre el analista "hablador". Al seguir siendo psicoanalista, freudiano o kleiniano, el analista puede usar el "esquizoanálisis" para orientar su estilo de trabajo personal. Para dar espacio al sujeto, hay que estar dispuesto a abandonar sus antiguas hipótesis sobre el analizante, por finas y bellas que puedan parecer. Para evitar cualquier restricción, sugerencia o adaptación a un modelo preestablecido, hay que poder renunciar no solo a los modelos extrínsecos (como los clichés sociales o teóricos psicoanalíticos), sino también a aquel que ya no parece ser extrínseco, aquel que se formó durante este análisis particular con este mismo analizante. Una interpretación que estimula la subjetivación, que tiene un efecto analítico, solo es posible a partir de "aquí", de la posición en la que se encuentra el analizante en este momento particular y a quien se dirige allí. De la transferencia.<sup>3</sup> No del "Edipo", del

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<sup>3</sup> Aquí podemos tomar un desvío y notar cierto paralelismo entre lo que discuto ahora y las ideas del psicoanalista Masud Khan, cercano alumno de Donald Winnicott. Khan (1975) observa que el

"allí" de la teoría analítica general o de aquella sobre el sujeto, sobre el analizante, que el analista se ha construido durante el trabajo. De lo contrario, el analista forma parte de la neurosis del analizante al sumergirse demasiado en el contenido del discurso. Y cuando se sumerge en el "Edipo", pierde todo contacto con la sustancia subjetiva.

En cuanto al "psicoanalista con Guattari", es necesario dar un paso más. La orientación "esquizoanalítica" para el psicoanalista no se limita a la orientación hacia los procesos de subjetivación en lugar del contenido del discurso. No se trata solo de la capacidad de renunciar a sus hipótesis sobre el analizante o a los conceptos y esquemas establecidos aprendidos durante el instituto psicoanalítico. ¡También se trata de la capacidad de renunciar a la propia orientación! Lo que hace Guattari, no solo en Anti-Edipo, sino también antes y después, no es un nihilismo sistemático, sino más bien una capacidad positiva para realizar esta dolorosa operación de renuncia a los esquemas aprendidos y muy queridos en el corazón de cada analista. Se trata de elegir en favor de lo que es adecuado y relevante para la situación analítica particular en ese momento. El esquizoanálisis no es un proyecto para enterrar a Freud. Guattari mismo no niega a Freud, ni la castración, ni el componente familiar en el desarrollo psicológico del joven sujeto. Cuando es apropiado para el material, Guattari mismo regresa a Freud e incluso al Edipo (por ejemplo, ver el seminario "Sobre un sueño: Systruc" (Guattari 1984), donde Guattari analiza su propio sueño). En su comentario sobre el caso de R.A. en "Psicoanálisis y transversalidad", Guattari lamenta el mal uso del Edipo por parte de los analistas: sería ilusorio pensar que hay algo que leer en el orden del ser o en el orden del mundo perdido. Del mismo modo, sería vano pensar que la reconstrucción del ser mítico, más allá de cualquier origen histórico, pueda ser institucionalizada como propedéutica, psicoanalítica o como mayemática. Dados los procesos reales implicados en el tratamiento terapéutico o en la formación de la organización terapéutica, referirse a este tipo de simplificación mitolingüística no lleva a ninguna parte más que al abismo de la especulación. Es crucial comprender que lo importante radica en el mensaje, así como en el objeto portador y la base de este mensaje. (Guattari 1972)

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mismo analizante puede dar impresiones completamente diferentes en sesiones sucesivas, a veces en desacuerdo con la estructura diagnóstica presupuesta por el analista. Khahn explica esto introduciendo el concepto de "facetas del Yo": el sujeto no es unidimensional ni homogéneo, sino que se caracteriza por una multiplicidad de facetas que se vuelven hacia el analista en diferentes momentos del análisis. Al hablar de la interpretación "aquí", también debemos hablar de la interpretación de la transferencia. Hahn agrega muy acertadamente: el analista también tiene muchas facetas de este tipo. Propongo aquí desarrollar un poco el pensamiento de Khan y agregar un elemento dinámico. Propongo cambiar el concepto de faceta por el concepto de plano subjetivo. En la intersección del plano subjetivo del analista y el plano subjetivo del analizante, hay una transferencia y ese mismo "aquí" en el que la interpretación es posible. Esta intersección no es permanente, los planos se deforman cuando se cruzan: la interpretación contribuye a la emergencia de un nuevo modo de subjetivación.

No importa si el analista es hablador o prefiere permanecer en silencio, siempre y cuando sea consciente del efecto analítico de sus palabras y acciones. No es primordial saber de qué fuente conceptual se nutre para formular una interpretación particular, siempre y cuando siga las reglas establecidas y las adapte si es necesario.

En la actualidad, es frecuente que los analistas den prioridad a sus propias ideas en detrimento del material y del sujeto, debido a su coherencia filosófica. Incluso algunos ignoran el sufrimiento del analizante o del paciente si no se ajusta a la concepción filosófica del clínico<sup>4</sup>. Es aquí donde "Anti-Edipo" habla a los clínicos. Hace cincuenta años, Guattari ya percibía el peligro de un "lacanismo", hoy en día es tan imperante. En los escritos de algunos seguidores de Lacan, el psicoanálisis, que es una disciplina muy cercana al hombre y a la sustancia del sujeto, adopta los rasgos de una práctica esotérica que produce fantasmas conceptuales que tienen una relación muy indirecta con la realidad (pero que, sin embargo, tienen algún vínculo con ella, como todos los fantasmas). La sociedad psicoanalítica se convierte entonces en una especie de híbrido entre la logia masónica y el partido bolchevique. Los analistas franceses, que se oponen a esta tendencia, no se definen como "lacanianos" sino como "psicoanalistas con Lacan", o incluso como "freudianos con Lacan". Elegir el "esquizoanálisis" como orientación para nuestra propia manera de analizar, es crear las condiciones necesarias para llevar a cabo la creatividad inherente a esta práctica. No creamos una nueva ortodoxia del "guattarismo", sino que nos comprometemos en un proceso de constante devenir como "psicoanalistas con Guattari". El esquizoanálisis, cuando se encuentra con el clínico, no se dirige directamente a los analizantes, sino más bien al analista mismo. Lo deforma y, en el corazón de esta deformación, genera una cierta posición ética, incluso ético-estética.

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<sup>4</sup> Aquí hago referencia tanto a cuestiones políticamente sensibles y controvertidas como la homosexualidad y la transexualidad, como a temas aparentemente clásicos como la esquizofrenia. Supongo que esto está fuera del alcance de la problemática de mi texto.

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## ***Devenir-psicoanalista con Guattari***

di GABRIEL MART

### **Abstract**

Encountered by a clinician, schizoanalysis does not speak about analysands at all. It addresses the analyst, it deforms him, and in this deformation it establishes a certain ethical (or ethico-esthetic, perhaps?) position. That one may coin 'clinical schizoanalysis' is first and foremost a style, a perpetual deformation the analysts of freudian, kleinian or even lacanian background undergo. In order to make way for a subject, an analyst must be prepared to forfeit any previously established hypothesis he has of the analysand, no matter how appealing and coherent they may seem. Moreover, a schizoanalytic orientation demands an ability to forfeit said orientation as well. As one chooses schizoanalysis as an orientation in one's own analytic style, he establishes the condition for creativity to be fulfilled; one does not establish the new orthodoxy of 'guattarism', but engages in continuous becoming-'psychoanalyst with Guattari'. In this essay, I explore the possible sources and practical implications of how guattarian thought might be embraced by mainstream psychoanalytic clinicians today.

In questo numero, i miei colleghi si occupano molto della schizoanalisi come disciplina, campo di sperimentazione e pratica creativa. Tuttavia, vorrei offrire una prospettiva diversa proponendo di riflettere sulla schizoanalisi non come una particolare disciplina, né tantomeno un dottrina, una scuola o una "psicoanalisi guattariana", ma piuttosto come un orientamento per lo psicoanalista, il clinico, che definisce il proprio stile analitico individuale.

Infatti, non è possibile imparare da Guattari allo stesso modo in cui si impara da Dolto, da Winnicott o da Mannoni. A differenza degli analisti che ci hanno lasciato un corpus abbastanza ampio di casi clinici molto dettagliati, Guattari è un prolifico scrittore che è rimasto soprattutto clinico per la maggior parte della sua vita adulta, fino alla sua morte - ha scritto molto poco sul suo lavoro clinico (così come Lacan, del resto). Oltre al celebre articolo sul caso di R.A. (Guattari 1972), gli esempi clinici di Guattari sono disseminati qua e là negli atti dei seminari che ha tenuto a La Borde, nei suoi taccuini e nelle sue lettere. Tutto questo, che dà conto del suo stile analitico personale, sembra poco applicabile per fini didattici convenzionali. Inoltre, la psicoanalisi si oppone alla didattica convenzionale. A differenza dell'istruzione in altre professioni, c'è una trasmissione analitica. La formazione (che rende molto meglio conto del gioco di segni implicato in questo processo) dell'analista avviene essenzialmente attraverso la deformazione delle sue idee e delle sue

credenze esistenti, in dialogo con la disciplina e i suoi colleghi. Questa formazione è quella del suo inconscio e, di conseguenza, questa deformazione è analoga all'inconscio: è dinamica, perpetua e senza punto finale (mi conformo qui alle idee dello psicoanalista Vincent Perdigon della Federazione degli Atelier di Psicoanalisi (Gaucher; Perdigon 2007)). È di questo che voglio discutere qui: del potenziale deformante e mutante del pensiero guattariano per lo psicoanalista. Ciò sembra completamente in accordo con lo spirito della schizoanalisi come pratica clinica. Quello che si potrebbe chiamare "schizoanalisi clinica" è prima di tutto uno stile, una deformazione in corso, che gli analisti di origine freudiana, kleiniana o persino lacaniana subiscono. Inoltre, a differenza dell'idea comune, Guattari stesso è estraneo al negativismo; tutto il carattere del suo programma risiede nell'inverso, nella creatività.

Prima di iniziare ad affrontare le possibili implicazioni di questa prospettiva, desidero precisare alcuni punti chiave della pratica psicoanalitica che sono pertinenti nel contesto del mio saggio. Nel 2003, in Francia, mentre la psicoanalisi era fortemente minacciata dall'oppressione dello Stato, si formò un Gruppo di contatto per opporvisi. Questo gruppo di analisti riuniva, secondo la loro stessa definizione, i "freudiani francesi" (Società Psicoanalitica di Parigi, Associazione Psicoanalitica di Francia, 4° Gruppo) e i "freudiani francesi con Lacan"<sup>1</sup> (Spazio analitico, Società di Psicoanalisi Freudiana, Movimento Cout Freudien, Associazione Freudiana Internazionale, Fondazione europea per la psicoanalisi, ecc.). Nel contesto delle proprie attività, il Gruppo di contatto ha proposto diversi punti<sup>2</sup> di definizione della psicoanalisi. I primi tre riguardano i concetti fondamentali, mentre il quarto e il quinto trattano direttamente gli aspetti metodologici della pratica clinica. Sono questi ultimi che attirano maggiormente la mia attenzione nel contesto delle mie riflessioni:

La psicoanalisi cerca - senza alcuna volontà di adattamento a qualche modello predefinito - di eliminare il più possibile ogni suggerimento. (Bernard s.d.)

È in questa parte della definizione della psicoanalisi che trovo un'occasione per situare un orientamento "guattariano" per lo psicoanalista. Prima di affrontare gli effetti delle

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<sup>1</sup> Occorre notare che qui non verrà articolato il concetto di lacanismo o di "analisi lacaniana". I fondamenti problematici ed ideologici di tale concetto meritano uno studio distinto.

<sup>2</sup> 1) La psicoanalisi è un'indagine sui processi mentali altrimenti inaccessibili e un metodo terapeutico che si fonda sulla scoperta freudiana, arricchita ed estesa, nonché sull'estensione del suo campo di applicazione; 2) Il riferimento all'inconscio e al transfert è indispensabile ed esclude qualsiasi formazione per chi non ha vissuto personalmente l'esperienza sul divano; 3) La psicoanalisi comprende la pratica di varianti della cura adattate all'organizzazione psichica di alcuni pazienti; 4) La psicoanalisi si distingue da tutti gli altri metodi psicologici e psicoterapeutici poiché, privilegiando l'interpretazione del transfert invece di utilizzarlo, cerca - senza alcuna volontà di adattamento a qualsiasi modello preconfezionato - di eliminare, il più possibile, qualsiasi suggerimento; 5) Come logica conseguenza di questi principi, emerge la necessità di un quadro della cura in relazione all'etica psicoanalitica, che richiede dal professionista una neutralità e una riservatezza che si confondono con la tecnica stessa della psicoanalisi.

deformazioni che il contatto con Guattari può apportare allo psicoanalista - in particolare per quanto riguarda il suo stile analitico personale - spiegherò il contenuto di questo elemento.

La psicoanalisi rappresenta una metodologia d'indagine dei processi mentali nonché una terapia che si avvale principalmente della pratica della parola. L'analista, mediante una specifica posizione d'ascolto, crea uno spazio dedicato alla parola e alla soggettivazione dell'analizzando, un luogo in cui è possibile depositare ciò che è stato represso e superarlo, al fine di scoprire nuovi modi di soggettivazione o, come sostiene il noto psicoanalista francese Jean-Pierre Winter, "ricordare per poter finalmente dimenticare" (Winter 2019).

Jacques Lacan, scherzando, affermava che si poteva immaginare un analista muto, ma non sordo. L'analista ascolta l'analizzando e, di tanto in tanto, interviene con qualche parola o commento. Tuttavia, le parole dell'analista fanno effettivamente parte dell'ascolto: l'interpretazione non ha lo scopo di spiegare qualcosa all'analizzando, di trasmettergli una conoscenza di sé, o di conformarsi a un modello che l'analista vuole imporre, bensì precisamente il contrario. L'interpretazione, attraverso interrogativi, pause e creazione di ambiguità, nonché mediante l'introduzione di fratture nel tessuto del discorso dell'analizzando, crea uno spazio in cui è possibile introdurre qualcosa di nuovo. L'interpretazione apre la possibilità di co-produrre un nuovo territorio per il soggetto.

La modalità e il momento in cui un analista fornisce la sua interpretazione sono uno degli aspetti più visibili e evidenti dello stile analitico personale di un clinico. L'analista francese Paul Denis ha avanzato un'ipotesi incerta: i clinici il cui analista era "loquace" e forniva molte interpretazioni tendono a diventare più taciturni per evitare di dire cose inappropriate (Denis 2015). Forse esiste tale tendenza... Tuttavia, mi sembra utile sottolineare un altro aspetto dell'osservazione riguardante l'analista "loquace". Mantenendosi come psicoanalista freudiano o kleiniano, ecc., l'analista può utilizzare la "schizoanalisi" per orientare il suo stile di lavoro personale. Al fine di dare spazio al soggetto, è necessario essere pronti ad abbandonare le proprie vecchie ipotesi sull'analizzando, per quanto sottili e belle possano apparire. Per evitare ogni costrizione, suggerimento o adattamento a un modello predefinito, è necessario essere in grado di rinunciare non solo ai modelli estrinseci (come i cliché sociali o i modelli teorici psicoanalitici), ma anche a quello che non sembra più essere estrinseco, ossia, a ciò che si è formato durante quell'analisi particolare con lo stesso analizzando. Un'interpretazione che stimola la soggettivazione, che ha un effetto analitico, è possibile solo a partire dal "qui", dalla posizione in cui si trova l'analizzando in quel momento particolare nel quale ci si sta rivolgendo a lui. Del transfert.<sup>3</sup> Non di "Edipo", del "là" della teoria analitica

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<sup>3</sup> Qui, si può fare una digressione e notare un certo parallelismo tra ciò di cui sto discutendo e le idee dello psicoanalista Masud Khan, un allievo di Donald Winnicott a lui molto vicino. Masud Khan (1975) osserva che lo stesso paziente può dare impressioni completamente diverse durante sedute successive, talvolta in contrasto con la struttura diagnostica presupposta dall'analista. Khan spiega questo introducendo il

generale o di quella sul soggetto, sull'analizzando, che l'analista si è costruito durante il lavoro. Altrimenti, l'analista, immergendosi troppo nel contenuto del discorso, entra a far parte della nevrosi dell'analizzando. E quando si immerge nell'"Edipo", perde ogni contatto con la sostanza soggettiva.

Inoltre, per quanto riguarda lo "psicoanalista con Guattari", è necessario fare un ulteriore passo avanti. L'orientamento "schizoanalitico" per lo psicoanalista non si limita all'orientamento verso i processi di soggettivazione anziché verso il contenuto del discorso. Non si tratta solo della capacità di rinunciare alle proprie ipotesi sull'analizzando o ai concetti e schemi stabiliti appresi durante i corsi all'istituto psicoanalitico. È anche la capacità di rinunciare all'orientamento stesso! Ciò che fa Guattari, non solo in *L'Anti-Edipo*, ma anche prima e dopo, non è applicare un nichilismo sistematico, ma piuttosto una capacità positiva di effettuare una tale dolorosa operazione di rinuncia a schemi appresi e molto cari al cuore di ogni analista.

Si tratta di scegliere ciò che è adeguato e pertinente per la situazione analitica particolare in quel momento. La schizoanalisi non è un progetto di sepoltura di Freud. Lo stesso Guattari non nega né Freud, né la castrazione, né la componente familiare nello sviluppo psichico del giovane soggetto. Quando appropriato per il materiale, Guattari stesso ritorna a Freud e persino ad Edipo (ad esempio, vedere il seminario Su un sogno: Systruc (Guattari 1984), dove Guattari analizza il proprio sogno). Nel suo commento sul caso di R.A. in *Psicoanalisi e transversalità*, Guattari deplora il cattivo uso di Edipo da parte degli analisti: sarebbe illusorio pensare che ci sia qualcosa da leggere nell'ordine dell'essere o nell'ordine del mondo perduto. Allo stesso modo, sarebbe vano pensare che la ricostruzione dell'essere mitico, al di là di ogni origine storica, possa essere istituzionalizzata come propedeutica psicoanalitica o come una maieutica. Dati i processi reali implicati nel trattamento terapeutico o nella formazione dell'organizzazione terapeutica, fare riferimento a questo tipo di semplificazione mito-linguistica non porta da nessuna parte se non all'abisso della speculazione. È cruciale capire che l'importante risiede nel messaggio, così come nell'oggetto portatore e nella base di questo messaggio (Guattari 1972).

Non importa se l'analista sia loquace o preferisca rimanere silenzioso, purché sia consapevole dell'effetto analitico delle sue parole e delle sue azioni. Non è così importante da quale fonte concettuale attinge per nutrire un'interpretazione particolare, quali regole segue e quali modifica se necessario.

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concetto di "sfaccettature del Sé": il soggetto non è unidimensionale e omogeneo. Si caratterizza piuttosto per una molteplicità di sfaccettature che si rivolgono all'analista in momenti diversi dell'analisi. Quando parliamo dell'interpretazione "da qui", dobbiamo anche parlare dell'interpretazione del transfert. Khan aggiunge con grande acume: anche l'analista ha molte sfaccettature di questo tipo. Qui propongo di sviluppare un po' il pensiero di Khan, di aggiungervi un elemento dinamico. Propongo di cambiare il concetto di sfaccettatura in concetto di piano soggettivo. All'intersezione del piano soggettivo dell'analista e del piano soggettivo del paziente c'è un transfert, e questo stesso "da qui" in cui l'interpretazione è possibile. Questa intersezione non è permanente, i piani si deformano quando si incontrano: l'interpretazione contribuisce all'emergere di un nuovo modo di soggettivazione.



Oggi, è frequente che gli analisti privilegino la coerenza filosofica delle proprie idee a discapito del materiale e del soggetto. Alcuni ignorano addirittura la sofferenza dell'analizzando o del paziente se non corrisponde al dispositivo filosofico del clinico.<sup>4</sup> È per questo che *L'Anti-Edipo* si rivolge ai clinici. Guattari aveva già intuito cinquant'anni fa il pericolo di un "lacanismo" oggi così imperante. Nei testi di alcuni ammiratori di Lacan, la psicoanalisi, pur essendo una disciplina molto vicina all'uomo e alla sostanza del soggetto, assume i tratti di una pratica esoterica che produce fantasmi concettuali con un rapporto molto indiretto con la realtà (ma che hanno comunque un legame con essa, come tutti i fantasmi). La società psicoanalitica diventa così una sorta di ibrido tra la loggia massonica e il partito bolscevico. Gli analisti francesi che si oppongono a questa tendenza non si definiscono come "lacaniani", ma come "psicoanalisti con Lacan", o ancora "freudiani con Lacan". Scegliere la "schizoanalisi" come orientamento per il nostro modo di analizzare significa creare le condizioni necessarie per realizzare la creatività insita in questa pratica. Non creiamo una nuova ortodossia del "guattarismo", ma ci impegniamo in un processo di costante divenire, di diventare "psicoanalisti con Guattari". La schizoanalisi, quando incontra il clinico, non parla affatto degli analizzandi, ma si rivolge all'analista stesso. Lo deforma e, al centro di questa deformazione, genera una certa posizione etica (o forse etico-estetica).

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<sup>4</sup> Faccio qui riferimento sia a questioni politicamente sensibili e controverse come l'omosessualità, la transessualità, sia a soggetti apparentemente classici come la schizofrenia. Suppongo che ciò esuli dalla problematica del mio testo.

Winter J. P. (2019). *L'avenir du père: réinventer sa place?* Paris : Albin Michel.

## ***La rencontre d'un philosophe et d'un militant politique psychanalyste grâce à une machine à écrire***

par ANNE QUERRIEN

### **Abstract**

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of *Anti-Œdipus*, it is important to acknowledge the pivotal role played by Fanny Deleuze, who typed for Gilles the proliferating texts sent by Félix, which have since been published in *The Anti-Œdipus Papers*. These texts outline the main concepts presented in *Anti-Œdipus*. The political choice, both revolutionary and constructivist, the option of the machinic to get out of the structuralist impotence, lead Guattari to propose a new conception of the unconscious, crossed by "desiring machines". He and Gilles Deleuze revisit the history of humanity, which they conceive as a war between nomadism and sedentariness, for which they hope for new forms of social and family relations. Under the name of schizoanalysis they invite a new way of conducting analysis, more collective than specular, by calling upon history, economics and literature.

La rencontre de Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari, et leur tandem, Deleuze Guattari, la puissance de ce tandem, n'ont pas cessé d'étonner.

Avant leur rencontre Gilles Deleuze était un professeur de philosophie très brillant, au lycée puis à l'université, qui a profondément marqué les élèves qui ont eu la chance de suivre ses cours.

Félix Guattari, fils de petit industriel, mais camarade de classe de jeunes communistes, commence à militer très jeune dans les organisations communistes. Il est influencé par son professeur de sciences naturelles Fernand Oury, qui pratique la méthode pédagogique Freinet, qui vise à produire la solidarité entre les élèves au lieu de la compétition, notamment en fabriquant un journal de classe ou d'école, en faisant des enquêtes à l'extérieur de l'école etc... Fernand Oury le fait adhérer au Mouvement des Auberges de jeunesse, où il rencontre Jean Oury, de six ans son aîné.

C'est Jean Oury qui suscite son intérêt pour la philosophie, pour la psychiatrie, pour les productions artistiques de certains fous. En 1951, il rejoint Jean Oury à la clinique psychiatrique de Saumery dont Jean est devenu directeur en 1949. Ils discutent tous les deux de longues soirées de leur désir de transformer le monde et la psychiatrie. En 1953 Jean Oury, las d'attendre de l'administration les moyens matériels qu'il demande pour

travailler, part avec patients et soignants fonder un nouveau lieu : ce sera la clinique de La Borde.

Félix Guattari a vécu entre La Borde et Paris. À La Borde il s'occupe de l'organisation du travail, de l'ouverture de cette clinique sans murs rendue attractive par plein d'ateliers faits avec des amis extérieurs ; il s'occupe aussi des négociations avec la Sécurité sociale pour inscrire cette tentative dans un cadre économique public, et accessible financièrement aux patients. Jean Oury l'appelle affectueusement son « ministre des affaires extérieures ».

Avec ses amis de l'Union des étudiants communistes, Félix Guattari mène une réflexion théorique et politique marxiste, critique des développements autoritaires de l'Union soviétique, et de la manière dont le Parti communiste français les justifie au nom du socialisme réel. Il critique aussi l'absence de solidarité avec la révolution algérienne, et pratique cette solidarité avec ceux qu'on appelle « les porteurs de valise » ( les militants français qui transportent des tracts ou des armes pour la révolution algérienne). Des militants algériens sont pensionnaires à La Borde

À la fin de la guerre d'Algérie les mouvements de gauche qui avaient soutenu la révolution algérienne ne voient plus quoi faire en France d'autre que soutenir les tentatives communistes dans le monde : Union soviétique, Chine, Cuba, bientôt Vénézuéla. Félix Guattari leur propose une autre perspective politique : élaborer des projets révolutionnaires dans tous les domaines de la vie quotidienne, élaborer des possibilités pour le prolétariat de participer à toutes les activités culturelles, abolir la distance entre intellectuels, ouvriers, et paysans, soit reprendre la ligne révolutionnaire de 1917. Une organisation est fondée dans cette perspective : la FGERI, Fédération des groupes d'études, de recherches, institutionnelles, en référence à la démarche d'Oury dite de psychothérapie institutionnelle.

La participation de Guattari à la clinique de La Borde et son compagnonnage avec Jean Oury l'ont conduit à fréquenter Jacques Lacan, et même à devenir son analysant pendant une dizaine d'années de 1960 à 1970.

Jacques Lacan lui demande en 1969 de faire une note de lecture sur le dernier livre de Gilles Deleuze, *Logique du sens*, qui semble aux élèves de Lacan une poursuite de l'œuvre de ce dernier. Mais la lecture de ce livre et de *Différence et Répétition* du même Deleuze inspire à Guattari un nouvel ordre de réflexion. Ce qui le frappe c'est que Deleuze établit des séries hétérogènes qui sont reliées par un troisième terme qui les entraîne toutes les deux comme une machine. Deleuze en parlant de littérature, en faisant de la philosophie, montre en fonctionnement des « machines désirantes ». La note de lecture se transforme en un texte théorique intitulé « machine et structure » où Guattari développe sa critique, très deleuzienne, de la recherche de structures, de répétitions par les structuralistes et les lacaniens, une recherche qui ferme les situations à l'histoire et à la transformation.

Quand Guattari apporte son texte à la revue de Lacan, *Scilicet*, le gendre de Lacan lui explique qu'il est sorti des limites du lacanisme et qu'il n'est pas question de publier ce texte dans la revue de l'école lacanienne.

Au même moment Gilles Deleuze, épuisé par la sortie d'une salve de livres plus importants les uns que les autres, n'arrive pas à se remettre au travail. L'un de ses anciens élèves, Jean Pierre Muyard, devenu psychiatre à La Borde, conseille à Félix Guattari d'aller le voir. Félix arrive avec son texte *Machine et structure*, qui séduit Deleuze immédiatement. Ce texte faisait le pas dont il avait besoin pour rebondir, sortait de l'impasse de la structure, dont Deleuze, auteur de la rubrique « Structuralisme » dans *l'Encyclopédia Universalis* avait été un des meilleurs introducteurs dans la pensée française. Deleuze propose à Guattari de lui écrire tout ce qui lui passe par la tête. Sa femme Fanny tapera les lettres à la machine d'où mon titre, mettant en valeur, cette première forme de la machine à écrire, le rôle de la femme de Deleuze dans leur agencement.

En janvier 2005 paraissent *Les écrits pour l'Anti-Œdipe* mis en forme par le jeune psychiatre Stéphane Nadaud à partir des textes de Guattari retrouvés dans ses archives. On s'aperçoit tout d'un coup que la plupart des idées mises en œuvre dans *L'Anti-Œdipe* sont jetées dans ces papiers, de façon parfois contradictoire, tel un magma en fusion, que l'écriture de Deleuze a réussi à canaliser, à ordonner, à transformer en une machine de guerre contre la psychanalyse et la famille.

On prend tout d'un coup conscience du fait que cet arrangement à trois Gilles, Félix, Fanny est une véritable machine à écrire, l'agencement par celle qui frappe à la machine de deux séries de pensées hétérogènes : celle appuyée sur les textes littéraires et philosophiques, celle construite à partir de la fréquentation des organisations communistes mixée avec la construction au jour le jour d'un lieu d'accueil pour la folie. Comme le disent Deleuze et Guattari dans *Mille plateaux* ils n'ont pas écrit à deux, mais à beaucoup, prenant les idées chez les amis au fur et à mesure qu'elles se présentent, les transformant en armes contre l'inertie sociale et politique, la régression en France après 68.

### **Les machines désirantes**

Guattari propose donc à Deleuze une vision de l'inconscient et de son traitement bien différente de celle élaborée par Freud à partir de son auto-analyse. Au lieu de remonter les associations d'idées qui se pressent sur le divan jusqu'aux souvenirs d'enfance, ces associations d'idées vont être suivies dans ce qu'elles désignent d'objets partiels non seulement dans l'expérience récente, mais aussi dans les investissements, les choix d'avenir.

Il y a dans le travail analytique de Guattari une inversion du temps, une orientation délibérée vers le futur, vers l'action libre, vers l'appartenance à des groupes nouveaux à créer ou à rencontrer. J'ai fait partie du groupe de schizoanalyse qu'il avait créé peu de temps après la parution de *L'Anti-Œdipe* pour accueillir les personnes qui venaient lui demander conseil pour sortir de leurs blocages existentiels. Tant qu'il s'agissait d'organiser de nouvelles activités, ces groupes ont marché ; mais ils n'ont pas pu traiter les problèmes conjugaux et familiaux qui sont le lot habituel de la psychanalyse.

Côté Deleuze cette vision productrice de l'inconscient, cet usage machinique des associations d'idées, permet de mobiliser tous les souvenirs de lecture littéraires et philosophiques, dans de nouveaux agencements créateurs.

L'inconscient machinique est fait de flux coupés ce qui engendre une nouvelle force comme dans la machine à vapeur. Deleuze aimait à dire que la première machine était formée par le sein maternel et la bouche du bébé qui en extrayait le lait, et trouvait dans cette opération de quoi grandir. Une image qui n'est pas loin de la force dégagée par le piston d'une machine à vapeur. À partir de là tout ce qui coule, et offre la potentialité d'être coupé par un mécanisme de transformation est bon à prendre comme exemple de machine.

Deleuze et Guattari insistent sur le caractère hétérogène des flux agencés par la machine : le capital consiste par exemple en l'agencement d'un flux d'êtres humains, les travailleurs, avec un flux d'argent qui s'incarne dans les machines qui vont exploiter le flux de travailleurs. La puissance du dispositif tient à l'hétérogénéité des deux flux mis en relation de production par la machine.

Deleuze ajoute à l'idée de machine celle de corps sans organes, idée que je n'ai jamais réussi à m'approprier vraiment pour l'instant. Le désir a une surface d'enregistrement, illimitée parce qu'en forme d'œuf, et le désir est adjacent aux machines qui l'emportent vers cet œuf. Alors que Deleuze appuie sa réflexion sur le texte d'Artaud, qui introduit précisément cette notion de corps sans organes, Guattari reste plus sensible aux délires qui émergent dans la clinique, et qui font dire à l'écrivain tous les noms de l'histoire c'est moi.

Le désir complètement différent du besoin, sexuel notamment, emporte au loin, déterritorialise, y compris quand le déplacement est infinitésimal, comme dans la physique quantique. Deleuze et Guattari nous font sortir des dimensions habituelles de la philosophie qui poussent vers l'infiniment grand, l'héroïsme, la masculinité. L'infini qu'ils présentent est plutôt infinitésimal, mais jamais réductible à la stabilité. Apparemment le voyage se passe sur place, mais il est toujours en mouvement et il n'est rendu conscient que par les ratés qu'il occasionne, idée proche de l'analyse par Freud du mot d'esprit.

Dans l'histoire militante de Guattari, toute cette réflexion doit conduire à la constitution de groupes révolutionnaires capables de déjouer l'aliénation capitaliste. Cependant il note après Sartre que trop souvent les groupes sujets, orientés vers l'action,

pratiquant des rapports libres et égaux, se transforment en groupes assujettis, prisonniers de fantasmes de groupe qui les induisent en erreur.

## **Psychanalyse et familialisme**

Deleuze et Guattari critiquent avec véhémence la psychanalyse qui rabat toutes les situations sociales sur le triangle familial papa-maman-moi. Peut-on rassembler sous la figure du père autoritaire l'ensemble hiérarchisé des hommes qui font la guerre aux Vietnamiens et aux Algériens ? N'y a-t-il pas danger pour l'autorité et la hiérarchie quand ces hommes sont politiquement vaincus, quand leurs ennemis deviennent indépendants ? N'est-ce pas dans ces défaites que les soulèvements des années 60-70 puisent leur énergie ?

Guattari a été en analyse avec Lacan de 1960 à 1970. Tout ce qu'on sait par des analysants de ce dernier montre que sa pratique n'était pas du tout conforme à l'image donnée de la cure psychanalytique dans la dénonciation anti-œdipienne, sauf peut-être l'appétit de l'argent. Les années 60 et 70 voient l'éclosion de la pratique professionnelle de la psychologie, appelée au chevet des enfants et adolescents difficiles, mais aussi se risquant à traiter des difficultés conjugales et à résoudre les problèmes d'organisation des grandes entreprises, comme EDF par exemple, grâce à des recherches-actions de psychologie sociale.

Depuis 1947 l'Université délivre des licences de psychologie. À partir de 1956 la sociologie sort également de sa phase empirique pour entrer aussi à l'Université et se distinguer de la philosophie. Parallèlement Jacques Lacan commence à donner des séminaires, régulièrement à partir de 1953 à l'hôpital Sainte Anne puis à l'École normale supérieure.

Il bataille contre l'Egopsychology fondée aux États-Unis par son ancien analyste Rudolf Lowenstein. Jean Oury fait sa connaissance et celle de François Tosquelles auprès duquel il effectue son internat à Saint Alban en 1947. Il y a une riche activité intellectuelle professionnelle parisienne en marge de l'université, animée par des personnalités novatrices, qui ont l'oreille des médias et de la toute nouvelle Organisation mondiale de la santé.

Le texte de Deleuze et Guattari n'a cure de ces deux courants distincts de la psychiatrie. Le courant lacanien, malgré son prestige intellectuel, reste très minoritaire dans la pratique professionnelle. Absent de l'enseignement universitaire dominé par Daniel Lagache, il ne semble pas soucieux de peser sur la psychiatrie, et ne s'intéresse que de loin à la psychothérapie institutionnelle. Celle-ci n'est guère défendue par ce texte qui l'assimile à toutes « les techniques du soin », ce qui ne pouvait que choquer les amis de Guattari qui s'étaient attachés à l'instituer dans plusieurs hôpitaux. Dans ce brûlot Deleuze et Guattari font de l'écart à la norme, du dissensus politique, de la difficulté avec

la famille, le premier pas sur le chemin de la création littéraire ou artistique. Ce n'est évidemment pas en restant envers et contre tout un ou une bonne élève, un bon fils ou une bonne fille, qu'on affirme son désir, puisqu'on l'aliène manifestement à celui de l'école ou de ses parents.

Le complexe d'Œdipe est « un double bind », une injonction contradictoire, qui interdit d'aimer ses parents réellement tout en exigeant de les prendre comme modèles à aimer, ce qui condamne les enfants à l'impuissance, à la castration, ou à la transgression. Mais Deleuze et Guattari ouvrent cet amour à l'homosexualité encore pénalement réprimée à l'époque : l'amour et l'imitation peuvent autant se porter sur le même sexe que sur le sexe opposé. La sexualité n'a pas qu'une fonction reproductive, même si c'est celle que la prohibition de l'inceste met en avant. *L'Anti-Œdipe* paraît peu avant *Le désir homosexuel*, rédigé par Guy Hocquenghem, l'un des fondateurs du FHAR, Front homosexuel d'action révolutionnaire. Ce mouvement lutte pour l'alignement des droits des homosexuels sur ceux des autres citoyens, et surtout essaie de transversaliser l'ensemble des productions culturelles à partir de nouveaux regards pervers sur la sexualité. La revue *Recherches*, dirigée par Guattari, s'en fait l'écho dans son numéro 12 « Trois milliards de pervers, Grande encyclopédie des homosexualités » en 1973.

D'après Deleuze et Guattari, le délire schizo, si on veut bien y être attentif, ne pas le coincer dans le triangle œdipien ou sous des stéréotypes, décrit un double voyage historique, géographique et social d'un côté, intérieur et intensif de l'autre, qui peuvent soit être contractés par la répression et poussés vers la mort, soit contribuer l'un avec l'autre à parcourir le corps sans organes que la schizoanalyse a placé au cœur du processus désirant avec Artaud.

Dans le délire schizo les parents sont des inducteurs parmi d'autres, sans privilège particulier. S'ils prennent place au sein des lignées humaines, des peuples et des races qui emportent le sujet, celui-ci part de fait loin des bases familiales. Deleuze et Guattari estiment pourtant que toutes les formes de thérapie connues d'eux, y compris l'antipsychiatrie, choisissent au contraire de restaurer ces bases familiales, en les modifiant et en les consolidant. C'est qu'il n'existe pas de lieux de vie quotidienne accueillants qui puissent s'y substituer, les hôpitaux et cliniques psychiatriques restant trop peu nombreux et dominés par la pratique de l'enfermement. *L'Anti-Œdipe* les critique nettement moins que la psychanalyse.

Deleuze et Guattari insistent sur le fait que les bases familiales ont été bouleversées et fragilisées pour la plupart des gens par la colonisation, par son abandon, par l'industrialisation, par la mondialisation, et par toutes les transformations sociales qui ont déterritorialisé l'inconscient, transformé les parents en références seulement partielles, parfois évanescentes. Il en découle une ambiguïté du désir qui est souvent investi dans un retour à l'autorité, au culte de la supériorité, dans des attitudes racistes. Mais de nombreuses autres personnes poursuivent le projet de révolutionner les rapports de production et de supprimer l'exploitation. De ce désir on connaît mal la puissance, tant il



est aux prises avec les instances répressives de la société et de la famille. Les machines désirantes se font alors sentir par leurs pannes, par la dépression.

Ces pannes, et cette dépression, ne sont que des indications d'une présence du désir. Elles ne disent rien de son contenu dont le sens n'est en aucun cas défini par la répression. Le désir n'est pas une transgression, une réponse à la répression. Il la précède ; elle l'étouffe et il resurgit. L'institution familiale assume la fonction répressive déléguée par la société et agit le refoulement au plus près des corps des sujets. Le soignant doit reconnaître le désir, faire repartir la production désirante repliée sur le corps sans organes, qu'il s'agisse de névrose ou de psychose. Le peintre ou l'écrivain arrive à « traverser le désert du corps sans organes », à franchir « la barre capitaliste » (Deleuze ; Guattari 1973: 158) « La schizophrénie est à la fois le mur, la percée du mur et les échecs de cette percée » (Ibid. : 162).

### **Sauvages, barbares, civilisés**

Deleuze et Guattari affirment que le capitalisme se forme en agençant les flux décodés, que la schizophrénie fait filer à l'infini : flux du travail, ou, depuis l'opéraïsme italien, flux des vies humaines, déterritorialisées par l'esclavage et le salariat ; flux de l'argent déterritorialisé par toutes les techniques bancaires successives. Le rapport de force semble bien inégal, la déterritorialisation étant manifestement agie par le pouvoir propriétaire et financier ; mais l'infini est du côté de la vie. La bataille ne fait que continuer. Deleuze et Guattari nous en racontent les grandes étapes passées par les « sauvages » qu'on appelle aujourd'hui autochtones, par les « barbares » dont Lacan avait dit qu'ils sont toujours venus de l'est, et par les « civilisés » qui s'auto-défendent.

Cette histoire s'inscrit sur la surface de la terre, corps sans organe de la production désirante humaine première, en formant une machine territoriale qui codait les flux et les code encore dans les poches d'archaïsme qui demeurent sous la domination capitaliste. La première territorialisation est peu hiérarchisée, elle est faite de filiations et d'alliances qui relient tous les membres du groupe humain connu, des prélèvements et des détachements commencent cependant. Le déséquilibre, le mauvais fonctionnement, l'échange inégal, que les anthropologues considèrent négligeables, sont en fait les incidents qui relancent la machine territoriale. Les mythes font passer la conscience collective de l'énergie intensive des corps à l'extension des relations. Cela a été particulièrement bien étudié par Barbara Glowczewski, dans le cas des Rêves des sociétés aborigènes d'Australie.

Et Œdipe chez les « sauvages » ? Il n'est pas plus présent que le chef de famille propriétaire de ses femmes et/ou de ses esclaves et membre d'une assemblée citoyenne dite démocratique. Deleuze et Guattari discutent avec érudition de nombreux travaux d'ethnologues déjà publiés, ou rapportés par leur cercle d'amis africanistes ; si sous

l'influence du magistère lacanien on trouve de l'universalité œdipienne, c'est qu'on croit à l'universalité de la posture intellectuelle d'interprète, qui n'est jamais que la résurrection de la posture du prêtre. Le problème pour Deleuze et Guattari c'est plutôt, là où on est, dans son propre champ de compétences, de machiner, de faire marcher, de mettre en mouvement.

Ils s'élèvent notamment contre la conception échangiste de la société primitive qu'on trouve généralement chez les anthropologues, qui présupposent un équilibre qui n'existe pas, et qui limitent la sphère de la production sociale à la circulation, comme si on était dans des sociétés stationnaires. L'inscription de l'histoire dans les mythes ou les rêves sur la terre, peinte sur les corps, ou gravée par des scarifications, dicte à chacune et à chacun son devoir, décrit la dette qu'il a vis-à-vis de la société. Des mouvements récents font de ces traditions des moyens de défense et de reconquête face aux spoliations dues à la colonisation, mais aussi des instruments de passage individuel au sein de la société hiérarchisée qui accueille chants et peintures pour étendre son répertoire marchand. Ces développements n'existaient pas encore au moment de la rédaction de l'Anti-Œdipe.

L'instauration de la machine despotique et du socius « barbare » coupe les alliances latérales et ne garde que la filiation directe, promeut le racisme typique de l'obéissance à l'autorité transcendante, installe une hiérarchie presque implacable. L'État fait de la terre la propriété privée de son élite et la divise en conséquence. L'impôt transforme la dette sociale en dette infinie, en culpabilité radicale. Il transforme toutes les anciennes inscriptions, et les surcode en relation exclusive à lui. Le despote multiplie les écritures, et soumet le graphisme à la voix, le détache de ses supports anciens. Le signe déterritorialisé n'est plus lié au corps qui l'émet, et devient utilisable de multiples façons. Le signifié devient l'essentiel, puisque plusieurs signifiants y correspondent, celui de la langue du maître et ceux des langues des esclaves ramenés des razzias guerrières : c'est le rapport de subordination « barbare ». Lacan a préféré travailler ce rapport signifiant/signifié plutôt que s'adonner à la régression organisée dans la croyance à l'universalité du complexe d'Œdipe.

La propriété privatisée et la dépendance collective caractérisent l'État, mais la propriété privée entraîne son dépérissement, la faillite des codes centralisés, ce qui oblige l'État et le capitalisme financier à inventer de nouvelles manières de décoder les flux, de gérer les vies humaines, à concrétiser toujours davantage leurs machinations.

C'est par hasard que les flux décodés de propriété, d'argent, de moyens de production, de travailleurs « libres » se sont conjugués dans la machine de production capitaliste, qui transforme avec cynisme, sans se poser de questions, la plus-value de code, en plus-value de flux, en accumulation d'argent. La monnaie qui rémunère les travailleurs, qui est pour eux un revenu, est transformée par les banques avec l'aide de l'État en monnaie de crédit, en outil d'investissement dans la reproduction élargie du rapport d'exploitation. L'État impose le changement des règles de la conversion au fur et à mesure de sa nécessité, à chaque fois qu'il y a crise. Ce changement va du centre vers la périphérie, organise la

poursuite de la déterritorialisation du capitalisme, et le développement du sous-développement et de la pauvreté. En s'appuyant explicitement sur Marx, Deleuze et Guattari expliquent comment la nouvelle production de code par la recherche scientifique et technique est absorbée par le gigantesque appareil d'anti-production que constituent les multiples formes des forces de répression étatiques. L'anti-production produit le manque qui couronne le système et indique la fausse route au désir.

Le capitalisme ne fonctionne qu'à condition d'inhiber la tendance au décodage des flux, à la schizophrénisation, à l'infinitisation qui l'anime ; il la remplace par une axiomatique progressive qui la ligote. Le pêcheur et le chasseur diraient : il la prend dans un filet qui se serre de plus en plus au fur et à mesure qu'elle se débat. Le capitalisme et l'État ne saisissent les choses que de manière molaire, statistique, moyenne, alors que les machines désirantes, la déterritorialisation des flux, travaillent au niveau moléculaire, infinitésimal, sans aucun sens repérable et a fortiori assignable depuis l'échelle « normale » de la vie quotidienne. On n'en constate que les effets de masse, quand ils existent ; ils peuvent aller dans des sens différents, voire opposés. Contre cette déterritorialisation moléculaire, ce décodage intensif, l'État capitaliste, chargé de réguler le décodage au niveau molaire, ne peut prendre que de nouvelles mesures de contention, puisées dans les images léguées par les systèmes antérieurs, d'où le sentiment d'archaïsme de son action. Il ne s'agit plus de la lutte des classes chère à Marx : bourgeoisie et prolétariat luttent pour leurs survies respectives et donc coopèrent dans le service du capital dont la domination est garantie par l'État.

Celui-ci reterritorialise à tour de bras les flux qui se décodent, et les soumet à des formes de gouvernement décentralisées pour les neutraliser. Les flux recodés freinent en effet le décodage des flux microscopiques. Le principal instrument de ce recodage c'est la propriété privée de la terre, du logement, de tous les moyens de vivre. Sont-ils transformés par la magie monétaire en moyens de production seulement ? L'expérience des camps qui se multiplient dans le monde montre que, au contraire de ce qu'en dit Agamben, les femmes et les hommes ne vont pas se soumettre tout nu à l'exploitation et à la mort. Elles et ils ont leur quant-à-soi, leur dignité, leur liberté, leur vie, leur rapport à l'infini.

## **Introduction à la schizoanalyse**

Les travaux de Marx, des anthropologues, des économistes, qui ont devancé Deleuze-Guattari, leur permettent de développer avec brio cette histoire des rapports entre le désir et la société. La mobilisation de la monnaie de revenu convertie en monnaie de crédit par les nouvelles règles édictées en 1973 est démontrée d'une manière particulièrement saisissante, alors que ses effets dévastateurs n'en seront observés qu'en 2008 avec la crise des subprimes.

L'introduction à la schizoanalyse, dernier chapitre, me semble plus laborieuse. Elle reprend la critique radicale de l'interprétation psychanalytique en termes d'Œdipe distillée tout au long du livre. Elle prend en compte une question souvent posée par les observateurs de la vie militante : comment se fait-il que les jeunes révolutionnaires enthousiastes se reconvertissent en hommes politiques plus nuancés, voire réactionnaires à un âge plus avancé ?

La schizoanalyse s'engage à s'attacher particulièrement à comprendre les oscillations de l'inconscient entre le pôle paranoïaque, fasciste, raciste, familialiste, moralisant et le pôle déterritorialisé, désirant, révolutionnaire, plein de contradictions. Ce sera un de ses principaux objets. Elle utilisera pour cela les différences entre nomadisme et ségrégation, groupe sujet et groupe assujetti.

Bien que Michel Foucault ait écrit dans la préface à l'édition américaine de *L'Anti-Œdipe* que c'est un manuel de vie non fasciste, il me semble que le manuel n'est pas suffisamment confronté aux méandres de la vie quotidienne et militante, pour être traduit en enseignements concrets, en manières de faire, en chemins d'invention. On en reste à de grands principes dont la description, vue auparavant, de la nature moléculaire des machines désirantes dit qu'elles ne peuvent pas être agies volontairement.

Comment se fait la communication entre l'espace moléculaire où se trament les désirs, et l'espace molaire des représentations qui cadenasse la perception, sauf dans les périodes révolutionnaires de soulèvement collectif ?

Le désir est machine, synthèse de machines, agencement machinique, machines désirantes, mise en mouvement coordonné de molécules qui fait sens, pensée, de manière sous-jacente aux représentations molaires qui sont la seule chose que l'on connaît à l'échelle « normale » de la vie quotidienne, échelle où on prend systématiquement les choses de manière statistique, dans l'ignorance des singularités qui signalent le désir. Peut-on en agissant sur ces représentations, en les détruisant systématiquement par l'analyse, laisser le champ libre au mouvement moléculaire des machines désirantes ? La schizoanalyse n'est pas une contemplation passive, mais une guerre menée contre les stéréotypes, les contre-vérités, qui ensevelissent les machines désirantes.

Cette guerre se mène en expérimentant des dispositifs successifs, qui sont à peine ébauchés quand s'écrit *L'Anti-Œdipe*. Le colloque singulier, siège du transfert typique de la cure psychanalytique traditionnelle, n'est qu'un parmi ces dispositifs, totalement insuffisant pour capter la dispersion des machines désirantes. Il est cependant essentiel dans la schizoanalyse également pour faire le point, se rapporter réciproquement les expérimentations en cours. Ces expérimentations s'expriment à l'échelle molaire par de nouvelles représentations, l'exploration de nouveaux territoires, qui ne sont plus conformes aux exigences de la reproduction sociale à l'inverse d'Œdipe et de la famille nucléaire. Les deux analysants partagent partiellement le même territoire, l'un paie l'autre pour le faire s'intéresser à ses propres choix, au minimum lui consacrer du temps, et lui faire découvrir son nouveau territoire existentiel et ses possibilités d'action.

La cure schizoanalytique n'en est alors qu'à ses balbutiements, et faute de mieux se coule dans d'autres pratiques proches, en particulier psychanalyse et thérapies familiales. Cela pousse Guattari par la suite à élaborer une méta-analyse des pratiques thérapeutiques, afin de pouvoir injecter une perspective schizoanalytique dans n'importe quel type de pratique analytique. C'est l'enjeu de son avant-dernier livre *Cartographies schizoanalytiques*. Faute de mouvements sociaux importants après 68, et sa répression, la cure schizoanalytique ne trouve guère de territoires collectifs auxquels s'accrocher. Elle ne touche que partiellement les membres du CERFI, centre de recherches en sciences sociales autogéré, créé par Guattari et ses amis ; et elle n'y touche que les femmes, qui appartiennent par ailleurs au Mouvement de libération des femmes, créé en France en 1970. La déterritorialisation moléculaire s'exprime alors plutôt dans des créations individuelles, artistiques ou de sciences sociales. Celles-ci sont évidemment tiraillées entre les poussées machiniques de déterritorialisation et les exigences répressives de la représentation sociale.

Le rôle de la schizoanalyse disent Deleuze et Guattari c'est de détruire les résistances à la déterritorialisation, de faire éclater les machines oppressives et avant cela d'en révéler caricaturalement le fonctionnement comme Charlie Chaplin dans le film *Les temps modernes*. Il s'agit par plans successifs de créer une terre nouvelle, de traverser et recomposer différemment les territorialités antérieures. Cette terre nouvelle est fabriquée par les machines désirantes en état de dispersion moléculaire les unes par rapport aux autres, dans des possibilités de rapports multiples ; au niveau molaire elles donnent lieu à des objets partiels d'attraction ou de répulsion désirantes.

En référence aux débats militants d'après 1968, Deleuze et Guattari distinguent les groupes révolutionnaires qui prolongent la déterritorialisation des flux des groupes assujettis qui cherchent à les maintenir dans le cadre existant. Le désir n'est pas conforme à l'intérêt qui se manifeste au niveau préconscient et suit le découpage de la société en classes. C'est la sexualité qui en donne le meilleur aperçu – avec qui désire-t-on s'allier physiquement, mais il s'exprime aussi dans des lignes abstraites, dans ce qui paraît étrange, et n'a rien à voir avec la remémoration du même dont parle la psychanalyse traditionnelle. Les choix amoureux résonnent des vibrations créées et entretenues par des investissements sociaux indicibles autrement.

L'attraction pour la femme ou l'homme est modulée selon qu'il s'agit de quelqu'un de riche ou pauvre, selon la manière dont la personne attirante se situe dans le champ social, dont il ou elle évolue dans des dimensions non humaines, étranges. Les investissements sociaux de désir priment sur les investissements familiaux, les font éclater, les mettent à mal. Ce malaise fonde la demande d'analyse, d'entrée dans une réparation ou dans une poursuite du décalage, de la déterritorialisation.

Le postulat familialiste de la psychanalyse est en fait un postulat personnalologique qui fait de la folie une tare individuelle, un manque à être comme tout le monde. Mais les échecs thérapeutiques ont conduit à en rendre responsable la communauté, et à mettre

en place des thérapies familiales et adaptatives, également tenues en échec par la folie, phénomène asocial présent dans toutes les sociétés. La schizophrénie ne peut pas être contenue dans la famille ou la communauté, car elle est ce qui leur échappe, sous des formes concrètes toujours renouvelées. Cette échappée est angoissante, mais sûre de son impossibilité de compromission. Le rôle de la schizoanalyse est de soutenir cette échappée et de l'aider à trouver des formes d'incarnation suffisantes pour ne pas se laisser aspirer trop rapidement par le corps sans organes et par la mort. Le schizo échappe au postulat de l'unité, du rassemblement, de la névrotisation.

Aujourd'hui où le fascisme relève la tête, multiplie les provocations racistes, la distinction entre le pôle paranoïaque, réactionnaire et fascisant et le pôle schizoïde révolutionnaire est particulièrement utile pour orienter nos pensées et nos actions. Le pôle paranoïaque asservit la production sociale aux ensembles grégaires, en quête d'identité, d'homogénéité, de puissance physique et de « souveraineté sélective » (Deleuze ; Guattari 1973 : 440). Le pôle schizoïde multiplie les ensembles moléculaires dispersés, les lignes de fuite, les dissidences. Ce n'est pas une utopie, cela correspond à l'existence de groupes sujets qui rompent avec le continuum social. L'art connaît aussi cette double polarité : valeur marchande et contenu codé d'un côté, expérimentation et suivi des lignes de désir de l'autre. De même la recherche scientifique est partagée entre le service du pouvoir et la poursuite de la connaissance à l'infini.

### **Les trois écologies et l'écosophie**

Au moment où Deleuze et Guattari écrivaient *L'Anti-Œdipe* les réflexions sur les limites de la croissance commençaient à peine et étaient encore interprétées comme des entraves mises à la nécessaire émancipation du prolétariat. Celle-ci était censée venir notamment d'une utilisation de plus en plus intelligente de la technologie qui libérerait des tâches les plus serviles et favoriserait l'épanouissement de tous. Félix Guattari a eu connaissance du livre de Hans Jonas *Le principe responsabilité* dès sa parution en allemand en 1979, mais n'a pu le lire dans sa version française qu'en 1990. Ce livre lui a fait l'effet d'une véritable bombe : il s'était trompé toute sa vie en assimilant le désir à la production, à la croissance, en chaussant les bottes du marxisme. Il fallait repartir à zéro, sans abandonner pour autant la déterritorialisation, l'inconscient machinique dans la mesure où la machine est le mouvement créé par une hétérogénéité et non un agencement technique destiné à créer plus de vitesse et plus de puissance. Il s'est alors rapproché du mouvement des verts, d'abord des verts allemands, puis des verts français, dont les divisions lui répugnaient. Il s'est même présenté aux élections municipales sur deux listes vertes concurrentes pour souligner la bêtise de ces divisions. Il a créé un bulletin comme il avait fait avant en psychiatrie ou au parti communiste dans tous ses lieux militants, *le Fil vert* qui accueillait des contributions de tous les courants.

*Les trois écologies* est le manifeste qu'il a écrit pour le mouvement vert français et fait paraître en 1989. En voici la quatrième de couverture :

Le drame écologique dans lequel est engagée la planète humaine a longtemps été l'objet d'une méconnaissance systématique. Cette période est désormais révolue. À travers des médias devenus hypersensibles à la répétition des "accidents" écologiques, l'opinion internationale se trouve de plus en plus mobilisée. Tout le monde aujourd'hui parle d'écologie : les politiques, les technocrates, les industriels... Malheureusement toujours en termes de simples "nuisances". Or les perturbations écologiques de l'environnement ne sont que la partie visible d'un mal plus profond et plus considérable, relatif aux façons de vivre et d'être en société sur cette planète. L'écologie environnementale devrait être pensée d'un seul tenant avec l'écologie sociale et l'écologie mentale, à travers une *écophilosophie* de caractère éthico-politique. Il ne s'agit pas d'unifier arbitrairement sous une idéologie de rechange des domaines foncièrement hétérogènes, mais de faire s'étayer les unes les autres des pratiques innovatrices de recomposition des subjectivités individuelles et collectives, au sein de nouveaux contextes technico-scientifiques et des nouvelles coordonnées géopolitiques. (Guattari 1989 : quatrième de couverture)

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## ***The Meeting of a Philosopher and a Political Activist Psychoanalyst Thanks to a Typewriter***

by ANNE QUERRIEN

### **Abstract**

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of *Anti-Œdipus*, it is important to acknowledge the pivotal role played by Fanny Deleuze, who typed for Gilles the proliferating texts sent by Félix, which have since been published in *The Anti-Œdipus Papers*. These texts outline the main concepts presented in *Anti-Œdipus*. The political choice, both revolutionary and constructivist, the option of the machinic to get out of the structuralist impotence, lead Guattari to propose a new conception of the unconscious, crossed by "desiring machines". He and Gilles Deleuze revisit the history of humanity, which they conceive as a war between nomadism and sedentariness, for which they hope for new forms of social and family relations. Under the name of schizoanalysis they invite a new way of conducting analysis, more collective than specular, by calling upon history, economics and literature.

The meeting of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and their tandem, Deleuze Guattari, the power of this tandem, never ceased to amaze.

Before they met, Gilles Deleuze was a very brilliant philosophy teacher, in high school and then at university, who had a profound effect on the students who had the chance to attend his classes.

Félix Guattari, the son of a small industrialist but a classmate of young communists, began to be active in communist organisations at a very young age. He was influenced by his natural science teacher Fernand Oury, who practised the Freinet teaching method, which aimed to produce solidarity between pupils instead of competition, in particular by producing a class or school newspaper, by carrying out surveys outside the school, etc. Fernand Oury got him to join the Youth Hostel Movement, where he met Jean Oury, who was six years his senior.

It was Jean Oury who aroused his interest in philosophy, psychiatry and the artistic productions of certain mad people. In 1951, he joined Jean Oury at the psychiatric clinic in Saumery, where Jean had become director in 1949. The two of them spent long evenings discussing their desire to transform the world and psychiatry. In 1953 Jean Oury, tired of waiting for the administration to provide him with the material means he needed to work, left with patients and carers to found a new place: the La Borde clinic.



Félix Guattari lived between La Borde and Paris. At La Borde he was in charge of the organisation of the work, of the opening of this clinic without walls, made attractive by many workshops made with outside friends; he was also in charge of the negotiations with the Social Security in order to register this attempt in a public economic framework, and financially accessible to the patients. Jean Oury affectionately called him his "minister of external affairs".

With his friends in the Union of Communist Students, Félix Guattari led a theoretical and political Marxist reflection, criticising the authoritarian developments of the Soviet Union and the way in which the French Communist Party justified them in the name of real socialism. He also criticised the lack of solidarity with the Algerian revolution, and practised this solidarity with the so-called "suitcase carriers" (the French activists who carry leaflets or weapons for the Algerian revolution). Some Algerian militants were boarders at La Borde

at the end of the Algerian war, the left-wing movements that had supported the Algerian revolution could no longer see what to do in France other than to support the communist attempts in the world: Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and soon Venezuela. Félix Guattari proposed another political perspective to them: to elaborate revolutionary projects in all areas of daily life, to elaborate possibilities for the proletariat to participate in all cultural activities, to abolish the distance between intellectuals, workers and peasants, in other words, to take up the revolutionary line of 1917. An organisation was founded in this perspective: the FGERI, Fédération des groupes d'études, de recherches, institutionnelles, in reference to Oury's approach known as institutional psychotherapy.

Guattari's participation in the La Borde clinic and his companionship with Jean Oury led him to frequent Jacques Lacan, and even to become his analysand for about ten years from 1960 to 1970. In 1969, Jacques Lacan asked him to write a reading note on Gilles Deleuze's latest book, *The Logic of Sense*, which seemed to Lacan's students to be a continuation of the latter's work. But reading this book and *Difference and Repetition* by the same Deleuze inspired Guattari to think in a new way. What strikes him is that Deleuze establishes heterogeneous series that are linked by a third term that drives them both like a machine. Deleuze, in talking about literature, in doing philosophy, shows "desiring machines" in operation. The reading note is transformed into a theoretical text entitled "machine and structure" where Guattari develops his very Deleuzian critique of the search for structures and repetitions by the structuralists and Lacanians, a search that closes situations to history and transformation. When Guattari brought his text to Lacan's journal, *Scilicet*, Lacan's son-in-law explained to him that he had gone beyond the limits of Lacanism and that there was no question of publishing this text in the journal of the Lacanian school.

At the same time Gilles Deleuze, exhausted by the release of a series of books, each more important than the last, was unable to get back to work. One of his former students, Jean Pierre Muyard, who had become a psychiatrist at La Borde, advised Félix Guattari to

go and see him. Félix arrived with his text “Machine et structure”, which immediately seduced Deleuze. This text was the step he needed to take in order to bounce back, to get out of the impasse of structure, of which Deleuze, author of the “Structuralism” section in the *Encyclopedia Universalis*, had been one of the best introducers into French thought. Deleuze suggested to Guattari that he write down everything that came to mind. His wife Fanny will type the letters, hence my title, highlighting this first form of the typewriter and the role of Deleuze's wife in their arrangement.

In January 2005, *Les écrits pour l'Anti-Œdipe* was published, edited by the young psychiatrist Stéphane Nadaud from texts by Guattari found in his archives. We suddenly realise that most of the ideas put into practice in *Anti-Oedipus* are thrown into these papers, sometimes in a contradictory way, like a molten magma, which Deleuze's writing has succeeded in channelling, ordering and transforming into a war machine against psychoanalysis and the family.

One suddenly becomes aware of the fact that this three-way arrangement of Gilles, Félix, Fanny is a real writing machine, the arrangement by the one who is typing of two series of heterogeneous thoughts: the one based on literary and philosophical texts, the one built from the frequentation of communist organisations mixed with the day-to-day construction of a place of reception for madness. As Deleuze and Guattari say in *Mille Plateaux*, they did not write in pairs, but in groups, taking ideas from friends as they arose, transforming them into weapons against social and political inertia, the regression in France after 1968.

### **The desiring machines**

Guattari thus proposes to Deleuze a vision of the unconscious and its treatment that is very different from that elaborated by Freud on the basis of his self-analysis. Instead of tracing the associations of ideas that crowd the couch back to childhood memories, these associations of ideas will be followed in what they designate as partial objects not only in recent experience, but also in investments and future choices.

In Guattari's analytical work there is an inversion of time, a deliberate orientation towards the future, towards free action, towards belonging to new groups to be created or encountered. I was part of the schizoanalysis group that he had created shortly after the publication of *Anti-Oedipus* to welcome people who came to ask him for advice on how to get out of their existential blockages. As long as it was a question of organising new activities, these groups worked; but they were unable to deal with the marital and family problems that are the usual lot of psychoanalysis.

For Deleuze, this productive vision of the unconscious, this machinic use of associations of ideas, makes it possible to mobilise all the memories of literary and philosophical readings in new creative arrangements.

The machinic unconscious is made up of cut-off flows which generate a new force as in the steam engine. Deleuze liked to say that the first machine was formed by the mother's breast and the baby's mouth which extracted milk from it, the baby found in this operation the means to grow. An image that is not far from the force released by the piston of a steam engine. From this point on, everything that flows, and offers the potential to be cut by a mechanism of transformation is good to take as an example of a machine.

Deleuze and Guattari insist on the heterogeneous character of the flows arranged by the machine: capital, for example, consists of the arrangement of a flow of human beings, the workers, with a flow of money that is embodied in the machines that will exploit the flow of workers. The power of the device lies in the heterogeneity of the two flows brought into a production relationship by the machine.

Deleuze adds to the idea of the machine that of the body without organs, an idea that I have never really managed to appropriate for the moment. Desire has a recording surface, unlimited because it is egg-shaped, and desire is adjacent to the machines that carry it towards this egg. While Deleuze bases his reflection on Artaud's text, which introduces precisely this notion of a body without organs, Guattari remains more sensitive to the delusions that emerge in the clinic, and which make the fool say all the names in the story are me.

Desire, which is completely different from need, especially sexual need, carries away, deterritorializes, even when the displacement is infinitesimal, as in quantum physics. Deleuze and Guattari take us out of the usual dimensions of philosophy that push towards the infinitely great, heroism, masculinity. The infinite they present is rather infinitely small, but never reducible to stability. Apparently, the journey takes place on the spot, but it is always in motion and is only made conscious by the misfires it causes, an idea close to Freud's analysis of the spirit word.

In Guattari's militant history, all this reflection must go through the constitution of revolutionary groups capable of thwarting capitalist alienation. However, he notes after Sartre that all too often subject groups, oriented towards action, practising free and equal relations, are transformed into subjugated groups, prisoners of group fantasies that mislead them.

### **Psychoanalysis and familialism**

Deleuze and Guattari vehemently criticise psychoanalysis, which reduces all social situations to the father-mother-me family triangle. Can we gather under the figure of the authoritarian father the hierarchical group of men who wage war against the Vietnamese and the Algerians? Is there not a danger to authority and hierarchy when these men are politically defeated, when their enemies become independent? Is it not in these defeats that the uprisings of the 1960s and 1970s drew their energy?

Guattari was in analysis with Lacan from 1960 to 1970. Everything we know from Lacan's analyses shows that his practice did not conform at all to the image given of the psychoanalytic cure in the anti-oedipal denunciation, except perhaps the appetite for money. The 1960s and 1970s saw the emergence of professional psychology, which was called to the bedside of difficult children and adolescents, but also ventured to deal with marital difficulties and to solve the organisational problems of large companies, such as EDF, for example, thanks to action research in social psychology.

Since 1947, the University has been awarding psychology degrees. From 1956 onwards, sociology also emerged from its empirical phase and entered the university, distinguishing itself from philosophy. At the same time, Jacques Lacan began to give seminars, regularly from 1953 onwards at the Hôpital Sainte Anne and then at the Ecole normale supérieure.

He fights against the Egopsychology founded in the United States by his former analyst Rudolf Lowenstein. Jean Oury met him and François Tosquelles with whom he did his internship at Saint Alban in 1947. There was a rich professional intellectual activity in Paris on the fringes of the university, animated by innovative personalities, who had the ear of the media and of the new World Health Organisation.

Deleuze and Guattari's text does not care about these two distinct currents in psychiatry. The Lacanian current, in spite of its intellectual prestige, remains very much in the minority in professional practice. Absent from university teaching dominated by Daniel Lagache, it does not seem to be concerned with influencing psychiatry, and is only remotely interested in institutional psychotherapy. The latter is hardly defended by this text, which assimilates it to all the "techniques of care", which could only shock Guattari's friends who had endeavoured to institute it in several hospitals. In this scorcher Deleuze and Guattari make the deviation from the norm, the political dissensus, the difficulty with the family, the first step on the path of literary or artistic creation. It is obviously not by remaining a good student, a good son or daughter, against all odds, that one affirms one's desire, since one obviously alienates it from that of the school or one's parents.

The Oedipus complex is a 'double bind', a contradictory injunction, which forbids one to really love one's parents while at the same time demanding that one take them as models to be loved, which condemns children to impotence, castration, or transgression. But Deleuze and Guattari open up this love to homosexuality, which was still criminally repressed at the time: love and imitation can be directed as much towards the same sex as towards the opposite sex. Sexuality does not only have a reproductive function, even if this is what the prohibition of incest emphasises. *Anti-Oedipus* appeared shortly before *Homosexual Desire*, written by Guy Hocquenghem, one of the founders of the FHAR, Front homosexuel d'action révolutionnaire. This movement fights for the alignment of homosexuals' rights with those of other citizens, and above all tries to transversalise all cultural productions based on new perverse views on sexuality. The journal *Recherches*, directed by Guattari, echoed this in its number 12 "Trois milliards de pervers. Grande

encyclopédie des homosexualités [Three billion perverts. Great encyclopedia of homosexualities]" in 1973.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the schizo delirium, if one is willing to be attentive to it, not to wedge it into the oedipal triangle or under stereotypes, describes a double historical, geographical and social journey, on the one hand, and an inner and intensive one on the other, which can either be contracted by repression and pushed towards death, or contribute with each other to travel through the body without organs that schizoanalysis placed at the heart of the desiring process with Artaud.

In the schizo delirium, the parents are inducers among others, without any particular privilege. If they take their place within human lineages, peoples and races that carry the subject away, the latter in fact leaves far from the family bases. Deleuze and Guattari believe, however, that all forms of therapy known to them, including anti-psychiatry, choose instead to restore these family bases, modifying and consolidating them. This is because there are no welcoming places of daily life that can take their place, as too few psychiatric hospitals and clinics remain dominated by the practice of confinement.

Deleuze and Guattari insist on the fact that family bases have been disrupted and weakened for most people by colonisation, by its abandonment, by industrialisation, by globalisation, and by all the social transformations that have deterritorialised the unconscious, transforming parents into only partial, sometimes evanescent references. The result is an ambiguity of desire which is often invested in a return to authority, to the cult of superiority, in racist attitudes. But many other people pursue the project of revolutionising the relations of production and abolishing exploitation. The power of this desire is not well known, since it is so much in conflict with the repressive authorities of society and the family. The machines of desire then make themselves felt through their breakdowns, through depression.

These breakdowns, and this depression, are only indications of the presence of desire. They say nothing about its content, whose meaning is in no way defined by repression. Desire is not a transgression, a response to repression. It precedes it; it suffocates it and resurfaces. It is partly nourished by the legacy of the family institution, but the latter mainly assumes the repressive function delegated to it by society and acts to repress it as closely as possible to the bodies of the subjects. The carer must recognise the desire, make the desire production folded on the body without organs start again, whether it is neurosis or psychosis. The painter or writer manages to "traverse the desert of the body without organs", to cross "the capitalist barrier" (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 133) "Schizophrenia is at once the wall, the breaking through this wall, and the failures of this breakthrough" (Ibid.: 136).

### **Savages, barbarians, civilised**

Deleuze and Guattari assert that capitalism is formed by arranging decoded flows, which schizophrenia makes spin endlessly: the flow of labour, or, since Italian operaism, the flow of human lives, deterritorialised by slavery and wage-labour; the flow of money deterritorialised by all the successive banking techniques. The balance of power seems to be unequal, deterritorialisation being clearly driven by the owner and financial power; but infinity is on the side of life. The battle continues the whole time long. Deleuze and Guattari tell us the great stages passed by the 'savages' we now call indigenous, by the invading 'barbarians', and by the 'civilised' who defend themselves.

This history is inscribed on the surface of the earth, the organless body of the first human desiring production, forming a territorial machine that coded the flows and still codes them in the pockets of archaism that remain under capitalist domination. The first territorialisation is not very hierarchical, it is made of filiations and alliances that link all the members of the known human group, but withdrawals and detachments begin. Imbalance, malfunctioning, unequal exchange, which anthropologists consider negligible, are in fact the incidents that revive the territorial machine. Myths shift the collective consciousness from the intensive energy of bodies to the extension of relationships. This has been particularly well studied by Barbara Glowczewski, in the case of the Dreams of Australian Aboriginal societies.

And what about Oedipus among the 'savages'? He is no more present than the head of a family who owns his wives and/or slaves and is a member of a so-called democratic citizen assembly. Deleuze and Guattari discuss with erudition numerous works of ethnologists already published or reported by their circle of Africanist friends; if under the influence of the Lacanian magisterium one finds Oedipal universality, it is because they believe in the universality of the intellectual posture of interpreter, which is never more than the resurrection of the posture of the priest. The problem for Deleuze and Guattari is rather, where one is, in one's own field of competence, to machine, to make work, to set in motion.

In particular, they speak out against the exchangeist conception of primitive society generally found among anthropologists, who presuppose an equilibrium that does not exist, and who limit the sphere of social production to circulation, as if we were in stationary societies. The inscription of history in myths or dreams on the earth, painted on bodies or engraved by scarification, dictates to each and every person his or her duty, describes the debt he or she owes to society. Recent movements have turned these traditions into means of defence and reclamation in the face of spoliation due to colonisation, but also into instruments of individual passage within the hierarchical society that welcomes songs and paintings to extend its market repertoire. These developments did not yet exist at the time of the writing of the Anti-Oedipus.

The establishment of the despotic machine and the 'barbarian' socius cuts off lateral alliances and keeps only direct descent, promotes the racism typical of obedience to transcendent authority, and establishes an almost implacable hierarchy. The state makes

land the private property of its elite and divides it accordingly. The tax transforms the social debt into an infinite debt, into radical guilt. It transforms all the old inscriptions, and over-codes them into an exclusive relationship to it. The despot multiplies writing, and submits graphics to the voice, detaching it from its ancient supports. The deterritorialised, written sign is no longer linked to the body that emits it and becomes usable in many ways. The signified becomes the essential, since several signifiers correspond to it, that of the master's language and those of the languages of the slaves brought back from the war raids: this is the relationship of 'barbarian' subordination.

Privatised property and collective dependence characterise the state, but private property leads to its decline, to the bankruptcy of centralised codes, which forces the state and financial capitalism to invent new ways of decoding flows, of managing human lives, of concretising their machinations ever more.

It is by chance that the decoded flows of property, of money, of means of production, of "free" workers have been combined in the capitalist production machine, which cynically transforms, without question, the surplus value of code, into surplus value of flow, into the accumulation of money. The money which remunerates the workers, which is for them an income, is transformed by the banks with the help of the state into credit money, into a tool for investment in the enlarged reproduction of the exploitation relation. The state imposes the change of the rules of conversion as and when it is necessary, each time there is a crisis. This change moves from the centre to the periphery, organises the further deterritorialisation of capitalism, and the development of underdevelopment and poverty. Drawing explicitly on Marx, Deleuze and Guattari explain how the new production of code through scientific and technical research is absorbed by the gigantic apparatus of anti-production constituted by the multiple forms of state repressive forces. Anti-production produces the lack that crowns the system and points the wrong way to desire.

Capitalism only functions on condition that it inhibits the tendency to decode flows, to schizophrenisation, to infinitisation that animates it; it replaces it with a progressive axiomatic that binds it. The fisherman and the hunter would say: he catches it in a net that gets tighter and tighter as it struggles. Capitalism and the state only grasp things in a molar, statistical, average way, whereas the desiring machines, the deterritorialisation of flows, work at the molecular, infinitesimal level, without any identifiable meaning, let alone one that can be assigned from the "normal" scale of daily life. We can only see the mass effects, when they exist; they can go in different, even opposite directions. Against this molecular deterritorialisation, this intensive decoding, the capitalist state, charged with regulating decoding at the molar level, can only take new measures of restraint, drawn from the images bequeathed by previous systems, hence the archaic feeling of its action. It is no longer a question of the class struggle dear to Marx: bourgeoisie and proletariat struggle for their respective survival and therefore cooperate in the service of capital whose domination is guaranteed by the state.

The latter reterritorializes the flows that are decoded and submits them to decentralized forms of government to neutralize them. The recoded flows in fact slow down the decoding of microscopic flows. The main instrument of this recoding is the private ownership of land, housing, all means of living. Are they transformed by monetary magic into means of production only? The experience of the camps that are multiplying in the world shows that, contrary to what Agamben says, women and men are not going to submit themselves naked to exploitation and death. They have their own self, their own dignity, their own freedom, their own life, their own relationship to the infinite.

### **Introduction to schizoanalysis**

The work of Marx, anthropologists and economists, who preceded Deleuze-Guattari, allows them to brilliantly develop this history of the relationship between desire and society. The mobilisation of income money converted into credit money by the new rules enacted in 1973 is demonstrated in a particularly striking way, even though its devastating effects will only be observed in 2008 with the subprime crisis.

The introduction to schizoanalysis, the last chapter, seems to me more laborious. It takes up the radical critique of the psychoanalytical interpretation in terms of Oedipus distilled throughout the book. It takes into account a question often asked by observers of militant life: how is it that young, enthusiastic revolutionaries turn into more nuanced, even reactionary, politicians in later life?

Schizoanalysis is committed to understanding the oscillations of the unconscious between the paranoid, fascist, racist, familialist, moralising pole and the deterritorialized, desiring, revolutionary pole, full of contradictions. This will be one of its main objects. It will use the differences between nomadism and segregation, subject group and subjugated group.

Although Michel Foucault wrote in the preface to the American edition of *Anti-Oedipus* that it is a non-fascist manual of life, it seems to me that the manual is not sufficiently confronted with the meanders of daily and militant life to be translated into concrete lessons, ways of doing things, paths of invention. We are left with grand principles which the description, seen before, of the molecular nature of desiring machines.

How is the communication between the molecular space where desires are woven, and the molar space of representations which locks up perception, except in revolutionary periods of collective uprising?

Desire is a machine, a synthesis of machines, a machinic arrangement, a desiring machine, a coordinated setting in motion of molecules that makes sense, thought, in a way that underlies the molar representations that are the only thing we know on the "normal" scale of daily life, a scale where we systematically take things in a statistical way, in ignorance of the singularities that signal desire. By acting on these representations, by



systematically destroying them through analysis, can we leave the field free for the molecular movement of the desiring machines? Schizoanalysis is not a passive contemplation but a war machine against the stereotypes, the untruths, which bury the desiring machines.

This war is waged by experimenting with successive devices, which were barely sketched out when *The Ant-Oedipus* was written. The singular colloquy, the seat of transference typical of the traditional psychoanalytic treatment, is only one of these devices, totally insufficient to capture the dispersion of the desiring machines. However, it is also essential in schizoanalysis in order to take stock, to relate to each other the experiments in progress. These experiments are expressed on a molar scale by new representations, the exploration of new territories, which no longer conform to the requirements of social reproduction in contrast to Oedipus and the nuclear family. The two analysands partially share the same territory, one pays the other to take an interest in his or her own choices, at least to devote time to him or her, and to help him or her discover his or her new existential territory and possibilities of action.

The schizoanalytic cure was then in its infancy, and for lack of anything better, it was integrated into other similar practices, in particular psychoanalysis and family therapy. This led Guattari to elaborate a meta-analysis of therapeutic practices, in order to be able to inject a schizoanalytical perspective into any type of analytical practice. This is the aim of his penultimate book *Cartographies schizoanalytiques*. In the absence of important social movements after 1968, and its repression, the schizoanalytic cure hardly finds collective territories to hold on to. It only partially affected the members of the CERFI, a self-managed social science research centre created by Guattari and his friends; and it only affected women, who also belonged to the Women's Liberation Movement, created in France in 1970. Molecular deterritorialisation was expressed more in individual artistic or social science creations. These are obviously torn between the mechanical thrusts of deterritorialisation and the repressive demands of social representation.

The role of schizoanalysis, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is to destroy resistance to deterritorialisation, to shatter oppressive machines and, before that, to caricaturely reveal how they work, like Charlie Chaplin in the film *Modern Times*. It is a matter of creating a new land in successive shots, of crossing and recomposing previous territorialities in a different way. This new land is made by desiring machines in a state of molecular dispersion in relation to each other, in possibilities of multiple relationships; at the molar level they give rise to partial objects of desiring attraction or repulsion.

With reference to the post-1968 militant debates, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between revolutionary groups that extend the deterritorialisation of flows and subjugated groups that seek to maintain them within the existing framework. Desire does not conform to the interest that manifests itself at the preconscious level and follows the division of society into classes. This is best seen in sexuality - with whom one desires to ally oneself physically, but it is also expressed in abstract lines, in what seems strange,

and has nothing to do with the recollection of the same that traditional psychoanalysis speaks of. Love choices resonate with the vibrations created and maintained by otherwise unutterable social investments.

The attraction to a woman or man changes according to whether they are rich or poor, according to the way in which the attractive person is situated in the social field, how he or she evolves in various cultural dimensions. The social investments of desire take precedence over the family investments, breaking them down and undermining them. This malaise is the basis of the demand for analysis, for entry into a reparation or a pursuit of displacement, of deterritorialisation.

The familialist postulate of psychoanalysis is in fact a personalist postulate which makes madness an individual flaw, a failure to be like everyone else. But therapeutic failures have led to the community being blamed for it, and to the introduction of family and adaptive therapies, also held in check by madness, an asocial phenomenon present in all societies. Schizophrenia cannot be contained within the family or the community, because it is what escapes from them, in concrete forms that are always renewed. This escape is distressing but sure of its impossibility of compromise. The role of schizoanalysis is to support this escape and to help it find sufficient forms of embodiment so as not to be sucked in too quickly by the body without organs and by death. The schizo escapes the postulate of unity, of gathering, of neurotization.

Today, when fascism is raising its head and multiplying its racist provocations, the distinction between the paranoid, reactionary and fascist pole and the revolutionary schizoid pole is particularly useful to orient our thoughts and actions. The paranoid pole subjugates social production to gregarious ensembles, seeking identity, homogeneity, physical power and “selective sovereignty” (Deleuze; Guattari 1983: 366). The schizoid pole multiplies dispersed molecular ensembles, lines of flight, dissidence. This is not a utopia, it corresponds to the existence of subject groups that break with the social continuum. Art also has this double polarity: market value and coded content on the one hand, experimentation and following lines of desire on the other. Similarly, scientific research is divided between the service of power and the pursuit of infinite knowledge.

### **The three ecologies and ecosophy**

At the time when Deleuze and Guattari wrote *Anti-Oedipus*, reflections on the limits of growth were just beginning and were still interpreted as obstacles to the necessary emancipation of the proletariat. This emancipation was supposed to come from an increasingly intelligent use of technology that would free people from the most servile tasks and favour the fulfilment of all. Félix Guattari became aware of Hans Jonas's book *The Responsibility Principle* when it was published in German in 1979, but only read it in its French version in 1990. This book was like a bomb to him: he had been wrong all his

life by equating desire with production and growth, by putting on the boots of Marxism. It was necessary to start again from scratch, without abandoning deterritorialization, the machinic unconscious insofar as the machine is the movement created by a heterogenesis and not a technical arrangement intended to create more speed and more power. He then got closer to the Green movement, first the German Greens, then the French Greens, whose divisions were repugnant to him. He even ran in the municipal elections in two competing Green lists to highlight the folly of these divisions. He created a newsletter, as he had done before in psychiatry or in the communist party, in all its militant places, the *Fil vert*, which welcomed contributions from all currents.

*The three ecologies* is the manifesto he wrote for the French green movement and published in 1989. Here is the back cover:

The ecological drama in which the human planet is engaged has long been the object of systematic ignorance. This period is now over. Through the media, which have become hypersensitive to the repetition of ecological "accidents", international opinion is increasingly mobilised. Everyone talks about ecology today: politicians, technocrats, industrialists... Unfortunately, they always talk about simple "nuisances". Yet ecological disturbances of the environment are only the visible part of a deeper and more considerable harm, relating to the ways of living and being in society on this planet. Environmental ecology should be thought of as a whole with social ecology and mental ecology, through an ethico-political ecosophy. It is not a question of arbitrarily unifying fundamentally heterogeneous domains under an alternative ideology, but of having innovative practices of recomposition of individual and collective subjectivities support each other, within new technical-scientific contexts and new geopolitical coordinates. (Guattari 1989 : back cover)

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## ***¿Qué es y cómo se reconoce (a) un parano-analista?***

por SERGIO DARIO RAGONESE

### **Abstract**

This text will discuss the relevance of two dominant conceptions in the psi world on the position of schizoanalysis in relation to psychoanalysis, namely the molar and abstract-theoretical opposition between them (one versus the other), and the assimilation of schizoanalysis as an internal variation of psychoanalysis. From some notions such as the paranoid pole and schizophrenic pole, despotic codes, imperial despot, and the relationship between Oedipus and Paranoia, for example, an alternative to those canonical positions will be proposed. This will lead to a different answer to the question: what is it that schizoanalysis opposes in the concrete practices? If it operates in the opposite direction to something (e.g. Oedipus and ontological lack), which figures embody this? Is it specifically about psychoanalysts in general (would this not result in a molar and abstract approach)? These questions can be answered from different problem fields, but here they will not be approached with theoretical pretensions, nor to focus the analysis on the level of macro-social practices, but to study the concrete practices that occur in the field of analytical clinics, trying to extract better tools for them from all this. On the other hand, for all these problems, we will try to propose some properly schizoanalytic answers, avoiding the abusive generalization of some concepts as well as the personalization of the problems, and searching for a pragmatic-functional approach in this respect, trying to forge a conceptual personae [*personnages conceptuels*] that can be embodied and detected in the practices: the parano-analyst.

### **Presentación del problema**

El siguiente texto parte de una pregunta, o mejor dicho, de tres preguntas entrelazadas que habitan ya el título. Este último oficiará de motor para poner en marcha algunas problematizaciones incipientes acerca de una noción, la de *parano-analista*, que fue forjada a partir de algunos desarrollos teóricos que se encuentran en la primera obra escrita de manera conjunta por Gilles Deleuze y Félix Guattari: *El Anti-Edipo. Capitalismo y Esquizofrenia*.

Aquellas preguntas que habitan el título, podrían ser leídas y trabajadas de distintos modos. No se trata de la misma pregunta en el caso de “¿cómo se reconoce un parano-analista?” (a sí mismo/a, por ejemplo) que en el de “¿cómo se reconoce a un parano-analista?”, siendo que en esta última, por incluir la preposición *a*, el sentido de la cuestión

vira hacia el punto de vista de un/a observador/a (cómo alguien reconoce a otro/a como tal). No se trata de un mero juego de lenguaje; en este texto me interesa problematizar ambas direcciones sin confundirlas y contemplando sus articulaciones.

Por otro lado, la primera parte de aquella pregunta (*¿qué es...?*) podría llevarnos a suponer que la noción de *parano-analista* (aún por precisar) referiría a algo que se es, trátase de un Ser, de una cosa, o de cierto tipo de identidad. Pero *el parano-analista*, si es algo, es una noción o un *personaje conceptual* como podríamos pensar con Deleuze y Guattari (Cf. 2011). Uno muy particular, puesto que puede ser encarnado o actualizado en la dinámica vincular y social (ya veremos cómo). Y bien, ¿qué indica esa noción una vez efectuada o instanciada?: señala a un enemigo del esquizoanálisis (no del *esquizoanalista*, cuyo estatuto requeriría otras apreciaciones); pero no lo hace a título de su persona o de su identidad personal, sino a ciertos modos de hacer y de funcionar, a los cuales el esquizoanálisis ha dirigido una gran parte de sus críticas. De este modo, debo explicitar que forjar dicha noción responde a la intención de proponer, inspirándome en las propuestas de ambos autores franceses, una noción más precisa respecto de otra pregunta: *¿a contramano de qué se dirige el esquizoanálisis en la prácticas analíticas?*

Es sabido que la recepción en el mundo psi de aquel primer libro escrito de modo conjunto ha sido conflictiva, llena de malos entendidos, incomprensiones, y reacciones conservadoras, y parece innegable que las críticas que allí se dedican *al psicoanálisis* en general, en su conjunto, merecen reparos y más precisiones dado que, en algunos casos, esta tiene puntos débiles, sean estos ciertos o aparentes. Elisabeth Roudinesco decía que ambos autores *erraron el tiro* (Cf. Dosse 2009); sin embargo, no se puede estar de acuerdo con ella cuando se observan las respuestas conservadoras que *El Anti-Edipo* recibió por parte de los psicoanalistas franceses que no estaban bajo el ala de Lacan (Cf. Chasseguet-Smirgel 1979). Sería más preciso considerar que el problema no es tanto el *tiro* sino, ocasionalmente, el *blanco psi*<sup>1</sup> supuesto (para Roudinesco: la enseñanza de J. Lacan; para otros/as: la generalidad del psicoanálisis y los psicoanalistas). No ahondaré aquí en esos posibles puntos débiles, en si son de estilo de escritura o de contenido conceptual, en su lugar intentaré especificar aquello a lo que el esquizoanálisis (mediante sus *tiros*) se puede oponer mejor. Esto podría ser abordado, por ejemplo, en un plano teórico (sea filosófico, psicológico, sociológico, antropológico, etc), así como en el de las prácticas sociales a nivel macro (problemas del cambio social revolucionario, la lucha contra/desde el capitalismo, etc), y/o en el dominio específico de las prácticas clínicas analíticas, sean estas dirigidas a individuos, grupos, o instituciones. Este texto intenta trabajar sobre este último nivel.

Además, intentaré evitar dos respuestas habituales, muy extendidas en el plano psi: una, la que dice que *el esquizoanálisis se opone al psicoanálisis* (oposición molar, abstracta,

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<sup>1</sup> Explicito lo de *blanco psi*, porque se hace indudable que hay también otros blancos en el mismo.

y teórica)<sup>2</sup>; la otra, que sostiene que *el esquizoanálisis se opone a ciertos psicoanálisis debido a que aquel es una variación interna de este* (el problema de esta última formulación es la asimilación simple que realiza hacia el final). Sin embargo, oposición total y asimilación total no son caminos propiamente esquizoanalíticos para abordar con rigor estos problemas. Así, basándome en propuestas de ambos autores, mediante lo que llamo *parano-analista* o *paranoanalista*, intentaré indicar o formular ese enemigo más concreto y más preciso, en el sentido de que será estudiado a partir de sus prácticas, sus acciones, las consecuencias que estas abren y los modos en que se ejerce el poder y el saber en aquellas. También, la tarea de detectar quien *está haciendo de parano-analista*, requeriría ser aplicada incluso en quienes la utilizan (no se está exento); recordemos que la dupla francesa sostenía que no se trata de criticar al fascista molar que sería otro/a, sino de detectar hasta qué punto nosotros mismos/as estamos actuando en lo molecular de modo fascista.

Quiero hacer aquí una aclaración terminológica: es importante notar que hablaré de *el parano-analista*, utilizando el artículo masculino. Esto es intencional, dado que se trata precisamente de un patrón mayoritario, un universal dominante encarnado, independientemente de los cuerpos (y/o las auto-percepciones subjetivas correspondientes) de quienes lo efectúen en concreto. Recordemos que Deleuze y Guattari referían ya que no hay un *devenir Hombre* porque Hombre (Masculino/Blanco/Europeo/Heterosexual y Racional/Cuerdo/Capaz/Útil) *se es*, no se deviene (Cf. Deleuze; Guattari 2010).

## Desarrollo

Entonces, un *parano-analista* no es un quién, sino un cómo, un modo de hacer y funcionar situado que eventualmente es encarnado por una persona, pero que no se confunde con toda ella<sup>3</sup>. Para leer ese *hacer* en cuestión, tomaré como referencia conceptual lo que Deleuze y Guattari denominan como sus *dos polos del deseo y/o del delirio*, los dos polos de lo inconsciente: esquizofrénico y paranoide. El que hace de *parano-analista*, así, actúa de modo directamente articulado a su polo homónimo: tiene un saber previo, el cual los sucesos eventuales sólo confirman (nunca refutan), y el mismo es racional y sistemático; siempre supone hay alegorías o alusiones que serían las adecuadas y verdaderas; además, no puede elucidar críticamente su propia posición. Su búsqueda intelectual de descifrar códigos, se traduce en sus prácticas en intentar imponer a los demás esos Códigos establecidos en los que él se reconoce (en los que tiene confianza

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<sup>2</sup> Pero en las prácticas no nos las vemos con *El psicoanálisis*, sino con quienes se dicen (y/o se reconocen) psicoanalistas.

<sup>3</sup> De modo similar, Fernando Ulloa gustaba de decir quien *es* psicoanalista en su consultorio, deja de ser tal cuando está en otra situación social que no sea la del encuadre analítico (cuando está con su familia o sus amigos/as, haciendo las compras para su hogar, etc). (Cf. Ulloa 1995.)

o certeza); esto lo vuelve tan conservador como opresor, aunque él no estaría de acuerdo con estos calificativos (fácilmente argumentaría que apunta a un Bien mayor). Esto le vuelve siempre desconfiado respecto de las versiones y explicaciones alternativas, de las que se desinteresa o a las que desestima, cuando no las considera erradas o directamente peligrosas (probablemente se presenten como amenazantes para su sistema racional con ambición totalizante-totalitaria). Recordemos que, en Semiótica, la noción de *Código* se utiliza tanto para los *códigos de significación* (indican qué significan tales o cuales signos o flujos de signos) como para los *códigos de conducta* (indican lo que se debe hacer en tal o cual situación/contexto); Guattari y Deleuze parecen tener en cuenta ambas especificaciones del término.

Para seguir hablando de los paranoanalistas con algunos términos propios de Deleuze y Guattari, diría que estos trabajan también en el sentido de la *máquina paranoica*<sup>4</sup> (que es anti-productiva) repeliendo las *máquinas deseantes* productivas. Por otro lado, más acá o más allá fomentan sutilmente la *represión general*, la *opresión social*, bajo la conservación de lo ya instituido y lo estructurado. Así, el parano-analista trabaja para la *anti-producción*, en tanto que opera de modo contrario a la producción de otras realidades y de un deseo creativo, novedoso, y provocador.

Ahora bien, respecto de la pregunta “¿cómo se reconoce un parano-analista?”, como dije, aquel que encarna lo que denomino un *parano-analista*, no se reconoce a sí mismo como tal. En el cono sur de latinoamerica, lo más habitual es que se reconozca a sí mismo como *psicoanalista* (pero esta correspondencia no es exclusiva ni universal, sólo común y extendida). Podríamos argumentar que la teoría psicoanalítica freudiana ya parecía favorecer a quien se afirma en que la persona que tiene en frente “no quiere mejorar”, “se resiste” (a curarse, a aceptar una verdad), “no se responsabiliza por su parte en aquello de lo que se queja”, “miente”, “niega”, etc. En la terminología de Guattari y Deleuze, podría decirse que la operatoria de los/as psicoanalistas freudianos/as, pero más aún los/as kleinianos/as, ha sido la de reducir lo que sucede a una grilla conceptual general denominada *Código Edípico* (aunque lo que entienden por esto va más allá del Complejo de Edipo freudiano o lacaniano), el que vendría a decir qué significa lo que le sucede a el/la paciente (código de significación), o qué es lo que el analista debe hacer con ello (código de conducta). Más adelante intentaré pensar acerca de algunos factores más que confluyen en esta situación. Pero ya en ese punto, podríamos recordar ciertas palabras de Deleuze y Guattari: “todo el psicoanálisis familiarista, comprendido el psicoanalista en primer lugar, es ajusticiable por un esquizoanálisis. Una sola manera de pasar el tiempo sobre el diván, *esquizoanalizar al psicoanalista*” (1995: 376; el énfasis es mío). Se entenderá esto que me interesa, en medio de estos desarrollos: que se pueda utilizar el esquizoanálisis para analizar al psicoanalista “en primer lugar”, y especialmente evaluando qué idea de *psicoanalista* tienen en mente ambos autores. Ellos explicitan

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<sup>4</sup> No se deben confundir los conceptos de *polo paranoico* (o *paranoide*), *máquina paranoica*, y *catexis paranoica*. Cada uno alude a cuestiones distintas, aunque por supuesto, existan relaciones entre ellas.

algunas cuestiones al respecto, como por ejemplo, que se dirigen al que *edipiza* o *familiariza* (el que relaciona todo con un tipo ideal y burgués de familia nuclear, y sus modelos de conyugalidad, paternalidad, filiación, etc), del que más hablan y al que toman como paradigma de los demás (esta asimilación es argumentalmente problemática por ser muy discutible su pertinencia, pero es la que ellos decidieron hacer). Pero también se refieren al que opera como *sacerdote piadoso* (el estructuralista que bendice la Falta en Ser), así como al *polizonte* moralista, y al *tecnó-psicoanalista* cientificista (Cf. Ibid.: 114). Podríamos decir aquí que en todos esos casos aluden a distintos modos de ubicarse en lo que ellos denominan *polo paranoide*. Desde este, se inyecta a los demás seres vivos (no sólo humanos sino también animales domésticos) aquellas matrices de los códigos respectivos. Y si “Edipo es primero una idea de paranoico adulto, antes de ser un sentimiento infantil de neurótico” (Ibid.: 283) y si el psicoanalista que critican es el que en sus prácticas analíticas se ubica en ese polo paranoide, esto podría reforzar esta propuesta de denominar, más bien, *parano-analistas* a quienes actúan de esos modos, mientras lo hacen. Así, en relación a esa última cita, podría agregar lo siguiente: *Edipo (y la familia nuclear como conjunto de partida) es una idea de parano-analista, antes de ser un sentimiento infantil de neurótico y en lugar de ser una causa universal psicopatológica*. Aunque lo mismo podría decirse de la carencia ontológica del lacanismo.

Ahora, he enfatizado el intentar estar atentos a lo que sucede en las prácticas analíticas y sociales concretas en el nivel microfísico y molecular, así como en el del *entre* vincular, y reconozco que quizás sea poco habitual para el pensamiento psi el dedicarse a estudiar lo que efectivamente se hace (como hacen más comúnmente los sociólogos), dejando de lado las ideas que los actores humanos se dan acerca de eso que hacen, pero es precisamente eso a lo que nos invita el esquizoanálisis. Podríamos recordar al respecto todas las referencias que Deleuze hace a que la filosofía no debe ser sólo teoría, no debe ser cosa de ideas filosóficas, sino que se trata siempre de una filosofía práctica o de una práctica filosófica, siempre un ejercicio accesible a la dimensión más cotidiana de las vidas. Otro tanto, o quizás más incluso, encontramos incesantes apelaciones en Guattari a realizar una pragmática esquizoanalítica y un estudio de los agenciamientos concretos.

### **Del psicoanálisis al paranoanalista**

Uno de los muchos y variados factores que permiten pensar la afinidad del método freudiano con los razonamientos paranoides, lo encontramos en el hecho de que aquel está inspirado, como Freud mismo lo admite en un texto que publicó bajo un seudónimo (*El Moisés de Miguel Ángel* (Freud 2020)), en un método elaborado para detectar las mentiras y engaños de quienes copiaban grandes cuadros para venderlos como si fueran originales. Este último se conoce como el *método indiciario*, desde el que se presta especial atención a los detalles que podrían haber pasado desapercibidos para la conciencia del



estafador (en el caso de G. Morelli), el/la paciente (en Freud y el psicoanálisis), o el ladrón (en el personaje de ficción Sherlock Holmes). Esto es sólo un ejemplo de todo aquello que reafirma en el propio psicoanálisis un modo de razonamiento paranoide: desconfianza a la otredad<sup>5</sup>, desmesurada confianza en las ideas propias, una voluntad de descubrir/inteligir/descifrar una verdad oculta o no evidente, etc; esto, al no poder auto-cuestionarse, tiende a imponerse sobre las demás personas. Sin embargo, aplicar aquel método a personas que consultan por sus padecimientos, tratando a estas como falsificadoras, criminales, mentirosas, y tendiendo a responsabilizarles individualmente (Cf. Guinzburg 2013), se logran consecuencias vinculares que, históricamente, no fueron suficientemente contempladas en su importancia ético-micropolítica (por ejemplo: aún en nuestros días existen los psicoanalistas que intervienen sobre sus pacientes que sufrieron abusos sexuales infantiles interpretándoles que ellos/ellas habrían provocado estos o, cuando menos, obtuvieron un goce al respecto). No es casualidad que Guattari y Deleuze remarquen que este modo de hacer (paranoide) es, no sólo normativizante, sino también opresor/inhibidor/castrador/represor. Una muestra de ello, entre muchas, es la lectura que hacen de la operación de interpretación que Melanie Klein lleva a cabo con su paciente conocido como el caso Dick. “No es sugestión, es terrorismo (...) ¡Di que es Edipo o si no recibirás una bofetada! El psicoanalista nunca pregunta: «¿Qué son para ti tus máquinas deseantes?», sino que exclama: «¡Responde papá-mamá cuando te hablo!»” (Deleuze; Guattari 1995: 50)<sup>6</sup>.

Por supuesto, esos y otros tipos de actitudes despóticas pueden encontrarse en algunos profesionales de otras terapias como las cognitivo-conductuales (claramente diferentes de las psicoanalíticas) que se vuelven operadores rutinarios de técnicas estandarizadas en protocolos internacionales (códigos de conducta), así como fanáticos de la cientificidad de sus teorías de referencia (otro código de significación instituido), las que se miden con una epistemología naturalizada, positivista, y reaccionaria. Sea cuales sean las teorías y/o técnicas en las que se interesa conscientemente y en las que se reconoce a sí mismo, un parano-analista utiliza siempre ciertos *Códigos* como incuestionables, como si fueran su palabra santa o su Verdad revelada, conocida o inteligible. Lo que importa no es si se trata de los libros de Freud, de Beck, de Moreno, o (peor) de ellos mismos, lo relevante es el uso tipo *códice* que hacen al respecto y las consecuencias ético-micropolíticas que se derivan de ello. Como vengo intentando mostrar, un paranoanalista está centrado en el Saber pero su actitud frente a él no es del orden de las ideas, sino que se expresa ya de entrada en *prácticas de subjetivación* de otros/as y actitudes o acciones concretas para con ellos/as. Quizás las acciones de cientos de profesionales cognitivos-conductuales sean aún más fácilmente reconocibles en esta línea para quienes se han formado psicoanalíticamente,

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<sup>5</sup> Por ejemplo, la célebre frase de Freud “*Mi histérica me miente*” ha sido tomada en esta dirección, como argumento para profundizar esa desconfianza.

<sup>6</sup> Curiosamente, el paranoanalista, si tiene *delirios de persecución* (como los habituales en la entidad psicopatológica llamada *paranoia*), estos tienden a ser actuados de modo que él es el perseguidor (algo que lo acerca a los *delirios de acción* de otra entidad similar, llamada *psicosis pasionales*).

pero nuestros autores eligieron reparar en el propio psicoanálisis del que venían (Guattari) o del que se nutrían (Deleuze), dando una advertencia (provocativa) al señalar que allí Edipo no ha llegado (ni con Freud, ni Klein, ni suficientemente a partir de Lacan) al *punto de su auto-crítica*, que es a donde lo lleva el esquizoanálisis.

Los parano-analistas siempre son racionalistas o intelectualistas, de uno u otro modo: consideran que todo es razonable, tiene motivos y causas cognoscibles (la existencia como código descifrable). En ocasiones consideran que se podría inteligir el absoluto si hubiera suficiente tiempo y dedicación. Están centrados, también entonces, en el conocimiento y en el reconocimiento (factores que Jacques Lacan ubicaba en lo que él llamaba *registro imaginario*, el dominio de la significación y el yo, así como de la conciencia, las apariencias y los engaños cotidianos).

Decía que de los dos polos de lo inconsciente, apuntan siempre a mover el péndulo hacia el polo paranoico-segregativo-narcisista/yoico. Pero un esquizoanalista (si usamos esa nominación) no sería quien permanece en el otro polo, el esquizo, y le hace de espejo al paranoico. El ubicarse *en espejo*, en oposición simple de modo de rivalizar personalmente, pertenece también a *lo imaginario* lacaniano y no es esa la propuesta sobria (y concreta) del esquizoanálisis, aun cuando muchos fragmentos de *El Anti-Edipo* puedan llevarnos a caer en esta apariencia de rivalidad, paridad, y oposición global. Aún no se ha logrado poner en circulación una lectura advertida del tipo de provocación humorística e irónica que alberga dicho libro. Pero un esquizoanalista, si eso existe, podría partir de poner en claro que no se opone ni al psicoanalista ni tampoco al paranoanalista. Quien se diga esquizoanalista tampoco podría garantizar estar ubicado exclusivamente en el polo esquizo, cosa que tampoco sería deseable. Más bien, como decían los antiguos filósofos herméticos, se pendula siempre entre un polo y otro. Un/a esquizoanalista, como mínimo, sabe de esa oscilación y está a la espera de detectar cada vez más rápido y mejor, en qué momento él/ella mismo/a está haciendo de paranoanalista, cuando se está convirtiendo en reaccionario/a o en un/a microfascista.

Antes mencionaba los códigos despóticos, y es de resaltar que mediante la construcción del personaje conceptual del *Déspota*, Deleuze y Guattari articulan no sólo cuestiones antropológicas y del psicoanálisis sino que también toman nociones del campo de las nosografías psicopatológicas, al referir que el *Déspota* y el *Paranoico* adulto son análogos. Ese *personaje conceptual*, el del *Déspota*, es paranoico ya no en el sentido psicopatológico, sino en uno funcional, y por ello puede encarnarlo un emperador, un sacerdote o el líder de una secta, un padre celoso de su hijo/a, un analista respecto de su paciente, etc. En todos los casos se trata siempre de figuras que ejercen cierto poder efectivo.

Esta relación entre poder y paranoia, que el esquizoanálisis visibiliza, puede ser rastreada incluso en las descripciones de la psiquiatría clásica, a fines del Siglo diecinueve. El paciente diagnosticado con paranoia tiene *delirios de grandeza* cuando tiene certeza de que él conducirá al pueblo o a la raza o a la humanidad, o que él es el elegido; y tiene un *delirio auto-referencial* cuando no duda de que las otras personas piensan sobre él o le

dedican sus acciones (“puso la música fuerte porque sabe que me molesta”, o “las calaveras en tu sueño muestran que deseas asesinarme y ocupar mi lugar” como le interpretó edípico-paranoicamente S. Freud a C. Jung) (Cf. Jung 2016). Este último tipo de delirio, en realidad, sólo recubre a aquel delirio de grandeza más profundo, ya que este muestra también el darse importancia, como si los/las demás giraran a su alrededor. Pero curiosamente, esa persona de supuesta importancia es quien necesariamente está aterrorizada, como muestra Alan Watts, y quien procede mediante recursos desesperados al respecto. Veamos el caso, por ejemplo de la Iglesia católica, su Rey celestial y sus delegados terrenales, los sacerdotes:

Culturas con gobiernos de carácter monárquico. Para ellos, el creador del universo fue concebido como el rey del universo (“el Rey de los reyes, el Señor de los señores, el único Gobernador de los príncipes...”).

La idea de que debemos arrodillarnos, inclinarnos y postrarnos ante el Señor del universo con humildad y respeto es un remanente de las culturas del antiguo Oriente. ¿Y esto por qué? Básicamente, porque no hay nadie que esté más aterrorizado que un tirano, y por eso siempre lo verás sentado con la espalda contra la pared mientras tú debes acercarte a él desde una altura inferior y con el rostro mirando hacia el suelo. De esta manera no podrás atacarle con un arma. Cuando te acercas a él, en ningún momento te incorporas para mirarle, porque entonces podrías atacarle. Y motivos no te faltarían, porque no hay peor criminal que aquel que, como él, se adueña de tu vida. [...] aquel que tiene el poder tiene total potestad de cometer crímenes contra ti. (Watts 2019: 17-18)

La cita parece bastante clara de por sí, y al hacer un esbozo de genealogía de la figura del sacerdote se ve llevado a relacionarla con una históricamente anterior, la del emperador de los imperios orientales. Esta relación también está presente en *El Anti-Edipo* y allí se articula con los estudios de K. Marx sobre el modo de producción asiático e imperial. Pero además, lo referido permite vislumbrar el temor paranoico de quien está en el lugar de ejercer el Poder real o efectivo, y los recaudos que se toma cuando establece códigos de conducta protocolares (para sus súbditos o los feligreses: arrodillarse y suplicar expresando respeto, humildad, y una actitud servil). Notemos, por otra parte, que aquel miedo y aquella actitud de estar alerta frente a los peligros ciertos e inminentes que podrían ocurrir<sup>7</sup>, sitúa al déspota/paranoico a vivir preferentemente en una sintonía mental: prefiere prever e inteligir, o, en todo caso, comprender retrospectivamente si algo se le ha escapado en el pasado, antes que centrarse en la conexión con su aquí y ahora

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<sup>7</sup> “La administración de una gran seguridad molar organizada tiene como correlato una [...] inseguridad molecular permanente” (Deleuze; Guattari 2010: 220). “Constantemente tememos perder. La seguridad, la gran organización molar que nos sostiene” (Ibid.: 230).

corporal y afectivo (el lugar donde el personaje conceptual llamado *esquizo* se sitúa preferentemente<sup>8</sup>).

En nuestras sociedades occidentales contemporáneas, esta ideación paranoide de parte de un líder despótico, está dejando de ser tan comúnmente encarnada en un gran emperador, un gran Presidente, un líder Religioso, una estrella de rock, etc, como era predominante hasta la mitad del Siglo veinte (época en que comienzan a caer los grandes relatos modernos), y se la encuentra más bien dispersa en neurosis cotidianas, *normopatías*, micro fascismos, y pequeños temores cotidianos (y seguridades defensivas) que pueden sacar lo peor de cada cual. De ese modo hay que tomar lo paranoide de los parano-analistas; no se trata, de ver algo patológico en un terapeuta o analista o lo que sea, sino de captar esa fibra común que emerge entre lo que hacen nuestros *enemigos* y lo que molecularmente hacemos todos los días nosotros/as mismos/as, aun avalados/as y apoyados/as por las instituciones concretas y los instituidos efectivos que dan consistencia teórico-práctica a nuestras intervenciones. Como dije, nunca estamos a salvo de ser también nuestros propios enemigos; pero esto no puede reducirse al viejo discurso judeo-cristiano que decía que el mal está en nosotros/as mismos/as dado que somos pecadores/as y culpables, y que, entonces, *debemos* rezar (según nos ordena el sacerdote-déspota y su Código incuestionable puesto que fue escrito *en nombre de Dios*), so pena de castigo. Aquí se trata de una otra lógica: el enemigo no es sólo interno ni sólo externo y ni siquiera podemos ubicarlo de modo estable en tal o cual persona porque no se trata de una persona ni de una cualidad personal (la personología aquí no nos es útil, como se aprende en *El Anti-Edipo*). Y si un *enemigo* es móvil, sólo se lo puede cazar provisoriamente y con un estar nómada. La posición a la que se quiere invitar, entonces, es la de la *elucidación crítica* (Cf. Fernández 1989) como actividad incesante, inacabable, pero realizable. Se trata de la difícil actitud de mantenerse en la incomodidad; incluso la de darle prioridad. Esto sabiendo incluso que no se puede vivir para siempre en la incomodidad, que nunca se termina de estar allí para siempre o del todo. Se trataría, entonces, de saber y no olvidar que tarde o temprano la comodidad nos atraparé cuando menos lo veamos venir; el cansancio, el temor, o la seguridad nos jugarán una mala pasada; la burocracia nos habrá capturado; el hartazgo o la impulsividad nos forzarán en sentido contrario a la disponibilidad, la lucidez, y la prudencia. Y esos fracasos no deben ser estimados como consecuencias inevitables, sino ser, también, parte del plan; en algún momento, aunque nos digamos esquizoanalistas nos pondremos paranoicos (recordemos el péndulo de polo a polo): no se trata de naturalizar esto como si fuera inevitable y nada pudiéramos hacer sino que, al contrario, nos cabe prepararnos cada vez mejor para que las consecuencias sean cada vez menos graves (ético-micropolíticamente). “El Plan, así concebido, siempre tiene forzosamente que fallar, pero los fallos forman parte integrante

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<sup>8</sup> Este personaje conceptual (el esquizo) que traza el dúo francés en su libro, no debe ser asimilado a la persona concreta que ha recibido el diagnóstico de esquizofrenia, como ellos aclaran.

del plan” (Deleuze; Guattari 2010: 272). De ese modo, el esquizoanálisis propone prepararse para esa otra cosa que aterra a un parano-analista: fallar.

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## ***The Legacy of Deleuze and Guattari in Sociocultural Anthropology<sup>1</sup>***

by SERGEI V. SOKOLOVSKIY

### **Abstract**

In this paper I focus on the reception of Deleuzoguattarian conceptual legacy and the peculiar situation of Russian sociocultural anthropology, distinguishing it from other national traditions of anthropological research. The peculiarity of this situation lies in the stark contrast between the proliferation of Russian translations of Deleuze and Guattari voluminous oeuvre, on the one hand, and the curious absence of any direct influence of their works on various domains and specializations within national tradition of anthropological research, on the other. In documenting this glaring lack of impact, I trace its main reasons to the prevalence of descriptive and experiential nature of the discipline, as well as to the continuing influence of some (post-) Marxist dogma, particularly in the still prevailing modernist interpretation of the subject-object and nature-culture dualisms.

### **Introduction**

It's not a matter of bringing all sorts of things together under a single concept but rather of relating each concept to variables that explain its mutations.

Gilles Deleuze. *Negotiations*

The semi-centennial anniversary of the publication of the French edition of *Anti-Oedipus* presents a fortuitous opportunity for an overview and assessment of the influence of the entire D&G's oeuvre and its rich conceptual toolkit on theories and practices of anthropologists. It is sure too ambitious a task for the allotted space, so I focus on the influence and reception of their ideas on sociocultural anthropology in the country, where this influence remains negligent, or almost entirely absent, the circumstance that

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simplifies my task. This is the case of Russian anthropology, and its interest lies mainly in the fact that the conspicuous absence takes place in the context of burgeoning numbers of translations of D&G's works into Russian<sup>2</sup>.

The dialogue between Deleuze and Guattari, on the one side, and sociocultural anthropology, on the other, has been for a long time one-sided, that is, both scholars regularly turned to the works of anthropologists (notably to Gregory Bateson and Claude Lévi-Strauss, but also Roger Bastide, Laura and Paul Bohannan, Pierre Clastres, Georges Dumézil, Meyer Fortes, Marcel Griaule, Edward Leach, André Leroi-Gourhan, Marcel Mauss, Bronislaw Malinowski, and Victor Turner), borrowing some concepts, terminology or ideas as material for the elaboration of their own conceptual tools<sup>3</sup>. In an effort to escape many of the assumptions, built into ordinary language or used in previous scholarship, the philosophers have thoroughly rethought many of the notions of their predecessors and elaborated new terminology to reference highly original concepts of their own making, e.g. *rhizome*, *assemblage*, *schizoanalysis*, *(de-, or re-) territorialization*, *transversality*, *lines of flight*, *(trans-, or de-)coding*, *smooth/striated space*, *nomadism* and *nomad thought*, *cartography/archaeology*, *desiring and war machines*, *body without organs*, *exteriority/interiority*, *molar/molecular*, *minoritarian/majoritarian*, the *ontology of becoming*, *flows*, *folds*, *perspective*, *multiplicity*, *intensity*, *plateau*, *disjunctive synthesis*, *faciality*, *univocity*, to name only the most popular. This new terminology is partly responsible for what makes the work of these two thinkers famously difficult to read.

Notwithstanding the difficulties, some anthropologists, although few in number (for

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<sup>2</sup> Admittedly, Russian translations, not mentioning the French originals, in some cases lagged for decades behind the English ones, and this fact alone might explain the delayed acquaintance of Russian audience with the works of the French scholars, e.g. *Logique du sens* [1969] appeared in Russian translation in 1995 (in English in 1990); next in 1997 came *Nietzsche et la philosophie* [1962] (Engl. 1983) and *Le Pli: Leibniz et le baroque* [1988] (Engl. 1992); then in 1998 *Difference et Repetition* [1968] (Engl. 1994), *Foucault* [1986] (Engl. 1988), and *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* [1991] (Engl. 1994) went out of print; in 1999 there appeared the Russian translation of *Proust et Signes* [1964] (in Engl. in 1972); in 2001 *La Philosophic Critique de Kant* [1963] (Engl. 1984) and a volume, comprising *Empirisme et subjectivité: Essai sur la Nature humain selon Hume* [1958] (Engl. 1991), *Le Bergsonism* [1966] (Engl. 1988), and *Spinoza: Philosophie pratique* [1970] (Engl. 1988); in 2001 *Critique et Clinique* [1993] (Engl. 1998); in 2004 both volumes of *Cinema* [1983, 1985] (Engl. 1986, 1989); in 2004 *Pourparlers 1972–1990* [1990] (Engl. 1995). The *Anti-Oedipus* [1972] was published in 2008 (Engl. 1977), and *Mille Plateau* [1980] (Engl. 1987) in 2010. The same year the translation of *Kafka: pour une littérature mineure* [1975] (Engl. 1986) was published. Next came in 2011 *Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation* [1981] (Engl. 2003); in 2015 *Leibnitz lectures* [1980, 1986/87] and finally in 2016 Deleuze's *Lectures on Spinoza*. Without second editions and corrected translations this constitutes the bulk of the D&G translations into Russian.

<sup>3</sup> The D&G's manner of citing and interpretation of the anthropological accounts have been harshly criticized by a comparative literature scholar Christopher Miller (1993, 1998, 2003) and vigorously defended by D&G's translator and scholar Eugene Holland (2003a, b), a debate that illustrates well the uneasy relationships between philosophical and anthropological knowledge-making. Compare, also, Marc Augé, who perceives D&G's position (together with the views of Clastres) as 'neo-evolutionist', adding that "Ethnographic description and phantasy have never been mingled in so cavalier a manner as in the last three or four years, and never have philosophers treated such materials so casually. All and sundry, with great confidence and with a subtly arrogant condescension, scan other peoples' ethnographies (done by others, speaking of others) and decide upon meanings." (Augé [1979] 1982: 91)

the sake of brevity I shall skip the names of those who used the terminology for purely ornamental purposes, due to current fashion, or just yielding to the temptation of an easy claim to cleverness), have engaged either critically or propitiously certain D&G's conceptions to reform their own research domains in a number of fields, notably in anthropology of media, of technology, digital and medical anthropology, material culture studies, political anthropology and post-colonial studies, the research at the intersection of anthropology with studies of biotechnology and body studies, and some other more specialized research areas.

Beyond anthropology proper, assemblage theory, affect theory and new materialism have been decisively influenced by D&G's work. Besides, the creation of an analytical framework that is capable of including humans and non-humans has been a central concern in STS and the 'multi-species' or animal turn, whereas in contemporary anthropology one of its major 'turns', the ontological<sup>4</sup>, has been inspired almost in its entirety by the French thinkers' ideas on multiplicity and perspectivism: e.g. Eduardo Viveiros de Castro in delineating his own version of 'perspectivism' adopted their vocabulary almost wholesale. In his book on Amerindian cosmologies, he states:

The future of the master concept of anthropology – *relation* – depends on how much attention the discipline will end up lending to the concepts of *difference* and *multiplicity*, *becoming* and *disjunctive synthesis*. (Viveiros de Castro 2014: 170, italics added)

Perspectivism, viewed by some anthropologists as the only version of the ontological turn that has affected their discipline (the view, basing on the situation with this turn in the case of anthropology in Russia, I consider mistaken), exemplifies the most evident case of D&G's influence on the current state of anthropological theory. It does not only borrow much from the conceptual toolkit of the French thinkers, but has a direct reference to the fundamental issues of anthropological research, such as the status of indigenous cosmologies/ontologies in their relation to the Western (scientific) ontology (Cf. Henare; Holbraad; Wastell 2007).

The influence of D&G's ideas on other branches and specializations of anthropological knowledge I assess as modest and profound at the same time. It remains modest in the outreach (that is sociologically, in terms of numbers of scholars involved) due to what Paul Rabinow defined as *idiosyncrasy* of the D&G's tropes (Rabinow 2011: 62) that had contributed to the general difficulty of their texts. Few anthropologists ventured into what most of them perceived as philosophical jungles, but those who did, turned out to be at

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<sup>4</sup> To be exact, only one version within the ontological turn variants (precisely Viveiros de Castro perspectivism that influenced quite a number of anthropologists beyond the field of Amerindian studies) is based on of D&G's concepts. Two other influential strands of the turn, each with their own perspectivist version of multiple nature/cultures of indigenous ontologies, and lead by Philippe Descola and Eduardo Kohn, respectively, practically do not mention any of D&G's works.



the same time influential figures in contemporary anthropology, who acted as interpreters and disseminators of delezoguattarian thought in their own fields of research.

### **D&G's Legacy in Western Anthropology**

In order to substantiate the statement on the profound influence on certain anthropological subdisciplines and research fields, I have to document this influence that quite unlike the case of perspectivism remains unconsolidated, that is dispersed among many domains, research topics, issues of concern, and research centres. One of such research directions not mentioned above is the anthropology of time, elaborated in a dialogue with Deleuzian notions of *l'intempestif*, *contemporaneity* and *historicity* by Paul Rabinow (Rabinow 2011: 62–63, 77), who had also creatively explored the concept of *assemblage* (Ibid.: 121–126). Another prominent case of such an influence is the elaboration by the British anthropologist Tim Ingold of the concept of *rhizome* in his relational approach to what he has termed as *being-in-an-environment*. Besides the concept of rhizome, Ingold has creatively used the D&G's ideas on the *lines of flight*, *haecceity*, and *smooth space* to tie together his different explorations of indigenous ways of life and the continuities between animal and human ways of being (Ingold 2000, 2007, 2011). Arjun Appadurai, an American scholar, specializing in economic anthropology, applied the D&G's terms *detrterritorialization* and *flow* in his analysis of globalization (Appadurai 1996, 2002). Princeton-based anthropologists João Biehl and Peter Locke, publishing mostly in the field of medical anthropology, edited an article collection "*Unfinished: The Anthropology of Becoming*" (Biehl, Locke 2017). Its authors found their inspiration in the rich conceptual apparatus, elaborated by D&G. They explain:

In working toward an anthropology of becoming, we have drawn on the work of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (in dialogue with his longtime collaborator Félix Guattari) [...] In Deleuze's writing we find approaches that seem refreshingly ethnographic and unabashedly open-ended – cartography as opposed to archaeology, rhizomes as opposed to deep structures, leaking social fields as opposed to enclosed systems, and lines of flight and deterritorialization forever breaking through the impasses imposed by totalizing forms of power and knowledge. (Biehl, Locke 2017: 7)

All these anthropologists turned out to be what is elsewhere known as 'multipliers' or mediators, due to the fact that other members of the anthropological communities throughout the world came to know many ideas of the D&G legacy, whose influence is discussed here, not directly, but mediated by the interpretations of their eminent colleagues. It is their engagement with D&G's rich conceptual legacy that has informed the fields and domains of anthropological research mentioned above, and that continues

to resonate with many statements of the French philosophers of becoming.

Perhaps less resonant but still effectual were ‘pin-point’ references to certain R&G’s concepts of other leading anthropologists. Among them are Marilyn Strathern, who engaged Deleuzian concepts of *flux* and *cut* in her influential paper “Cutting the Network” (Strathern 1996), Michael Fisher, who elaborated the term *plateau* into his own *ethical plateaus* (Fischer 2004)<sup>5</sup>. Paul Staller, a US Africanist, in discussing the problem of representing complexity and the search “for a set of metaphors that ethnographers, among others, might use to represent” draws our attention to the D&G’s concept of rhizome as alliance and recommends it for ethnographers to use as “a model for thinking about the dizzying array of complex assemblages that constitute contemporary social worlds (Staller 183–184). There were many more mentions and engagements with D&G legacy by the British, US and Brazilian anthropologists, whereas in France, with exceptions of Barbara Glowczewski (2020), who in her recent book used a whole array of the D&G’s concepts, anthropologists as a rule referred to the D&G’s work either casually, or critically. (see *footnote 2*, above).

To sum up, the influences Deleuze and Guattari (in line with other post-structural philosophers – Jacques Derrida, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault) have exerted a perceptible influence on various fields in contemporary Western anthropology. They have been a decisive force behind the turn to non-Cartesian ontologies and epistemologies that problematize the authorial omnipotence and its representational strategies, as well as to politically more engaged anthropological research. The brief inventory of the intersections and dialogues of Western anthropologists with D&G legacy, presented above, is far from exhaustive (for the sake of brevity I have not covered their influence on media and digital anthropology), its main purpose being the comparison with the place of their legacy in the special case of Russian anthropology.

## **The Case of Russian Anthropology**

If we judge by direct references to their works in Russian ethnology and sociocultural anthropology, the D&G’s legacy seems to be almost totally ignored. This looks strange as all the major texts of the French scholars are available in Russian, although some translations are quite recent (see *footnote 1*, above), which might be a factor in delayed reception.

Perspectivism in its various versions (books by Viveiros de Castro, Descola, Kohn and

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<sup>5</sup> Fischer mentions that Paul Rabinow’s most successful and path-breaking ethnographic work on molecular biology in the 1990s *The Making of PCR* (1996), a landmark book in science studies, “was originally a text drawing heavily on the philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, but all such vocabulary and philosophical attempts were excised from the final text, Rabinow explained at the time to me and other friends, so that it could be read by his molecular biology interlocutors, so that the people he wrote about could also read it.” (Fischer 2018: 81)

Löwenhaupt Tsing are available in Russian translations) produced a negligent impact on fieldwork agenda and subsequent analysis: this approach has been implemented only by a couple of Siberianists, who have attempted to see similarities to Amerindian ontologies among indigenous peoples of Southern Siberia (*cf.*: Broz 2007; Tykhteneva 2011, 2012)<sup>6</sup>.

Indirect influences, that is, the impact of D&G's ideas, interpreted and creatively applied by such scholars as Bruno Latour, John Law, Donna Haraway, Annemarie Mol among others, seem to be more important in the Russian case. Latour, who frequently referred to various parts of the D&G' legacy, has been instrumental in institutionalizing a whole new field in Russian social sciences, affecting those domains within anthropology that are related to STS, among them medical anthropology, body studies, media anthropology, and material culture studies<sup>7</sup>. Urban anthropology, due to the impact of Latourian actor-network theory, based on D&G's ontological insights, has been substantially revised to include in its subject all kinds of infrastructures and invisible agents, such as microbes, radioactive and poisonous waste, etc. (Trubina 2010: 154) 'Flat ontologies', underscoring agency of non-human objects, rhizomatic relations within networks, and 'territorializing' forces of the state apparatus received attention in the anthropology of technology (Kuznetsov 2016; Vozyanov, Kuznetsov, Laktyukhina 2017; Vozyanov 2018), urban anthropology (Bychkova, Popova 2012; Karasyova 2020), and political anthropology (Ssorin-Chaikov 2022). The actor-network methodology has transformed some research domains in medical (Mikhel 2021; Kurlenkova 2018; Torlopova 2017, 2018), and in ecological anthropology (Sokolovskiy 2022). However, such endeavors remain marginal among mainstream research ideologies and have not been so far successful to alter the overall positivistic agenda of the national tradition of anthropological research, a situation that could be documented by the programs of many recent professional forums of Russian anthropologists.

This modernist and positivist agenda (an heir of Marxist materialism that dominated all science in Russia till the early 1990s), with its stark dualisms of nature vs. culture, subject vs. object, past vs. present, human vs. animal, matter vs. spirit, mind vs. body, laid all alternative ontologies suspect, and is responsible for their outright rejection on ideological grounds as being 'unscientific', 'speculative, or 'conjectural'. Professional 'myopia', boarding on obscurantism, of many Russian anthropologists has further contributed to labeling all knowledge that contradicted the established dogma as 'quaint', and to denounce scholars, who experimented with new approaches, as 'victims of fashionable fads'.

Another potential factor that might have contributed to the lack of attention to what happens beyond the discipline's boundaries is the deep entrenchment of interdisciplinary barriers, instituted by a number of agencies, such as academic councils, editorial boards, university departments, etc. that engender boundary policing practices and discourage

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<sup>6</sup> For a comprehensive account of the perspectivist turn in anthropology, see: Vaté, Eidson 2021.

<sup>7</sup> For a review of the 'material turn' publications in Russian anthropology, see: Sokolovskiy 2021.

cross-disciplinary ‘borrowings’. Due to such barriers and veto practices, books as *Cannibal Metaphysics* have been perceived as ‘purely philosophical’, that is, not pertaining to the domain of sociocultural anthropology.

Additionally, the legacy of Marxist materialism, still felt in Russian anthropology, remains a factor that prevents accepting such ideas as democracy of things, the agency of non-human material objects, flat ontologies, or symmetric anthropology that are based on D&G’s notion of the entanglement of humans and non-humans in shared networks and intersecting flows of becoming. All these factors explain the relative lack of attention on the side of Russian anthropologists to the D&G’s rich conceptual legacy that is successfully used in other national traditions of anthropological research.

## Conclusion

The D&G’s legacy has made a substantial impact on anthropology of media, technology, on digital and medical anthropology, on political anthropology, as well as on material culture and post-colonial studies. However, this impact on anthropological theories and practices remains geographically limited, as it has been demonstrated by the case of Russian anthropology, where despite the availability of translations of all the major D&G’s works, very few anthropologists are experimenting with the concepts, elaborated by these French scholars.

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## ***Life After Death: the Concept of New Vitality in Schizoanalysis***

by ANELIYA ZEMLYANSKAYA

### **Abstract**

The article is devoted to the analysis of the essence of life in the conception of schizoanalysis by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in the context of modern philosophy's attempts to go beyond the human. On the example of two opposing anthropologies – psychoanalytic and schizoanalytic – the author shows two ontologies of life, correlated with Aristotelian hylomorphism – life of form and life of matter. Building on Freud's later theory of the death drive, it is demonstrated that psychoanalytic thought is a product of Western Aristotelian-Christian culture, in which to be alive means to be “shaped”. In contrast with this view, Deleuze and Guattari propose a new ontology of vitality that goes beyond hylomorphism, in which life is given to “formless” matter. This new lens leads to a rethinking of man's position in the world, placing him on a par with non-human forms of life such as animals, plants, slime, bacteria and even, beyond that, with metal. The author concludes by outlining some philosophical prospects made possible by overcoming anthropocentrism through this recognition of other weird, life.

In the context of critiques of anthropocentrism, contemporary philosophy seeks to find new ways to imagine what it means to be human which don't center our species to the detriment of the rest of the world. In *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari present their joint project of schizoanalysis as an alternative to rigid and violent psychoanalysis, and, in doing so, offer one such way of transcending anthropocentrism. Schizoanalysis can be discussed in different contexts – as psychoanalytic, Marxist, political, aesthetic, or ethical theory. We propose to consider it primarily as a philosophical-anthropological theory. Such a view reveals Deleuze's and Guattari's *project of a new anthropology* based on an ontology of man different from the classical philosophical tradition.

In Western philosophy man has been long considered consistent with the Aristotelian hylomorphic model – as a union of matter and form, body and soul. The soul is the entelechy of the body, it gives it form and motion. Matter is passive, it only has potency, actualising itself through the soul. According to the hylomorphic principle, matter and form are inseparable and have no substantial expression: just as vision cannot exist apart from the eye, the soul is inconceivable apart from the body. However, in one circumstance Aristotle violates this principle: there exists a special part of the

soul – Nous, world mind, immovable and eternal source of the rational part of the soul, capable of separating itself from its material carrier: “When separated it is alone just what it is, and this above is immortal and eternal” (Aristotle 1991: 54). Thus the soul has a privileged position in relation to the body: it is eternal, and since truth in ancient Greece was understood as something eternal and immutable, the soul is endowed with the quality of truth. Human truth is not in the body, but in the soul. This attitude can be traced through medieval scholasticism, where the soul, unlike the body as the receptacle of base instincts, was thought to be the divine part of man, and in modern times, which elevated the human mind over the feelings rooted in the animal body. Thus, if we turn to the history of philosophy, we can soon discover that philosophers were not interested in man in his entirety, but only partially – as a receptacle of the soul, consciousness, mind – in short, only as a form. As a consequence of this attitude, ever since the dawn of New Age epistemology, man has been reduced to the notion of the subject as a bearer of consciousness and cognitive activity.

Deleuze and Guattari discussions of the subject find it well on its way from the integrated subject addressed by Kant to the divided subject central to Freudian thought. Whereas in Kant's philosophy the subject placed in the center of the cognitive process was thought to be simple and rational, S. Freud, and following him Jacques Lacan, called into question such a self-subject revealing that his consciousness is in many respects a product of the unconscious beyond his control. Deleuze and Guattari followed Freud in weakening the subject, but pressed it to its conclusion and rejected the notion altogether, replacing it with “subjectivity” and emphasizing its procedural rather than essential character. This radical gesture also required the rejection of psychoanalysis, which had the Kantian rational subject at its center, albeit under interrogation. Psychoanalysis, based on New Age discourse, aimed at restoring the lost integrity of the subject: at the heart of the analytic process lies the intention to bring the dark unconscious to light and place it under the control of the conscious. That is why Freud, wishing to structure the unconscious, does so according to a clear linear logic: there are oral, anal, and phallic stages of psychosexual development, failures in which lead to the formation of neurotic character structures. There is also a universal plot of the individual's mental life – the Oedipus Complex. Oedipus sets up a symbolic order: here is mother, here is father, and here is me, and relations in this family triangle develop according to a predetermined scenario. However, Deleuze and Guattari remark that such an effort to regulate the unconscious, to subject it to rational logic, is itself neurotic because neurosis, following Freud's own classification, is the desire of the conscious to supplant the unconscious. Thus, the psychoanalyst finds himself in the position of the neurotic.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, in order to escape the oppression of rationality exercised by psychoanalysis, it is necessary to overcome the Oedipus Complex not in the Freudian sense but by stepping outside it, as in reality it is not the hidden content



of the unconscious, but a type of compulsion imposed by psychoanalysts. In the preface to *Anti-Oedipus*, Foucault will call this book “a book on ethics” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: xiii) and the fight against fascism in a broad sense: fascism as everyday behavior, expressed in our love of power and the various forms of domination over us, whether it is the domination of a policeman, a teacher or a psychoanalyst. In an even broader sense, it is about liberation from domination in any form, and in particular from the Oedipal.

Oedipus is a form-forming figure: like a sculptor, he strips away the superfluous from the unconscious and gives it the necessary outline, in other words, he creates a stable subject. But while psychoanalysis centers on the subject as a permanent *structure*, schizoanalysis centers on subjectivity as a continual *process* – the process of desiring-production. Desire is understood here not as individualistic – to emphasise its impersonal nature the authors talk about its machine character – but as a kind of vital energy, an ontological force that constructs the world. This desire has nothing in common with the Oedipus Complex, where it is teleological (because it is strictly channeled and directed towards the figure of the mother or father) and deficient (because it is funded by scarcity). On the contrary, it is aimless and redundant: it is a productive force, a machine that sets in motion the process of the production of reality. The unconscious, at the heart of which is desiring-production, is structured neither linearly like Freud's nor linguistically like Lacan's; it is not structured in any way. It is not a structure but a process, not a centered tree with a strict hierarchy, but a rhizome dispersed by the flows of desire in all directions. Therefore, from a schizoanalytic perspective, man is heterogeneous: he is not a single entity, but an aggregate of many – many molecules that make up the body, each of which is charged with desire.

If the neurotic displaces the unconscious by creating Oedipus in order to hold on to his integrity, the opposite figure, the psychotic, displaces consciousness, undermining it in order to disintegrate into the multitude. If the neurotic wishes to strengthen his subjectivity, the psychotic longs to lose it, to become the pure object of the unconscious, to experience it overwhelming and engulfing him like an oceanic wave. However, both strategies are problematically grounded in the Oedipal: the neurotic is positively attached to the form, while the psychotic is negatively attached, through its negation. The form is constitutive for both:

It would be inaccurate to maintain an Oedipal interpretation for the neuroses, and to reserve an extra-oedipal explanation for the psychoses. There are not two groups, there is no difference in nature between neuroses and psychoses. For in any case desiring-production is the cause, the ultimate cause of both the psychotic subversions that shatter Oedipus or overwhelm it, and of the neurotic reverberations that constitute it. (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 126-127)

The true liberation of the unconscious from the constructs of the mind, however, lies in going beyond Oedipus – into the realm of schizophrenia. Deleuze and Guattari speak of schizophrenia not as a clinical diagnosis but as a process of desire production – the vital activity of the individual presented as a desire machine, unconsciously realizing its desires. The neurotic urge to stabilise and fix the form leads to breakdowns in this process, the psychotic urge to lose the form leads to deviations from it, since “the resistance to Oedipus, the return to the body without organs was still an artificial sphere, O asylum!” (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 363).

Overcoming neurosis and psychosis as forms of alienation from reality is possible through the dismantling of all the stable constructions of the mind on which it rests. Stability of constructions is given by solid bodies having a form. Therefore, it is necessary to melt these bodies so that they become a fluid mass, a formless matter. This means entering into the pure process of schizophrenia, a flow free of stable forms. Thus becoming schizophrenic involves the death of the ego:

That is why we speak of an Oedipal-narcissistic machine, at the end of which the ego encounters its own death, as the zero term of a pure abolition that has haunted oedipalized desire from the start, and that is identified now, at the end, as Thanatos. 4, 3, 2, 1, 0 – Oedipus is a race for death. (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 359)

Deleuze and Guattari speak of death as an anthropological transcendence. If classical philosophy thinks of man as a transcendent animal, schizoanalysis proposes taking another transcending step and going beyond the human, beyond the ego. The death of the ego does not mean the death of the human, but a new experience of life – the experience of becoming non-individualized matter-flow, obtained through “decapitation”. One does not die after decapitation. When the head leaves its place, it triggers the dissolution of the hierarchy: the chains holding the organs in place break up and the head sets off on its free journey through the body freed from the violence of the forms.

Yet for man in western culture, a fundamentally hylomorphic model, non-individual life does not exist: *to be alive means to be “formed”*. All other forms of life are perceived as death, a total loss of self. This Aristotelian attitude can be seen within Freud's philosophy, in particular in his theory of the urge to death. According to his thought, man's becoming takes place between two poles, the life and death drives, Eros and Thanatos. If Eros is oriented towards development and complication of the individual, Thanatos is oriented towards regression and simplification: the death impulse is the urge of every living organism to return to the previous stage of development, in the desire to become inorganic matter, as “inanimate things existed before living ones” (Freud 1961: 32). Phenomenologically the urge to death means the urge to rest as inanimate matter in a state of complete rest.

Freud demonstrates the mechanism of this desire for rest using the image of the “undifferentiated vesicle of a substance” (Freud 1961: 20), the elementary living particle symbolizing the human psyche. This vesicle perceives the world as a threat:

This little fragment of living substance is suspended in the middle of an external world charged with the most powerful energies; and it would be killed by the stimulation emanating from these if it were not provided with a protective shield against stimuli. (Freud 1961: 21)

However, it has protection against stimulus provided by the surface of the vesicle, its “cortical layer” – the dead part of the organic matter which does not let the destructive forces of the outside world inwards. This shell must be intact: the closure of the vesicle ensures its safety. Thus, the Freudian subject is separated from and opposed to the world.

Deleuze and Guattari refer to a similar image, that of a circle, to describe the subjectivation process. At the center of this circle are the machines of desire-absolute vitality, the intensity of pure production that works redundantly, without any purpose or reason-and on its surface is the body without organs, a zero intensity that is anti-functional and wants to stop all production processes. The process of subjectification unfolds between two dichotomous poles: the pure intensity of the machine-organ and the zero intensity of the body without organs. These poles are interdependent: just as the surface of an atom cannot exist without a nucleus, the surface of a body without organs forms a unit with the charged machines of desire. The forces of attraction and repulsion act between the center and the surface, generating states of varying intensity. The subject appears on the surface of the circle as an effect, a “recorder”, of the intensities through which it passes. It is transpositional because it does not represent the whole circle but only a part of it, appearing here and there:

It is a strange subject, however, with no fixed identity, wandering about over the body without organs, but always remaining peripheral to the desiring-machines, being defined by the share of the product it takes for itself, garnering here, there, and everywhere a reward in the form of a becoming or an avatar, being born of the states that it consumes and being reborn with each new state. (Deleuze; Guattari 1977: 16)

Unlike the Freudian subject which is self-identical and closed off from the outside world, the schizoanalytic fluid subject is neither closed nor separated from the world. If we continue with the Freudian metaphor of vials, he is like Leonid Lipavsky's “bubble”:

Life appears as the following picture. A semiliquid inorganic mass, in which fermentation takes place, tensions and knots of forces come and go. It surges with bubbles, which, adapting, change their shape, stretch out, split into a multitude of

stirring threads, into whole chains of bubbles. All of them grow, tug, tear off, and these torn off parts continue their movements as if nothing had happened and stretch out and grow again. (Lipavsky 1994: 84-85)

According to Lipavsky, there are at least two ways to live: “our way” and “not our way”. Thus, a dead man, a lunatic, an idiot are alive, but the form of their life is fatal for us. If the sleepwalker would not appear in one row with the dead man, then one may think that to live not our way means not humanly in the most literal sense of this word: cellular, parasitic, bacterial, all that lives in the human body. But the sleepwalker is not a bacterium or a dead man: his heart beats in his chest, his lungs are filled with oxygen and he has a completely human appearance. He does not live our way because he leads a “formless” irrational life, he becomes a pure stream, a flow of matter. In this sense, the sleepwalker is no different from the slime bug, bedbug, clothes louse, worm, and other scary creatures – scary because they are “almost liquid”. Paradoxically, the subhuman, to which Lipavsky attributes all body fluids (mucus, blood, saliva, bacteria, viruses, worms, mites, bedbugs), appears closer to man than his neighbor, right inside him. These hideous life forms provoke both horror and contempt: the animate nature of this swarming, impersonal mass seems unnatural.

If the Freudian man has a defense against external influences, but “towards the inside there can be no such shield” (Freud 1961: 23). Freud understood the inner world, from which these forces originate, as primarily a psychic world: surplus unspent energy presses on the psychic apparatus from within, seeking an exit to the outside. But it can also be interpreted literally – as a totality of different kinds of fluids and “almost liquid” beings hiding under our skin. As soon as we get a small cut on our skin, this flow of life erupts and spreads outward in all directions, penetrating into objects and vaporizing. Blood embodies the image of unfocused impersonal life, which “oscillates between certainty and indeterminacy, impersonality and individuation” (Lipavsky 1994: 82).

Matter is man's main fear and object of desire: the urge to death is the unconscious desire to return to a state of absolute inorganic materiality. But while Freud thinks of inorganic matter as dead, Deleuze and Guattari speak of it as a special form of life:

The prodigious idea of *Nonorganic Life* – the very same idea Worringer considered the barbarian idea par excellence – was the invention, the intuition of metallurgy. Metal is neither a thing nor an organism, but a *body* without organs. (Deleuze 2005: 411)

If for Lipavsky matter is predominantly liquid, for Deleuze and Guattari it is a flow in which the solid and the liquid ceaselessly turn into each other. Metal has a similar shape-shifting quality. Metal is rhizomatic: it is capable of being reborn again and again in different forms, both hard and fluid. It lies deep in the Earth and at the same time

pervades its entire surface: “Even the waters, the grasses, the forests and the beasts are inhabited by salts or mineral elements”. Man is neither a solidified metallic form nor a molten metal capable of taking any shape but a metalworker and smith. “The metallurgist” of Deleuze and Guattari is not one who forces metal to follow his will, but one who himself follows the metal:

Rather, artisans are those who follow the matter-flow as pure productivity: therefore in mineral form, and not in vegetable or animal form. They are not of the land, or of the soil, but of the subsoil. Because metal is the pure productivity of matter, those who follow metal are producers of objects par excellence. (Deleuze 2005: 411-412)

If the man of the earth is a man standing on it and cultivating it as an object, the man of the subsoil is immersed in the earth, he acts as part of it. To the agriculturist he appears dead, buried. However, in the subsoil, Deleuze and Guattari say, it is possible to live, but to live not in our own way. It is not a state of absolute fusion with the world in which the animal resides. If every animal, as Georges Bataille wrote, is in a world “like water in water” (Bataille 1989: 19), then man is like metal in matter. He is not dissolved but distributed as the productive force of matter:

It's not a question of being this or that sort of human, but of becoming inhuman, of a universal animal becoming – not seeing yourself as some dumb animal, but unraveling your body's human organization, exploring this or that zone of bodily intensity, with everyone discovering their own particular zones, and the groups, populations, species that inhabit them. (Deleuze 1995: 11)

The anthropological project proposed by Deleuze and Guattari seems, at first glance, to be negative, since it implies the deconstruction of forms. In reality, however, it does not aim at deconstruction, but at overcoming forms: if in the first case we are talking about negative dependence on form, in the second case we are talking about liberation from dependence on form. A person should not cling to the form, as a neurotic does, nor undermine it, as a psychotic does, but build themselves into a being in which form is not substantiated: I am ready to become any form and to reject it at any moment in order to immerse myself in the elements again. The schizophrenic can take any form, because he is independent of it, he does not care about it. His intention is to break through to vitality, to join the element as the beginning of being, where form can be a stage on the way to this joining, but not the final point. This requires entering the mode of gameplay without rules: the schizoanalytic subject is constantly playing, but it is not clear what it is playing at.

Thus, in order to emerge from the anthropological and ecological crises to which man's selfish behavior has led, he needs to build his identity on new foundations: not by opposing himself to other forms of life, but by inserting himself into the same world alongside them. It is necessary to undermine the organism and become a body without

organs, from which absolutely any structure may arise at random, thus equalizing the status of all entities, from bacteria or mucus to plant or man. It is this gesture that will enable man to overcome the anthropocentrism still prevalent in philosophy.

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